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 Located approximately in the middle of the central Mediterranean channel, the Maltese 
Archipelago was touched by the historical events that effected the political, economic and 
cultural environment of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.  The islands were close to 
the major maritime routes throughout history and they were often on the border between clashing 
military, political, religious, and cultural entities.  For these reasons, the islands were presumed 
to have been strategically and economically important, and, thus, frequented by ships.  
 An underwater archaeological survey around the archipelago revealed the scarcity of 
submerged cultural remains, especially pertaining to shipping and navigation.  Preliminary 
findings elucidate a story that contrasts with the picture presented by modern history and 
historiography.  In this sense, a comparison of the underwater archaeological data with the 
information gathered through a detailed study of Maltese maritime history clearly shows that the 
islands were attributed an exaggerated importance in historical texts, due to political and 
religious trends that are rooted in the period during which the islands were under the control of 
the Order of Saint John.  An objective investigation of the historical and archaeological material 
provides a more balanced picture, and places the islands in a Mediterranean-wide historical 
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framework from the first colonization of the archipelago eight thousands years ago to the 










To my parents 




First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee: Dr. Kevin Crisman, 
Dr. Cemal Pulak, Dr. Filipe Castro and Dr. James Bradford, for the preparation of this 
dissertation and providing me advice and guidance throughout my doctoral studies at Texas 
A&M University.  I also would like to thank Mr. Joseph Muscat who provided encouragement 
and advice and shared my interest in the maritime past of Malta.  Communicating with these 
individuals has provided invaluable support for my work.  I would also like to thank Father 
Eugene Teuma for his help in locating and translating archival documents in Malta and Dr. 
Nicholas Vella, the University of Malta, for also sharing my interest in maritime archaeology 
and his deep knowledge of Maltese archaeological material. I also would like to thank John 
Wood for his assistance in providing information about the early underwater work in Malta as 
well as information about the maritime history of the islands, and John McManamon, who not 
only accompanied me to Malta in the first season of my fieldwork, but also through his 
continued interest he has been a great colleague with whom to discuss my research.   
I would like to thank the Turkish Institute of Nautical Archaeology (TINA) for providing 
a scholarship to support my doctoral studies.  The Marine Technology Society, Nautical 
Archaeology Program and the Institute of Nautical Archaeology provided partial financial 
support in the form of scholarships and grants that contributed greatly to my survival during my 
fieldwork and research.  
Both my field project and this dissertation would have been impossible without the 
archaeological permits provided by Dr. Anthony Pace, the Director of the National Museum of 
Archeology in Valletta, Malta (NMA).  I am also indebted to the Museum Curators and Reuben 
Grima of the NMA for their expert counsel and generosity in providing access to the museum 
 
 vii
facilities, collection and archives.  Other important collections and archives in Malta were made 
accessible by Assistant Curators Rodriguez Espinoza (Maritime Museum) and George Azzopardi 
(Gozo, Cittadella Museum).  
It would have been impossible for me to carry out my fieldwork in Malta without the 
generous support of George Robb Jr., the Institute of Nautical Archaeology (INA) Director, who 
provided financial support and part of the remote sensing equipment during the first two seasons 
of the project. I am also indebted to INA Director Gregory Cook both for his encouragement and 
his financial support for the 2001 season. Marty Wilcox and John Van Tassel also deserve to be 
mentioned here for it would have been impossible to accomplish the project without the 
equipment they provided.  The excavation at the Quarantine Hospital site was made possible 
with the help and financial support of MIDI Inc., special thanks to Benjamin Muscat and Alex 
Torpiano.   
Another major supporter during my field project in Malta was the Malta Maritime 
Authority (MMA).  The MMA generously provided their survey boat, Madonna ta Pinu, for the 
duration of the survey. Special thanks to Chairman Marc Bonello for his enthusiasm and interest 
in the project. Joseph Bianco and Godwin Borg, skilled employees of MMA, made incredible 
contributions to the project as well as Charlie Scicluna, Francis Mifsud and Johan Camilleri who 
worked long hours on the survey vessel throughout the project.  NMA provided the vehicle for 
our transportation, assigned two of its limited staff for our work, and provided space in the 
museum building for the wet storage, conservation, photography, drafting and study of the 
artifacts. 
The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and Sperre A.S provided 
the equipment and personnel for the ROV survey.  Fredrik Soreide of NTNU and Thor Olav 
 
 viii
Sperre of Sperre A.S. both sacrificed their vacations to make the ROV equipment available for 
the project.  I extend my gratitude to Brett Phaneuf who helped me to design, carry out and fund 
the project and supported me in every phase of my fieldwork.  
I would like to thank INA for approving my field project every year and supporting my 
research in Malta.  My workload would have been much heavier without the help of the INA 
staff in College Station.  It would also have been impossible to carry out my research without the 
intelligent staff of the interlibrary loan desk at Texas A&M University Evans Library and the 
library at the University of Malta.  I would like to extend my appreciation to Timothy Gambin 
who initiated the Malta project by contacting INA through the U.S. Navy Historical Center and 
who also assisted with project logistics throughout the project’s duration. I am indebted to my 
Maltese team members, Edmond Cardona and Michael Spiteri of the NMA, for their enthusiasm 
and for helping me in all phases of the fieldwork. Special thanks to Michael Spiteri for his 
excellent skills in organizing the dives and watching over our safety.  I also am thankful to the 
University of Malta for providing the funds for the participation of team members Joanne Mallia, 
Elaine Azzopardi, Vanessa Ciantar and Elizabeth de Gaetano who formed an invaluable part of 
the diving team and sacrificed their summer vacation to help me with conservation and recording 
of the artifacts.  I am equally indebted to the University of Bristol for providing financial support 
for the participation of their graduate students, Christopher Longstaff and Christopher Faine, in 
the Quarantine Hospital Excavation.  
I cannot thank enough my editor, Marie Phaneuf, for accomplishing the painstaking job 
of correcting the numerous grammatical errors of a foreigner writing in English.  Writing this 
dissertation would have been impossible without the constant support and advice I received from 
Brett Phaneuf, who has been my major help throughout the process.  My foremost support 
during the process of writing my dissertation and pursuing my doctoral studies so far away from 
 
 ix
home have been supported in every possible way by my parents, Sevil and Akın Atauz, who 
have always believed in me and did everything to make it possible for me to accomplish my 
goals whatever they may be.  I would also like to thank my friends Nancy DeBono who helped 
me keep my sanity during my research and writing, and Tiago Fraga who fixed my computer 
countless times, saving my dissertation from oblivion, and me from having a nervous 
breakdown. There are countless other individuals who supported my studies, my field projects, 
my research and writing, and who helped me to become a better scholar through this process of 















TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………… x
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….…… xiii
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………….……...….. xv
CHAPTER 
   I INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………… 1
   II THE MALTA PROJECT………………………………………………………. 6
  Beginnings of Underwater Archaeology in Malta..…………......………… 8
  INA Surveys in Malta................................................................................... 9
  The 1999 Season........................................................................................... 10
  The 2000 Season........................................................................................... 14
  The 2001 Season........................................................................................... 24
  The Excavation on the Waterfront of the Quarantine Hospital..................... 24
  Shipwrecks off Xlendi................................................................................... 28
  Summary....................................................................................................... 32
   III PREHISTORY OF MALTA.…….…………………………………………….. 34
   IV PHOENICIAN AND PUNIC PERIODS………………………………………. 40
  Arrival of the Phoenicians in Malta.............................................................. 40
  The Rationale and Significance of the Phoenician Colonization of Malta... 43
  Rise of Carthage and the Isolation of Malta................................................. 50






   V ROMAN PERIOD ……………………………………………………………... 55
  Literary Sources and Archaeological Evidence............................................ 56
  Conclusions................................................................................................... 71
   VI LATE ROMAN AND BYZANTINE PERIOD.……………………………….. 73
   VII MIDDLE AGES: PERIOD OF MUSLIM OCCUPATION……………………. 83
  The Mediterranean Region in the Medieval Era........................................... 87
  Who Conquered Malta?................................................................................. 90
  The Conquest of Malta in Historical Sources............................................... 93
  Malta under ‘Arab’ Rule............................................................................... 95
  Norman Attacks............................................................................................. 100
   VIII LATE MEDIEVAL PERIOD…………………………………………………... 106
  Economic Importance, Resources and Products of Malta in the Late Medieval Period............................................................................................ 107
  Beginnings of the Genoese Domination and the Appearance of Counts, Admirals and Pirates in Malta....................................................................... 110
  1284-1380: One Century of Naval Plundering in the Mediterranean........... 117
  The Chiaramonte Incident............................................................................. 120
  The War of Chioggia and Its Effects on Malta............................................. 122
  Malta after the Genoese: Rebellions and Destruction.................................. 123
  Conclusion..................................................................................................... 131
   IX HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE ORDER OF 
SAINT JOHN IN MALTA……………………………………………………... 134
  Historical Background................................................................................... 134
  Arrival of the Order in Malta........................................................................ 136
  Mediterranean in the Sixteenth Century........................................................ 137
  The Ottomans Attack Rhodes........................................................................ 138
  Charles V Does Not Support the Order to Recover Rhodes......................... 140
  Consequences of Losing the Sovereign State................................................ 141
  Organization of the Order and European Territories..................................... 143
  The Grandmaster Accepts Charles V’s Offer............................................... 146





   X NAVAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDER OF SAINT JOHN..…………... 153
  The Galley Squadron..………………..…………………………………… 154
  The Squadron of Sailing Warships…..………………………….………… 206
   XI NAVAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ORDER OF SAINT JOHN…………………. 215
  Naval Expeditions……………………………………………...………….. 217
  Corsair Operations…………………………………………………………. 226
  Naval Training During the Rule of the Order of Saint John..……………... 242
  Quarantine Shipping……………………………………………………….. 246
   XII MALTESE POPULATION DURING THE PERIOD OF 1530-1798…………. 251
  Changing Landscapes and Job Opportunities: Maltese as Construction Workers......................................................................................................... 253
  Expanding Horizons: Maltese as Boat and Shipbuilders, Seaman, Corsairs and Merchants...............................................................................………… 255
  European Perceptions.................................................................................... 257
  Conclusion..................................................................................................... 259
   XIII CONCLUSIONS AND AFTERWORD....…………………………………….. 261












LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE Page
1 Map of the Mediterranean Sea showing the location of the Maltese 
Archipelago……...……………………………………………………………... 6
2 Map of the harbor area around Valletta……………………………..……….…. 11
3 Location of the ballast pile in the Dockyard Creek..…………………………... 12
4 Map of Maltese Archipelago showing the major modern settlements…………. 19
5 Photograph showing the ballast pile in Salina Bay ……………………..……... 20
6 Map showing the locations of the ROV survey areas of the 2001 season in 
Gozo ……………………………………………………………………..…….. 23
7 Map showing the location of the excavation squares at the Quarantine Hospital 26
8 The survey team launching the ROV ……………………………...…………... 29
9 The shipwreck site off Xlendi………………………………...………………... 31
10 Interior apse of the Mnajdra Temple…………………………………………… 36
11 Phoenician settlements of Malta and Gozo……………………………..……... 41
12 Wind and current patterns in the Mediterranean Sea……………………..…… 45
13 Prevalent local winds in the Mediterranean………………..………………….. 46
14 Map of the Mediterranean showing the major Phoenician cities and colonies… 47
15 Major Phoenician colonies in the western Mediterranean in relation to the 
wind and current patterns…………………………………………..………….. 48
16 Locations of terrestrial sites in Malta during and before the Roman era..…….. 58









18 Locations of underwater remains in Malta based on the information provided 
by Scicluna………………………………..…………………………………… 64
19 Salt pans of unknown date at Xlendi…………………………………………… 67
20 Map created by Ibn Hawqal placing Malta to the east of Peloponnesian 
peninsula………………………………………………………………………... 85
21 Funerary inscription known as the ‘Maimuna stone’ discovered in Gozo..….… 86
22 Birgu and Senglea from an engraving of 1565………………………………… 110
23 Distribution of the European Commanderies of the Order of Saint John…….... 144
24 Journey of the Order of Saint John during the years between their expulsion 
from Rhodes and arrival at Malta………………………………………………. 148
25 Lines and construction plans of the Capitana from the Order of Saint John’s 
fleet by Chapman……………………………………………………………….. 157
26 Drawing of a chebec by Chapman……………………………………………… 160
27 The cross-sectional view and the rigging plan of a third rate ship from 1729 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE Page
1 Measurements of a typical Maltese Capitana ……...………...……………… 157
2 Measurements of a typical Maltese chebec …………………………………. 160
3 Number of galleys comprising the galley squadron of the Order throughout 
its existence in Malta (1530-1798).…….…………………………..………... 163
4 Numbers of galleys in major fleets during the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries ………………………………………………..…………………… 176
5 Galleys built at the Birgu Arsenal …………………………...………..……... 178
6 A comparison of the construction activities in Maltese, French and Venetian 
shipyards between 1651 and 1740……………….…………………...……... 179
7 Shipbuilding material imported to Malta and its sources..……………..…… 181
8 Galleys built for the Order outside of Malta…………………………………. 182
9 Maintenance and construction costs for the galleys of the Order’s squadron.. 187
10 The six galley foundations of the period between 1598 and 1636………...… 196
11 Ships built by the Claramonte Foundation…………………………………… 199
12 Organization of the Order’s naval command structure………………………. 201
13 Ships of the Sailing Men-of-war Squadron used and/or built by the Order of 
Saint John between 1700 and 1798…………………………………………... 208
14 Ships forming the squadron of the sailing warships.…………..……………. 212
15 Numbers of ships in the major European fleets in the eighteenth century – 
compared with the fleet of the Order of Saint John.……………………..….. 213
16 Prices for the sale of the captured prizes in Malta as of 1662, based on a 
document NAMRPS (National Archives Mdina - Registro delle Prese e 







Two basic factors determined almost everything in the history of the Maltese Islands: (1) 
they are located at the middle of the narrow passage separating the western and eastern basins of 
the Mediterranean Sea, and (2) they are very small.   
Only two of the islands among the tiny Maltese Archipelago are large enough to have 
ever been inhabited: Malta and Gozo.  One can see most of this tiny country from the ancient 
citadels located in the middle of each island.  Today, the archipelago has one of the higher 
population densities in the world, with 400,000 inhabitants – a number that swells every summer 
with the addition of one million tourists.  In Malta, you keep running into that woman you met 
on the plane, that couple who stays in your hotel, and you know where the old lady who works at 
the bank shops.  People of small villages leave their keys on their doors since they know all their 
neighbors and do not want to give the rude impression that the door might be locked or closed.  
The crime rate is extremely low, life is uneventful, and routine social cycles are highlighted by 
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Despite their small size and the almost complete absence of natural resources, the 
Maltese Islands have a reputation of being an important commercial and military crossroads in 
the history of the Mediterranean.  Malta is mentioned in every history book addressing the 
Mediterranean, from the prehistoric era to the present day.  Although their size does not allow 
for the Maltese Islands to appear on small-scale Mediterranean maps, their location at the middle 
of the central channel that connects the eastern and western Mediterranean basins is nevertheless 
marked. 
The development of a program of nautical archaeology in Malta is of crucial importance, 
because the archaeological record is largely incomplete due to the thin soil of the islands and the 
continuous occupation of the major archaeological sites.  The archipelago has received all of its 
occupants and cultural influences, as well as its food, from the sea for the majority of its history.  
All of these are positive indications of the potential abundance of the underwater archaeological 
material around the islands.  Encouraged by these promising prospects, and with an invitation 
from the National Museum of Archaeology in Malta, I had the opportunity to conduct the first 
systematic survey in the Maltese territorial waters.1  The project continued for three seasons, the 
major objective being to locate and map underwater archaeological material throughout the 
archipelago. 
The fact that we discovered an almost complete absence of shipwreck remains by the 
end of the third season of the survey was a bit of a surprise.  Even areas such as the Grand 
Harbor and Marsamxett Harbor lacked the abundant harbor debris that is typical of ancient 
ports.2  Our work in the Quarantine Hospital area (Marsamxett Harbor), however, began to yield 
pre-twentieth century material after nearly a week of excavation, and even then, the number of 
pre-nineteenth century artifacts was rather low.3  The only shipwreck site discovered during our 
 
 3
surveys is in hundred meters of water, and represents mixed material from three or four different 
periods of history in an unusually disturbed state.4 
Our fieldwork also included the recording of the limited quantity of archaeological 
material in the museum collections discovered underwater either by archeologists or by amateur 
divers and fishermen.  The low number of these finds may be due to the scarcity of underwater 
archaeological work conducted in Malta or to the widespread problem of looting.  Three seasons 
of surveying certainly could not cover the entire coastline of Malta; but our team was able to 
study all the high potential areas using a combination of remote sensing equipment and diving 
surveys.    
I believe that the major contribution of our underwater archaeological survey was to 
underscore the discrepancies between the image of Malta painted by generations of historians, 
and the picture emerging from an interpretation of the archaeological record in a historical 
context.  Moreover, it was fascinating to learn how certain historical events and periods were 
distorted to over-emphasize and sometimes exaggerate the ‘importance,’ ‘Christianity,’ and 
‘strategic significance’ of the archipelago.   
 Thus, a detailed study of the maritime history of Malta became unavoidable in order to 
make certain decisions regarding the future progress of the survey project.  Several facts 
emerged in the early stages of research.  Firstly, most of the ‘known’ shipwreck sites of Malta 
were based on the finds of lead anchor stocks of the Roman period or isolated amphoras sighted 
by divers in the 1960s.5  Second, for the Maltese people, the term ‘Malta Channel’ applies to the 
channel between Malta and Gozo, whereas for Europeans, it is generally used to refer to the 
channel between Malta and Sicily, or even Sicily and Tunisia.  Thus, even if the historical 
information is accurate, the ships that are known to have been lost in the ‘Malta Channel’ can be 
 
 4
anywhere between Sicily and Tunisia.  Third, ships embarking from Maltese ports, their 
commanders and their crews, may sometimes be referred to as ‘Maltese’ by the primary and 
secondary sources.   This issue complicates the study of the medieval and the post medieval 
periods since not every ship that came from Malta was ‘Maltese’.  In fact, they were mostly 
Genoese and later, ships of the Order of Saint John, in which membership was denied the 
Maltese people.6   
 When it comes to the study of Maltese maritime history, one has to proceed very 
carefully.  Accounts that mention Malta in the Roman, Byzantine, and medieval periods may be 
unreliable, as they were rarely written by people who had actually been to the islands.  In the 
post medieval period, historical accounts on Malta are generally biased and tend to give a 
version of the truth that is distorted in varying degrees.  The majority of these accounts are 
provided by the official historians of the Order of Saint John, and are exaggerated in an effort to 
emphasize the ‘importance and greatness of the Knights’ and ‘the indispensable function’ 
performed by their fleet in its glorious campaigns against the enemy.  Almost no failure is 
mentioned in these accounts, and the size and number of the prizes may sometimes be 
exaggerated.7  Some historians of the Order also distorted the accounts of the previous periods in 
order to ‘erase’ the period of Muslim rule in Malta and to present its history as a continuously 
Christian one from the time of Saint Paul’s shipwreck in the first century A.D.8    
 Although limited, the archaeological record, whenever it is available, helps to complete 
and correct the picture created by historians.  However, in the course of my research and 
fieldwork, I realized that there was an additional problem with Maltese studies.  There are 
basically two types of secondary material about Maltese history (and archaeology).  In the first 
category are the works by European scholars, which are generally perceived as ‘colonial 
approaches’ and rejected by Maltese scholars.  Such work may be general books that refer to 
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Malta briefly in certain sections, books that are entirely about the history of Malta with no 
mention of contemporary or parallel developments elsewhere in the world, or books written by 
the modern members of the Order of Saint John that focus on the accomplishments of the 
Knights.   
The second category consists of works by Maltese scholars, which generally focus on 
the islands, but often miss the larger picture.  When reading works of this type, one has to make 
a conscious effort to remember the size of the islands, as in many cases there are elaborate 
discussions about the demographic patterns, urbanization, and differences between the ‘coastal’ 
and ‘inland’ areas.  Considering that there are very few spots in the archipelago from where one 
cannot actually see the sea, the distinctions and anthropological models created for larger islands 
and continents do not readily apply to Malta and are, at times, absurd in the Maltese context.  
 The following chapters endeavor to provide a comprehensive maritime history of the 
Maltese Archipelago, based on archaeological evidence, archival sources, primary accounts, and 
secondary sources.  This is a first-time attempt to put Maltese history into an intra-Mediterranean 
framework and view its events in a larger picture.  The emphasis of this study is on the 
‘maritime’ dimension of Maltese history and, even though most everything in Malta has a 
maritime flavor, I had to exclude the majority of the impressive archaeological material from 
terrestrial sites as well as archival information about issues that are not directly related to the 
naval or commercial affairs of the islands.  The period of the Order’s rule (1530-1798) extends 
through some of the most complex areas of world history.  Many of the major external historical 
developments and events that ultimately had a direct effect on the Order of Saint John and Malta 
are mentioned only briefly and only insomuch as they relate directly to Malta, since the space 




THE MALTA PROJECT 
 
The Maltese Islands are situated in the central Mediterranean, between Sicily and the 
coast of North Africa (Fig. 1).  The archipelago consists of three main islands: Malta, Gozo, and 
Comino, and the three uninhabited islets of Cominotto, Filfla, and Saint Paul.  Malta lies 350 
kilometers north of Tripoli and about 290 kilometers east of Tunis.  The distance from Gozo to 
Sicily is about 90 kilometers. 
 
Fig. 1. Map of the Mediterranean Sea showing the location of the Maltese Archipelago. (Map: author). 
The total length of the archipelago is approximately 45 kilometers.  The maximum 
length and width of the Island of Malta is 27 kilometers and 14.5 kilometers respectively.  The 
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archipelago has a total surface area of about 316 square kilometers and a coasline of 180 
kilometers. 
The islands forming the archipelago are formed entirely of sedimentary rocks deposited 
at the bottom of a warm, shallow sea during the Oligo-Miocene era of the Tertiary period (25 
million to 30 million years ago).  Today, the archipelago has no lakes, rivers, forests or mineral 
resources other than salt.1  Geologically, the western and northern parts of Malta consist of a 
series of parallel ridges and deeply incised valleys.  A large fault escarpment separates the 
northern part of the island from the western and eastern areas.2  Various types of limestone, the 
most common being globigerina, are easily cut and fashioned, and characterize the general 
texture and color of Maltese architecture.  Layers of a more porous and fissured coralline 
limestone are also easy to carve.3  The widespread distribution of these geological formations is 
the major reason for the frequent use of rock-cut and underground structures in Maltese cultures 
of the past. 
The karst geology of the northern and western Malta is not suitable for crop cultivation 
nor for animal herding.  Conversely, the valleys of western Malta constitute the most fertile 
agricultural regions of the archipelago, as this is the only area irrigated by the perennial water 
from the coralline hills of the east.4  Gozo and Comino share the same geological characteristics 
as northern Malta; upper coralline prevails mostly in the eastern parts of Gozo and Comino, 
while globigerina occurs commonly in the western parts. 
Malta’s climate is characterized by mild and wet winters and by extremely hot and 
humid summers.  The average local temperature during the coldest months of the year (January-
February) is 11°C, while the average temperature of the hottest months (July and August) is 
34°C.5  The most suitable crop for this climate, and Malta’s most important export product since 
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its introduction in the Middle Ages, is cotton.  In addition, typical Mediterranean fruits and 
vegetables are grown in the limited agricultural lands of the archipelago.6   
Beginnings of Underwater Archaeology in Malta 
Human beings have always been interested in recovering material from the vessels lost 
at sea.  It is likely that the people of Malta salvaged goods from wrecks around the island 
throughout history.  It is common knowledge that ship and aircraft wrecks from underwater 
contexts have been salvaged from the Maltese waters in the twentieth century.  In addition to 
efforts of clearing navigation hazards such as shallow wrecks, it is also known that salvage 
companies were contracted to recover unexploded ordinance from the World War II.7  
Unfortunately records were never kept for such activities, and it is not possible to know if the 
salvage companies recovered archaeological objects during the period they searched the seabed. 
Recovery of underwater archaeological material in Malta began in the 1960s when sport 
divers turned over to the National Museum of Archaeology amphoras, anchors, and shipborne 
artillery they had recovered.  In 1967 a shipwreck in Mellieha Bay was partly excavated by a 
team directed by Honor Frost.  The site yielded a primary cargo of mortaria8 that were almost 
surely manufactured in southern Italy; amphoras and glass vessels were also raised.  The ship 
was likely a merchantman of the Severan era (ca. A.D. 200).9 
After a lengthy hiatus, serious interest in submerged cultural resources in Maltese waters 
was revived by collaboration between the National Museum of Archaeology in Valletta and 
archaeologists from Europe. In 1988-1989 a group from Specialist Archaeology Systems (SAS) 
conducted a survey and identified at least two promising targets in the Grand Harbor.  
Unfortunately, subsequent excavation using a water dredge produced only a scatter of modern 
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detritus.  The SAS team also surveyed extensively in Saint Paul’s Bay, traditionally associated 
with the wreck of the Alexandrian grain vessel carrying Paul of Tarsus to his final appeal before 
the emperor in Rome. The search showed the virtual absence of archaeological material along 
Tal-Ghazzenin Reef, the suspected site of Saint Paul’s shipwreck. 
In 1992, the Maltese National Museum of Archaeology began a three-year period of 
collaboration with a team from France’s Départment des recherches archéologiques 
subaquatiques et sous-marines (DRASSM).  A survey, conducted from 14 - 19 December 1992 
in the area around Manoel Island and the Lazzaretto in Marsamxett Harbor, successfully 
determined the location of the iron ship Carolita.  In December 1993 a joint rescue excavation 
by DRASSM and the National Museum of Archaeology in Marsascala Bay yielded ceramic 
finds ranging widely in date but having their greatest concentration in the period from the fourth 
to the sixth centuries A.D.10  
INA Surveys in Malta 
 The Institute of Nautical Archaeology was first contacted in 1999 by Maltese scholars 
and the staff of the Museums Department to join the local efforts to carry out a survey of certain 
areas in the Grand and Marsamxett Harbors scheduled for marina construction.  Upon this 
invitation, the author took up the task of investigating the maritime archaeological potential of 
Malta.  At first, the project was limited to the specific areas of Grand Harbor, but soon after 
beginning our first investigations in Malta, it became clear that it was impossible to obtain 
meaningful results unless the entire coastline of the small archipelago was included in the survey 
area.   
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 The goal of the survey project was to provide information about the commercial and 
naval history of Malta, the ships used for trade and naval activities, and the locations of the 
archaeological remains of coastal settlements that could be identified based on underwater 
material.   
The 1999 Season 
The first season of the INA Survey in Malta was a preliminary reconnaissance. 
Objectives included general examination of the Grand Harbor and Marsamxett Harbor (Fig. 2).  
The focus of this short project was the investigation of areas within the confines of the marina 
project that involved construction activities on parts of the Valletta waterfront, including the 
placement of bottom-hugging pontoons.  Previous research indicated that parts of the harbor 
slated for marina construction were likely to contain shipwrecks, and priority was given to the 
selected sections of the harbor that had not been dredged.  Therefore, Dockyard Creek, the main 
channel of the Grand Harbor, and Marsamxett Harbor were the pre-determined survey areas.  
The survey of the area described above was accomplished with a Sea Scan PC high-
resolution side-scan sonar, coupled with a Geometrics cesium magnetometer.  This system is 
designed to locate large and small objects underwater in zero visibility, and was chosen for this 
survey due to poor visibility and silty bottom conditions of the survey areas.  A GPS unit, used to 
give approximate longitude and latitude of the sonar targets, provided navigation for the survey.  
Other aspects of the survey included diver inspections of selected areas of the sea bottom to 
examine sonar and magnetometer targets known as anomalies.  Unusual features noted in the 
sonar images were reviewed and the more promising targets were identified for diver 





Fig. 2. M p of the harbor area around Valletta. (Map: author). 
among the areas slated for marina 
constru
a
As mentioned above, Dockyard Creek was 
ction.  This part of the harbor was in use as early as the Roman period, and likely to 
contain archaeological material.  In addition, archival records indicated that several ships sank in 
the creek in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Unfortunately, a coarse sand bottom 
covered by a thick layer of silt characterizes the seafloor in this part of the harbor.  Sonar 
systems are generally ineffective for finding materials buried beneath sand, and we had doubts 
about how well a magnetometer would function in this environment having a very high 
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concentration of modern debris, including chains and other metal objects.  Consequently, on 
October 6, 1999, a few track lines were first executed to test the equipment.  
The initial results seemed promising.  In general, the targets within the survey area 
appeare
 
d to be flat, with no acoustic ‘shadow’, and most were crescent-shaped features with 
associated magnetic anomalies, interpreted as chains or pipe fragments that did not require 
further investigation.  However, one target southeast of the ferry terminal off Vittoriosa was 
designated as a diving location based on the characteristics of its sonar image.  It appeared to be 
an area consisting of a pile of uniform rocks with an associated magnetic anomaly.  Piles of 
rounded rocks are characteristic of shipwrecks, since they are used as ballast on ships and 
portions of the hull are preserved under it.  The extent of this site, nine meters long and four 
meters wide, bolstered the idea that it might be a shipwreck site (Fig. 3).   
Fig. 3. Location of the ballast pile in the Dockyard Creek.  The site was behind the tuna pans seen on 
photograph. (Photograph: author). 
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Diving investigations of this target were not successful due to very low visibility in the 
area.  




Constant boat traffic, low visibility and water pollution continued to be the most 
significant drawbacks for diving operations in the harbor area throughout the survey.  In 
addition, diving operations yielded an important result: the rock pile/anomaly in the sonar image 
was not on the surface of the seafloor, and so not visible to divers; the side-scan 
sonar/magnetometer was detecting features underneath the layer of mud and silt.  Although this 
compounds the difficulty of locating wrecks, it provides comfort in the knowledge that they may 
at least be well-preserved and available for inspection at a later date.   
Additional investigations that included the removal of part of t
 conclude that there was no wood preserved underneath the pile.  Low visibility and boat 
traffic made further investigations impossible, and not being in an area scheduled for 
construction, this site was reserved for future investigation when more advanced equipment and 
funds become available.  The site was added to the Museums Department’s files to ensure its 
protection.  Other sonar targets in Dockyard Creek turned out to be modern debris, metal and 
wood fragments that were too deteriorated for identification, and anchors of modern date.   
The last area examined in Dockyard Creek was the site of the test trench excavat
ring a survey by a French archaeological team.  The objective was to ascertain the extent 
of silt accumulation in the creek.  The French team had previously dredged silt and sand out of 
the creek, and recovered pottery dating to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Our 
investigation determined that the site had been completely re-covered by silt in the fifteen years 
since the original survey. Only one fragment of possibly seventeenth century pottery, 
typologically similar to the finds of 1984, was recovered.  
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The second survey area was the main channel of Grand Harbor.  We concentrated our 
efforts on covering the area between the land and central part of the harbor that was dredged in 
1981.  Although extensive boat traffic frequently interrupted the survey, two possible shipwreck 
sites were located between Senglea Point and Saint Angelo Point, and deemed worthy of 
investigation.  Most other anomalies in the area surveyed were of known modern shipwrecks, 
which confirmed that the equipment functioned effectively, and that it could be used as a tool 
with which to compare new anomalies and to calibrate the equipment.  
Another set of track-lines in the main channel of the Grand Harbor yielded an area of 
concentrated ‘rock piles’ around the location of a previously located target slated for revisiting. 
In general, these are mounds of rocks spaced about 100-50 meters from each other, some having 
clearly associated magnetic anomalies. The area is close to Senglea Point and, among the eleven 
targets detected, three were identified as worthy of diving investigation. Unfortunately, it was 
impossible to carry out any diving at this location due to heavy boat traffic.  
The scope of the remote sensing survey in the third area included the entrance to 
Lazaretto Creek, the area to the southeast of Fort Manoel, and between the southernmost end of 
the Quarantine Hospital building and the easternmost tip of the Manoel island (Fig. 2).  Clay 
pipes, musket balls, and various terra-cotta artifacts constituted the major groups of underwater 
finds in this area.  The artifacts were consigned to the National Museum of Archaeology in 
Malta for further study.  However, no shipwrecks were located in the area.   
The 2000 Season 
In April 2000 INA conducted an archaeological/geological hazard survey around 
Manoel island on behalf of the Malta Museums Department and TBA Periti Associates 
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Architectural Corporation.  The area around Manoel island was surveyed in a series of closely-
spaced parallel tracks, one set being perpendicular to the other utilizing the Malta Maritime 
Authority’s (MMA) fourteen meter hydrographic survey vessel outfitted with a high-resolution 
sub-bottom profiler coupled to an advanced digital data collection system and a precision global 
positioning system accurate to within 50 centimeters.  Two gigabytes of sub-bottom profile data 
were collected, our efforts being focused predominantly on areas adjacent to Lazzaretto, the site 
of the old Quarantine Hospital for ships entering Malta, and the proposed site of the breakwater 
construction. These areas are the most probable locations for potential negative impact on 
archaeological resources and the largest square area scheduled for seabed modification.  Two 
shipwrecks within the survey areas were detected; however, the Museums Department was 
already aware of their location, disposition, and origin, and they were not considered particularly 
significant from an archaeological perspective.  Several other sub-bottom anomalies were 
detected within the general survey area.  We prepared detailed recommendations to the Museums 
Department to mitigate potential damage to these resources.   
One area of concentrated sub-bottom anomalies detected during the survey and 
investigated by divers later in the summer was found to contain archaeological material ranging 
from Roman ceramic fragments to modern debris centered around a small mound on the seabed 
approximately five meters in diameter and extending in depth to approximately two meters 
beneath the seafloor.  The area of high artifact density associated with this anomaly runs along a 
roughly north/south axis; however, no other anomalies indicative of similar deposits were 
detected on adjacent parallel transects.  Modern nautical charts indicate the presence of a 
‘mound’ directly along the anomaly ‘path’, most probably representing dredge spoil from 
modern harbor works that contained ancient material as well as modern debris.  Previous diving 
surveys conducted in the region noted that the area had been extensively dredged to allow for the 
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berthing of deep-draft ships.  However, no records of the dredging activity were located at the 
Malta Maritime Authorities files, so it is impossible to determine the source of the dredge spoil 
for further investigation.  Based on the report we submitted to the Museums Department, no 
construction will be allowed in the immediate area of these remains, hopefully protecting those 
artifacts yet to be recovered.   
In May of 2000 a joint INA-Maltese team carried out a preliminary survey of the 
anchorages in and around the Maltese Islands.  The work was conducted using a Sea Scan PC 
side-scan sonar (Marine Sonic Technology, Ltd.), coupled with a GPS receiver.   
The first phase of the summer was dedicated to extensive research among the documents 
conserved in the archives of the National Museum of Archaeology in Valletta. The museum 
possessed artifact files and annual reports dating to the early 1960s; the files offered information 
about the context and location of underwater materials now conserved in the museum 
storerooms.  Re-evaluation of this data, utilizing geographical and chronological criteria, enabled 
the team to determine the areas with higher concentrations of archaeological material.  The 
museum curators also allowed us to examine the forms submitted by sport divers and fishermen 
in order to indicate the location of artifacts they had seen.  These files provided valuable 
information about potential areas of artifact concentration. They also were very informative 
since comparisons between earlier and more recent reports indicated the extent of looting and 
dredging damage to archaeological sites.  
Our archival research also included the study of previously published material regarding 
the underwater finds.  Moreover, many of our sources (i.e., a map indicating the location of 
ancient anchors and amphoras produced by an amateur diver in 1965) required considerable 
work to establish their reliability.  A database of the information collected during the research 
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was created, and potential sites were plotted to determine the extent of the survey areas and to 
establish the sites of highest priority for immediate attention that summer. 
We also allocated time for a survey of local navigation patterns and weather conditions.  
Based on the findings of this research that included a detailed analysis of factors such as 
coastline configuration, and prevailing winds and currents, we designed the survey program for 
summer 2000.   
Another factor taken into consideration when assessing priorities for the survey areas 
was the growing season for poseidon grass or poseidonia (Posidonia oceanica).  This type of sea 
grass has roots that extend nearly one meter into the sand bottom, the visible portion of the plant 
reaching up to two meters in height, and growing in thick banks to a depth of over 30 meters.  It 
attains a heavy bloom in summer and leaves behind a thick carpet of dead rhizomes in winter.  It 
is possible that this thick material covers shipwreck remains.  Therefore, surveying in the winter 
and early spring, when the poseidonia is in its weakest state, would most likely yield better 
results, but hazardous navigation conditions would prevent access to the areas of greatest 
interest.  
Every survey area required the use of a different approach, and the survey techniques 
were generally dictated by the nature and location of the site.  However, other factors such as the 
availability of the equipment or weather conditions also played a role in the choice of surveying 
techniques utilized.  The survey techniques employed during the summer of 2000 can be 
grouped as follows:  
- Diving investigations of previously known and reported sites, 
- Side-scan survey of the coastline, 
- Diving examination of the targets detected by the side scan sonar, and 
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- Diving surveys on hazardous points.  
The first survey area of the 2000 season was Marsascala Bay, one of the few safe 
anchorages in northeast Malta (Fig. 4).  The objective of our investigations was to perform a 
visual inspection of the area where the National Museum of Archaeology in Valletta and 
DRASSM conducted a rescue excavation in 1993.  The area was included in the survey program 
at the explicit request of the museum curators, who felt that detailed mapping of the site might 
help better determine its nature.  If the artifact scatter presented other chronological 
concentrations beyond the fourth and sixth centuries, it might indicate a site with multiple 
shipwrecks.  However, a lengthy diver search established that any material still on the site must 
be buried beneath the poseidonia.  In addition, the site is vulnerable to damage from storms and 
to plundering by divers who have easy access to it.  No further surveying of this site was carried 
out for the following reasons: (1) previous work in this area produced sufficient material for the 
dating of the site, (2) the site is stable and is preserved under the poseidonia, and (3) the Bay is a 
popular swimming and diving area, and scientific dives by our team seemed to promote interest 











Fig. 4. Map of Maltese Archipelago showing the major modern settlements. (Map: author). 
Our second survey area was on the eastern shore of Salina Bay (Fig. 4).  The site is 
characterized by a significant pile of stones not of local origin.  The majority of the 
agglomeration is comprised of tufa, with much smaller quantities of what appear to be slate and 
black marble (Fig. 5).  A photomosaic coverage and measurements using a baseline and offsets 
generated a site map.  Extensive diver inspection produced two amphora fragments buried deep 
within the pile of rocks.  The base fragment includes the toe, while the body fragment is ridged.  
Possible parallels pointed to a North African type common in the fourth century A.D.  The 
sherds appear to be consistent with, and non-intrusive to, the mound of stones considered to be 
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the ballast of a Late Roman shipwreck.  A petrological analysis of rock samples from the site is 
required to determine the type of ballast and, if possible, the provenance of this ship.  
Unfortunately, there is little probability that wooden elements of the hull are preserved on the 
site.  In two different locations divers reached bedrock by hand fanning in and around the stones.  
Therefore, a full excavation of the site would be unlikely to yield results commensurate with the 
costs.   
Fig. 5. Photograph showing the ballast pile in Salina Bay.  All artifacts associated with the site were 
collected from the layer below the stones.  (Photograph: author). 
The third survey area of the 2000 season was near a reef close to Munxar Point (Fig. 4).  
In 1964, an amateur diver reported a wreck of “Spanish Romano” amphoras located in this area 
and the report was also supported by later sightings of possible amphora sherds by other amateur 
divers.  Side scan track-lines were run parallel to the reef, and an area varying in depth from 
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seven to fifty-one meters was covered.  However, the survey produced no targets or anomalies 
requiring visual diver inspection.  In addition, it was clear that diving investigations would be 
safer and more productive if carried out in another season, since thick poseidonia obstructs the 
bottom, the presence of fish farms that attract big seasonal fish such as shark and tuna create 
safety concerns, and visibility is low due to pollution caused by these fish farms.  
A number of artifacts reportedly brought up off Qawra Point were donated to the 
National Museum of Archaeology in 1964 and 1969.  Most of these artifacts are Roman anchor 
stocks and collars, including the largest Roman anchor stock ever found (about 4 meters long).  
In addition, debris consisting of Roman amphoras of the third century B.C. was reported in 1965 
by a local amateur diver.  Moreover, Qawra Point was selected as one of our survey areas due to 
recent reports of eroded sherds washing up on shore after storms.  The side-scan sonar track-
lines were run from Tal-Ghazzenin Reef to Qawra Point, but no archaeological targets were 
identified in this area.   
Saint Paul’s Bay has long been of interest for its legendary association with the biblical 
account of Saint Paul’s shipwreck in Malta (Fig. 4).  However, various searches by previous 
expeditions showed the virtual absence of archaeological material that might be dated to the 
period.  On the other hand, artifacts such as a pilgrim’s flask similar to Byzantine types from the 
sixth and seventh centuries, one complete Dressel 20 amphora, a large grapnel type iron anchor 
of the eighteenth century, and other scatters of Phoenician ceramics of sixth to second century 
B.C. date were reported.11   It was also reported that post-medieval ceramic materials, generally 
characterized as ‘Berber ware’, wash into the bay after storms.  The INA team ran several track-
lines around Saint Paul’s islands and across a reef at the head of the islands.  Data was also 
gathered in the small bay to the west of the islands and the next peninsula to the west of Saint 
Paul’s Bay, Blata l-Bajda.  Several anomalies were detected and noted for future visual 
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inspection by divers.  The reef immediately to the north of the islands is one of Malta’s premier 
diving locations, and the probability of finding undisturbed artifacts in this region is very low. 
Sport divers have extensively plundered the area around Comino Island.  Additionally, 
the small bays on northern Malta and southern Gozo facing Comino (Santa Marija and San 
Niklaw Bays) are also known to have included archaeological material reported as looted in the 
past.  One wreck, pillaged in the 1970s, is said to have yielded an alabaster vase of unknown 
origin.12  Additionally, there are a few artifacts donated to the museum from this area, including 
a grapnel-type anchor with four flukes recovered by the Royal Navy from the Comino Channel 
in 1965, two lead anchor stocks raised in 1994, and a Greco-Italic amphora found in the region 
in 1999.  The archaeological evidence from land contexts, dating to the Phoenician and Punic 
periods of occupation, suggests extensive seafaring activities between the fifth and the third 
centuries B.C.  The area was selected as a high priority for archaeological survey based on the 
above-mentioned information and the report of a possible Punic wreck site that contained 
amphoras from the late fourth century B.C.  However, the sonar data from Santa Marija and San 
Niklaw Bays and from the channel between Comino and Gozo produced only a few targets of 
small scale not likely to be shipwreck sites.  Visual inspections in the two bays by divers did not 
locate any significant cultural material due to the thick bloom of poseidonia. 
Museum divers reported sightings of large amphoras amidst boulders at the base of a 
cliff side approximately 30 meters to the south of the Xatt l-Ahmar Point.  The amphoras were 
visible after winter storms in the area.  Several sonar tracklines were run parallel to the shore 
from Xatt l-Ahmar Point southward.  Visual diver inspection located the aforementioned 
boulders at a depth of over 40 meters, but divers saw no amphoras exposed above the sand.   
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The entrance to Xlendi Bay is made treacherous by the presence of a pair of submerged 
reefs, and the area is known to have produced whole amphoras that span a significant period in 
antiquity (Fig. 6).  Amphoras recovered from the bay in the past 40 years include examples of all 
of the following types: Punic, Aegean Greek, Greco-Italic and Roman.13  Recently, a cylindrical 
fourth-century African amphora was recovered by fisherman near the northern reef.  Because no 
harbor works have yet been located in the surrounding village and countryside, ancient sailors 
probably used Xlendi Bay only as a safe anchorage during storms.  The INA team extensively 
surveyed this promising area, running one trackline into the bay itself and several tracklines 
parallel to the shoreline across the entrance to the bay.  The lines covered the steep drop-off of 
the shore to a depth of approximately 80 meters.  A group of anomalies was noted for further 
examination by divers or by a remotely operated vehicle (ROV).  
Fig. 6. Map showing the locations of the ROV survey areas of the 2001 season in Gozo.  The area to the 
west represents the entrance to the Xlendi Bay and the one to the east is the area near the Mgarr ix-Xini 
inlet.  These areas were first surveyed in 2000 using a side-scan sonar.  [Map: based on the Admiralty Map 






The 2001 Season 
Summer 2001 was the third season of the systematic survey of the Maltese coastline by 
INA.  Based on the findings of the previous seasons and the research that has been carried out in 
the first two years of the survey project, we decided to concentrate our efforts in two areas.  The 
first phase of the survey was the systematic collection of the surface debris and the excavation of 
four test trenches in the area adjacent to the Quarantine Hospital in Marsamxett Harbor.  The 
second phase of the survey included a remote sensing and ROV survey of the area near Xlendi 
Bay and the area between Xatt l’Ahmar and Mgarr ix-Xini inlets, concentrating on the 100-
meter-depth profile where the previous season’s side scan sonar targets were located.  In 
addition, we have dived with a hand-held magnotemeter into an area near Zonkor Point upon the 
Museums Department’s request.  Two iron swivel guns were found in this particular spot; we 
searched the area for more artifacts of this type and to determine whether or not this represented 
a shipwreck site.  After two dives into the area, we determined that there were no other iron or 
ceramic objects buried in the sand, making it unlikely that this represented a shipwreck site.  Our 
team also dived near the watchtower at the entrance of the Mgarr ix-Xini inlet in Gozo to search 
for the iron guns that fell to the sea from the watchtower according to the archival documents.  
We did not find any guns.  It is possible that the archival documents that indicated the guns were 
mistaken or that they were recovered at a later date.   
The Excavation on the Waterfront of the Quarantine Hospital 
The two large and well-protected harbors of Malta, Marsamxett and Grand Harbors, are 
located to the north and to the south of Valletta, respectively.  Manoel Island is at the middle of 
Marsamxett Harbor and is today connected to land by a small bridge.  Conducting a survey 
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around Manoel Island was important for several reasons.  First, it is impossible to have an 
understanding of the maritime history of Malta without knowing the history of land use around 
Marsamxett Harbor, the second most important harbor in the archipelago.  Second, Manoel 
island was the site of the Ottoman camp during the ‘Great Siege of Malta’, and it is possible that 
archaeological objects from this period are preserved in the harbor silt.  Third, Marsamxett is 
mentioned in medieval texts during times when the Catholic Church had banned trade with the 
Muslims; Christian and Muslim ‘pirates’ exchanged their goods on Manoel island away from the 
prying eyes of the tax collectors in Birgu, the medieval harbor of Malta.  Fourth, and perhaps the 
most important reason for our survey in Marsamxett, is that Manoel island was the quarantine 
center of Europe for nearly two centuries.   
Quarantine control became institutionalized in Malta in the mid-seventeenth century.  
The goal was to segregate incoming passengers and imports from countries where occurrence of 
the plague was considered epidemic or from countries in the Western Mediterranean that were 
known to be infected with plague (see Chapter XI, section about quarantine shipping, for 
detailed discussion).  Passengers and goods coming from these lands had to be cleared by 
quarantine authorities before being granted release to circulate in Malta or to proceed on to other 
destinations in Europe.  The quarantine period lasted 40 days, during which time the cargo was 
unloaded within the Lazzaretto where it was subjected to ‘fumigation’.     
Manoel Island was utilized as a quarantine center, Lazzaretto, since 1593.  The first 
building of the permanent Lazzaretto was erected in 1643 by the Grandmaster of the Order of 
Saint John, Lascaris.  It was enlarged in later periods, but this first structure was used as a dive 




Fig. 7. Map showing the location of the excavation squares (labeled 1-4) at the Quarantine Hospital 
(locations of the excavated sand pockets - labeled a-h).  (Map: author). 
Our investigations in the area began in April 2000, when a team from INA and the Malta 
Maritime Authority conducted an archaeological and geological hazard survey around Manoel 
island using a high-resolution sub-bottom profiler.  During diver inspections of sub-bottom 
profiler targets, archaeological material ranging from Roman to the modern era was recovered.  
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The abundance of artifacts near the Quarantine Hospital was an impetus for further study in the 
area, and an extended survey involving systematic collection of surface material and excavation 
of a number of trenches was planned for the summer of 2001 (Fig. 7). 
The underwater slope in front of the Quarantine Hospital is littered with furniture 
discarded from the hospital and large boulders that tumbled into the sea when the building was 
damaged by bombing during WWII.  In addition to beds and boulders, the charm of the site is 
augmented by Carolita, a modern iron-hulled wreck that attracts fish and sport divers to the area.   
Carolita looks almost haunted in the murky waters of the harbor. where visibility is never greater 
than three meters.  The diving survey near the Quarantine Hospital proceeded under these 
circumstances and in two phases:  (1) a systematic surface collection of archaeological material, 
and (2) the excavation of test trenches in the most promising areas.  The team consisted of eight 
divers from INA, the National Museum of Archaeology, the University of Malta, and Bristol 
University.   
The first dives focused on acclimating team members to diving in zero visibility and on 
the collection of archaeologically-diagnostic surface material.  After each dive a short meeting 
was held to familiarize team members with the archaeological material recovered and to hone 
their skill on discerning artifacts.  The surface material was mostly whiteware used by the Royal 
Navy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, broken artifacts dating to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and a few late Roman and Byzantine ceramic sherds.   
Once the surface survey data was analyzed, the areas for excavation squares were 
selected.  The squares were made of PVC pipes and measured two meters on each side.  Each 
diver was assigned to one quarter of a square.  Artifacts were sketched and photographed prior to 
their lifting.  Divers were also responsible for labeling and on-site logging of artifacts from their 
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sections.  A water dredge was set up to increase the speed of silt removal and to increase 
visibility by sucking away suspended sediments.  In addition to the squares, a number of up-
slope sand pockets were excavated, because they formed natural traps for material spilling down 
the slope and had better stratification of the preserved artifacts.  Once the loose silt was removed, 
the grayish and more compact level of silt that contained earlier artifacts was reached 
immediately, especially in the sand pockets.  However, the layer approximately ½ meter below 
the gray silt preserved traces of poseidonia roots that grows only on a sandy bottom and dates 
approximately to the seventeenth century. Archaeological material from this layer yielded more 
consistent dates.  The location of the grid squares and the excavated sand pockets were measured 
and plotted on a large-scale map and assigned real world coordinates.   
Ceramics from the excavation were cleaned, desalinated, reconstructed, photographed 
and drawn once the excavation was over.  All 434 logged artifacts were entered into a database 
that allowed for comparison of the archaeological material in terms of their number, date and 
origin (see Appendix D).  Although the ceramics are still being studied, preliminary observations 
indicate that eleventh and twelfth century Islamic ceramics (possibly of North African origin) 
outnumber the seventeenth to early nineteenth century polychrome Majolica sherds of the 
‘Knights’ period when the Quarantine Hospital was heavily in use.  This points to an extensive 
use of the Marsamxett Harbor during the medieval period. 
Shipwrecks off Xlendi 
The deep-water work scheduled for the 2001 season concentrated around an area of 
seabed near the entrance to Xlendi Bay, an inlet on the southwest coast of the island of Gozo.  
Prior to the construction of an artificial breakwater at Mgarr, Xlendi was possibly one of the 
most widely-used anchorages of Gozo.  Even so, the inlet is not an ideal anchorage, because 
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there are two shallow reefs at its entrance.  In addition, the entrance to Xlendi is characterized by 
turbulent waters, since it is not protected from the prevalent winds as demonstrated by the 
existence of wrecks in shallow parts of Xlendi.  Two shipwrecks of Roman period were partially 
excavated by divers of the British Navy in the early 1960s, and the rest of the sites were looted in 
the following years.  Today, no trace of these two shipwrecks is to be found.  Several currents of 
variable intensity, in addition to seasonal variations, make the entrance to this small anchorage 
even more difficult.  The topography of the island of Gozo makes the interior of the Xlendi Inlet 
a dangerous anchorage, as the winds funneling through the deep valleys of Gozo create 
turbulence on stormy days, putting the boats at anchor between two opposing winds.  Our side 
scan surveys in the area from the previous season demonstrated that there were scattered artifacts 
in the shallow parts (shallower than 80 meters) of the entrance.  Interviews with fishermen and 
reports made available for our research by the National Museum of Archaeology suggested high 
archaeological potential along this coastline and to select it as one of our main survey areas.   
Fig. 8. The survey team launching the ROV.  (Photograph: author) 
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The initial survey relied on the use of a scanning sonar that was part of the ROV 
equipment; ROV cameras immediately inspected anomalies detected by the sonar.  The survey 
was carried out using a small remotely operated vehicle (ROV) (Fig. 8).  These ROVs (which 
typically weigh between 200 and 500 kg) are perhaps the most ideal vehicles for archaeological 
purposes.  They are fairly inexpensive, but have enough flexibility, power, and size to complete 
advanced documentation tasks and even those requiring sampling in deeper water.  In addition to 
the scanning sonar and video cameras used to locate and document artifacts, the ROV was 
equipped with an underwater positioning system for fizing its location and the objects it locates 
relative to the survey vessel.  The equipment also included a laser-based underwater 
measurement system, for measuring artifact positions and dimensions.  
The major find made by the ROV and its associated technology in 2001 was an amphora 
scatter off the entrance to Xlendi Bay (Fig. 9).  The scatter consists of thousands of amphoras, 
representing at least seven different types, spread over an area of about four-by-one kilometers.  
The depth and the nature of the site (an anomaly located at the middle of flat, sandy bottom at a 
depth of 100-130 meters) compel us to identify it as a ‘shipwreck’ site.  However, it is unclear 
whether the deposit represents a single large shipwreck site, or more likely, a multiple-wreck 
site.   
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Fig. 9. The shipwreck site off Xlendi. (Photograph: author). 
We were able to identify seven different amphora types represented on the Xlendi site 
(see Appendix A), but it is very difficult to date the entire site based on the examination of a 
single archaeological sample we were able to bring to the surface with the equipment available 
to us during the preliminary survey season.  The small size of the ROV made it impossible to 
raise complete amphoras that are full of sediment and only allowed the collection of small and 
broken pieces.  Detailed information regarding the dating of the amphora types is provided in the 
Appendix A.  The archaeological sample was identified as a Punic amphora of the third century 
B.C.  Other types of amphora from the site dated to different periods.  Based on preliminary 
visual examinations, their dates range from the fourth century B.C. to the third century A.D.   
The amphora types are very common Mediterranean varieties originating from various centers of 
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the Western Mediterranean.  Further study of the Xlendi shipwreck is crucial to understand the 
role played by Malta in interregional trade through seven centuries. Detailed analysis of these 
artifacts is planned upon the issuance of an excavation permit from the Maltese authorities.    
An additional area near the Inlet of Mgarr ix-Xini on Gozo was surveyed using the 
ROV.  The inlet has similar characteristics to that of Xlendi.  Located on the same side of Gozo, 
and one of only three semi-sheltered anchorages on the island, it held similar potential in our 
minds as Xlendi (Fig. 4).  In both Xlendi and Mgarr ix-Xini, the entrance of the inlets looks 
promising to ships seeking shelter in bad weather.  However, the wind funnels through the valley 
landward of the mouth, and creates contrary waves to those of the open sea.  In such instances, 
commonsense compelled ships to escape from the trap, but if the storm reached a certain strenght 
it was impossible for the ship to escape this situation.  Our hypothesis was disproved by the 
complete absence of exposed archaeological material near the entrance to Mgarr ix-Xini.  
Therefore, Xlendi was a harbor or anchorage known to sailors, but the multi-shipwreck site 
outside the inlet indicates that this was unfortunately a poor harbor, and sailing was difficult and 
risky around Gozo.  
Summary 
 At the end of our third season of surveying the coastline of the Maltese Islands, we 
reached certain conclusions.  It was clear that there were no obvious shipwreck sites in the 
surveyed areas with the exception of Xlendi.  The most likely area to contain shipwrecks, Grand 
Harbor, was silted, heavily dredged, and polluted.  Heavy boat and ship traffic in the harbor 
made it a dangerous diving location.  It was also very difficult to use any towed vehicle for 
remote sensing surveys due to obstructions such as buoys, lines, garbage, and other items cast 
from ships.   
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It was also interesting to note that the only shipwreck site we found dated to the Roman 
period, which was likely a time when navigation around Malta was not as frequent as it was 
during later periods, such as the era when the Order of Saint John was based on the island.  Thus, 
it was clear that the shipwreck evidence did not concur with the historical record, but it did not 
provide sufficient evidence to suggest a revised approach to Maltese history.   
At the end of our third season, it became necessary to carry out extensive research and 
place our findings in a historical perspective to determine how much our work contributed to 
filling the gaps in Maltese history and archaeology.  This in-depth analysis of the maritime 
history of Malta also became absolutely necessary to determine future survey areas and also to 
have a better idea about what archeological evidence survives and where we could expect to find 
it.   
Surprisingly, it was not possible to find a scholarly source that treated the full breadth of 
Maltese maritime history, which meant that this information had to be compiled first.  This 
dissertation is the outcome of this research project, presented as a chronological arrangement of 





PREHISTORY OF MALTA 
 
First evidence of seafaring activity in the Mediterranean dates to about 10,000 B.C., 
based on the archaeological discoveries of obsidian that originates from the island of Melos at 
Franchti Cave on mainland Greece.  This crossing was not a very difficult one, but the 
appearance of deep-sea fish bones in the same site about 8000-7000 B.C. and evidence of 
Neolithic settlers of Anatolian or Levantine origin in Cyprus in the second half of the seventh 
millennium B.C. are solid proof that human beings developed the ability to navigate the 
Mediterranean.1  Crete was colonized in the seventh millennium and the islands of the Aegean 
and the Ionian seas received their first Neolithic occupants over the next two millennia.2  In the 
western Mediterranean basin, the first settlers of Corsica appear to have reached the island in the 
ninth millennium, and those of Sardinia arrived in the late eighth or early seventh millennia.3  
The first settlers arrived on the Maltese Islands around 5200 B.C.  This relatively late 
date of its settlement is possibly due to the small size and low relief of the islands that would 
have necessitated blind crossings of a distance of about 100 kilometers, which separates the 
Maltese Islands from Sicily.4  Natural forest fires and other indications might have led the men 
on Sicily to determine the existence of an island in this location, but performing the actual 
crossing still required the development of certain skills.  Moreover, the fact that Sicily is quite a 
fertile land itself possibly delayed the necessity to seek alternative farmland.   
The first Neolithic culture of Malta displays similarities with those of Monte Kronio in 
Sicily.  The local culture appears to have had contacts with the eastern Sicilian cultures of the 
Middle Neolithic previously grouped under the Stentinello culture.5  The earliest people on the 
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islands initially occupied rock shelters and open dwellings and developed what is known as the 
Ghar Dalam culture.  They grew barley, wheat and lentils, practiced fishing, and supplemented 
their food with hunting.  To the early Neolithic farmer on Malta the sea served more as an 
isolating factor, since no valuable raw materials were available on the islands that could attract 
traders.6  The absence of resources also provided these settlers with some degree of security 
since they were not harassed by outsiders.  Unlike the villages in Sicily, those in Malta are not 
fortified during this period.7  The Ghar Dalam culture evolved into the Grey Skorba culture some 
time between 4500-4400 B.C., and into the Red Skorba culture between 4400-4100 B.C.  
Monochrome red pottery is characteristic of the Red Skorba Period, which is largely influenced 
by the Diana culture of Sicily.8     
During the fourth millennium new waves of Sicilian farmer migrants, differentiated from 
their predecessors by their new ceramic repertoire, reached the islands.  The Zebbug and Mgarr 
phases span the first eight hundred years of what is known as the Temple Period (4100-2500 
B.C.), but these phases have not yielded any temple remains.  The most important contribution 
of these two early phases lies in the fact that advances had been made in agriculture, and the 
Neolithic community managed to provide a surplus of food that was essential to sustain a healthy 
community.  This allowed a group of people to take leadership in ritual and community affairs, 
developing a more complex hierarchy, and thus providing the seeds for social change that shaped 
later prehistory.  The surrounding sea allowed commercial and cultural contact with Sicily, but 
also isolated the Maltese Islands by allowing their inhabitants to evolve on internal inspirations 
to create the Megalithic monuments characteristic of the Temple Period (Fig. 10).9  Each of these 
temples, with its particular plan, belongs to a group of structures that claim to be one of the 
earliest achievements of mankind.  Colin Renfrew notes that these structures are the earliest free-
standing monuments of stone in the world and that the "earliest architecturally conceived 
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exterior in the world" is probably the facade of the Ggantija Temples on the island of Gozo.10  
On mainland Malta the temples at Hagar Qim possess the earliest use of dressed stone in human 
prehistory, while the colossal statue of a fertility goddess in the western temple at Tarxien was 
probably unique for its size at the time.11   
Fig. 10. Interior apse of the Mnajdra Temple. (Photograph: author).  
During this period of Maltese prehistory cultural development was characterized by the 
isolation of the island, both in terms of being closed to outside influences, and being closed to 
influencing the neighboring regions.  While Sicily was inhabited by a population that possessed 
metallurgical technology, the population of Malta appears to have been unaffected by this new 
technology.12  A more striking aspect of the insularity and isolation of this splendid culture is the 
fact that external contacts were never interrupted but a diffusion of cultural influences did not 
take place.13  What stands out about this period is that this culture had no influence on the 
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development of other cultures, and there is no indication that the temples were visited by 
outsiders.14   
Very little is known about the events of this period and the reasons why this culture 
disappeared.  The reasons are possibly related to the considerable quantities of timber used in 
temple construction which led to deforestation and instability of climate, soil erosion, drought, 
and eventual crop failure.  According to Trump, these circumstances could easily lead to famine, 
war and disease, and the survivors would be forced to leave or die.15  What is clear is that there is 
no cultural continuity of traits in the succeeding cultural record, and it seems likely that the 
population of the Maltese Temple culture disappeared or abandoned the islands abruptly.16   
After the collapse of the Temple culture the islands were re-inhabited by immigrants, 
known as the Tarxien Cemetery people, characterized by a much more advanced tool and 
weapon technology - they practiced bronze metallurgy - but a notably inferior artistic and artisan 
culture.17  Clearly, the Bronze Age in Malta was less rich culturally and economically than the 
Temple culture.  The Tarxien Cemetery culture is mostly known for its funerary remains 
(dolmens), and it is likely that its people came from Sicily or South Italy, as suggested by close 
affinities with the pottery production of Capo Graziano in Lipari and with other pottery from 
Sicilian sites like Serraferlicchio, Manfria-Zichilino, and Barriera.18  
Contacts with, and possibly migration from, western Sicily resulted in establishment of 
the second local Bronze Age culture of Malta, named after the type site at Borg in-Nadur (1500-
700 B.C.).19  These people, after a transient coexistence with the Tarxien Cemetery people, are 
characterized by settlement patterns that show preoccupation with defense and security (i.e., il-
Wardija ta’ San Gorg).  There are traditions that suggest connections with Mycenaean Greece 
during the Borg in-Nadur period.  These are generally based on the identification of Malta as 
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Ogygia, the island of Calypso, visited by Odysseus on his return from Troy and the reference in 
Lycophron to a settlement in Malta of a group of Greek warriors on their way back home from 
the Trojan war.20  Unfortunately, there is very little archaeological evidence to support the theory 
of established relations with Mainland Greece.21  Another chronologically overlapping culture 
with Borg in-Nadur, known as Bahrija culture, occupied areas in western Malta.  Bahrija pottery, 
dated between 900 and 700 BC, has parallels in Calabrian and Campanian vessels.22   
Overall, the data indicate that the Maltese Islands became increasingly interconnected 
with neighboring mainland cultures in the second millennium.23  The Bronze Age settlements of 
the Maltese Islands are on relatively elevated locations, and their fortifications seem to reflect a 
marked change in the international climate of the central Mediterranean.24  Given the total 
absence of mineral resources in Malta, it is hard to guess why traders could have been at all 
interested in these islands that were removed from their major routes along the coast of Sicily 
and southern Italy.25  It is also difficult to understand what Bronze Age Malta offered in 
exchange for imported copper.  Based on the remains of colored textile found at Tarxien and 
other archaeological evidence related to the production of purple dye, Sagona suggests that 
Malta was a dye or a textile producer by 1500 B.C.26  The period corresponds to an increase of 
exotic artifacts in Malta and it could be argued that these commodities were traded for Maltese 
cloth.27  There are various interpretations of the archaeological material from Malta between this 
last culture of the Bronze Age and the arrival of the Phoenicians.  Gras believes that Malta 
became a “cul-de-sac” at the fringes of the navigation routes, and increasingly dependent on 
Sicily.  Gras suggests that all the artifacts (including all Greek and early Phoenician pottery) of 
foreign origin found in Malta came through Sicily.28   
The twelfth century in the eastern Mediterranean is marked by a series of political 
upheavals that resulted in the collapse of the Hittite Empires, the end of the Mycenaean 
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Civilization, the beginning of the Dark Age in Greece, the destruction of important and thriving 
cities like Ugarit, and the emergence of new political and ethnic entities on the Syro-Palestinian 
coast (the Phoenicians in the North and the Philistines in the South).  These rapid changes in the 
eastern Mediterranean are attributed to the activities of the mysterious Sea Peoples, invaders 
from the north.29  It seems that these events were felt in the western Mediterranean indirectly by 
the collapse of the economic system and trade network.  There is no doubt that the connections 
between the east and the west of the Mediterranean were weakened during the period between 
the collapse of the Bronze Age trading systems and those initiated by western colonizers from 




PHOENICIAN AND PUNIC PERIODS 
 
Arrival of the Phoenicians in Malta 
The Phoenicians began sailing to the western Mediterranean sometime between the tenth 
and the eighth centuries B.C., exploring and exploiting the geological and natural resources of 
the region.  It is known that these pioneers established colonies in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain 
around the eighth century B.C.1  Development of Phoenician shipping routes and the 
establishment of a trade network, shared with Greek merchants, quickly led to a significant 
improvement in commercial ties between the settlements in the east and the west of the 
Mediterranean.2 
The date of Phoenician colonization of the Maltese Islands cannot be determined with 
precision because of the lack of stratigraphy in the island’s thin soils and the continuous 
occupation of archaeological sites.3  Ceramics found in a tomb at Mtarfa represent the earliest 
datable objects of Greek and Phoenician origin in Malta and date to the first half of the seventh 
century B.C.4  Another tomb at Ghajn Qajjet (Rabat) includes ceramics that date to the second 
half of the seventh century B.C.5  However, according to Moscati, the colonization of Malta 
dates to the mid-late eighth century B.C., based on archaeological evidence from Tas-Silg (Fig. 
11).6  Sagona suggests that an initial period of frequent Phoenician visits may have led to the 
foundation of some sporadic settlements, but full-fledged Phoenician colonization took place 
between the mid-eighth and early seventh centuries, characterized by an increase in imported 
pottery from the Levant and the Aegean.  This is contemporary with the tomb at Ghajn Qajjet.7  
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On the other hand, Frendo prefers to classify this early period of Phoenician presence that 
extends from the late eighth to the period of the first inscriptions of the sixth century as the 
‘prehistoric’ phases of Phoenician Malta.8 
Fig. 11. Phoenician settlements of Malta and Gozo (after Ciasca, “Malta,” p. 207). 
We know very little about the condition of the Maltese Islands when they received their 
first Phoenician settlers.  One approach suggests that the Bronze Age culture in Malta was 
already declining at the beginning of the first millennium, and that the archaeological evidence 
suggests a decrease in population.  Accordingly, the first Phoenicians to arrive in the eighth and 
seventh centuries found a community living in conditions similar to a squatter occupation around 
Tas-Silg.9  This view also suggests that the Phoenician colonists implanted their own material 
culture with little to no input from the local elements.10  On the other hand, certain 
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interpretations of archaeological evidence points to the possibility that the local Bronze Age 
people of Malta and the Phoenicians co-habited the island prior to the beginning of the full-scale 
Phoenician colonization.11  Archaeological evidence from the Bronze Age settlements with 
superimposed Phoenician habitation levels (such as Mdina) yield early Phoenician pottery 
clusters in proximity to or mixed with the local Bronze Age wares.12  It is certain that the 
colonization of Malta was a slow and gradual process, making it difficult to recognize in the 
archaeological record.  Unfortunately, the picture is too incomplete to help us understand the 
nature of the relationship between the local population and the Phoenician settlers.13 
 The Phoenician colonization of Malta has many peculiar and puzzling characteristics.  
The choice of new and autonomous centers with well-defined features, like promontories and 
small islands in front of the coast, characterizes the Phoenician presence in the Mediterranean 
area.14  The fact that the Phoenician settlements of Malta replaced the native Bronze Age towns 
is very atypical, which, according to Moscati, is an adaptation to special circumstances 
characterized by the geography of the Maltese Islands, rather than by a contradiction to usual 
criteria.15  In other words, existing Bronze Age towns were settled because they occupied the 
only accessible parts of the coastline, while the high and steep coastline of the archipelago 
eliminated the possibility of founding typical Phoenician settlements.  Therefore, it was a 
necessity, rather than a matter of pure choice, which conditioned Phoenician settlement in Malta.   
Phoenician colonization and the development of a related trade route dotted by 
commercially-active centers led to a rise in wealth and number of the inhabitants of Malta.  
Diversification of this population led to development of the humble Bronze Age settlements into 
urban centers on the island such as those at Mdina-Rabat and Paola-Marsa.16  The highland 
urban center of Gozo was at Victoria/Rabat, but almost nothing is known about the coastal 
settlements.17  In the fourth century B.C., Pseudo Skylax mentioned that the islands were 
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inhabited by the Carthaginians, Melite was a city with a harbor, and Gaulos was (only) a city.18  
It is also possible that the Island of Malta developed a secondary settlement close to the existing 
Neolithic structure at Tas-Silg, and around the bay of Marsaxlokk, which may have functioned 
as the main harbor and commercial center of Malta during the Phoenician period.19  According to 
Gonzales, the function of the Phoenician temple that replaced the existing structure at Tas-Silg 
was to legitimize the occupation of the island, indicating that it now was under the protection of 
the new deity Astarte.  Sanctuaries dedicated to Astarte are generally related to the protection of 
navigation, Phoenician ships, commercial enterprises, and the ports that are essential parts of this 
system.20 
The Rationale and Significance of the Phoenician Colonization of Malta 
The objective of initial Phoenician colonization of Malta cannot be explained by the 
attractiveness of its natural resources.  Based on information presented by the Roman historian 
Diodorus Siculus,21 many scholars believe that the most ‘obvious’ attraction of the archipelago 
was its convenient location as a provisioning point for the merchantmen sailing between eastern 
ports and western destinations.22  However, Malta is highly unlikely to provision these ships, as 
the provision of water and food to sustain its own population is one of the inherent problems of 
this island.23   If, on the other hand, adequate amounts of food were being imported, the diversion 
of some supplies to ships may not have been a problem and even generated profits for the local 
population.24 
Diodorus tells us that both Malta and Gozo were Phoenician colonies, and they were 
colonized because the islands provided well-protected harbors that could offer safety to ships in 
bad weather.  We understand from Diodorus’ account that these harbors were also important to 
the Phoenicians because they “lay out in the open sea,” and because the inhabitants of the islands 
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were willing to offer (and receive) assistance.25  According to Diodorus, the population of the 
archipelago quickly raised their living standards and wealth as they welcomed Phoenician 
‘assistance’.26  In my opinion, all we understand from this passage is that (1) the Maltese harbors 
were good, well-protected shelters for the occasional ship caught in a storm, and (2) the 
inhabitants of Malta became rich as they provided more and more assistance to the Phoenicians 
and developed new skills, becoming experts at certain crafts (and therefore increasing the 
commercial value of their local products).  But this passage does not necessarily say that Malta 
was an excellent stopping point for all ships on their normal journies from the eastern to western 
Mediterranean.27 
Indeed, Malta was not likely to be a convenient provisioning point, as the wind and 
current patterns of the central Mediterranean make this archipelago an unlikely location for such 
a function.  It is almost certain that ships of antiquity sailed following the counter-clockwise 
current of the Mediterranean.  By doing so, the single-square-rigged ships depending on their 
quarter rudder for steering could sail with the steady northerly winds prevalent in summer 












Fig. 12. Wind and current patterns in the Mediterranean Sea (after John H. Pryor, “The Geographical 
Conditios of Galley Navigation in the Mediterranean,” in The Age of the Galley, ed. Robert Gardiner 
(London, 1995), p. 206). 
 
It is easier for a sailing vessel coming from the east to hug the Peloponnesian coast and 
cross the Ionian Sea towards Sicily.  The sailing routes diverge to the north of Sicily, through the 
Straits of Messina, or along the southern coast of this island.  The Straits of Messina are known 
to be a dangerous passage, but this did not prevent frequent navigation through this area and the 
establishment of trade routes with flourishing port cities along the northern coast of Sicily.28  For 
the Phoenician ships, it is clearly easier to reach Ischia, Sardinia or the colonies clustered on the 
northwestern part of Sicily if they crossed the Straits of Messina, due to the nature of the wind 
and current patterns in the Tyrrhenian Sea.29  On the other hand, the channel between Sicily and 
North Africa, described as a “wide and dangerous stretch of sea” by Cicero, is characterized by 
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currents in the west-east direction (Fig. 12), and even though these currents are not very strong, 
it is always harder to sail against them.30   
Fig. 13. Prevalent local winds in the Mediterranean.  (after John H. Pryor, “The Geographical Conditions 
of Galley Navigation in the Mediterranean,” in The Age of the Galley, ed. Robert Gardiner (London, 
1995), p. 211) 
Those ships that sailed along the southern coast of Sicily, against the current, could 
easily end up in Malta, as the prevalent winds are typically from the north and northwest in this 
region.  Therefore, once a ship came to Malta, it is likely that it would have difficulties sailing 
back to the route that followed the southern coast of Sicily, going west, because this would mean 
that the square-sailed vessel would have to sail tacking against the wind and against the current.  
No doubt, the local winds (Fig. 13) and coastal breezes in this region might have helped this 
crossing at certain times of the year, but a ship that came to Malta was likely to have this port as 
its destination, or is likely to have fallen off track (possibly off Sicily) and have been dragged to 




Fig. 14. Map of the Mediterranean showing the major Phoenician cities and colonies. (Map: author). 
Thucydides’ narration includes a story, which explains clearly that this scenario was 
encountered in antiquity.  The Corinthian reinforcements sent to help Syracuse at the beginning 
of the spring of 413 B.C. could only arrive at the beginning of August, as they were “thrown to 
Libya” by the wind.  This fleet had to follow the coast of Cyrenaica until Neapolis (south of 
Cape Bon), from where they could cross directly to Selinus, and that crossing took two days and 
one night (Fig. 14).32  This particular incident clearly illustrates the difficulties and dangers of 
the passage, and why the northern passage would have been preferred.  All that said, one has to 
remember that the distance between Malta and Sicily is only about 100 kilometers, and even 
though a ship certainly may have had difficulties sailing west or north from Malta, it really was 
not such a prohibitive distance. 
Wind and current patterns forced the ships loaded with products and raw materials of the 
western Mediterranean to follow the only feasible return route along the African coast (Fig. 
15).33  However, after the fall of the Phoenician cities of the East in the mid-sixth century, the 
nature and organization of these trade routes changed considerably, as the Punic commercial 
enterprise became more concentrated in the western basin of the Mediterranean.  The Punic 
colonies in Sicily continued to maintain their connection with North Africa, but this connection 
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between the Sicilian colonies and Africa was very unlikely to have gone through Malta, as it was 
simply not feasible and/or practical to do so due to wind and current patterns.   
 
Fig. 15. Major Phoenician colonies in the western Mediterranean in relation to the wind and current 
patterns.  (Map: author, based on the information provided in Aubet, The Phoenicians, p. 161-162, figs. 
28-29; Pryor, “The Geographical,” p. 206). 
In summary, trade routes connecting the eastern and western Mediterranean ports 
developed according to the environmental parameters briefly described above, as well as the 
locations of profitable markets and resources.34  It is known that Greek colonizers from Euboea 
and the Phoenicians cooperated in the harvesting of Italian natural resources during the eighth 
and seventh centuries B.C.  There is also archaeological material to allow the interpretation that 
there were Phoenician workshops in Etruria manufacturing trade goods to be bartered for 
Etruscan silver, or to be offered as prestigious gift items to secure the cooperation of the local 
Etruscan chieftains who controlled access to native sources of silver.35  The fact that most 
Phoenician-Punic colonies in Sicily are on the north and northwestern coast of the island, and the 
archaeological evidence of direct trade between the Phoenician cities of the Levant and 
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Northeastern Italy (Ischia and Etruria) as early as the eighth century B.C. point to the 
importance, as well as the obvious convenience of the northern route that crossed the Straits of 
Messina instead of circumnavigating Sicily.36   
Therefore, since the objective of Phoenician colonization of Malta cannot be the 
exploitation of the natural resources or the convenience of these islands as a provisioning point, a 
possible explanation for Phoenician interest in controlling such a remote area might lie in the 
way the economic structure of the central Mediterranean was organized.  According to Gonzales, 
the reason for the colonization of Malta is likely to be related to the establishment of Greek 
colonies on the southeastern coast of Sicily, bringing a certain commercial and economic 
segregation in this period, leading to increased competition and a need for protecting claims over 
certain routes and perhaps commodities.37   
City-states of mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, and Ionia started to establish 
colonies in several areas of southern Italy and Sicily in the eighth century B.C.38 The reasons for 
the Greek colonization are complex, but may have been caused by the inability of the Greek 
landmass to sustain a growing population.39  These Greek colonies must have established 
contacts with the Maltese Islands as early as the eighth century, and Greek pottery is so abundant 
in the seventh-century Maltese archaeological contexts that several modern scholars were led to 
believe that it represented evidence for the Greek colonization of the island.40  The growing 
number of Greek colonies and the beginning of a second generation of colonization initiated by 
the original colonies increased the population and settlement density in Sicily, creating 
competition for natural, agricultural, and commercial resources.  Two of these colonies are of 
special significance in understanding the dynamics in the area and their effects on Malta.  
According to Gonzales, the foundation of Greek colonies at Himera and Selinus in the middle of 
the seventh century B.C. was of special interest for Phoenicians in Malta.41  It is likely that the 
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establishment of Selinus was an effort of the Megarans to control the route following the 
southern coast of Sicily, while the Zankleans aimed to spread their influence along the northern 
passage by establishing Himera.42  According to Ciasca and Gonzales this Greek expansion into 
strategic areas could have been countered by the establishment of a Phoenician base in Malta for 
patrol ships that controlled the route along the southern coast of Sicily.43   
According to this hypothesis, while Malta played a peripheral role in the development of 
the Phoenician-Punic realm in the western Mediterranean, its distance to the other colonies, its 
small surface area to sustain a sizeable population, and its general geographic isolation inhibited 
its development as a large naval base or an important commercial center.44  Therefore, the 
Maltese Archipelago remained a small garrison that presented a threat to competitive merchant 
shipping, providing a safe harbor for Phoenician ships in distress, and contributing some local 
products for commerce.45  Based on archaeological signs of the non-violent colonization of the 
island, it is unlikely that the fortifications discovered around certain Phoenician settlements were 
measures taken against the Maltese population.  Therefore, it is clear that the protective measures 
were taken against outside assaults, and this could be either by the ships of the Greeks, the 
Etruscans, or pirates of either origin.46 
Rise of Carthage and the Isolation of Malta 
Excavations in Malta revealed several objects of Phoenician origin, pointing to a direct 
trade or navigational connection with the Levantine coast.47  According to Moscati, the 
similarities in pottery styles, in crafts, in language and writing, as well as the permanence and 
persistence of religious features of eastern origin in Malta, all point to a direct eastern connection 
established in the early phases of Malta’s colonization.48  Although Malta was only on the 
fringes of the developing Phoenician-Punic commercial network, the existence of archaeological 
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objects of Ionian and Aegean origin in archaeological contexts suggests that the island might 
have functioned as a small base that controlled the route passing through the south of Sicily, 
while Ischia controlled the more substantial traffic going through the Straits of Messina.49   
Because of the scarcity of resources in Malta, it was difficult to find goods to exchange 
with an outside source, but the Maltese Islands eventually became a modest part of this 
Phoenician trade system.50  We do not know for certain what products the Maltese Islands 
offered in exchange for imported goods, but the possibilities include cloth, salt, ceramics, and 
carved ivory jewelry and ornaments made out of imported tusks.51    
The best-known Maltese export in the Phoenician period is likely to have been textiles.  
Even though references to the Maltese textile industry all date to the Roman period (see Chapter 
V), it is possible that production started during the Phoenician period or even earlier.  
Unfortunately, because this industry by its nature leaves few traces and because textiles are not 
shipped in containers, it is very difficult to detect its trade in the archaeological record.  Analysis 
of rare archaeological textile samples from Malta showed that the raw material used for Maltese 
textiles was flax.  Flax was presumably imported to Malta, since its cultivation requires a great 
supply of water, which is in short supply on the island.52  But, it is likely that the process of 
transforming flax into linen and the production of linen garments for exportation took place on 
Malta.53   
With the loss of the political autonomy of the Phoenician cities of the east in the mid-
sixth century, Carthage, the most prosperous and powerful of the western colonies, assumed the 
role of champion and leader of the western colonies.  As a consequence, the Maltese Islands lost 
their importance, since the commercial and military routes that joined Carthage to Sicily and 
Sardinia evidently did not pass through Malta, which in turn became a cul-de-sac bypassed by 
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historical and, consequently, cultural development.54  If Malta was a provisioning point for ships 
coming from the eastern Mediterranean going west, that function ended with the fall of Tyre in 
573 B.C.  Without the Phoenician cities of the east, the east-west route that followed a course 
close to Malta must have been abandoned.  It is also likely that the Messina passage became 
easier to access for Punic ships that continued to be involved in eastern trade, especially after the 
fourth century, due to the suspension of hostilities between the Greeks and the Carthaginians in 
consequence of the political developments in Greece, namely its invasion by Alexander the 
Great and its incorporation within the Hellenistic empire.  The inhabitants of Malta, who 
depended completely on this traffic for the marketing of their products, as well as their outside 
contacts of all types, were left in marginal and isolated territory.55   
The appearance of ceramics and amphoras originating from Gela, Syracuse, and Taranto, 
as well as pottery from Greece and Ionian islands, suggest that the population of the Maltese 
Islands received food and other necessities from Sicily, Italy and Greece.  It is possible that in 
the absence of Phoenician-Punic provisioning, the islands turned to the close-by Greek colonies 
of Sicily.56  Another difference that occurs at the end of the fifth century B.C. is the further 
spread of burials throughout the island, suggesting transformation into a predominantly agrarian 
pattern accompanied by rural development.57  However, it is possible that this turn to agriculture 
was not enough to provide sufficient food for the increased population of the island, since in the 
third century B.C. we see migrations of the inhabitants of Malta to other places in the 
Mediterranean such as Lilybaeum and Ibiza.58  It is also possible that the rising piracy of the 
Tyrrhenian Sea in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. expanded into southern Sicily, affecting 




The development of the struggle between the rising power of Rome and its major 
competitor Carthage led to the outbreak of the conflict known as the First Punic War (264-241 
B.C.).  The rising insecurity of the Maltese population can be seen in the construction of a 
complicated system of watchtowers and defensive walls around important structures such as the 
temple area of Tas-Silg and more humble dwellings such as the rural farm of Saint Paul Milqi.  
Finally, a Roman force of unknown magnitude took over control of the Maltese Islands in the 
early years of the Second Punic War (218-202 BC).  However, archaeological evidence shows 
that in the early Roman period the Phoenician-Punic culture was hardly affected by the new 
rulers and was slow to disappear.60 
Summary 
Archaeological evidence shows that there was a direct connection between Malta and the 
Phoenician cities of the Levant, especially during the period of Malta’s initial colonization in the 
seventh century B.C.  Archaeological study of the following period gives the impression that the 
island was quickly reduced to an isolated state and maintained a lateral position within the 
western domain of the Phoenician presence.  It was, therefore, less exposed to political and 
cultural developments, thus preserving certain primary characteristics of its early Phoenician 
culture.61  It is likely that the main function of the inhabitants of the Phoenician colony in Malta 
was to provide some very basic repair and maintenance services for damaged ships, produce 
certain products such as dyed textiles, and maintain their own subsistence.62   
The reason for the Phoenician colonization of the islands in the first place is difficult to 
understand, as the absence of natural, mineral, and agricultural resources cancels the possibility 
of commercial interest.  Therefore, the only plausible explanation for continued Phoenician and 
Punic occupation of the island lies in its strategic importance, potentially capable of controlling 
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the east-west trade route that follows the southern coast of Sicily.  This importance becomes 
more significant during times such as the seventh century, when there was increased Greek 
colonization along this route.  On the other hand, the strategic importance of Malta fluctuates 
depending on regional military, imperialistic, and commercial developments.  With the 
colonization of Sicily by the Greeks, Malta assumed for the first time a strategic importance in 
the contest between Phoenician and Greek commercial and military power blocs for control of 
the martitime routes.63  In all, the archipelago was a strategically-located port-of-call in the wider 
Phoenician maritime network in the seventh century.  In the Punic period, it became a peripheral 
and isolated colony, representing a minor element in the evolution of a Phoenician-Punic world 






The Roman Empire gradually became the biggest consumer and supplier of an immense 
variety of materials, providing enormous opportunities for trade and commerce in the 
Mediterranean.1  Agriculture was the primary occupation of people throughout the Empire and 
was the most important industry.  Food was the single most significant item of production, 
consumption, and trade, both in volume and in value.  The production surplus was either 
exchanged at the local market for goods and services or was surrendered as taxes paid to the 
state and rent paid to landowners.  This transfer of agricultural surplus from producers to 
consumers through trade, taxation, and rent formed the foundation of the Roman economy and of 
the Roman State. Although the Romans could master the sea when there was a pressing need for 
it, they were not eager to be engaged in such activity indefinitely.  The Roman system of 
commercial communications across the Mediterranean was administrated in a very efficient way 
for centuries.2  After the end of major conflicts, the burden of patrolling the seas was entrusted to 
diminutive squadrons of fast and small galleys called liburnians, and most merchants and sailors 
who continued to provide Italy with goods from all parts of the Mediterranean were non-Latin 
provincial merchants, mainly Greeks and Phoenicians.3     
Typical imports of Italy were grain, meat, and raw materials such as wool.  Merchants 
brought silk, glassware, spices, and jewelry from the provinces of Asia, Syria and beyond.  
Luxuries such as papyrus from Egypt, emeralds from Scythia, and perfumes and cosmetics from 
Arabia flooded in from the exotic margins of the Empire and beyond.4  Rome, Alexandria and 
Antioch became the Empire's greatest commercial centers.  The tremendous growth of trade was 
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stimulated by a number of related factors such as the development of extensive road networks, 
provision of safety at sea via the organization of a patrol system, establishment of efficient 
coinage, and the growth of the Empire to include new markets.  
In the previous chapter we saw that Malta became increasingly isolated form the Punic 
domain and gradually developed relations with the neighboring Greek settlements of Sicily.5  
The absence of Etruscan pottery in Malta reveals that the island was isolated from the 
developments in the western Mediterranean basin and the activities of Etruscan traders or 
Tyrrhenian pirates.6  With the beginning of Roman occupation and changes in the socio-political 
structure of the Mediterranean, Malta lost what was left of its strategic importance and became 
just another small island within the quiet Mare Nostrum.7  In the following sections we will 
examine how this new political and economic environment affected the archipelago.  
Literary Sources and Archaeological Evidence 
The earliest Roman literary sources relating to Malta are accounts concerning the Roman 
capture of the islands, the principal account being that of Naevius.8  According to his reports, the 
Roman army crossed to Malta for the first time and laid waste to the island during the First Punic 
War.9  According to the historical analysis of Rizzo, this attack is likely to have taken place in 
255 B.C., when a Roman fleet passed through these waters under the command of the consuls 
Servius Fulvius Petinus and Marcus Aemilius Paulus.10  This information is repeated by the fifth 
century A.D. writer Paulus Orosius, with the exception of the exact name of the consul in charge 
of the forces that destroyed Malta.11   
The expedition described by Naevius was possibly a simple raid rather than a conquest, 
since Rome had to attack Malta again during the Second Punic War.  Livy states that the Maltese 
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Islands were captured (from the Carthaginians) by a Roman fleet, which crossed over from 
Lilybaeum in 218 B.C.12  The Roman forces were under the command of consul Tiberius 
Sempronius Longus, and the small Carthaginian garrison of 2,000 men, under the command of 
Hamilcar son of Gisco, surrendered without much struggle.  It seems that the conversion into 
Roman rule was peaceful and uneventful, and was simply due to the fact that the Punic force was 
too small and lacked a fleet to protect itself.13   
After the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C. and the creation of the Roman province of Africa, 
Malta lost its last shreds of strategic significance. The fact that the islands passed into Roman 
hands but continued to preserve their earlier cultural characteristics with the help of their isolated 
position is apparent in the archaeological record, which reflects a very slow and gradual change 
(due to the Romanization) seen in the material remains.  
Pseudo Skylax (fourth century B.C.) mentions that Melite was a city with a harbor, and 
Gaulos was (only) a city.14  The archaeological evidence also supports the existence of only one 
city on each island throughout the Roman period.  The city of Melite was where the modern 
settlement of Mdina/Rabat is located.  This area has been inhabited since prehistoric times 
because it is the only elevation on the island, visually controlling the territory around it, is close 
to both major harbors at Marsaxlokk and the Grand Harbor, and in proximity of the majority of 
the water springs on the island.15  Based on excavation results, it seems that the three nucleated 
settlements (Mdina/Rabat and its harbor settlement in Marsa, as well as Victoria in Gozo) 
essentially sustained their previous sizes.  There are indications that the Rabat settlement was the 
most populated center and was probably fortified.16   In his 1915 article, Ashby provides detailed 
descriptions of a first century B.C. Roman villa with a peristyle excavated in Rabat, which was 
decorated with mosaic floors and marble sculpture.17   This villa was inhabited for over a century 
and was re-furnished with new decorations (portraits) in the first century A.D.18 
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Archaeological evidence also agrees with the historical record in terms of reflecting 
clearly the continued isolation and detachment of Malta from the Roman sphere of influence, 
even centuries after its ‘conquest’ (Fig. 16).  The earliest Latin inscription, one of a public 
nature, is dated to the beginning of the imperial period, two centuries after the beginning of the 
Roman era in Malta.19  In addition to this inscription, a coin minted in Malta at the end of the 
first century B.C. bears the Latin legend MELITAS.20  According to Bonanno, the inscription is 
an official document in honor of the governor of Malta, while the name of the island appearing 
in Latin on the coin can be explained as part of the standard propagandistic function of Roman 
coinage.21  Phoenician-Punic characteristics also survive in the forms and production techniques 
of the ceramic repertoire on the islands for about two more centuries after the ‘Roman 
conquest.’22    
Fig. 16. Locations of terrestrial sites in Malta during and before the Roman era. (Map: author). 
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A number of other Roman writers mentioned the Maltese Islands.  These are generally 
very short references simply mentioning the location of the islands (i.e., Ptolemy23).  Fortunately, 
we have two writers who provided more detailed information concerning social, political and 
economic life in Malta during the first two centuries of Roman rule.   
Diodorus Siculus was a Roman historian who was born in Agyrium, Sicily.  He wrote 
his major work Bibliotheca Historica in the first century B.C. (ca. 90-21 B.C.).  Bibliotheca 
consits of forty books and is a compilation of the information collected during Diodorus’ travels 
through Asia and Europe.  Historians are generally cautious in accepting Diodorus’ information 
as reliable, but the parts of the Bibliotheca that were based on Diodorus’ personal observations 
are fairly consistent.  Therefore, the information regarding Malta and Gozo, presented in book 
five, could reflect the truth since Diodorus is likely to have been familiar with the products of the 
Maltese Islands.24  From Bibliotheca we learn that the inhabitants of Malta were “blest in their 
professions” and the artisans were “skilled in every manner of craft.”  Diodorus also points to the 
importance of the textile industry and linen production (that had possibly begun during the 
Phoenician period), and the superior quality of the product that was “remarkably sheer and 
soft.”25  This passage explains that the first century B.C. inhabitants of the islands achieved their 
skills through cooperation with the Phoenicians.26  It also seems clear that via the sale of these 
local luxury products the inhabitants increased their wealth and lived in exquisite houses 
“adorned with cornices and finished in stucco with unusual workmanship.”  It is doubtful that 
Diodorus visited the islands himself, however, since he mentions that the Island of Gozo was 
also “adorned with well-situated harbors,” which simply is not the case.  
Cicero also talked about textile production in Malta, which is mentioned as one of the 
examples of Verres’ crimes.27  In this passage written around 70 B.C., Cicero states that Verres 
turned this island, that he has not visited even once, into a textile factory, weaving and making 
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women’s dresses, for three years.28  It is understood from Cicero’s orations that Verres sold the 
Maltese made linens to Rome, presumably for great profit.29  It is also understood from this 
passage that this production was carried out in the only town of Melita, and a secondary location 
of importance on the island was “an ancient temple of Juno on a headland that was not far from 
the town.”30  This temple, which included valuable artifacts (ivories, ivory sculpture and other art 
objects), was plundered by Verres, and the representatives of the people of Melita filed an 
official complaint.  According to Cicero, this temple’s sanctity was not violated during the Punic 
Wars and was respected even by the “pirate hordes.”   
It is clear that Cicero’s aim was to emphasize the cruelty of Verres’ crime when he 
stated: “that the place where our enemies have often landed and the pirates are in the habit of 
passing winter after winter, without laying hands upon it (the temple).”31  His statement suggests 
that enemies of Rome landed in Malta frequently, and that pirates wintering there was a ‘normal’ 
situation.  It is likely that Malta was indeed a well-known pirate base, and even the pirates 
considered it ‘home’ as they did not attack the valuable contents of the temple.   
Historical sources speak of increased piracy in the Mediterranean, especially between 
the third and first centuries B.C.  During this period, no coastal town and merchant ship 
anywhere on the Mediterranean was safe, but certain areas such as the Tyrrhenian, the Adriatic, 
and the Ionian Seas were particularly dangerous.32  The pirates known as the Tyrrhenians were 
possibly a combination of Etruscans, Italians, Sardinians, and Greeks, all living around this sea.  
Illyrians inhabited the northeastern coast of the Adriatic and terrorized this area until the first 
century B.C.  The piracy in the Mediterranean and in the waters surrounding the Italian 
peninsula reached such a level that the grain shipments to Rome were being disrupted by these 
activities, creating a danger of famine in the city.  The Romans took certain measures to control 
the Illyrian pirates, whose fleet reached the size of 220 ships, between the two Punic Wars (241-
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218 B.C.), but could not establish control in the area until the establishment of a permanent 
patrol later in the first century B.C.33  Farther to the east, the Cretans were notorious pirates and 
the pirates of Cilicia became one of the greatest problems of the Romans in the first century 
B.C.34  The first serious attempt to terminate piracy in the Mediterranean was made in 67 B.C. by 
the assignment of Pompey to the task.     
The years immediately before the activities of Pompey were the worst times of pirate 
attacks, which devastated the countryside, especially in Sicily.35  To illustrate Verres’ 
unsuccessful conduct as the governor of Sicily, Cicero reports that pirate attacks on Sicily, 
especially between 73 and 71 B.C., were a constant problem.  It seems possible that at least some 
of these pirates were those who wintered in conveniently nearby Malta.36   According to 
Bussutil, Cicero’s account of pirates wintering in Malta points to a type of symbiotic relationship 
between Malta and the pirates, who possibly provided protection to the island, which in turn 
explains why the temple was never violated.37  It is possible that the absence of a standing 
Roman fleet or a patrol force compelled the Maltese to seek an arrangement with the pirates to 
avoid destruction.  Busuttil also points to the possibility that the small population of the islands 
must have been socially (and culturally) affected by these winter guests, who, without a doubt, 
frequented the harbors in the summer as well.38   
Piracy must have been beneficial for the inhabitants of Malta.  Some possibly became 
pirates themselves and the island may have served as a market for the plundered goods of the 
pirates (i.e., slaves and captured goods), contributing to the island’s economy.  Another 
economic activity could have been to provide repair, maintenance and provisioning services for 
ships harboring or wintering in Malta.39   
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Fig. 17. Warehouses in Marsa as drawn by Barbaro in 1794. (From: Barbaro). 
Remains of certain buildings that date to the Roman period were still standing in 1768 at 
one extremity of the Grand Harbor near Marsa.40  Carl’Antonio Barbaro’s careful examination 
and description of these structures provide the only information available about them (Fig. 17).41  
Barbaro believes that the buildings were first constructed by the Phoenicians, and based on the 
ash deposits he observed in the urns that were recovered from this building, he thinks that they 
had funerary functions in the Roman period.42  In explaining the function of these buildings, 
Barbaro points out that at least one of them possibly had a harbor-related function, presumably 
based on the inscriptions and the path or cart-ruts leading to the sea.43  Ashby mentions that 
warehouses containing several hundred complete amphoras were found near Corradino Hill.44  
Of these amphoras, 24 bore graffiti in Greek, and coins found with the amphoras date the 
assemblage to between the third century B.C. and the ninth century A.D.45  Possibly because of 
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the other finds mentioned by Barbaro and Ashby (i.e., parts of marble columns and sculpture 
fragments), scholars are generally inclined to date this long-lost find to the Roman period.46  
What is described by Ashby as “a quay-wall of large stones,” was found in connection with these 
buildings.47  They were reported as “buried in levels containing nothing but Roman sherds.”48  
Thus far, structures that may have served as warehouses, pointing to the possibility of a harbor 
settlement, have only been identified at this location.  Accordingly, it is likely that there was 
only one commercial center in the Maltese Archipelago located at Marsa.  Archaeological finds 
from underwater contexts possibly dating to the Roman period are scattered around the islands, 
but this may only point to the dangerous sailing conditions around the islands rather than to the 
use of other (and much less convenient) bays for commercial purposes (Fig. 18).  I would also 
like to emphasize that the existence of a lead anchor stock in a particular location does not 
necessarily mean that there is a wreck there.49  Moreover, sometimes even the existence of 
several wrecks in a certain location does not necessarily mean anything more than that there 
were navigational hazards in that area.  Therefore, one has to be careful in assessing the 
archaeological evidence and the context of the artifacts before reaching conclusions about the 




Fig. 18. Locations of underwater remains in Malta based on the information provided by Scicluna [After: 
Carta dei rinvenimenti sottomarini lungo le coste dell’isola di Malta, Missione Archeologica Italiana a 
Malta (Rome, 1965)]. 
There have been many Roman-era ship-related archaeological finds around the Maltese 
Islands.  The majority of these are lead anchor stocks recovered by fishermen and sport divers, 
and ‘reported’ to the Museum, but generally kept by the finder.50  As discussed above, the 
presence of a lead anchor stock does not necessarily indicate a shipwreck site, as it is well known 
that ships may lose anchors for several reasons and still avoid shipwreck.51  It was also the 
practice of ships in severe distress to jettison cargo in order to lighten the vessel and avoid 
shipwreck.52  Artifacts on the seabed do not necessarily mean a shipwreck occurred at that site.  
Some objects, broken or intact, are simply discarded from a ship while it lays at anchor, or while 
under sail.  Therefore, it is necessary to be careful in identifying the find-spot of an individual 
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amphora or an anchor stock as a shipwreck or even an anchorage site.53 Ceramics and anchor 
stocks are often found in locations of popular sport diving activities (and diving schools) or areas 
where there are dangerous reefs or other natural hazards (i.e., strong currents and dangerous 
coastal breezes) that caused ships to lose their anchors since they first began sailing around these 
islands.  Figure 18 shows the areas investigated by the team from the Institute of Nautical 
Archaeology, based on previous reports to the Museum.  We were able to determine with 
certainty that only the Melliehha Bay and outer Xlendi reef represented possible shipwreck sites, 
and collected broken pottery fragments of Roman date in the Marsamxett harbor and Salina Bay 
(material of Roman date located by INA is marked in orange).54  For the latter two, since the 
archaeological finds only represent a few broken pottery fragments, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not these locations represented anchorages or harbors with any economic 
importance.55 
Even less is known about Roman-era harbors and settlements of the island of Gozo.  The 
main town of Gozo stood almost in the center of the island and was almost certainly at Victoria 
(also known as Rabat).56  Some information comes from eighteenth-century writers who noted 
the existence of architectural elements mostly in the form of fragments.  Inscriptions and a series 
of architectural pieces – cornices, capitals, shafts and bases of columns – were noted by 
eighteenth-century writers such as G. Agius de Soldanis and Jean Houel, lying about in the 
streets of Rabat and Cittadella.   These suggest that the town of Gaulos was prosperous enough 
to possess public and religious buildings adorned with marble architectural decoration.57  Markoe 
suggests that the coastal settlement of Gozo was at Mgarr, but this is highly unlikely because 
before the construction of the modern breakwater there, this bay was not a well-protected one.58  
Xlendi, Mgarr, Marsalforn, and Ramla Bays are likely to have been significant in the economic 
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infrastructure of Punic and Roman Gozo, with roads from these coastal areas converging at the 
inland site of Victoria.59   
 Figure 18 shows the locations of underwater material around the island of Gozo.  The 
only possible shipwrecks discovered at Gozo are outside Xlendi Bay (Appendix A).60  The 
archaeological material there dates from the third century B.C. to the fifth century A.D.  
However, this does not indicate the economic importance of Xlendi Bay, but shows clearly that 
the entrance to Xlendi Bay was a dangerous spot for ships throughout history.  On the other 
hand, it is hard to determine what this underwater assemblage actually represents.  As discussed 
in Appendix A in detail, the only conclusion that can be derived with certainty is that ships 
carrying large cargoes sailed around the islands.  That some of the amphoras dating to the 
Roman period may be of Maltese production points to the fact that Malta exported either empty 
containers or some liquid product (i.e., olive oil, wine, or honey inside the jars).61  References to 
oil production in Malta, and archaeological remains of oil presses from the Roman period 
indicate that if these amphoras were full, they were likely to have included olive oil.62  Future 
studies of the organic remains and pollen preserved in the amphora contents from this site may 
help to determine the products carried in them.  
Scarcity of underwater archaeological remains around Malta, and the absence of detailed 
scientific studies on existing wrecks (i.e., the shipwrecks off Xlendi) limit our knowledge about 
the role of the Maltese Islands in the greater Mediterranean economy during the Roman period 
(Fig. 19).  However, the fact that the Maltese Islands are almost absent in contemporary literary 
works points to their peripheral state in the Roman domain.  After Cicero’s references to Malta 




Fig. 19.  Salt pans of unknown date at Xlendi. (Photograph: author). 
The wrecking of Saint Paul’s ship, described in the Acts of the Apostles, constitutes the 
next instance where Malta reappears in written sources.64  There have been countless discussions 
about the interpretation and reliability of the information presented in this account of Saint 
Paul’s shipwreck off Malta, possibly around the year A.D. 60.65  It has been debated whether or 
not the journey described by Luke was an actual journey undertaken by Paul.66   Conzelmann 
believes that the events of this journey are full of realistic details and really must have happened 
at some time to somebody, but it was one of those stories of sea voyage and shipwreck current in 
literature roughly contemporary with the time of Luke.67  There also are different views about 
the identification of Malta as the shipwreck site, since some biblical scholars believe that Saint 
Paul’s ship drifted to the north into the Adriatic and ran aground in Mljet (Meleda) off the 
Dalmatian coast, to the Island of Cephalonia in the Ionian Sea off the Greek coast, to the Island 
of Capri off the Italian coast, or even to the city of Mitylene on the Island of Lesbos in the 
Aegean.68   
However, it is generally accepted that Saint Paul’s ship is much more likely to have 
drifted to Malta with the prevailing northeasterlies.69  Apart from all the different debates, there 
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are certain types of reliable information one can gather from the narration of Saint Paul’s 
journey, which can be analyzed in two major groups.  The first type of information concerns the 
general organization of navigation and trade routes in this period.  Saint Paul’s route from the 
Levantine coast to Rome follows the direction of current in the Mediterranean, as reviewed in 
the previous chapter (i.e., following the Levantine coast and the southern coast of Asia Minor, 
reaching Crete and crossing the Ionian Sea towards the Straits of Messina).   
The part of Saint Paul’s journey after Crete is of special importance, as its detailed 
description provides information about navigation conditions in this part of the Mediterranean.  
The first problem encountered was the beginning of strong winds due to the late season 
(October) this ship was sailing in.70  While sailing to a harbor called Phoenix on Crete for the 
purpose of wintering there, the ship was caught in an east-northeasterly wind called 
Euroclydon.71  The ship could not sail against this wind so they decided to let it drift with the 
wind, which pushed the ship towards Syrte.72  Several measures were taken to secure the ship, 
such as taking the tender in (normally towed) and jettisoning some of the cargo and other heavy 
tackle of the ship to the sea in order to ‘lighten’ the ship.73  After drifting in the Ionian Sea 
(Adria) for about thirteen or fourteen days, the ship finally came close to land.74  As they 
approached the shore, the crew dropped four anchors from the stern of the ship in order to avoid 
hitting any rocks in the increasingly shallow depths.  
The second type of information that can be retrieved from this passage is about the 
island of Malta itself.  The shipwreck incident, which possibly took place in one of the bays on 
the coast of Malta, has caused great speculation in modern times and different ideas about the 
location of the event led several expeditions to seek the evidence of this biblical incident in the 
waters surrounding Malta.75  According to the description in the Acts of the Apostles, during the 
last phase of the storm the only hope of survival seemed to lie in beaching the ship in a small 
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inlet.   The crew of the ship cut all the anchor lines, abandoning the anchors on the seabed.76  The 
ship was then driven aground and the people on board swam to shore, some holding on to 
floating pieces of the ship that was already breaking apart.  The survivors encountered the 
“barbarous people” of the island, who were presumably the Punic-speaking Maltese locals.77  
The second group of inhabitants of the island was exemplified by the Latin-speaking man named 
Publius, “the chief man of the island,” who offered accommodation to Paul and his immediate 
companions (Luke, Aristarchus and Julius the centurion, and not to all 276 men on board) for 
three days after Paul healed Publius’ father.  Paul healed other sick people on the island during 
the time he spent there, waiting for the sailing season to begin in order to continue his journey to 
Rome.  Finally, three months later, they all left on board a ship named Dioskouroi (“sons of 
Zeus”) of Alexandria headed to Syracuse.    
Apart from the obvious religious and cultural importance of this event on the future 
development of Maltese identity, culture, and other related traditions, Saint Paul’s shipwreck is 
also an event of great significance in recognizing the context of Malta in the Mediterranean 
Roman world.78  First of all, one has to note the similarities in the drifting of the ship that carried 
Saint Paul to Malta and the story of the Corinthian reinforcements sent to Syracuse at the 
beginning of the spring of 413 B.C., and who drifted to Libya.79   That ships pushing south with 
the northeasterly and northwesterly winds (depending on the season) ended up in the Gulf of 
Syrte is also supported by the sailors of Saint Paul’s ship’s reaction to the storm.80   
There is no doubt that the ship carrying Saint Paul ended up in Malta accidentally.  
Therefore, the authors who refer to Saint Paul’s ship coming to Malta from the east as literary 
evidence pointing to the existence of trade contacts with the eastern Mediterranean are 
mistaken.81  But based on the information, it seems that just like the ship, Dioskouroi, that took 
them on board at the end of the winter, some merchant ships did go to Malta to winter there.  It is 
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also remarkable that the latter ship could not cross to Sicily throughout the winter due to 
dangerous conditions.   
Numerous lead anchor stocks and collars of Roman type were discovered around the 
Maltese Islands, including the largest one ever discovered in the Mediterranean.82  An anchor 
stock that is of these dimensions would fit a wooden anchor about six meters long.  Such large 
anchors are likely to have been carried by the very large bulk carriers of Roman times generally 
involved in the grain trade.  There is ample literary evidence regarding the fact that Rome was 
dependent on grain shipped from the provinces, especially Egypt.83   Just like the ship that 
carried Saint Paul from Alexandria, it is possible some of these grain ships ended up in Malta 
due to storms, or went there to supply the inhabitants of the island.84   Therefore, it is likely that 
many ships drifted into these dangerous coasts by northerly storms and which did not have the 
island as their intended final destination.  There is very little doubt that the Mellieha shipwreck 
dating to the second or third century A.D. shared a similar fortune with that of Saint Paul’s.  As 
the excavator of the site, Honor Frost puts it: “The ship, driven by a gregale, northeasterly wind, 
sank on the ‘rock awash’ in the middle of the bay.”85   However, the Mellieha Wreck’s cargo 
(especially its glass) is likely to have originated in Italy, suggesting a route opposite to that of 
Saint Paul’s ship.86   
The other valuable information the biblical passage provides regarding Malta is the very 
clear indication that the Maltese people still spoke Punic in the first century A.D.  This not only 
signals the persistence of old traditions in Malta, but also the slowness of Romanization and the 
isolated state of the island.  What cannot be determined with certainty from this account are, 
unfortunately, the aspects of greatest interest to nautical archaeologists.  Firstly, this account 
clearly states that the ship ran aground in shallow water and disintegrated quickly, allowing the 
survivors to hold onto floating pieces of the ship.  Therefore, it is almost impossible to find the 
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remains of this ship.  Secondly, this account does not provide clear indication of where in Malta 
the survivors landed, so one can not know which beach was used for this purpose.  And, thirdly, 
there is no indication that anyone was converted to Christianity during the three months Saint 
Paul spent in Malta.  As Bonanno states “One must admit, however, that for the first three 
centuries of our era there is no evidence, not even archaeological, of the practice of the Christian 
religion (in Malta).”87   
The question of Christianizing brings us to the period following the division of the 
Roman empire into two parts: The western part, on the decline from the beginning of the fourth 
century until its collapse with the death of the last emperor of the west, Romulus Augustulus, in 
A.D. 476, and the eastern part centered in Byzantium, which was made the new capital of the 
empire by Constantine in AD 330.  The literary sources do not throw much light on the 
vicissitudes of either Gozo or Malta during this period.   It is possible that the Vandals and the 
Ostrogoths attacked and occupied the islands for a short time.  Brown believes that both found 
themselves under the jurisdiction of the Byzantine Empire around A.D. 535 when Sicily was 
conquered by Belisarius, the general of Emperor Justinian. 88 
Conclusions 
It seems that Malta was attacked and destroyed by a Roman fleet around the mid-third 
century B.C., and then occupied by another Roman fleet in 218 B.C.  Possibly beginning in the 
third century B.C., the island became a pirate hideout and a wintering base.  It is likely that these 
pirates organized their attacks on Sicilian towns and merchant shipping in the Tyrrhenian and 
Ionian Seas from Malta.  Consequently, the islands themselves were never subjected to pirate 
attacks; the sanctuary on the island was adorned with rich gifts, and the island economy 
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benefited through the marketing of pirate booty.  On the other hand, the islands continued to be 
officially connected to Sicily and under the control of its governor.   
The Maltese Islands were ultimately integrated into the Roman Empire and court cases 
regarding complaints of the Maltese subjects (i.e., incidents after the sack of the Temple of Juno 
by the governor Verres) were heard in Rome.  From Cicero’s accusations, we understand that 
governor Verres himself might have collaborated with pirates, and it seems possible that the 
Maltese population was terrorized both by the pirates and the governor who put them to work to 
produce linen garments (which he himself sold in Rome) and looted their temple.  It is not clear 
how politics worked in the region, but based on the archaeological evidence it seems that the 




LATE ROMAN AND BYZANTINE PERIOD 
 
 There is virtually no archaeological or literary record that provides information about 
social and economic developments in Malta during the period between Saint Paul’s shipwreck in 
the first century and the sixth century.  The few inscriptions dating to this period suggest only 
that an increasingly Romanized community that practiced emperor worship existed on the 
island.1  But for the most part, the situation in Malta and the nature of its transition into the 
Byzantine period can only be indirectly deduced from the general trends of wider social, 
economic, and military developments in the Mediterranean to which Malta was exposed. 
Between the late second and late third centuries, the Roman Empire began to show signs 
of decline.  The Severan period (193-235) and especially the period immediately thereafter was 
defined by military anarchy leading to a succession of short reigns and eventually the rule of the 
soldier-emperors (235–284).  Since the expansion to include Asia Minor, the Levant and Egypt, 
the cultural and economic centers of the Roman Empire were in the east.  With the exception of 
Rome, the west remained largely rural and agricultural.  Especially during the period of anarchy 
in the third century, social life declined in the Roman towns of the western provinces.  On the 
other hand, the Roman aristocracy, whose secure lifestyle in large fortified estates of the 
countryside, flourished and eventually developed into medieval feudalism.  The wealthy elites of 
Gaul and Britain owned estates worked by slaves and free Celtic peasants.  They also developed 
a taste for luxury items such as silver, glass, and oriental goods. 
When Diocletian emerged as an able and strong ruler in 284, he ensured the protection 
and reorganization of the empire by creating new, smaller provinces, marking a clear distinction 
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between the duties of military commanders and civil governors, and sharing overall control with 
peers by dividing the empire into western and eastern halves.  Unfortunately, this experiment in 
power sharing lasted only a short time, and Constantine eventually reunited the Western and 
Eastern halves of the empire in 324. 
As political power shifted to Constantinople, the new capital of the Eastern Roman 
Empire founded in 330, the church gradually replaced the declining civil authority at Rome.  
One of the major deficiencies of this new political entity in the east, later known as the 
Byzantine Empire, was that the first generation of rulers (i.e., before the fifth century) neglected 
the establishment of a navy, which, in turn, contributed to the loss of the western Mediterranean 
territories in the wake of the Germanic invasions.2  The Germanic tribes who lived along the 
northern borders of the empire emerged as political and military powers at the end of the fourth 
century.  In the 370s, the Huns invaded areas along the Danube River, driving many of the 
Germanic tribes into the Roman provinces.  The emperor Valens was killed by the Visigoths at 
Adrianople in 378, and the succeeding emperor, Theodosius I, conducted campaigns against the 
Goths, but failed to evict them from the empire.  After his death in 395, the empire was divided 
between his sons, Honorius (Western Roman emperor) and Arcadius (Eastern Roman emperor) 
but the West could not survive the incessant barbarian invasions.  Under Alaric, the Visigoths 
sacked Rome in 410 and Spain and Southern France were occupied.   The German, Odovacer, 
became the king of Rome in 476 after deposing Romulus Augustulus, the last Roman emperor in 
the West.  In 493 the great Ostrogothic leader Theodoric established a kingdom in Italy but, 
more importantly, the Vandals captured Carthage and created a powerful navy that was the 
center pole of their naval kingdom that included North Africa, the Balearics, Sardinia, and 
Corsica.3  The eastern Roman provinces survived the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 
and developed into what we today refer to as the Byzantine Empire. 
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In the western Mediterranean, the Vandal fleet controlled the seas and their piratical 
expeditions terrorized the western Mediterranean and southern Greece with little opposition.4  
Ostrogoth efforts to establish themselves in southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia were also 
supported by a smaller naval force that concentrated its activities in this area.  It is possible that 
the Vandals and the Ostrogoths attacked or occupied the Maltese Islands for a short time but 
there is no evidence of permanent occupation.5  The Saint Bishop of Vita (in North Africa), 
Victor, writing around the middle of the fifth century mentions that several islands (Sardinia, 
Sicily, Corsica, Maiorca, Minorca, and Ebusum) were conquered by the Vandals.6  Based on the 
evidence suggesting that Malta became increasingly dependent on Sicily in the preceding few 
centuries, it is reasonable to suggest that Malta was also in this group.  Following the same logic, 
it is possible that Malta also was subsequently absorbed by the Ostrogoths who took control of 
Sicily around 478.  It should be emphasized, however, that there is no direct evidence for Vandal 
or Ostrogoth control of Malta.   
Taking advantage of a general decline among the Germanic Kingdoms, the Emperor 
Justinian I (527-565) undertook to restore the western Mediterranean to the Empire.  Realizing 
that control of the seas would be the key to success, he began by dispatching an armada against 
the Vandal naval kingdom in 533.  The Vandal fleet, still to be avoided at all costs, had been 
decoyed to Sardinia where Justinian had fomented a revolt.  The Byzantine forces were able to 
capture Carthage without opposition from the sea, and the Vandal kingdom collapsed.7  
The Maltese Islands are likely to have passed into the jurisdiction of the Byzantine 
Empire in this period, possibly around 535, when Belisarius, the general of Emperor Justinian, 
conquered Sicily.  The first unequivocal datable reference to medieval Malta is supplied by 
Procopius, the Greek historian who wrote an account of the wars the Byzantines fought during 
the reign of Justinian.  In the section that describes the events of the year 533, Procopius reports 
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that Belisarius’ fleet had departed from a location called Caucana (identified as the Porto 
Lombardo on the island of Lipari) and ‘touched at’ the Maltese Islands on its way to Africa.8  
The Greek verb used implies a very short anchoring time, or maybe even simply sailing close to 
the islands but not landing.  However, it is certain that Malta was not Byzantine at that time since 
Belisarius had to get permission from the Goths to launch this attack from a base in Sicily.  If 
Malta was Byzantine it could have been used as a staging base for the expedition and there 
would have been no need for such an intricate strategic and political dealings to allow Byzantine 
access to Sicily.   
Byzantium moved against the Ostrogoths, and by 540 most of Italy including the 
Ostrogothic capital at Ravenna was in Byzantine hands.  Brown believes that Malta was 
Byzantine territory by 544, based on an indirect reference to the island, once again by Procopius.  
In this section Procopius mentions that the Libyans who survived the Berber invasions fled to 
‘Sicily and the other islands.’9  Brown believes that Malta is among the ‘other islands’ and that 
this passage proves that the Maltese Islands were conquered some time between 535 and 544.10  
Because the Maltese Islands had increasing contact with the Greek settlements of Sicily since the 
fifth century B.C., the traits of Greek culture were already commonplace on the island.11  
Therefore, the transition of the island to Byzantine rule occasioned almost no major cultural 
changes that can be detected in the present day material remains.12  
Procopius also mentions the name of the island in a familiar shipwreck story.  Artabanes, 
the commander of the armies in Sicily who was crossing the Ionian Sea from Cephalonia to 
Sicily, was caught in a storm off Calabria.  Having lost his mast during the storm, Artabanes 
could do nothing but to let his ship drift to Malta.13 
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The fighting between the Ostrogothic kingdom and Byzantium continued until the 
definitive victory of the latter in 551.  Also around this time, another Byzantine fleet took control 
of the Mediterranean coast of Vizigothic Spain, and the Balearics.  The Mediterranean once 
again became a Roman lake, kept secure by efficient Byzantine naval dominance.14    
In this new world order, the Maltese Islands were included in the patrimony of the 
Roman church and were possibly incorporated into the secular administration of Sicily.15  
However, this system might have been imposed on Malta at a later date, as there seems to be no 
evidence for the existence of a bishopric in Malta before 553.16  The first unequivocal references 
to a bishop in Malta are recorded in the register of the letters of Pope Gregory the Great (590-
604).17  Unfortunately, these documents provide very little information other than the fact that 
Malta now had a bishop. 
Regardless of how the Maltese Islands were incorporated into the Byzantine system, it is 
clear that they were in the Byzantine domain.  The Byzantine fleet emerged as the dominant 
naval power in the Mediterranean during the period following the victories against the Vandals 
in North Africa and Ostrogoths in Italy.18  The Vandal fleet had utterly disappeared and the 
Ostrogoths had completely abandoned their naval claims.  Ahrweiler states that the 
Mediterranean was not a border of the Byzantine Empire, but was the core of it, by providing 
cohesion and unity for the lands that bordered the sea via the sea-lanes stretching from the 
Caucasus to beyond the pillars of Hercules and from Crimea to the Red Sea.  Therefore, 
providing safety on the sea not only for commercial shipping but also for communication was of 
crucial importance to the Empire.19   Safety at sea led to a flourishing maritime trade, and 
increased shipping.  In turn, piracy became more appealing to many as a vocation.  The period 
between the sixth and the eleventh centuries is characterized by a rise in piracy that was 
increasingly directed against coastal settlements, especially after the emergence of the Muslim 
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state in the seventh century.20  Piracy against coastal settlements generally indicates diminished 
maritime activity and the absence of commercial vessels with rich cargoes plying the regular 
trade routes.21  The transformation of the Byzantine fleet, and its incorporation to the theme 
system created in 582 by Emperor Maurise, was the first Byzantine reaction to these 
developments.22  The army was also divided into smaller units; the Byzantine Emperor had his 
own garrison troops, tagmata, at Constantinople and a series of provincial armies stationed in 
political regions called the themata.  The themal system involved the introduction of a 
decentralized government and the creation of provinces with their own, independent themal 
fleets.  Under this system the expense of maintaining a navy fell directly on the same areas of the 
Empire that required naval protection.  The imperial fleet was kept in Constantinople and smaller 
themal fleets were assigned to patrol their own areas (themes).  The system proved to be very 
effective in providing safety at sea, at least to some extent, until the appearance of the Arabs on 
the eastern and southeastern coasts of the Mediterranean, shortly followed by the emergence of 
their fleet as the major rival to Byzantine forces in the Mediterranean.23  In the 600s, Persian and 
Arab invasions devastated much of Byzantium’s eastern territories.  Especially after the capture 
of Egypt and its port Alexandria by the Arabs in 641, and the establishment of other bases on the 
Syrian coast, the Arabs became a powerful naval enemy.  In addition, the loss of major 
commercial centers like Alexandria and Antioch, which were the second and the third largest 
cities of the Roman Empire and major elements of commercial system, disrupted the commercial 
interactions and shipping throughout the Mediterranean. 
Byzantine ceramics dating to the sixth and the seventh centuries found in Mdina and 
Tas-Silg in Malta and in Cittadella in Gozo indicate that Malta was also frequented by eastern 
merchants and ships during the period of relative peace following the establishment of 
Justinian’s system.24  Based on the Byzantine ceramics found in the area near Marsa, it is likely 
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that this inlet continued to serve as the main port for the islands.25  The dating of scattered 
ceramic fragments excavated at the shore of the Marsascala Bay by a Franco-Maltese team in 
1993 indicate that this location may have been used as an anchorage from the second century 
B.C. until the seventh century A.D.26  The greatest concentration of dated material clusters 
around the fifth and the sixth centuries and this possibly points to the fact that more ships 
anchored here during the Roman and Byzantine periods.27  However, the archaeological material 
is very difficult to interpret in this case, as no information is available about whether or not there 
was a terrestrial settlement around the Marsascala Bay.  In addition to the shrinking population 
and limited settlement in urban areas, it also seems that the occupants of these settlements in the 
center of the island felt insecure and built fortifications.  It is difficult to tell who or what caused 
these defensive measures, but raiding pirates or the Arabs are the likely candidates.   
In all, the archipelago did not seem to have any importance for the Empire during this 
period.  Its isolated location justified its only known function: a place of exile.28  A reference to 
the Maltese Islands comes from Patriarch Nicephorus’ account of the events of 637.  In this year, 
Emperor Heraclius exiled his brother’s son Theodorus, who was accused of conspiracy, to the 
Maltese Islands after having his nose and hands cut off.29  Theodorus was accompanied with a 
letter to the dux, the local military commander on the island, who ordered one of his legs to be 
amputated upon his arrival.  The Byzantine chronicler Theophanes’ account, dated 790, also 
confirms the function of the island as a place of exile. Emperor Constantine VI sent the leaders 
of the revolt of the Armenaikon theme to Sicily and “the other islands” for exile.30  
Apart from the information in ‘Theodorus’ letter’ that suggested that a dux was in charge 
of Malta, there is even less secure evidence that the islands might have been home to other 
important military personnel.  A seal that supposedly dates to the eighth or the ninth century 
bears the name of Niketas droungarios and archon of Malta.31  The seal was published in 1900 
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by Schlumberger and apparently belonged to Marquis d’Anselme de Puisaye, who had 
purchased it in Tunis, and subsequently lost it.  Brown’s unsuccessful search for the seal is 
described in detail in his 1975 article, as well as his doubts about the date assigned to the 
artifact.32  Nevertheless, the seal appears to point to the existence of a high-ranking naval officer 
in Malta, presumably with a small fleet.33  Based on an evaluation of the organization of the 
Byzantine navy, the title droungarios used here would imply that Niketas was in charge of a 
sizeable naval squadron and may have been directly responsible to the emperor.34  The fact that 
he also was the archon means that he was entrusted with the administration of the island.35  
However, Brown believes that this situation might also be interpreted as Niketas being the 
commander of a droungos (a unit of 1,000-3,000 men), who had taken over the functions of the 
civil governor of the town.36  In all, the scant literary and archaeological evidence from Malta is 
not enough to suggest that the islands were a naval center of major importance.37  It should also 
be noted that during this period the Byzantine navy was weakening its grip, especially over the 
western Mediterranean, as the central government was very much involved with religious and 
political crises in the capital.   
Constantinople was under an Arab siege between 716-718.  Once the Arabs were forced 
to lift their siege due the able command of the new Byzantine Emperor Leo III, another equally-
devastating time known as the Iconoclastic Period (717-843) had begun.  Initially, the 
destruction of holy icons provoked a popular revolt and in one instance, an unruly mob killed an 
officer who had removed statuary from an altar.  That first inflammatory incident was followed 
by the revolt of the troops of the Theme of Hellas.  It also became evident that the European 
provinces were opposed to the new religious policies.  Leo's attempts to win over the Patriarch 
and the Pope also failed and shortly thereafter, in 787, Charlemagne conquered most of Italy, put 
an end to the Lombard Kingdom and was proclaimed Holy Roman Emperor in 800.   
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At the end of the eighth century, widespread economic development took place in the 
eastern Muslim provinces that began to revitalize the markets of the eastern Mediterranean.  
New caravan routes opened between Egypt and the Atlantic coast of Africa, which avoided 
Byzantine-controlled waters in the Middle Sea.38   In short, during these years (mid sixth to late 
eighth century) the Byzantines were never able to use their control of the central Mediterranean 
to completely dominate the maritime activity of their Islamic or Western neighbors.39   
The Arab conquest of Crete in 825-826 required the Byzantine Empire to re-evaluate the 
organization of their navy.  Crete was of crucial importance to maintain connections with the 
western territories (i.e., Italy and Sicily).40  As mentioned above, the theme system, established 
in the late sixth or early seventh centuries, was basically a defensive organization based on small 
and localized fleets, dedicated to protecting specific areas against pirates and to maintain the sea 
border with the Islamic Caliphate.41  Crete was not recovered until 961, but a re-organization of 
the Byzantine fleet from a defensive force into an offensive weapon was realized.  The theme 
system was abandoned, and a number of imperial fleets were established with the goal of re-
asserting Byzantine power in the Mediterranean and recovering all “Roman domains.”42   
The ninth and the tenth centuries were characterized by steady Islamic expansion, and 
Muslim sea power mustered sufficient strength to take control of most of the islands of the 
Mediterranean: the Balearics, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica in the West, and Cyprus in the East 
were all conquered.  This ‘sea change’ was a return to the situation that had existed during the 
reigns of Justinian and his successors, when ships from Syria and Egypt could freely move 
through the waters of the Middle Sea to the West and vice versa.43  
The only two early medieval sites on Malta known to have been occupied until the 
Muslim period are the Byzantine basilica at Tas-Silg and the dwelling that replaced the Roman 
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villa at San Pawl Milqi.  In addition, the remains of a villa in Rabat, Gozo are similar to those of 
San Pawl Milqi.  The archaeological evidence from these sites indicates that the standard of 
living declined gradually until the ninth century.44 
The Maltese Islands were captured by a Muslim force originating from North Africa in 
870, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  There are no Byzantine accounts of 
this event, but a tenth century Byzantine document mentions the crown’s claims to the island of 
Sicily, and its 22 cities, after the island was completely lost to Muslims.  Pertusi mentions that 
eight of these cities were on the islands of Malta and Gozo and they are mentioned among the 




MIDDLE AGES: PERIOD OF MUSLIM OCCUPATION 
 
Historical texts, archaeological sites, and ethnographic evidence clearly point to a period 
between the late ninth and late thirteenth centuries, during which the Maltese Islands were under 
the Muslim sphere of political and cultural influence.  Then, between the thirteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, the Maltese population transformed from predominantly Muslim beliefs into devout 
Roman Catholicism.  Between 1530 and 1789, the Maltese Islands were the home of the Order 
of Saint John, a major institutional force in the military strategy to protect Christian Europe from 
Islamic expansionism.  Consequently, the religious identity of Malta as a Catholic nation 
occupies a very important place in Maltese culture and in the mind of the present day Maltese 
population. 
The modern political and ideological direction of Malta is concentrated towards an 
economic and cultural integration into Europe.  Therefore, African and Muslim contributions to 
Maltese heritage not only conflict with everything Malta ‘wants to be’, but also are generally 
treated as a dark spot in the history of the island that the modern Maltese population is willing to 
ignore.1  Predecessors of this tendency can be found in the seventeenth century texts that 
constitute the foundations of Maltese history.  Modern scholars are generally aware of the 
existence of such inconsistencies and incorrect information in earlier histories of Malta, but these 
misconceptions are deeply imbedded in the literature, and repetitions of some mistakes can still 
be seen in various recent publications.   The physical characteristics of the modern Maltese 
population (looking much like the inhabitants of North Africa) and the Maltese language (a 
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Semitic one that originated from a North African dialect of Arabic) are reminders of the Muslim 
periods and subsequent interactions with Muslim North Africa.  
The current interpretation of medieval Maltese history is largely based on the 
information presented in a text titled Descrittione di Malta, published in 1647.2  The author of 
the Descrittione, a Maltese scholar named Gian Francesco Abela, was a patrician cleric who 
eventually became the Order’s vice-chancellor.3  Modern historians tend to regard Abela as a 
reliable source, but a close examination of his work reveals that the history presented there is 
based on unreliable materials such as local stories, popular folklore, and legends.  Furthermore, it 
appears Abela consciously misinterpreted and distorted his sources to portray Malta as innately 
European and Christian, de-emphasizing its historic links with Africa and Islam.4  Abela’s 
history was reprinted in Latin in 1723 in the fifteenth volume of Johannes Graevius’ Thesaurus 
Antiquitatum et Historiarum Siciliae, and it was re-edited in 1772 by Giovanni Ciantar and 
published in Italian in four volumes as Malta Illustrata.5  In an eighteenth century effort to 
strengthen the case for Abela’s distortions, a Maltese priest named Abate Vella generated forged 
Arabic documents.6  Even though these manuscripts are interesting to read, since they clearly 
illustrate how historiographic scholarship may be influenced by ideology and politics, it is 
apparent that there are no reliable texts of European or Maltese origin that provide information 
about the period between the ninth and thirteenth centuries.  
Unfortunately, contemporary Arabic sources that include information regarding the Arab 
period of Malta are very limited.7  In most cases, Muslim geographers only provide basic 
information about the geographical position of Malta; but there are distinct discrepancies in 
some of these descriptions (i.e., Qazwini mentions that Malta is close to the Iberian Peninsula).8  
Figure 20 shows an Arabic map from this period that mistakenly locates the island in the Aegean 
Sea.  ‘Ad Dimasqi – mistakenly – mentions that Malta is 60 miles long (about 96 kilometers) and 
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30 miles (48 kilometers) wide, and has one city on it, called Malta,9 and Al-‘Umari, states that 
Malta is close to Tripoli, has a protected harbor on the east side of the island, and is abundant in 
sheep, honey and fruit.10  The exaggerated dimensions of the island is often reflected on Arabic 
maps from this period (Fig. 20).  
Fig. 20. Map created by Ibn Hawqal placing Malta to the east of Peloponnesian peninsula. (After: 
Margherita Pinna, Il Mediterraneo e la Sardegna nella cartografia Musulmana, p. 88, no. 37) 
Maltese Islands lack archaeological material from the medieval era.  Funerary 
inscriptions found in archaeological contexts provide only the names of the deceased, dates and 
Quranic quotations (Fig. 21).11  Treasure hunting and looting of archaeological sites has been a 
serious problem in Malta since the fifteenth century.12  In addition to the ancient looting, it is 
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probable that medieval structures and artifacts were damaged or destroyed during the 
construction of the modern towns that lie on top of the ancient settlements of medieval Malta.  
Most buildings on the islands were completed in the post-medieval period, and construction 
work in Malta is still unsupervised. 
Fig. 21. Funerary inscription known as the ‘Maimuna stone’ discovered in Gozo (the artifact dates 
approximately to the twefth century).  (Photograph: author). 
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Another problem related to the archaeology of medieval Malta is the absence of 
publications.  It is known that a number of Muslim tombs near Mdina were excavated in 1881 
and between 1920 and 1925; but they were not published.13  The major exceptions to the general 
absence of medieval archaeological records are the excavations at Tas-Silg and San Pawl Milqi.  
Final reports have yet to be published, but preliminary accounts make it clear that archaeological 
excavations can produce valuable information about the medieval history of Malta.  Similarly, 
archaeological materials dating to the medieval period that were recovered from the underwater 
excavations near the Quarantine Hospital (see Appendix D), may help to reveal the use of this 
harbor before the arrival of the Knights.14  These preliminary finds point to a comparatively 
flourishing Byzantine period, a Muslim conquest followed by Muslim occupation, and a 
subsequent period of Latin reconstruction.15 
The last problem affecting the archaeological record of Malta lies in its geological 
formation: the limestone surface of the island is covered with a very thin soil disturbed by 
generations of Maltese farmers.  Archaeological remains have been damaged or completely 
destroyed by intensive land use or erosion, by carting, quarrying, terracing, fertilizers, and 
dumping of inorganic town refuse.   
The Mediterranean Region in the Medieval Era 
The economic and political dynamics of the period of Muslim expansion into North 
Africa have been widely discussed by scholars.  The book titled Mohammed and Charlemagne, 
written in 1927 by the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne, included the first and most extensively 
debated thesis on this issue.  According to Pirenne’s thesis, commercial relations between the 
Mediterranean East and West were interrupted by the Arab conquests of the seventh century.  As 
a reaction to this interruption, Europe reorganized its political and economic structures around 
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agriculture and upon a north-west axis, leading to a progressive decline of Mediterranean 
commercial hegemony.   
Other scholars have not agreed with Pirenne, claiming that there is enough historical and 
archaeological evidence to suggest other scenarios.  Historians such as Sabbe and Lombard 
pointed out the evidence that confirmed not only the continuation of relations between the East 
and West, but also suggested that the Arab conquests indeed amplified international commerce.  
Cahen provides an overview of this scholarly debate and historical interpretations of Medieval 
Mediterranean history in his 1980 article.16  According to Cahen, it was not the Muslim 
expansion, but the politics of economic war adopted by the Byzantine Empire against the Arabs 
that was responsible for the creation of new economic and political boundaries in the 
Mediterranean of the late eighth century.17  Cahen believes that with its dominance of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the Byzantine fleet could intercept merchant ships or oblige these ships 
to bring their cargoes into ports under Byzantine control.  The Muslim reaction was to do the 
same when they could, especially in areas close to the coast under their control.  Under these 
conditions, the Mediterranean ended up being divided into two sectors separated by a horizontal 
line extending approximately from Rhodes to Sicily.  Cahen’s argument suggests that the trade 
of these two sectors was organized differently because of the specific geographic conditions, 
and, that in both sectors, maritime trade was avoided whenever possible since the land routes are 
easier to control and protect.  Lewis also views the situation of this period as one of “two quite 
distinct major maritime complexes: a Black Sea-Aegean one centering in Constantinople and an 
Islamic one stretching from Spain and the Maghreb east via Sicily to Syria and Egypt.”18  Lewis 
also provides a brief analysis of each complex.  The Byzantine complex was self-contained, and 
possessed all the raw materials required to maintain a high level of economic life (i.e., food, 
timber, salt, metals).  On the other hand, the Islamic complex depended upon both interregional 
 
 89
trade and international commerce reaching it from the Indian Ocean and Sudan.  In turn, the east 
depended on the timber, iron and slaves procured from the west.19 Therefore, Muslim 
Mediterranean was relatively richer and more expansive in its economy.  A consequence of this 
fragmentation was the development of piracy of each zone upon the other.20   
The Arab occupation of Crete, Sicily and Calabria roughly between the ninth and 
eleventh centuries, of Sardinia and Corsica until the eleventh century, the Balearic islands until 
the thirteenth century, and other lands and islands of minor importance for varied lengths of time 
led to the creation of a fairly large pocket of Muslim control in the central and western 
Mediterranean.  Relatively safe trade could be conducted in this area, and “eastern” products 
came into Europe through these re-established commercial connections between Europe and 
North Africa.  The merchants of Amalfi were the first Christians to infiltrate this network in the 
ninth century, shortly followed by Naples and Venice.21  According to Cahen, the role the 
Amalfitan merchants played in the establishment of trade connections was due to the lack of ship 
timber in North Africa.  The timber required for naval construction in the expanding Fatimid 
state was supplied by the Italian city-states, led by Amalfi, in return for Egyptian alum.   
Soon after the establishment of a regular and continuous commercial link between the 
Fatimids and the Italian city-states, North African connections lost their importance once again, 
as trade shifted to the major centers, such as Amalfi and Cairo.  The Bedouin invasions into 
North Africa accentuated this shift.  The reaction of the North African centers to this 
development was to turn to piracy, and to prey upon the wealth by-passing their ports.  Although 
the North African pirates do not seem to have become strong enough to present a threat to the 
trade of the central Mediterranean, they certainly prompted the Italian city-states to organize a 
patrol system, which eventually led to their control of the western Mediterranean basin.22  North 
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Africa re-acquired its economic importance when the gold of Sudan and the coins minted in 
North Africa started to appear in European contexts in this period.23 
The conditions that developed in other parts of the Mediterranean directly affected the 
logistical importance (or insignificance) of the Maltese Islands in the early medieval period.  The 
general decline in economic relations between East and West decreased frequency of sea traffic, 
and the re-establishment of the boundaries of the Christian and Muslim cultural and economic 
spheres of influence around an East-West axis, rather than the North-South boundary (from 
Sicily to Tunis), led to a decline of Malta’s logistic importance in the ninth century.   
Who Conquered Malta? 
The Muslim conquerors of Malta in the ninth century were the Aghlabids of North 
African origin, who embarked from their African bases and from Sicily, which was also an 
Aghlabid territory in this period.  It is necessary to briefly introduce these North African peoples 
in order to understand their political and military motives and their cultural impact on Malta. 
The Arab conquest of North Africa was not part of a preconceived plan of expansion or 
an organized effort of the Islamic caliphate, but was initiated by Arab military chiefs in Egypt to 
gain military prestige and booty.  Amr bin al-As, the general of the Muslim army that conquered 
Egypt, began the western expansion of the Islamic State after the surrender of Alexandria in 642.  
He led a campaign to Cyrenaica in 642 or 643 and conquered Tripoli in 645.24  The new 
territories were administratively attached to the province (wilaya) of Egypt and the area was 
named Maghrib, meaning ‘the West’.  
The Muslims started to challenge Byzantine supremacy at sea during Constans II’s reign 
(641–68) by capturing Cyprus after their invasions of Armenia and Asia Minor.  These invasions 
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threatened Sicily and Constantinople, leading to Constans’ campaigns in the Balkans, and his 
eventual establishment of a fortified base in Syracuse (663), to provide additional resistance to 
Muslim expansion in this area.25  The archaeological discovery of eighth-century Byzantine seals 
in Malta and Gozo suggest the presence of certain Byzantine naval officers on the islands in this 
period.26  However, this Byzantine naval reorganization could not prevent a Muslim raid on 
Sicily in 667, but helped to reduce Muslim activity in this region to mere raids and temporary 
conquests.27   
On the other hand, the North African Muslim forces under the leadership of Ukba bin 
Nafi met their greatest challenge in Carthage.28  Unable to take Carthage from the Byzantines, 
Ukba bin Nafi founded the city of Kairwan as a military base some 90 miles to its south.29  
Carthage ultimately fell in 693, and Malta and Sicily were most impacted by these developments 
and received numerous Byzantine and Berber refugees fleeing northward.30  Ukba’s forces 
reached the shores of the Atlantic Ocean in 710, and gained their first foothold on the mainland 
of Europe in 711, but the only Muslim occupation in the central Mediterranean thus far was the 
island of Pantelleria, occupied since 700.31  
The Aghlabid State was established in the second half of the eighth century.  The major 
reason for its detachment from the Islamic State lay in the disputes between the Arabs of the 
wilaya of Ifriqiya and the government of the caliphs regarding the autonomy of the amir.32  
Ibrahim bin al-Aghlab was the governor of Sab and was from the Muhallab family.33  His power 
increased considerably after he suppressed a rebellion that took over the capital city of Kairwan 
in 797.  Once the city was freed it was under strict control of al-Aghlab’s army.34  The unpopular 
wali of Ifriqiya, Ibn Muqatil, fled the city before it was sacked by the rebels.  With popular 
support, al-Aghlab refused to hand the power back to Ibn Muqatil upon his return to Kairwan to 
resume his functions.  In February 800 he formally usurped Ibn Muqatil’s position and requested 
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Caliph Harun al-Rashid to grant him Ifriqiya as a hereditary fief.35  Ibrahim al-Aghlab’s request 
was approved, and his descendents ruled Ifriqiya in the name of the Abbasids until 909, 
preserving their political autonomy and minting their own coins.36  
Initially, the Aghlabid state comprised the area to which the wilaya of Ifriqiya had been 
reduced after 761: Tunisia, eastern Algeria, and Tripolitania.37  In 827, the amir, Ziyadat Allah I 
(Ziyadat Allah Mohammed ibn Ibrahim), began the conquest of Sicily, which the Muslims had 
raided several times before the Aghlabid period.38  The same information is provided by Ibn 
Khaldun who mentions that Ziyadat Allah equipped a fleet under the command of the governor 
of Sicily, Ibrahim ibn Abd Allah ibn al-Aghlab, to attack Pantelleria and “the islands” in 836.39  
Therefore, there is little doubt that the first Muslim raids on Malta began in 835/836.40 Command 
of the expeditionary force was entrusted to qadi Asad bin al-Furat.  Ibn al-Athir’s accounts 
suggest that Malta and Gozo were also attacked during the descent upon Sicily in 835/836 by 
Ziyadat Allah’s fleet.41 
By diverting the energies of the jund towards military conquest outside the Maghrib, and 
by the political skill they employed in dealing with the religious leadership, the Aghlabids 
avoided internal upheavals.  Stability led to economic expansion.  The production of cereals, 
olives, dates, and animal products increased and contributed to the expansion of both external 
and internal trade.  Kairwan became an important center of a trade network reaching western and 
southern Africa and the rest of the Islamic State in the East.  During the Aghlabid period the 
accumulation of gold in Ifriqiya rose to a great extent due to its trade relations with Sudan, which 
also provided large numbers of slaves.  Prosperity resulting from agriculture and trade 
contributed to the development of crafts, such as weaving, jewelry making, leather and 
woodworking.  The urban population consequently expanded and an economic elite consisting 
predominantly of traders and landowners developed in the cities.42  
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The Conquest of Malta in Historical Sources 
The rise of Islam and the consequent shifts in the balance of Mediterranean power 
started to affect Malta long before the definitive conquest of the island.  Muslims started raiding 
Sicily as early as 700 and established a naval base in Tunis, enclosing the islands of the central 
Mediterranean and increasingly controlling the sea routes in this area.  The conquest of Sicily 
gained augmented importance during the reign of the Aghlabid Dynasty.  The Muslims captured 
Palermo in 831, and during the next ten years strengthened their hold on the Val di Mazara 
region, where the first Islamic colonies were founded.  From 860 onwards they undertook the 
final phase of Sicily’s conquest and at last occupied Val Demone (Taormina) in 902.43  As 
mentioned above, an account by Ibn al-Athir may be interpreted as an evidence for Arab attacks 
on Malta and Gozo in this period.44   
Goodwin and Brown believe the relatively late conquest of Malta may be attributed to 
the increased importance accorded to the island by the Byzantines, who provided Malta with 
good defenses.45  However, it may also be suggested that Malta was less of a concern to the 
Muslims because of the absence of defenses, resources and any other economic or military 
importance.  The fact that there is no record of earlier attacks supports the latter argument. 
According to historical texts, the definitive Muslim conquest of Malta took place in 869 
or 870, when the Aghlabids attacked both Malta and Gozo.  Their naval expedition embarked 
from the main bases in Ifriqiya (Tunis, Sousse, Sidi Daoud or Kelibia) and also included 
reinforcements from Sicily.46  The Aghlabid fleet that took Malta was probably under the 
command of an Aghlabid prince named Ahmed ibn Omar ibn Ubayd (or Obeid) Allah ibn al-
Aghlab.47  Based on an evaluation of the available historic documents, it seems likely that this 
first Muslim effort, which failed to capture the main fortified settlement, was shortly followed by 
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the arrival of a Byzantine relief force, which made it possible to resist the invasion for a few 
months.48  Michele Amari,49 Louis de Boisgelin50 and Salvatore Candido51 (whose information is 
based on a compilation of Amari’s earlier work) date the definitive conquest to 29 August, 869 
based on information provided by the Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun.52  Another anonymous 
medieval manuscript preserved in Cambridge also gives this precise date for the conquest of 
Malta.53  
Yet, another historical source on the conquest, presented by Kendal, is a Byzantine 
document that mentions that the bishopric prior of Malta was unable to return to his see after the 
Council of Chalcedon in 868 because the island was being invaded by the Arabs.54  No bishop of 
Malta is known between 868 and 1156.  
On the other hand, other scholars mention a variety of dates by.  In his Descrittione di 
Malta Abela mentions that Malta was definitively conquered by the Muslim governor of Sicily 
in 828.55  Ettore Rossi reported that Malta was conquered during the same year as the Muslim 
conquest of Mazara in Sicily, in 824.56  An-Nuwayri mentions that the Island of Malta was 
conquered between 864 and 875 during the reign of Abd-Allah ibn al-Aghlab, known as Abu al-
Garaniq.57  In addition, according to Ibn al-Athir, there was a Byzantine attempt to re-conquer 
the island in 870, but the Muslims held out and the Byzantine effort was unsuccessful.58  This 
piece of information would indicate that Malta was already under Muslim control in 870.59   
Al-Himyari provides the most detailed description of the conquest of Malta:  
It was attacked by Halaf al-Hadim, the master of Ziyadat Allah Ibn Ibrahim … with the help of 
Ahmad Ibn Umar Ibn Abd Allah Ibn al-Aghlab – and it is he who suffered for it … He 
besieged it and died during the siege.  And they wrote to Abu Abd Allah about his death, and 
Abu Abd Allah wrote to his governor in the island of Sicily, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad, and 
they captured the fortress of Malta and took its ruler Amros prisoner, and they demolished the 
fortress, and they looted, and desecrated whatever they could not carry.60 
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The situation after 870 is also ambiguous.  Both the archaeological record and al-
Himyari’s account suggest that there was considerable opposition to the Muslim attack of 870.  
Al Himyari describes the events after the conquest as follows:  
… and he took to Ahmad from the churches of Malta that with which he built his castle in 
Susa by the sea…after that the Island of Malta remained an uninhabited ruin, but it was visited 
by shipbuilders, because the wood on it is of the strongest kind, by the fishermen, because of 
the abundance and tastiness of the fish around its shores, and by those who collect honey, 
because that is the most common thing there.61 
 
Al Himyari’s accounts about the depopulation of the island do not seem reliable, as there 
is no other historical or archaeological evidence pointing to a period of complete abandonment 
of the island.62  On the other hand, the archaeological record hints that the capture of the Island 
of Malta (although not necessarily Gozo) was destructive.63  
Malta under ‘Arab’ Rule 
The period examined here is generally referred to as the ‘Arab’ period of Malta. 
However, not all of the Muslims who settled in various parts of the Mediterranean were Arabs.  
In reality, they were composed of many African ethnic groups as well as of populations from 
Asia.64  For example, Sicily under the Aghlabids was inhabited by a mixture of many different 
peoples, races and religious persuasions such as Christian and Muslim Sicilians, Greeks, 
Lombards, Jews, Arabs, Berbers, and even some Persians and Negroes.65  The Muslims who 
settled in Malta were also ethnically heterogeneous.  Numerous Muslims moved into the islands 
from Ifriqiya, although others came from Muslim Sicily, and perhaps from Andalusia, Egypt, 
Syria, the African interior, and other places.66  People of Berber heritage probably constituted the 




The major cultural contribution of the ‘Arab period’ to Maltese heritage was the Maltese 
language, which is probably very close to the one then spoken in Tunisia.  The extent of the 
Arabization of Malta is shown by the thoroughly Arabic character of the local place-names, 
since there are few place-names that predate the Arab era on the archipelago.68  The majority of 
the place-names are of Arabic origin, with the exception of the names of ‘Malta’ and ‘Gozo’, 
which are derived from Latin roots.69  
In addition to the language, the Arabs brought a variety of new crops into the western 
Mediterranean region.  Although it is impossible to precisely date the introduction of different 
crops into Maltese agriculture, it is possible that crops such as citrus fruits and cotton were 
introduced at this time by Arabs who also brought know-how about the agriculture of such plants 
as well as techniques of processing the product.  This thesis is also supported by linguistic 
studies.  Arabic contributed most of the vocabulary concerning irrigation works and irrigation 
farming, not only to the Maltese language but also to the Spanish and Italian languages.  It is 
possible that the Arabs, coming from generally drier climates, were more skilled in the use of 
scarce water supplies for agricultural purposes.70  They also introduced an animal-powered 
device for lifting water from wells onto land.71 
Based on the archaeological evidence, it is possible that Malta was visited by ships 
sailing between Sicily and Maghreb.  Most of the imported ceramics (and glass) from this period 
are of Sicilian or Tunisian origin and were found in either Mdina and, to a lesser extent, in 
Cittadella (Gozo) and other minor towns.72  However, the fact that the name of Malta was not 
mentioned at all in the Geniza documents that otherwise provide an impressive account of the 
commercial contacts of Tunisia and Sicily is significant.73  This absence might help to establish 
that there were no direct commercial contacts but ships sometimes used the Maltese harbors as 
shelters in case of a storm or as a supply point.    
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In 991, a census of the Maltese Islands officially counted 14,972 Muslims and 6,339 
Christians.74  During its Muslim occupation, Malta was governed by a kaid and a group of 
leading Muslim citizens.  The Muslims re-fortified the old Roman capital, renamed it Mdina (or 
in Arabic Medina), and added coastal fortifications on the peninsula of Birgu.  The major 
Muslim settlement on the island was at Mdina, with its cemetery just outside the town.   
Accounts in Arab sources provide very scanty and controversial information about Malta 
in this period.  One chronicler (al-Qazwini) described as “Malitah is an island located close to 
Andalusia … rich in everything that is good and in the blessing of God… well peoples 
possessing towns and villages, trees and fruit.”  Although it is possible that the Arabs may have 
viewed the islands more favorably as they came from more arid regions, it is also possible that 
al-Qazwini was talking about another island, as Malta barely fits the above description.75  
Another account from the twelfth century, by the Muslim geographer Idrisi, mentions that the 
archipelago lies about 100 miles (160 kilometers) to the east of Pantellaria, 80 miles (128 
kilometers) south of Sicily and half-a-day distance to Crete.76  He adds that the island of Gozo is 
small but has a protected port and that Malta is a large island that lies to the east of Gozo and has 
a protected harbor on its east.  Idrisi also mentions that Malta “abounds in pasture, sheep, fruit, 
and above all honey.”  He mentions that wood was shipped to Sicily from Malta.  Idrisi’s 
account implies that most of Maltese land was used for grazing animals and thus left 
uncultivated.  The type of agriculture hinted at in this sketchy description also implies a low 
population density.77   
The main significance of the Maltese Archipelago seems to have been its logistical 
position in the middle of a commercial network connecting Ifriqiya to the ports of Europe.  
Unfortunately for Malta’s inhabitants, for most of the period during which the islands were 
under Muslim control, developments in the area lessened the importance of the central 
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Mediterranean and the Maltese Islands.  Italian city-states such as Genoa and Pisa became 
increasingly involved in the trans-Saharan trade and managed to break the Muslim grip on both 
Sardinia and Corsica, establishing their supremacy in the Tyrrhenian Sea.  In 1034 Genoese and 
Pisan naval forces sacked Bône, one of the most important commercial centers of the Algerian 
coast and also seized the island of Pantelleria with assistance from the Byzantine navy.  In 1087 
the invasion of Malta’s closest neighbor to the south, Mahdia, must have had especially 
devastating effects on the commercial goods flowing through Maltese harbors.  To make things 
worse, Moizz bin Badis, the governor of Ifriqiya, accepted a fresh investiture from the Sunni 
caliph in 1046, which prompted his Shiite subjects to revolt.  This was the beginning of a period 
of instability for the region which would last for decades, eventually leading to the invasions of 
Arab nomads (known as Berber or Bedouin invasions of Maghreb).  These invasions had a 
massively destabilizing effect on Maghreb’s political life and trade, both with Europe and sub-
Saharan Africa.  The destrupions caused the trans-Saharan trade routes, which until this time ran 
to Ifriqiya, to shift much further to the West, eliminating the important trans-Saharan trade from 
the central Mediterranean prior to the Bedouin invasions.78 
Weakening of Malta’s links with Ifriqiya, and the inability of the homeland in Ifriqiya to 
provide protection for the islands, prompted enemy attacks.  According to al-Himyari, the 400 
free Muslims on Malta were attacked in 1053/4 by the Rum, that is the Byzantines, under the 
command of George Maniaces.79  Al-Himyari describes the events of this attack as follows:  
…In the year 445 the Byzantines attacked it with many ships and in great numbers, and they 
besieged the Muslims in the city and the siege became unbearable… and the Muslims asked 
for clemency, and they refused it except for women and belongings. And the Muslims 
reckoned the number of combatants among themselves and they found them to be about 400; 
then they counted their slaves and found they were more numerous than themselves. And they 
summoned them and said to them “if you are loyal to us in our struggle against our enemy, and 
you go as far as we go, and end up where we do, you will be free men, we shall raise you to 
our level and we shall give you our daughters in marriage, and we shall make you partners in 
our riches; but if you hesitate and abandon us, your fate will be the same captivity and 
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bondage which will be ours, nay you will fare even worse because with us one may be 
redeemed by a dear friend or freed by his ally or saved by the support of his community.  And 
the slaves, of their own accord, promised more than they [the Muslims] had thought they 
would, and they [the Muslims] found that they [the slaves] rushed against their enemy more 
promptly than themselves….. The Muslims took possession of their [Byzantines] ships and 
only one of these slipped away.80 
 
Arabic writer al-Qazwini also refers to this attack and the help provided to the Muslims 
of Malta by the slaves.81  Once again, the final outcome is unclear.  The Muslim offer of 
“women, freedom and property” to the slaves in return for their help is controversial.82  First, it 
would be against the Muslim religion to offer Muslim women to non-Muslims, and second, it 
would have been more profitable for the slaves to let the Byzantines conquer the islands, and be 
freed as Christians, allowing them to return to their own land.  From this passage it is understood 
that the slaves were Muslim, even if they were descendents of the pre-870 inhabitants.  They 
fought the Byzantines to avoid becoming slaves to Christians instead of Muslims, which would 
have worsened their situation.  Besides, the fact that the Muslims offered their daughters in 
marriage might suggest that the slaves were not Christian, since Islam prohibits Muslim women 
from marrying non-Muslims.  The reality may have been an untidy and fluctuating jumble of 





In 1091, however, resistance by the islands to the attacks of Norman Count Roger was 
very feeble, and Muslim Malta and Gozo entered a period of subjection to the Christian rulers of 
Sicily, which lasted until the Latin colonization of the islands and the expulsion or conversion of 
many Muslims in the thirteenth century.84   
Count Roger the Norman attacked the island in 109185  The chief source for that event is 
the chronicle of Roger’s French chaplain and biographer Geoffroi Malaterra, who was either 
with Roger or received a first-hand account of events.86  His chronicle included a passage 
describing how the Muslims’ Christian captives, of whom a great number were held within the 
town, came with palm-leaves to greet the victorious count.  The first information provided here 
is that by 1091 there were many Christian captives in Malta.  Roger took them away, seriously 
overloading his ships.  On reaching Sicily he freed the captives and offered to settle them in 
Sicily free of any servile exaction, but they preferred to return to their own ‘fields and friends’ 
and left for their various homelands, crossing the Straits of Messina.87  Clearly, the freed 
captives were not indigenous to Malta and were not from Sicily, since they left for their 
homelands by crossing to mainland Italy.  Besides, Malaterra mentions that they cheered in 
Greek when Roger first came to free them.88  Therefore, it is likely that these captives were 
Latins, and quite possibly Italians, who must have been captured by pirates, been shipwrecked or 
imported as slaves.89  If Geoffroi Malaterra was correct in reporting that Count Roger took away 
from Malta, all, or perhaps most, of the Christian captives then on the island, it would follow that 
Malta was more Muslim after 1091 than before.90   
In any case, the Norman advance southward to seize Sicily and Malta (ca.1090) had little 
to do with religion and much to do with an interest in re-establishing profitable political and 
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commercial links with Ifriqiya, which was once again beginning to attract trade from sub-
Saharan Africa.91  In fact, it seems likely that Roger the Norman never intended to conquer 
Malta and that the attack of 1090 was a power demonstration intended to prevent the use of 
Malta as a Muslim base, reducing the Muslims of Malta to tributary status.92  It should also be 
emphasized that Muslims were not the only competitors of the Norman Kingdom since a 
strengthened Byzantine navy recovered Crete, Cyprus and Cilicia in the late tenth century, and 
the Pisans and the Genoese took control of Corsica and Sardinia from the Muslims between 1016 
and 1050, and emerged as a renewed naval power.  
Therefore, it appears that the Norman attack of 1090 did not interfere in a substantive 
way with the Muslim population.  Although the Muslims had to pay tribute to Sicily after this 
date, their customs were largely unaltered.  The Normans, moreover, did not restore the 
bishopric of Malta, as is erroneously stated in Abela’s Descrittione.93  Information provided in 
the Descrittione and later myths and legends also give credit to Count Roger for the construction 
of a cathedral and several coastal fortifications.94  However, there is no historical and 
archaeological evidence to support these statements, and Abela’s statements are considered to be 
false by many scholars.  In fact, a large part of the Norman military retinue consisted of 
Muslims, and Count Roger consistently resisted ecclesiastical pressure to convert them to 
Christianity.95  It seems that the Normans tolerated the existence of Muslims in the lands under 
their rule, and even allowed an amir to remain in power in Malta with the understanding that he 
would pay an annual tribute.  The major reason for this Norman policy is due to the fact that the 
Normans came to Malta as rulers rather than colonizers and never resided in Malta in large 
numbers.  
 In summary, the Normans probably became popular in Malta precisely because they 
never attempted to settle the islands or change the status quo.  Moreover, even though Malta 
 
 102
passed to the Normans only four years before the first Crusade, there was no attempt to convert 
the population to Christianity.96  Count Roger encouraged Christian immigrants to settle in Sicily 
to control the rebellious Muslim population, but Malta had little land to attract immigrants.  In 
addition, such immigration and the Christianization of the Maltese population were not 
especially encouraged as the Muslims of Malta did not present any problems.97  
After 1090 Malta disappears from the documents once again.  Presumably, the island 
relapsed into the African sphere of influence during the troubles that followed Count Roger’s 
death in 1011 and the consequent resurgence of Muslim power.  Malta had to be re-conquered by 
Roger II in 1127, and this more definitive conquest must be understood in terms of the general 
revival of commerce in the twelfth century and of Latin expansion across the whole 
Mediterranean.98   
Navy personnel under Roger II (son of Count Roger) were predominantly Greek, but 
Muslims made up the backbone of his army.  It was also to Muslims that he tended to entrust 
financial management, though Muslims, Normans, Byzantines, and Jews held important 
positions in his civil administration. People from throughout the Mediterranean basin, including 
Jews, Muslims, and Christians were involved in regular trade, communication and cultural 
exchange in the central Mediterranean basin in the early 1100s. 
Information transmitted to Roger II by geographers like Idrisi, about the abundance of 
gold in Ghana, led Roger II to try expanding his kingdom into Africa.99  Therefore, the growth of 
the Norman Kingdom to include Sicily, Reggio Calabria, Apulia, and Malta was part of a larger 
policy for a southern expansion in the direction of Ghana. Because Roger II was more motivated 
by lust for gold than by religion, he did not attempt to force Muslims in Sicily or in Malta to 
convert to Christianity.  Given Roger’s overall policy in the central Mediterranean, Malta’s 
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strong ties to Africa and to Islam were a bridge, an asset.  In addition to Roger’s strong dislike of 
the Frankish rulers of Jerusalem, he chose to play no part in the Second Crusade, because of his 
religious tolerance and also because Muslims remained a majority in Sicily and Malta in 1145.  
Hence, even as a so-called Age of Crusades was unfolding in the eastern Mediterranean, it 
seemingly left the day-to-day lives of the Maltese unaffected.100 
The territory between Tripoli and Bône was completely under the control of Roger II by 
1160, and Normans controlled the central Mediterranean region.  The fact that the Maltese 
population was predominantly Muslim and Arabic speaking contributed to the increasing 
importance of the island as a strong cultural tie between the Norman territories of Southern 
Europe and Northern Africa, as well as a commercial staging point.101   
The Ayubid Dynasty under Saladin replaced the Fatimid rule in 1169.  Saladin not only 
confronted the Crusaders in a more effective way, but also embarked for a re-conquest of 
Maghrib to establish a firmer control over the trade between North Africa and Europe.  It is 
significant that there were no Muslim attacks on Malta in this period, possibly because the island 
was still predominantly Muslim.102  According to the report by Burchard, the Bishop of 
Strasbourg, who passed through Malta in 1175, the island was “inhabited by the Saracens” at the 
time.103 
It was not until Fredrick II (1194-1250) started to reorganize his Sicilian Kingdom (ca. 
1220) that western influences began to permeate Malta.  We know that there were Christians in 
Malta in 1154, based on a court document that states that some Christians got into trouble when 
they killed a Muslim at that date.104  In 1224 part of the rebellious population of the Christian 
town of Celano, in Abruzzi, were deported to Malta.  It is possible that Muslims were pressured 
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to abandon the island or convert to Christianity.  The fourteenth century historian Ibn Khaldun 
reports the events as follows:  
The tyrant of Sicily besieged the Muslims in their fortress on the hill, surrounded them, forced 
them to come down from their castle and sent them beyond the straits, establishing them at 
Lucera, a populous part of the province.  Then he passed to Malta and chased out the Muslims 
who lived there, sending them to keep company with their brethren.105 
 
However, an estimate of the population made around 1240 indicates that there were 
many Muslims in both Malta and Gozo.  Population statistics derived from a report compiled by 
Giliberto Abate in 1240-1241 indicate that there were a total of 836 Muslim families, 250 
Christian families, and 33 Jewish families living on the royal estates of the islands of Malta and 
Gozo.106  The precision of the figures in this report suggests a genuine count, possibly for tax 
purposes.  The high number of Muslim families points to the fact that this population was left 
intact, even though there had been Christian migrations to the islands.  Luttrell makes a 
compelling argument in his 1975 and 1993 articles, suggesting that the low number of Christian 
families on the island of Malta is a mistake inadvertently caused by a careless clerk who copied 
the original.107  Even if the number of Christian families was somehow higher, the number of 
Muslim families would still be high two centuries after the Christian capture of Malta.108   
A document dating to 1271 from the Malta archives make clear that the disputes 
concerning the disposal of the property that belonged to Muslims who were presumably 
expelled.  However, as Wettinger pointed out, the decree of expulsion was not issued against an 
ethnic group, but was applied to a religious group, the Muslims.109  Therefore, Muslims who 
rejected their religion and accepted a formal Christian baptism did not lose their property and 
stayed on the islands.  Quintin, writing in 1536, describes the settlement near the harbor as 
“Apart from the city and some houses in the suburbs, one would take all the rest for African 
huts.”110  Based on this description and other contemporary descriptions and inventories of 
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Maltese houses, Wettinger thinks that the Moorish styles of architecture still predominated as 
late as the sixteenth century.111 
In summary, it is clear that Malta was of a limited strategic or commercial importance 
during the period between the ninth and thirteenth centuries due to military and commercial 
instability of the central Mediterranean region.  Muslim geographers did not know the island’s 
precise location, and there is no word about its government, its language or any other details 
regarding the population, trade or defense in Arabic sources.112  It is interesting to note that the 
only events registered by the Arab chroniclers are the conquest and the loss of Malta.  It seems 
that Malta was an obscure piece of land off the Sicilian coast that did not merit any particular 




LATE MEDIEVAL PERIOD 
 
The second phase of medieval Maltese history spans from the beginning of the 
Hohenstaufen period in 1220 to the arrival of the Order of Saint John in 1530, during which time 
the islands were integrated into the European realm.   
This period of Malta has been the subject of several books, but a critical study devoted 
exclusively to the political and economic context of Malta before the arrival of the Order of Saint 
John has not yet been attempted.1  There are four major published sources that include 
information about the late medieval history of Malta: (1) the very short summary by Blouet,2 (2) 
the article that summarizes the “state of research” by Luttrell,3 (3) the book chapter by Wettinger 
focusing on the medieval history of the Castrum Maris, the only coastal settlement in medieval 
Malta,4 and (4) the information provided in the relevant chapters of the recent book by 
Goodwin.5  However, all four works are of a descriptive nature and represent only a 
chronological presentation of available information, and the approaches of the investigators do 
not vary significantly from one another.  This results from the fact that all three articles are based 
on almost identical sources.  The following description is a summary of “medieval Malta” 
presented by the above-mentioned authors.  Malta has always accommodated a dense population, 
and feeding the inhabitants became more of a problem after the population of the archipelago 
doubled itself during the medieval period.6  Unable to produce the necessary natural resources 
and agricultural land, Malta became almost completely dependent on Sicily for food.  This 
dependency, in turn, dictated that the rulers of Sicily controlled Malta.  As a consequence, the 
history of Malta was almost identical to that of any Sicilian town.  
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However, this view does not always agree with the historical evidence and, in my 
opinion, an evaluation of Malta’s role in the central Mediterranean trade network and warfare 
depends upon the answers to the following questions:  What was the basic pattern of commercial 
exchange in the central Mediterranean region in this period and what was the role of Malta in 
this context?  Defining the nature of the products being exchanged and the position of main lines 
of communication between the Kingdom of Sicily and North Africa are also important to 
determine Malta’s context.  It seems that the main occupation of Malta’s inhabitants was cotton 
production, but they also had other sources of income such as trade and piracy.  Commercial and 
pirate ventures were possibly financed by sources outside the island, and an analysis of where 
the finances came from is important to conclude this discussion.  The aim of this chapter is to 
offer answers to these questions and show that Malta functioned more like a Genoese ship 
permanently anchored to the south of Sicily for most of its post-Muslim era, especially between 
1200 and 1400. 
Economic Importance, Resources and Products of Malta in the Late Medieval Period 
Roughly between 1200 and 1240, the major trans-Saharan trade routes that had shifted 
westward due to the Bedouin invasions of the eleventh century were re-established in their 
original paths.7  In fact, medieval trade between Italy and Africa reached its maximum volume in 
the thirteenth century.8   The gradual integration of the Italian cities of Venice, Genoa, Pisa and 
Amalfi into the economic system of the Mediterranean, that had begun in the twelfth century, 
was also finalized by this time.9  Expansion in the volume of goods circulating between Italian 
ports and those of Ifriqiya increased the importance of the ports in between, such as Malta.  
Shortly after the establishment of Tunis as the major urban center of the region (replacing 
Kairwan) in 1228, the Hafsid ruler, Abu Zakaria Yahya I, extended his control to other important 
 
 108
commercial ports such as Bougie and Algiers.  Now that he could control all these centers, he 
proceeded to conclude commercial treaties with Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and Sicily, while 
encouraging trade with the Aragonese. 
However, the short crossing that could generally be performed in one or two days did 
not really require a stopping point.  The Maltese Islands realistically could only have been a 
useful stopower point on the route from Venice to North Africa but there is no evidence to 
suggest that it was a port on this route.10  It seems that ships on their east-west or north-south 
routes went through Malta only when they could not use the route that crossed the Straits of 
Messina because of a conflict in the area.11  However, both the Maltese Islands, and Pantelleria 
are known to be harbors to escape dangerous weather in this area in contemporary portolans such 
as the Compasso da navigare.12    
The Maltese Islands also had some commercial products to offer.  The fourteenth 
century manuscript by Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La Pratica della Mercatura, lists the 
regions of Puglia and Calabria of southern Italy and the islands of Sicily and Malta as important 
cotton growing and exporting regions.13  The early medieval towns of Malta were concentrated 
in the southeastern half of the island and produced the export crops, primarily cotton and cumin, 
that were introduced into Maltese agriculture during the Arab period and which constituted the 
major income source for the island by the mid-thirteenth century.14  However, it was not until the 
late-fourteenth century that cotton production acquired the status of a monoculture in Malta.15  
On the other hand, because the cotton and cumin plantations occupied the majority of the 
cultivated lands, an increasingly large percentage of foodstuffs had to be imported from Sicily, 
especially after the thirteenth century.   
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According to information provided in La Pratica della Mercatura, it is certain that Malta 
was producing cotton in the fourteenth century.  However, Pegolotti clearly states that the cotton 
producers (and only those that are included in this section) are listed according to the quality of 
their raw cotton, meaning not the quality of the fabric but the quality of the unprocessed cotton 
itself.  On this list of eleven locations, Maltese cotton ranks ninth, being better than the cotton 
from Calabria and Sicily.16  But even if the quality of the Maltese cotton was not among the 
highest, the island was one of the few production centers in the western Mediterranean and the 
product was apparently marketable in Europe.  Therefore, cotton cultivation quickly spread 
around the archipelago.   
Cotton cultivation required intensive field labor followed by labor-intensive processing 
to gin, spin and possibly weave the cloth in order to produce the finished goods for export.  In 
Malta the great labor demands and subsequent employment in cotton processing led to an 
increase in population.17  At the same time, Malta shifted from an economy based on subsistence 
agriculture to an economy based on commerce in which cash flowed as the result of the cotton 
trade.  The change in settlement patterns in later medieval times and the increasing concentration 
of the population around the Castrum Maris were symptomatic of developing commercial 









Fig. 22. Birgu and Senglea from an engraving of 1565. (After: Albert Ganado, “The representation of 
Birgu and Fort Saint Angelo in Old Maps and Views,” in Birgu, A Maltese Maritime City, ed. Lino 
Bugeja, Mario Buhagiar and Stanley Fiorini (Malta, 1993), p. 557, pl. 16.8).   
 
Beginnings of the Genoese Domination  
and the Appearance of Counts, Admirals and Pirates in Malta 
 
The distance of the Maltese Islands to the major trade routes of the central 
Mediterranean made it a remote location that was a very suitable position for the autonomous 
forces of corsairs as well as pirates.19  Bresc states that Malta was close enough to the trade 
routes to prey on merchantmen, but just far enough from the principal areas of military 
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operations in the central Mediterranean to avoid reprisals for unlawful activities originating in 
the island.20  For this reason, the Sicilians, who never wished this island to develop into a major 
pirate base that could threaten the coastal settlements of Sicily and the economic welfare of the 
island, always had an interest in establishing some level of control.21 
The Genoese had strong connections with Sicily, which were further strengthened after 
the crowning of the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI of Hohenstaufen as the King of Sicily in 
1194.22  Expansion of Genoese naval power to the central and eastern Mediterranean in this 
period also created requirements for additional naval bases along the long-distance trade routes 
to guarantee the security of the Genoese merchantman.  Such intermediate bases at Malta and 
Crete (for a short time roughly between 1206-1210) kept their distance from the authorities in 
the major centers such as Palermo and Constantinople, and were also production centers for 
certain goods generally distributed to the Mediterranean markets on board Genoese ships.23  
Notarial documents indicate that large quantities of Maltese cotton were exported to Genoa as 
early as 1164.24  The fact that all the Counts of Malta between 1194 and 1220 were Genoese 
indicates that Malta was under direct Genoese political control at the time.   
The first individual to acquire the title “Count of Malta,” Margarito of Brindisi (1194), 
was a renowned Genoese pirate.25  He was succeeded by another corsair, Guglielmo Grasso, and 
then by Guglielmo’s son-in-law, the dreaded pirate and corsair Enrico Pescatore, also known as 
Henry the Count of Malta.26  It is important to emphasize that all these Counts served as Admiral 
of the Navy to the King of Sicily.  Therefore, all the Admirals of the fleet of the King of Sicily 
were Genoese pirates based in Malta in this period.27   
The last of these, Henry, established his sovereignty in Malta, taking advantage of the 
weakness of the Kingdom of Sicily (and the Byzantine Empire).  Henry’s main activities were 
 
 112
piracy and also trade with the Muslims of North Africa.  In this period, the Maltese Islands were 
used as a base to assault Henry’s more ambitious target, Crete, with substantial support from the 
Genoese navy, granted to him in exchange for major commercial concessions made to Genoese 
merchants.28   It is also important to note that the Maltese Islands remained on the sidelines of 
the major naval expeditions in the Mediterranean.  The Crusades completely bypassed the 
Maltese Islands, which still had a predominantly Muslim population at the time.29   
We see the first determined efforts of the Italian merchant-towns to establish permanent 
commercial relations with the eastern Mediterranean during the Crusades.  Initially, Genoa, 
Venice and Pisa were the only participants in the conquest of the Holy Land and supporters of 
the Crusaders.  In time, these three were joined by Siena, Ancona and Firenze in northern Italy, 
Amalfi in the South, the Provence towns of Marseilles, Montpellier and Saint Gilles, and later 
on, Barcelona.  The non-Italian merchants possessed fewer privileges, but they also benefited 
from the reestablishment of the oriental trade routes, with friendly ports at their eastern ends.   
The fact that Malta stood outside these developments had an impact on the history of the island.  
Very simply stated, the European merchants had to pay for the goods they brought back from the 
East with cash money or by kind.  The commerce, therefore, encouraged the development of a 
money economy and evidently the rise of a merchant class and the overall standard of living.  
The refreshing effects of the cultural flow in the east-west direction in the Mediterranean reached 
Malta five centuries later when the Order of Saint John, a creature of the process of exchange 
itself, arrived in Malta.30  
Malta was firmly integrated into the Hohenstaufen Kingdom of Sicily only after 
Frederick II’s reorganization of 1220.  However, this reorganization did not alter the basic 
elements of the Norman administration.  Consequently, Syracuse, Malta and the office of the 
naval admiral remained under the control of Genoese Counts.31  It was only gradually that 
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Frederick acquired control over the Admirals of the Fleet and converted these hostile Genoese 
freebooters into loyal servants of the Crown.  As long as Frederick was able to control his 
Admiral of the Navy, Malta posed no threat to him.  Frederick finally formulated a detailed code 
of the Admiral’s naval duties and privileges when Nicolo Spinola of Genoa succeeded Henry in 
1239.32  This code provided the Admiral with jurisdiction over the royal fleet and granted him 
the right to grant reprisals, license pirates and to preside over civil and criminal cases involving 
piracy.33  However, this formulation also integrated Malta into the royal domain and into the 
defensive matrix of the Kingdom via the installation of a local administrator, castellan, directly 
accountable to Frederick.34   
The new situation also meant that the King was responsible for the financial burden of 
defending the island.  The three fortified locations on the Maltese Islands, Castrum Maris, the 
castle of the “city” – Mdina, and the castle in Gozo required expensive maintenance.35 
It is also important to remember that at the time Malta still had a large Muslim 
population.  The report by the Governor of Malta, Giliberto Abbate, to Fredrick II, presented in 
detail at the end of the previous chapter, clearly shows that the Maltese Islands had more Muslim 
families than those of Christian or Jewish faith.36  Cutajar’s research of the medieval 
archaeological material showed that the main connections of the Maltese Islands were with 
Sicily.  Cutajar mentions that most twelfth-century glazed ceramics reached the islands through 
Sicily.37  Therefore, it seems that Malta’s contacts were limited to possibly the food shipments 
from Sicily in exchange for the local products of the islands.  This isolation is possibly the 
reason why Malta was not affected by the religious conflicts of this era characterized by the 
Crusades and other hostile encounters throughout the Mediterranean.38   
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The control of Malta passed to Charles of Anjou after the Battle of Benevento in 1266.  
However, the basic structures of Norman and Hohenstaufen government remained intact.  The 
Genoese, at the peak of their commercial prosperity, maintained their authority in Sicily and 
Malta.39  The Eighth Crusade, organized by the Angevins, achieved its objective of capturing 
Tunis in 1270, and the emir of Tunis became a vassal to Charles of Anjou.  After the Eighth 
Crusade, peace was promptly established and commercial relations between Ifriqiya and Europe 
continued as usual.  Hafsids re-established their contacts with the ports of Aragon, Pisa, Venice 
and Genoa.  The Maltese Islands must have played a possibly minor role in the execution of the 
Eighth Crusade, as Charles established garrisons on the Maltese Islands, presumably manned by 
the Maltese.40   
Increased Angevin involvement in the trade of Ifriqiya must have increased the strategic 
importance of Malta, as we start to see more serious efforts to establish firmer control of the 
islands and to keep the Genoese out after the Eighth Crusade.  Two additional officers, Giovanni 
Pontibio and Roberto Caffuro, were appointed in March 1273 to take charge of the maritime 
defense of Malta and Gozo in the event of an “impending Genoese attack.”41  However, despite 
these measures it seems that the Genoese ships continued to interrupt trade around the islands as 
the capitan, castellan and rector of Malta, Bertrando de Real, reported their “hostile activities” 
in a letter dated 27 December 1273.  A report dated 2 January 1273 announced that de Real 
seized two Genoese vessels, Sanctus Nicolaus belonging to Deotisalve Margonus, and Sanctus 
Franciscus belonging to Lanfranquinus de Assolis.42   
Such incidents did not greatly affect Genoese maritime sovereignty in the area.  An 
Angevin document indicates that a ship was sent to Malta in March 1273 to escort the royal 
galley (with no passengers) back to Sicily due to the lack of safety at sea.43  Considering that the 
distance from Malta to Sicily is only about 100 kilometers, this measure seems excessive, but the 
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threat posed by Genoese piracy was a considerable problem.  On June 12, 1274, Morier, the 
viceroy of Sicily, was asked to provide 50 well-armed Frenchmen to accompany Matheo de 
Podio, the new castellan, to Malta.44  Another document dated to 1275 mentions that Genoese 
pirates captured Raymond, a Maltese ‘marenarius,’ who was returning from Africa on the barque 
belonging to Bonsignore de Gaudisana of Malta.45  All these documents indicate that the 
Angevins did not control the seas south of Sicily, and since all of the hostile activities are of 
Genoese origin, I am confident that it was Genoa who had control of the east-west passage 
between Tunisia and Sicily.   
The beginning of the decline of Angevin power is marked by a massive rebellion in 
Sicily against the rule of Charles of Anjou.  The beginning of this rebellion, known as the 
‘Sicilian Vespers’ (30 March 1282), is the traditional date for the change of government from the 
Angevins to the Aragonese in Italy.46  But, in reality, the change was an extended transition, 
characterized by extensive conflict between the Aragonese and Angevins (supported by the 
Genoese) for control of Sicily and Sardinia.   
Malta was not directly attacked, but the islands surrendered to the Aragonese in 1283 
because of their dependency on Sicilian food.  The short period of Maltese resistance ended with 
a treaty that secured the immediate arrival of the regular grain shipment from Sicily.47  King 
Peter of Aragon (Pedro III), anxious to regulate and recover the eroded royal domain, issued a 
boon to the “people of Malta” upon their surrender, and brought the island back under direct 
control of the Sicilian Crown “in perpetuity.”48  The message of Pedro III to the castellan da 
Barba, which was sent on the day Malta passed voluntarily under his rule and got the first 
shipment of grain from Sicily, suggests that there were ‘enemy’ threats requiring additional 
Maltese naval assistance.  The naval support was to be provided when the enemy threat was at 
hand.49   
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A notarial document dated 9 February 1283 records a merchant vessel, belonging to a 
certain Christofaro da Malta with a cargo of wine and carobs destined for Syracuse.  This 
indicates that trade activities were back to normal by February 1283.50  On the other hand, 
Castrum Maris was still under Angevin control and, to make matters worse, a large Angevin 
fleet from Marseilles arrived in mid 1283, threatening the Aragonese position in Sicily and its 
African supply lines.   
According to the thirteenth-century chronicle written by Bernardo D’Esclot, a number of 
Angevin (Provincial) galleys escaped to Malta in 1283, and the men on the galleys took control 
of the castle.  The chronicle mentions that the castle in question is the main city on the island, 
which would have been Mdina but according to the account of events it must have been Castrum 
Maris.51  The Angevins were chased (two days behind) by the galleys of the King of Aragon and 
Sicily, under the command of Roger of Lauria, arriving at the harbor of Malta soon after.  The 
naval battle that followed is one of the most famous encounters of galley warfare and was 
studied in detail by many scholars.52  Details of this encounter are not directly relevant in terms 
of understanding the maritime history of Malta, but the result of the conflict was a famous 
Aragonese victory.53  However, even after the Battle of Malta, the Castrum Maris held out and 
was regularly supplied by sea, presumably by Genoese ships that frequented the harbor. When it 
finally fell into Aragonese hands in February 1284, new settlers of Catalonian, Valencian and 
Majorcan origin were integrated into the commercial sector of Malta.  These migrants were 
practiced merchants with well-established connections in the Levant and North Africa, and their 
experiences abroad introduced new challenges and competition.54 
It is interesting that there is no archaeological evidence of trade or incoming goods to 
Malta prior to the Aragonese period.  According to Luttrell, the excavations of medieval remains 
in Malta reveal that most of the pottery was manufactured locally using the same techniques and 
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styles of the previous centuries.55  Contradicting Luttrell’s findings, Cutajar states that ceramics 
imported from Tunisia, Brindisi, Taranto, Campania, southwest Sicily, and possibly from Spain 
and the eastern Mediterranean appear in Malta as early as the thirteenth century.56   
Archaeological evidence is hard to interpret in this case, since the ceramics found in Malta 
represent examples of very common and widespread types, which also are very common in 
Sicilian contexts of this period.  Therefore, it is quite possible that the ceramics reached the 
Maltese Islands through Sicily, along with all the other Sicilian pottery that continued to 
dominate the Maltese archaeological contexts as the major class of imported pottery.  It is also 
possible that at least some of these artifacts originating from Spain were the personal belongings 
of the incoming immigrants.  It should also be noted that Maltese medieval sites are very hard to 
date because most ceramics are locally produced, and because there are very few chronologies 
for central and western Mediterranean ceramics in general.  The extent to which the Maltese 
Islands were subjected to cultural, political and commercial influences from the outside world is, 
therefore, very hard to determine.     
1284-1380: One Century of Naval Plundering in the Mediterranean 
The series of conflicts referred to as the Hundred Years War between Venice and Genoa 
(1256-1381) had a direct effect on the development of Genoese interests in Malta and on the rise 
of piracy in the Mediterranean.  Piracy had been ‘a natural part of life’ in the Mediterranean 
since the tenth and eleventh centuries.  Pisa, Genoa and, to some extent Venice, were the major 
maritime cities involved in piracy, but they also maintained fleets to fight foreign pirates in their 
own waters.57  The Venetian defeat by the Genoese at the Battle of Curzola (1294-99) was 
followed by the Treaty of Milan, which only restrained Venice and Genoa from each other’s 
territorial waters in times of war, but left the question of supremacy unresolved.58  The vague 
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language of the Treaty of Milan resulted in a sharp rise in piracy, as rivals continued to struggle 
for dominance over trade.   
The Genoese received trade concessions from Constantinople for their efforts in 
reestablishing the Byzantine Empire in 1261.  Meanwhile, the Catalans established a foothold in 
the Duchy of Athens and threatened to expand their operations to Romania.  Because the 
situation was completely out of control and the Catalonians were disrupting commercial 
shipping, the Venetians assigned patrol ships in 1301 to secure the safe conduct of their 
merchantmen and armed their own corsairs.59  The tensions created by the conflicts between 
Angevins, Sicilians, Genoese, Venetians, Byzantines, and Catalans constantly threatened the 
passage of merchant shipping.  In addition, although there were penalties for attacking the ships 
of allies, it was not always easy to make the distinction between friend and foe, nor was it easy 
to keep current with information during this period of constant political change.60  
The fourteenth century was also a turning point in the history of naval plundering during 
which the distinction between pirates and corsairs became concrete.  Briefly, a corsair may be 
differentiated from a pirate insofar as he obtained some form of permission from the mother state 
to commit aggressive acts.  Assaults were restricted to times of war and only against enemy 
vessels.  Diverging from either of these two conditions was considered a piratical act.  A pirate 
ravaged the seas of his own accord without legal sanction.  He chose his targets more or less 
indiscriminately and amassed his prizes or booty for his profit alone.61  Therefore, it was not the 
act that rendered itself legitimate, nor the actor, but only the authorization: certain forms of 
violence such as war, quasi-war of marque, reprisal, and piracy were strict royal monopolies.62  
Evidence suggests that the scope of maritime aggression shifted in the fourteenth century to 
include privateering and legitimate piracy.63  Conversely, many of the maritime cities were 
deprived of invaluable manpower due to the famine of 1315-1317 followed by the Black Death 
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that dispatched one-third of the population of Europe between 1347 and 1530.  Cities were 
willing to settle differences by negotiation and compromise in order to avoid the continued loss 
of experienced sailors and rowers.64  In accordance with that precept, many Italian maritime 
republics tried to avoid the use of true corsairs under the banner of war, but granted their 
captains the freedom to raid enemy merchandise and vessels nonetheless.65  Under these 
circumstances, shippers had to be allied to one power that regularly shipped their merchandise in 
order to ensure the safety of the vessel, the crew and the cargo.66   
 At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Genoese had strong control over the flow 
of their commercial merchandise, regulated piracy and protected their merchant ships, but ‘the 
crisis of the fourteenth century’ had changed the political and economic reality for Genoa.  
Castilian ‘Atlantic-type’ vessels began to appear in Sicilian waters after 1311, and Catalan naval 
power presented a direct threat to Genoese shipping.  For example, a Narbonnese cog carrying 
alum and waxed leathers from Loredan was captured  by Catalan corsairs and brought to Malta.67    
Attempts at cooperation between Genoa and Venice foundered on the banks of suspicion and 
envy, compelling Genoa to cooperate with Catalonia itself; a treaty with the King of Sicily was 
put into effect in 1350.68  At the same time, a precautionary patrol fleet was organized in order to 
guarantee the security of grain shipments from Sicily to Genoa.69  Unfortunately, in the same 
year the Aragonese, now established in Sardinia, formed an alliance with Venice to compete 
with the Genoese and Catalonians.  Genoa found herself in an untenable position that could not 
be remedied without external aid, and she began to decline as a maritime power in 1350.70   
The decline of Genoa had negative effects on the well-being of Malta.  The rest of the 
fourteenth century is characterized by repetition of the same depressing scenario: the Aragonese 
Crown concedes Malta to Sicilian magnates; the local population, anxious to escape exploitation 
by rapacious absentee Counts, petitions for re-incorporation into the Royal domain; the Crown 
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concedes this request in perpetuity, but subsequently grants out the island once again.71  Thus, 
the documentary evidence from this period is obscure and fragmentary.  However, two definitive 
statements are possible based on the evidence that is presented below: (1) Malta was still a 
Genoese ‘territory’ because there is no evidence whatsoever of Venetian, Catalonian or Castilian 
presence and,72 (2) the trade contacts and connections with Sicily continued as usual.  The 
following incident summarizes the situation in fourteenth century Malta and how complicated 
and interwoven the politics had become.  
The Chiaramonte Incident 
Manfredi Chiaramonte was the viceroy of the Aragonese King of Sicily (Frederick IV) and 
the Admiral of Sicily.73  At the same time, he had cotton interests in Malta that he was exploiting 
with the aid of a group of Genoese merchants and financiers.  Giacomo de Pellegrino of Messina 
was the castellan as well as the capitano of Malta.  On 26 October 1361, Pellegrino began to 
launch pirate attacks on Genoese ships bound for North Africa.  It is possible that Pellegrino was 
also involved in the cotton trade, since he owed large sums of money to a few of the Genoese 
whose ships he was assaulting.  As mentioned earlier it is difficult to tell the difference between 
corsairs and pirates based on documentary evidence but, in Pellegrino’s case, it is clear that he 
was not authorized as a corsair by the King and had to be stopped, especially since he was 
interfering in the Admiral’s commercial interests.  Therefore, in 1372 Frederick IV, King of 
Sicily, had to intervene to restore order in Malta.  Frederick’s fleet was supported by ten 
Genoese galleys and was commanded by Chiaramonte.74  With the help of local royalists the 
Castrum Maris was recaptured and Pellegrino was banished.75  King Frederick rewarded a 
number of local royalists, servientes, who had helped him recapture the castle, by forgiving their 
debts to Pellegrino.76   
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The whole episode of 1372 is as confusing as it is interesting.  First, the fact that a local 
officer attained the status required to keep the island as a pirate base under his control for eleven 
years is significant.  However, it seems that Pellegrino financed his piratical ventures, at least 
initially, with the profit he made through commercial activities with Genoese partners.  The fact 
that he did not pay his Genoese partners’ shares could account for the extra wealth he needed for 
his rebellion to control the island.  Second, the fact that Frederick IV rewarded at least three 
servientes of the castle indicated inside collaboration on the part of the King.  However, the fact 
that the “reward” was in the form of “forgiving their debts to Pellegrino” indicates that the 
servientes were also involved in commercial ventures and were Pellegrino’s credit partners as 
well.  Third, the considerable naval force (some unknown number of vessels that Frederick IV 
supplied and the Genoese contribution of ten galleys) indicates that Pellegrino established a very 
strong military presence that required the deployment of such a fleet.  Documents indicate that 
the ten Genoese galleys were not leased to Frederick IV, but were in fact sent as a Genoese 
contribution to the King’s forces.  The fact that the Genoese helped Frederick to defeat a pirate 
who attacked Genoese shipping indicates that there was substantial Genoese shipping to be 
protected, and that the Genoese had interests in re-establishing order in Malta.  Lastly, the fact 
that this whole incident took place in a period when the Aragonese and the Venetians were at 
war with the Genoese is remarkable.  It underscores to what extent trade and politics were 
interwoven in this period, and that the major trade ventures were probably in the hands of royal 






The War of Chioggia and Its Effects on Malta 
The Genoese defeat in the War of Chioggia (1378-1381) marked the end of the Hundred 
Years’ War of Venice and Genoa.  While the Venetians accumulated possessions in the eastern 
Mediterranean, the Genoese turned to business and financial operations in Western Europe and 
the Atlantic.77  Although the Genoese turned increasingly from trade to finance and began to use 
mercantile partners in the West, incidents like the sack of Djerba in 1388 and the assault of 
Mahdia in 1390 indicate that Genoese “interests” in the central Mediterranean were not 
completely abandoned.  North Africa was still an excellent market for the products of southern 
Spain, and Genoa still had footholds from Morocco to Tripoli that demanded Spanish products 
be shipped on board Genoese bulk carriers.  Meanwhile, Genoese merchants were establishing 
an ever-tightening grip on the economies of Iberia, while also dominating the sugar trade of the 
new Portuguese Atlantic islands, and monopolizing trade with the Castilian mercury mines at 
Almaden.78   
Documentary evidence also indicates that Malta continued to be close to Genoa after 
1380.  However, it is at this time that the first indications of Venetian presence in Malta are 
apparent.  Admiral Chiaramonte was still involved in trade and had interests in Malta but began 
to explore a new area, the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in the Adriatic.  Documents, 
including a proposal for a trade agreement between Ragusa and Malta are preserved in the 
archives.79  Although information regarding Adriatic trade connections is limited, the 
establishment of a regular trade route between Malta and Ragusa automatically drew Venetian 
attention.  Venice had very close connections with Ragusa, and the Venetian capitaneus culfi 
(commander of the maritime patrol in the Adriatic) controlled the shipping and had the right to 
stop, search and seize unwelcome vessels, including those of Genoa.80  Another document of 
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1387 indicates that Chiaramonte offered the Venetians free access to the island and guaranteed 
liberty and security of trade there.81  The account concerning the wreck of a Venetian cocca in 
the Grand Harbor in 1397/8 provides the first definitive evidence of a Venetian presence in the 
port of Malta.82   
Malta after the Genoese: Rebellions and Destruction 
The traveler’s accounts written in 1394 by an Italian notary named Nicolas Martoni 
indicate that Malta was producing cotton, cumin, wine, meat, and wheat, painting a picture that 
reflects the islands as quite prosperous places in the fourteenth century.83  Unfortunately, the end 
of this period is characterized by rebellions that eventually led to the complete destruction of the 
island as a commercial center.  Two successive rebellions, led by Artale Alagona (1396) and 
Guglielmo Raimondo III di Moncada (1397), had devastating effects on trade and the condition 
of the port of Malta.84  Alagona was the tutor of Princess Maria, the only heir of Frederick IV, 
King of Sicily.85  The reasons for the rebellion led by Alagona are not clear, but the incidents 
began with piratical attacks on settlements along the Sicilian coast.  The pirate vessels that 
harbored at Malta included two of the ‘rebellious traitor’ Alagona’s galleys and four Genoese 
pirate galleys.86  The rebellion was quickly suppressed by Guglielmo Raimondo III di Moncada, 
Count of Augusta and of Novara, when he was assigned as the Marquis of Malta and Gozo and 
the castellan of Malta, only to lead a revolt himself against the Sicilian Crown a year later.   
Information concerning Moncada is ambiguous since some sources do not place him in 
Malta at all.87  However, all sources agree that he was a pirate and a corsair.88  Shortly after 
Moncada inherited the County of Augusta in 1378, he sold his land there and bought two ships in 
1383 and 1384, with a desire to become a corsair.  During the following years, he focused his 
activities in the Levant, but documentary evidence suggests that about 1390 he extended his area 
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of operation and began launching attacks on Tunisian ships (Tunis was an ally of Aragon at the 
time), Genoese ships, and even Catalan ships in the central Mediterranean.  Although some of 
his activities were deemed ‘piratical’, he generally kept the distinguished title of “corsair” and 
was not charged with piracy.  The end of his brilliant career as a corsair came with his rebellion 
in January 1397.  The causes of his revolt are unknown but were probably a reaction to the 
incorporation of Augusta into the royal domain.89  It is not clear whether Moncada was in Malta 
during the revolt or if supporters there had taken up his cause.  In either case, it is known that the 
Castrum Maris was ruined during the efforts to suppress the revolt and that Malta was 
reincorporated into the royal domain by King Martin I. 
Additional taxes were promptly exacted to cover costs of repairs to the castle.  The new 
taxes included: (1) one florin on each butte of imported wine and two quartuchi on the sale of 
wine by retail, (2) one tari on every uncia of all trade goods (both imports and exports), and (3) 
one Maltese tari on every ubara of oil.90  Furthermore, royal supporters were rewarded with 
exemption from various duties and taxes.  It is likely that the high rate of taxation discouraged 
the merchants of Birgu from operating in Malta.  A decrease in royal income inhibited the 
maintenance and repair of the Castrum Maris, which, in turn, weakened the settlement.  In 1406 
the castle was reported to be partly in ruins.91  In all, Malta never recovered from the incident of 
1397, and the history of Malta can be characterized as miserable until the arrival of the Order of 
Saint John in 1530.   
The primary reason for the marked economic decline of Malta was the disappearance of 
Genoese predominance in maritime trade in the central Mediterranean.  Genoa endured fourteen 
revolutions between 1413 and 1453, and was in foreign hands for much was the fifteenth century 
before becoming a client, first, of the French and then, of the Spanish Crown.92  In addition, 
while the Catalans were trying to trap the Genoese in their harbor by terrorizing the seas with 
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corsairs, the Genoese took over the sector of financing in Barcelona, Malaga, Seville, Cadiz, and 
Lisbon and acquired a dominant position over the routes to Britain and Flanders.93  The alum of 
Catalonia was shipped to the cloth makers of northern Europe on Genoese ships and under 
Genoese finances.  The nature of this traffic required the employment of ships suitable for bulk 
transport (carracks), and these comprised an overwhelming part of the Genoese merchant fleet in 
the fifteenth century.  Because the large carracks were not economical conveyors of many other 
types of products, the Genoese merchant fleet specialized completely in the alum trade and 
abandoned their shipping lines in the central Mediterranean.94  The second major reason for the 
decline of Malta was ever-increasing piracy in the central Mediterranean after the definitive 
conquest of Sicily by King Martin in 1398.  The pirate ships of, first, Catalan and, then, Castilian 
and Basque origin generally used the Sicilian ports as their bases.95  The adverse effects of 
increasing piracy are illustrated by an incident in 1399, when a galiote of Syracuse belonging to 
Jannuczu di Prestiangelu, captured a ship (a ligne) that belonged to a certain Maltese named 
Philippu.  According to the document, the ship was carrying wine and slaves to Tunis.96     
The economy of Malta seems to have declined considerably with the decline of Genoese 
trade in the central Mediterranean.  One of the desperate measures taken by the Università,97 was 
the arming of an ‘official’ pirate ship, in the hope of sustaining the poor local economy.98  
Reports dating to the beginning of the fifteenth century indicate that the fortifications and 
harbors of Malta were in need of repair.99  It is possible, in view of the poor state of the island, 
that King Martin exempted the inhabitants of the Castrum Maris from all new taxes in 1408.100   
In 1416 King Alfonso granted permission to the Università of Malta for the construction of a 
tower on Comino.  To provide the funds for this construction, the King allowed the Jurats to 
impose a tax of one florin per barrel (botte) of imported wine.  The income of the shuttle boat 
that worked between Malta and Gozo, run by the Università and known as the mahadia, was also 
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to be taxed.101  Another decree by the King in 1416 stated that the castellan could not interfere 
with anything extending beyond the castle’s ditch, and that he could not license any corsairs.  
The licensing of corsairs now fell under the jurisdiction of the capitano (the equivalent of a 
town-mayor who was also responsible for Birgu, the port settlement around the castle).  King 
Alfonso V of Aragon subsequently confirmed the town’s claim that the jurisdiction of the 
castellan did not extend beyond the ditch, and that the castellans were not to interfere with 
vessels entering or leaving the port.102  This caused great tension between the castellan and the 
capitano, and both refused to take charge of the required repairs.  Besides, now that the islands 
were not enjoying naval protection provided by Genoese vessels of all types (including pirates 
and corsairs), one of the essential requirements became the upkeep of a galley and a brigantine 
(for quick communications) to defend the Castrum Maris.103  All these expenses made the 
devastated port of Malta far from profitable for the Crown.  Malta desperately needed funds 
directly from the Crown treasury for repairs and other defense requirements.   
 To make matters worse, Alfonso V of Aragon was also in distress.  High mortality from 
the plague in the Kingdom of Aragon in the 1440s, failure of Catalan banks and depletion of 
gold and silver reserves in the 1440s and 1450s all contributed to an economic crisis.104  In 
urgent need of money, Alfonso broke Martin’s charter and in 1420 pledged Malta to the viceroy 
of Sicily, Antonio Cardona for 30,000 gold florins.105  Subsequently, the islands were given to 
Gonsalvo di Monroy for the same sum in 1425.  
This semi-autonomous status granted to the islands (just like Pantelleria) saved the King 
from paying for defensive expenses.  The fact that the islands were not generating an income that 
would enable the new rulers to pay for such costs remained a constant problem.  The lack of 
direct royal control led to an increased atmosphere of tolerance for unlawful behavior, and the 
new rulers could only afford to provide the funds necessary for defense from an alternative 
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income source, piracy.  For example, the galley assigned to protect the Castrum Maris was first 
financed by Francesco Gatt (1398), and was replaced by a ‘nova galea’ belonging to Ingarao 
Desguanesch in 1402.106   Archival documents indicate that Ingarao Desguanesch was the owner 
of a vessel involved in grain shipment between Sicily (Syracuse and Brucoli) and Malta.107   
However, the names of Ingarao and Antoni Desguanesch appear on many documents related to 
piracy as owners of corsair ships.  One of the Desguanesch ships (a fusta) was taken by Venetian 
corsairs in the eastern Mediterranean as a prize in 1443.108  Except for that one loss, it seems that 
the Desguanesch ships were very successful corsairs themselves, as there is documentation that a 
total of four fuste(s), three galiots and a bireme owned by either Antoni or Ingarao Desguanesch, 
and commanded by various captains, captured North African (Moorish), Sicilian and Ragusan 
ships and cargoes as prizes between the years 1443 and 1447.109  
However, the rule of Gonsalvo di Monroy, who made great extortions, was largely 
unpopular, leading to the revolt of the Maltese in 1427 against his rule.  Maltese ambassadors 
were sent to the viceroy in Sicily to settle the problem, and their pledges ultimately led to the 
reincorporation of both islands into the royal domains via a new charter on June 20, 1428.110  
The same decree also stated that the islands would never again be granted as a fief and that five 
percent of the money acquired from corsair looting was to be kept in an account to be used for 
repair of the castle.111  The efficacy of the regulation is not clear, but a report written by the 
castellan Guterra de Nava on March 15, 1429 announced that the castle was once again 
serviceable.  As a result, the Maltese were able to resist the great Moorish invasion of September 
1429.112 
 Moorish raids seem to have continued in the following years.  Archival documents 
include a petition by the Secreto of Gozo to the Crown (dated 1432) regarding problems created 
by Moorish attacks and the shortage of food on the island.113  Other documents communicating 
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to the King the security concerns of the Jurats on the island, and replies by the King expressing 
his own financial problems point to the fact that the attacks continued until 1494.114   
 While Malta was suffering, trade in the central Mediterranean was flourishing to reach 
one of its most lucrative periods, as commercial contacts with the Muslims were largely tolerated 
in this period.  Merchants from Venice, Catalonia, Naples, Messina, Syracuse, Mazara, and 
Trapani all were involved in trading weapons, iron, wood and lead to North Africa.115   This 
trade, coupled with the weakness of the Sicilian Crown attracted increasing numbers of pirates 
and corsairs to the area.  In 1442 a corsair named Juan de la Corogne brought the Florentine 
vessel he had captured to Gozo, and the galleys of Pedro del Busch captured a Venetian nef, to 
be sold in Gozo.116  An order from the viceroy of Sicily dated 1453 instructs the royal vessels to 
capture the six Genoese vessels loaded with the merchandise ‘evacuated’ from Constantinople.117  
In 1456 six galleys – under the guise of crusade – attacked a Genoese nef on its way to Tripoli 
and Tunis.118  Piracy was the only lucrative business for the Maltese but it was also a business 
with high risks.  The corsairs and pirates were not reliable business partners.  They frequently 
attacked friendly ships and were sometimes reluctant to share the profit with the ship owner who 
financed the expedition, as the latter often was based on land and had no way of knowing the 
value of the captured prize.119 
Another serious problem faced by the Maltese Islands and everywhere else around the 
Mediterranean was the bubonic plague that was endemic from 1347 until its complete 
disappearance in 1844.120  This epidemic, known as the Black Death, possibly originated from 
Mongolia, spread to the Black Sea port of Caffa, and from there to Constantinople, Alexandria, 
Cairo, Messina, and Sicily.121  The first outbreaks in Europe occurred in 1348, almost 
simultaneously, in all major maritime ports: Pisa, Genoa, Venice, Marseilles and Barceolona.122   
Bubonic plague was the most devastating natural disaster ever to strike Europe, killing three 
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Europeans out of ten within the first five years of its rapid spread on the continent.123  Certain 
areas in Europe, and especially the major ports were hit worse than the others: the population of 
Florence was reduced to one third of its previous size after being hit eight times by the plague 
between 1348 and 1427,124 and Venice lost sixty percent of its population between 1348 and the 
summer of 1350.125  After the middle fifteenth century mortality rates in Europe began to 
decrease in comparison to those in the Muslim Middle East, thus, requiring a strict quarantine 
system to avoid the return of the dreadful disease.126   
The plague first threatened the port of Malta during the second half of the fifteenth 
century.127  Although the plague itself does not seem to have reached the island, the period 
between 1454 and 1524 is characterized by an extensive paranoia, and the resulting precautions 
brought economic activities of the port of Malta almost to a standstill. 
The first reference to a plague alarm dates to October 21, 1454 when the town council 
met to discuss the arrival of a ship belonging to a merchant from Messina.  Because there were 
rumors about an outbreak of the disease in Messina, the council’s decision was to expel this ship 
immediately and ban contact with the crew.  Four years later news reached Malta that the plague 
had spread to Syracuse.  The government responded by barring admission to the island.  On June 
22, 1458 the town crier proclaimed at Birgu and Qormi that no one was to come into contact 
with the men of the galley belonging to Johannes de la Turri under threat of a 100 uncie fine.   In 
July 1475 ships coming from Trapani, where plague was reported, were also included in the 
expanded restraining order.128  Another unfortunate incident took place in 1488, when almost all 
ships from ports in Sicily were refused entry, even though provisions in Malta were running low.   
Meanwhile, the plague had reached Tripoli in the early sixteenth century, and fear of its 
reaching Malta increased considerably after the Spanish invasion of Tripoli in 1520.129  
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Eventually, the plague reached Malta in 1523, probably on board a galleon belonging to Don 
Ugone de Moncada, with a cargo from Tripoli.  The town council set the ship afire in the open 
sea but apparently this did not help because cases of the plague were reported in Birgu.  Soon 
after this incident, the town crier announced that no vessel was allowed to enter or leave the 
harbor.130  To prevent the spread of plague to the countryside, people of Mdina and Rabat 
guarded the limits of Birgu until the town council finally lifted restrictions on the inhabitants of 
Birgu on June 30, 1524.131  
The period of plague in Malta coincided with a period of intensified piracy in the central 
Mediterranean. Fast ships such as caravels and brigantines proved efficient in chasing and 
capturing the bulky Mediterranean merchant ships, and Catalan and Castilian corsairs in time 
completely destroyed Sicilian trade.132  There was also an increase in the Ottoman naval 
activities in the Central Mediterranean.  Twelve Ottoman galleys attacked the harbor settlement 
of Malta, Birgu, in 1488, plundered a cache of cotton and cloth, and captured 80 people.133  After 
this raid, preparing to defend the island against Ottoman attacks became a serious consideration.  
The Royal Court at Naples sent Francesco Patella, the Chief Harbor Master, and Jacobo Tudisco 
to Malta equipped with a naval contingent consisting of “barques, ships and men-at-arms” to 
protect the islands.134  In a letter dated June 13, 1513, the King ordered his viceroy Ugone de 
Moncada to pay the Portuguese captain, Pietro de Texaro, who had been sent to protect the 
Maltese Islands with his ships.135   
In terms of Malta, the only evidence of trade in this period are three partnership deeds 
from the notarial registers of 1504-1518 indicating that local Maltese merchants from Birgu 
participated in, or financed, trading operations.136  These are the first trade contracts known that 
involve locals with Maltese surnames, and it is possible that in the absence of foreign merchants 
the locals were encouraged to conduct their own business.137  Also, the Maltese ships, with no 
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other options, became involved in piracy as evidenced by three feluccas plundering Ragusa and 
taking prisoners.138  This attack is also the first known documentation of  “Maltese” ships 
committing acts of piracy.   
In the meantime, the concerns of the local government regarding the inadequacy of the 
defenses against the growing Ottoman threat were increasingly communicated to the viceroy in 
Sicily.139   
Conclusion 
Although the population of Malta was dependent on Sicily for grain, the island appears 
to have had closer connections with Genoa.  It is also true that even though Genoa controlled the 
flow of large quantities of merchandise in the Mediterranean, this city also depended on regular 
shipments of Sicilian grain.  Genoa’s major sources of income were from trade and piracy, and 
Malta was in a suitable geographic and strategic position for both activities.  Therefore, the 
Genoese appear to have been interested in keeping the port of Malta as a friendly shelter and a 
small market for exchanging plundered goods and slaves.   
Raiding merchant shipping with a letter of marque issued by a political authority was a 
‘legitimate’ form of warfare in the Middle Ages.140  During the late medieval period virtually all 
people agreed that if a man from one city were injured, defrauded or robbed by a man of another 
city, the wronged party might recoup his loss or avenge his injury on the goods of his injurer’s 
compatriots as long as the creditor was officially sanctioned and provided with a letter of 
marque.141  Corsairing and trade were interwoven and the same person could simultaneously be a 
merchant, pirate, corsair, admiral or any combination of these.  Because jurisdiction over Malta 
rested with the King of Sicily, acts of piracy may or may not have been subject to penalty, and 
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would have been open to the King’s interpretation based on the current political situation.  
Whether an admiral was a pirate or not, his acts were rightful and his jurisdiction legitimate 
because he was a sovereign’s agent; what he did was authorized by man and God.  In this 
context, Malta became at times a port of armament where piracy was financed and centralized.  
The islands provided sailors for the corsair and privateer ships, and in return became a market 
where the prizes were sold.  
The Genoese brought some measure of wealth to Malta in the Medieval Period, not only 
by financing the modest cotton trade but also by utilizing the island as a pirate base.  As long as 
it did not interfere with royal interests and not directly threaten the interests of the King of Sicily, 
such activity was tolerated as it increased the royal income through taxes on the markets of 
Birgu, and also through the royal percentage taken from the corsair loot.   
What the Genoese did not bring to Malta was a general economic and social renaissance.  
Effects of increased maritime trade and cosmopolitanism seem to have been restricted to the 
harbor area.  The rest of the archipelago was under control of the ecclesiastical authorities, 
especially during the period of Aragonese control between 1283 and 1410.  Like everywhere 
else, the institutions of church and state were united by the Spanish Inquisition in Malta.  The 
economic development of the islands was constricted internally with feudalism and externally by 
Spain’s foreign policy.  In Europe there was increased interest in secular nationalism at the 
beginning of the fifteenth century.  In Malta, on the other hand, civil authority and control of 
taxation remained in the hands of the nobility and the bishops, and there was no middle class per 
se.142  Consequently, development of financial institutions and economic structures required for 
the development of trade did not occur in Malta, mainly for reasons related to the harsh rule of 
the Spanish Inquisition.  
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The Genoese presence and patronage provided Malta with a context and a role to play 
that took advantage of the geographical location of the island.  By controlling Malta the Genoese 
gained access to an excellent harbor located favorably for commerce as well as piracy.  But the 
Genoese never took possession of Malta per se, possibly to avoid the costs of attacking and 
defending the island.  In other words, the harbor facilities offered by Malta were desirable, but 
the annexation of the island was not feasible.  The Kings of Sicily only cared about Malta only to 
the extent that they did not want it to fall into the hands of an enemy who could not be controlled 
through diplomacy.  Genoa seemed to fit this description, as no Genoese fleet ever launched an 
attack against Sicily from Malta.  
After the end of Genoese economic domination in the central Mediterranean, Malta’s 
economic situation rapidly declined.  By the time the Knights of Saint John arrived in Malta in 
1530, the island was in a poor economic state, the coastal fortification in the harbor area was in 
ruins, and there was no substantial production or trade.  The Knights of Saint John initially 
refused to accept Malta as their base (in 1524) because the island did not have the population and 
agrarian base to support their presence.   
The only important improvement that took place during the period of Spanish rule was 
the development of a local government which entailed the recognition of the island as a 
Università, i.e., a commune with two officials annually elected from among the Maltese.143  This 
was the only time in Maltese history (prior to independence in 1964) that the islands had some 




HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE ORDER OF 
SAINT JOHN IN MALTA 
 
Historical Background 
By the time the Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem reached the central 
Mediterranean island of Malta, it had already had seen over four centuries of history.  The Order 
of Siant John grew out of a hospice for the care of pilgrims in eleventh-century Jerusalem into a 
religious and hospitaller brotherhood, which dedicated its service to the poor and to sick 
pilgrims. After the first crusade and after a considerable increase of members and properties in 
the Holy Land and in Europe, the brotherhood was formed in 1113 into a religious order of the 
Catholic Church.  Conditions in the Holy Land became increasingly turbulent, leading to 
increased involvement of the members of the Order in the military affairs of the Crusader States, 
thus evolving after 1120 into a military order integrating the monastic and military ways of life 
bound by vows of poverty, chastity and obedience.1   
Transport by sea was the quickest, cheapest and safest way of traveling between Europe 
and the Holy Land, and the Knights had to undertake seafaring activities over and above their 
military duties.2  The permanent fleet did not develop as long as there was still a Christian 
foothold in the Holy Land.  The earliest evidence that might suggest the existence of an armed 
Hospitaller fleet is the obscure title of Commendator navium, encountered in a document dating 
to 1234.3   
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With the fall of Acre in 1292, the Hospitallers retreated to Limassol on Cyprus.  The 
new residence on an island required a stronger fleet to guard this position, leading to the official 
initiation of the Order’s navy in 1300.4  In 1306-1307 the Order of Saint John purchased the 
islands of Rhodes, Kos and Leros from Genoese admiral Vignolo Vignoli, who had established 
control over these supposedly Byzantine islands.  Little is known about the Order’s occupation 
of the islands but it appears to have involved fighting against the local inhabitants who fiercely 
opposed the Order’s arrival.5   
 Neither the change in location, nor the increasingly anomalous position of an 
international chivalric Order at a time when national interests were gradually overtaking the 
crusading ideal tempered the Knights’ hostility to the Muslim powers.  Indeed, without a military 
role the Order could scarcely have justified its continued existence.6 The increasing vitality of 
Muslim shipping in the area necessitated a concentrated effort by the Knights to arm a fleet to 
counter the danger posed by the growing fleet of the Ottoman Empire and to prevent or at least 
interrupt Ottoman merchantmen from navigating freely in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The Order maintained a fleet from this time until Napoleon conquered the Island of 
Malta in 1789.  The Order of Saint John had two major functions to justify its existence and to 
acquire financial and political support for its survival.  The first function, outside the scope of 
this manuscript, was to provide hospital services to those in need.  The second was to fight the 
forces of Islam that were arrayed against Christendom.  Acquiring the status of an island nation 
since the thirteenth century, its major weapon performing its tasks was the navy.  Recognition of 
the organization, administration, function, and performance of this fleet is, therefore, key to 
understanding the political, economic and military context of the Order during its three centuries 




Arrival of the Order in Malta 
The expulsion of the Order of Saint John from its base in Rhodes in 1522 and its arrival 
in Malta was a turning point in history for the Knights and the island.  Information about the 
events of this period survived through contemporary historical documents.  In addition to the 
accounts, iconography appears as an alternative source of information, providing data especially 
about the specifics of the naval forces of these new occupants of Malta when they first arrived at 
the island.   
In studying this period, it is not always easy to recognize the distinction between the 
objective truth regarding the actual events and the official historical accounts, which were 
sometimes manipulated to further a political agenda.  Interpretation of the texts and paintings 
requires an understanding of the period and the circumstances under which these works were 
created.  It is apparent that in most cases these official accounts and paintings served to promote 
the power and glory of the Order of Saint John.  Impartiality was not the major objective in 
recording occurrences but most events were real.  Thus, a general description of the 
Mediterranean world at the middle of the sixteenth century is crucial to determine the extent of 
exaggeration that may be present in descriptions of both general events and specific 
characteristics of the naval forces.  A realistic assessment of the composition and 
accomplishments of this initial fleet is also important to comprehend subsequent naval 
developments.  However, because of textual and iconographic discrepancies regarding specific 
ships, relevant discussions about the details are presented in a separate Appendix (Appendix B).   
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It is important to emphasize that the Order’s ships not only provided transportation, but 
also served as floating homes for the Knights and the thousands of Rhodians who accompanied 
them during this journey, which occurred between the fall of Rhodes in 1522 and the arrival of 
the Order in Malta in 1530.  The reason for the length of this journey and the circumstances that 
led to the selection of Malta as a new base ultimately determined how the Order of Saint John 
and its naval forces were organized between 1530 and 1798. 
Mediterranean in the Sixteenth Century 
The sixteenth century in Europe was a time of unprecedented change, caused by 
revolutions in almost every aspect of life.7  The century opened with the discovery of new 
continents.  The renaissance in Italy was at its height and was spreading north.  Especially at the 
beginning of the century, life was relatively prosperous for the average European, the economy 
was growing and population was increasing.  The mechanisms of commerce started to depend on 
the developing systems of international finance.  Establishment of annual trans-Mediterranean 
commercial shipments, as well as regular trade with India, led to the development of an 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and a capitalist, money-based economy.  Technological innovations 
like the employment of advanced casting techniques and gunpowder were changing the nature of 
warfare, leading to the rise of the centralized nation-states.  The printing press created a media 
revolution and the first half of the century saw what contemporaries viewed as the most earth-
shattering change in the century, breaking the religious and cultural consensus of Europe: the 
Reformation.      
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In 1503 the Portuguese launched a serious challenge to Mediterranean hegemony in the 
spice trade by bringing pepper directly from India and marketing the prized commodity at lower 
prices by eliminating the Middle Eastern middlemen.  The rise of Atlantic seafaring coincided 
with a marked growth in population in the Mediterranean world, while its agricultural production 
began to stagnate. Towards the middle of the century, prices started to rise, and the inflationary 
spiral worsened with the flow of bullion from the Americas to Spain.  The search for inexpensive 
grain intensified throughout Europe as the sixteenth century progressed.  To meet the demand, 
the ships of England and the Hanseatic League regularly sailed to Mediterranean ports in search 
of grain.  Because the English and Dutch ships were built to carry bulk cargoes, their tonnage 
almost doubled that carried by their Mediterranean counterparts.  New trade routes, inflation in 
vital sectors of the economy, and the growing influence of northwestern European seafarers in 
the Mediterranean were all accompanied by bitter wars of religion.  While soldiers and sailors of 
the Cross battled those of the Crescent, the armies of Catholic monarchs fought to counter the 
progress of Martin Luther’s Reformation.  At the center of both struggles stood Charles the 
Habsburg, the first Charles to become king of Spain and the fifth to be crowned Holy Roman 
Emperor.  His extensive territories, Catholic piety, and fierce rivalry with the Valois monarchs of 
France forced him to fight on every front. 
The Ottomans Attack Rhodes 
The Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its power in the sixteenth century.  The 
Ottoman armies defeated the Safavids, capturing the Safavid capital Tabriz and establishing a 
more effective control over the silk and spice routes after 1514.  The capture of Syria and Egypt 
in 1516 and 1517, respectively, strengthened the Ottoman position in the East as well as 
increasing the wealth and economic power of the Empire.8  The continued occupation of Rhodes 
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by the Knights of Saint John, who regularly attacked merchant ships and harbored pirates and 
corsairs, was clearly undesirable for the Ottomans.   
The Ottoman decision to conquer the islands directly on the Mediterranean trade routes 
was a strategic move to secure control over maritime trade.  In addition, the opening of the route 
around Africa and the establishment of Portuguese strongholds in India were developments that 
demanded firmer control over the area still under Ottoman rule.  Now that some oriental 
products reached Europe through a different, more direct channel, all possible areas of trouble 
within the Ottoman sphere had to be eliminated.  Therefore, capture of the Christian stronghold 
on Rhodes, lying nearly astride the route between the ports of Alexandria and Constantinople 
became a priority for attack by the Ottomans. 
Suleyman I (the Magnificent) attacked Rhodes in 1522, and after an epic siege the 
survivors surrendered on December 18, 1522.  Suleyman agreed to let the Knights depart and 
gave them twelve days to withdraw from Rhodes.9  The definitive evacuation of the island took 
place on January 1, 1523.  Fifty vessels loaded with Knights, auxillary troops, those injured 
during the siege, and about 5,000 Rhodians and their belongings sailed away from the island.  
The ‘Grand Carrack’ that carried the Grandmaster Villiers d’Isle Adam and other high officials 
also had the sick and injured on board, and was loaded with the valuables of the Order.10  This 
last-minute departure was more like an escape since time was running out: the carrack had to cut 
its anchor cables and leave two large anchors behind.11 
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Charles V Does Not Support the Order to Recover Rhodes 
The Knights of Saint John initially hoped to find support from European powers and 
take Rhodes back from the Ottomans, and in the years following 1523 attempts were made to 
arrange an uprising in Rhodes that would facilitate re-occupation of the island.12  Another 
opportunity to re-conquer Rhodes arose between 1523 and 1524 when the rebellion of Ahmet 
Pasha in Egypt disrupted Ottoman rule.  There is evidence that L’Isle Adam was conspiring to 
re-conquer Rhodes by siding with Ahmet Pasha in the internal struggles of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1525, with the objective of getting Rhodes back in return for employing his forces against 
Mustafa Pasha.13  No European power was inclined to provide military or financial support to the 
Order to accomplish its goal; Europeans had enough trouble of their own without initiating 
another confrontation with the Ottomans.  
After they finally put down the revolt in Egypt, the Ottomans concentrated on meeting a 
Portuguese threat to the holy cities of Islam.  In 1525 the Portuguese attacked Jidda, the port of 
Mecca.  Defense of this religiously significant part was of crucial importance to the Empire, but 
once the Portuguese threat in the east was taken care of, the Ottomans struck again in the west.  
In 1526, three years after the fall of Rhodes, Ottoman armies invaded Hungary.  Louis II Jagiello 
of Hungary and Bohemia was killed in the Battle of Mohacs, and the Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V's brother Ferdinand was elected his successor.  Different opinions about this 
succession led to civil war.   Trouble continued in Hungary, and in 1529 the Ottomans laid siege 
to Vienna.  There were also developments in the Mediterranean.  Kheireddin Barbarossa was not 
formally representing the Ottomans when he captured Algiers in 1530, but the event was viewed 
as an alarming Muslim advance.14   
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Other important developments of this period were the defeat of the French under Francis 
I by the imperial army of Charles V and Charles of Bourbon at the Battle of Pavia in 1525.   
Francis I eventually signed the Treaty of Madrid in 1526 renouncing all French claims to Italy, 
Burgundy and Flanders.  Charles of Bourbon was subsequently given an army to invade northern 
Italy on behalf of Charles V but, the Holy Roman Emperor provided no funds to support the 
expedition.  Consequently, in 1527 Bourbon’s army ravaged northern Italy in search of loot and 
then sacked Rome, laying siege for eight months to Castel Sant'Angelo where the Pope himself 
had taken refuge.  Charles V apologized for the incident and was forgiven by the Pope, but in the 
meantime Henry VIII, King of England, had begun petitioning the Pope in 1525 for the 
annulment of his marriage to Charles V’s cousin, Catherine of Aragon.  England soon joined the 
other regions of Northern Europe that had broken with the Catholic Chruch.   
In short, during the years that the Order of Saint John courted European monarchs for a 
combined effort to recover Rhodes or be granted a new base in the Mediterranean, its problem 
was the least of the Holy Roman Emperor’s worries.  
Consequences of Losing the Sovereign State 
After its military defeat at Rhodes the Order had to survive numerous political defeats in 
the years to come.  For eight years after its expulsion from Rhodes, the Order of Saint John was 
homeless, and it seemed at times as if, like the Templars and the Teutonic Order, it was destined 
to break up and disappear.15  Being without a base for an extended time was a situation 
threatening the very existence of the Knights.  Thus, Grandmaster L’Isle Adam began to travel 
around Europe to solicit help.  But in addition to the relative unimportance of the subject in the 
political agenda of the times, the European courts at the height of the renaissance were also 
convinced that the Order was an anachronism of the medieval era and should be allowed to 
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expire.16  Seeking a new base to call their own, the Knights requested peninsulas in Sicily, the 
sizeable islands of Corsica, Sardinia and even Minorca, Ibiza, and Ischia.  They even considered 
the islands of Elba, Heres and Ponza, which are all smaller than Malta but could function 
practically as peninsulas off Italy.  Other options included the port of Sued on the northern coast 
of Crete, or Cerigo, the southernmost Ionian island in the Aegean Sea.17     
But settling the Knights of Saint John on territory close to major European commercial 
centers and routes was not a viable proposition.  During their occupation of Rhodes, the Order 
became increasingly involved in piracy, partly as a result of its policy of increasing the power of 
its fleet by attracting pirates to form a numerical deterrent to Ottoman reprisals.18   Christian 
pirates frequented Rhodes and it was impossible to check this activity without decreasing a 
principal source of wealth.  The Knights became well-known as the foremost privateers of the 
eastern Mediterranean, and Rhodian piracy was not confined to Muslim ships and states.  The 
reality was that by this time most European nations were trading with the Muslims: the Ottomans 
controlled trade routes from India and China, and Mediterranean commerce became 
inconceivable without Muslim involvement.19   Intensification of trade increased both the 
number and wealth of European merchants involved in oriental trade, and these individuals often 
held important political positions in European society.20   Maintenance of fragile relationships 
between Muslim and Christian merchants was of crucial importance, and the Order’s attacks 
upon merchant shipping were violently protested by the European cities and countries that traded 
with the Ottoman Empire and the North African coast.21  Venice, for example, was consciously 
avoiding confrontation with the Ottomans, and was reluctant to join naval leagues against them, 
because continuation of its Levantine commerce was conditional upon peace with the sultans.22   
Venetians regularly complained that pirates of Rhodes and the ships of the Order had attacked 
their ships under the pretext of preventing commerce with Muslim countries in the years 1502-
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1504.23  Fifteen years later, Anconitans, Florentines, Ragusans, and even Genoese added their 
complaints to those of the Venetians detailing the omnipresent threat of pirates based in 
Rhodes.24   
The policy of encouraging piracy as a defensive measure seemingly turned against the 
Knights and hastened the fall of Rhodes by bringing Suleyman the Magnificent to the island to 
expel the Order.  Furthermore, after the fall of Rhodes, no European power wished to concede 
sovereign territory to the Order and thereby have a pirate base close to its routes of commerce.   
The Order’s support of piracy had also hurt Christian merchants on enough occasions to place 
them in an untenable political position during this period.25  Thus, after eight years of searching, 
the only offer for a new base was that of Charles V: the Knights could have the Maltese Islands 
and a castle in Tripoli.  The Grandmaster had run out of time to find a better option, and time 
was vital, for delays in establishing the Knights in a new base threatened the ability of the Order 
to hold onto its European estates, the backbone of the organization. 
Organization of the Order and European Territories 
The fall of Rhodes was a crucual turning point in the history of the Order of Saint John, 
for it almost brought the whole organization to an end.  The gravity of the situation lay in the fact 
that there was no justification for European powers to support the Order, especially now that it 
could not perform its military function in the absence of a strategically located base.  There was 
no way the Order could continue its existence without support from European royalty, as the 
foundation of its finances lay in the preservation of economically-viable estates in Europe (Fig. 




Fig. 23. Distribution of the European Commanderies of the Order of Saint John. Numbers indicate the 
total of ‘commanderies’ in each region. The information used to compile this map does not indicate 
precise periods but is largely valid for the period between 1550 and 1750.  (Map: author, based on H.J.A. 
Sire, The Knights of Malta (London, 1994), pp. 112-206). 
 
The political organization and the economic structure of the Order were interconnected.  
The Grandmaster was elected for life and his election was subject to papal confirmation.   
Although there were three main groups (Knights, chaplains and serving brothers) only the 
Knights had a voice in the government of the Order, the Chapter General.  The Knights were 
grouped into Langues (tongues).  There were originally seven Langues: Provence, Auvergne, 
France, Italy, Spain (later breaking up into Castile and Aragon), England, and Germany.26  Each 
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Langue was responsible for the defense of one sector of the fortifications and had its own 
auberge where its members messed and lodged.  Each Langue had a head, known as the pillar, 
and was allocated one of the major offices of the Order in which to perform its basic functions.  
The pillar of France was the Grand Hospitaller; the pillar of Castile was the Grand Chancellor; 
the pillar of Provence the Grand Commander with charge of the treasury; and the pillar of Italy 
was the Grand Admiral.  The pillar of England held the important command of the coastal 
defenses until the cancellation of this langue.  
The considerable estates of the Order belonged to the Langues of the country in which 
they were situated, and were graded according to size and importance into commanderies, 
priories and bailiwicks under commanders, priors and bailiffs, respectively.  National or 
territorial groups of priories and other units were termed grand priories, and the grand priors 
were members of the Chapter General.  Each unit contributed at least one-third of its revenues, 
known as the responsions, to the upkeep of the armed forces, hospital, and other activities of the 
Order in Malta.27  This income was absolutely vital to the Order’s existence.  However, since the 
lands from which these revenues arose were scattered all over Europe, the Order depended on 
the goodwill of European sovereigns for its continued ownership of the lands.28  For example, 
one of the first actions of Henry VIII, after leaving the Roman Catholic Church, was to seize the 
lands of the Order in England in 1540, and the threat that other sovereigns might follow suit was 
a powerful diplomatic weapon, exploited adroitly by the Republic of Venice in its dealings with 
the Knights of Saint John.29  Another example that illustrates the fragile balance upon which the 
Order depended was the crisis with Portugal.  Shortly after the fall of Rhodes, the King of 
Portugal, Joao III, threatened to seize all the property that belonged to the Order in his country 
unless his candidate was appointed Commander.30  The second major income source was the 
droits de passage (the induction fee) paid by the new Knights.31  This source of income was also 
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threatened, since the induction of novices was interrupted by the loss of Rhodes.  Therefore, 
finding a new base as quickly as possible was indispensable for the Order.   
The Grandmaster Accepts Charles V’s Offer 
Already stripped of its estates and possessions in Protestant lands, the Order now 
depended on the good will of Catholic rulers if it were to succeed in preserving the remaining 
European properties which supplied the financial underpinning for the whole organization.  In 
1524 Charles V offered the Knights the three small islands of the Maltese Archipelago provided 
they aided him in securing the fortress at Tripoli.32  Malta was a safe distance from Europe but 
close to the Barbary Coast.  Charles V also introduced a new set of rules to keep the Knights 
under very strict control.  Unlike their unchecked freedom in Rhodes, in Malta the Knights were 
not only vassals of the King of Spain, but they were forced to renew their homage via the King 
of Sicily every year.  In addition, Charles V employed the Order’s naval force for all his ventures 
to Africa, and the Knights had to fight in Spanish ranks in combat against the Ottomans.  
Although fighting against the infidels was their raison d’être, they were now compelled to do so, 
not at their convenience or on religious grounds, but due to the economic needs of other rulers, 
and under the command of the Spanish during the actual fighting.33   
Even though they were in a distressed state, the Knights did not accept the offer 
immediately.  The first commission sent by the Grandmaster in 1524 to report on Malta’s 
potential as a base concluded that Malta had three fundamental disadvantages: food had to be 
imported, the existing fortifications were old and in need of repair, and the local population was 
not large enough to provide an adequate defense force.34   
The island’s proximity to ‘enemy’ territory, rendering possible the continuation of the 
statutory holy war; its spacious harbors; and its conveniently safe distance from the Catholic 
mainland, safeguarding the Order’s autonomy and neutrality without involving it in too 
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many international complications – all must have favorably counterbalanced in Grandmaster 
L’Isle Adam’s view the island’s military, political and economic liabilities: the poor quality 
of the soil, the meager yields of its Crown lands, its dependence for continuous food supplies 
and raw materials on Habsburg Sicily, the despicable state of the fortifications, and its 
repulsive exposure to Muslim corsair attacks.35 
Under the circumstances, the Knights of St John had no option but to accept Charles V’s 
offer, for they had canvassed all the other rulers of Europe and had everywhere met with 
indifference, prevarication or blunt refusal.36  When the Order finally arrived in Malta on 
October 26, 1530, the Knights took up residence in the harbor town of Birgu and the 
Grandmaster housed himself in Castrum Maris, renamed Fort Saint Angelo.  After spending 
more than 400 years in the eastern Mediterranean, the Order of Saint John was given a new 
home in the west. 
The Ships That Took Part in the Journey from Rhodes to Malta 
January is a bad time to sail in the Mediterranean, but the winter of 1522-23 was 
exceptionally harsh.37  The convoy that carried the Order from Rhodes consisted of ships of 
different tonnage and sizes and was, therefore, difficult to control.  Already in disarray, it was hit 
by a storm en route to Crete, and even though their passengers were rescued, a few overloaded 
ships were lost entirely.  When the convoy finally reached Crete after about ten days at sea 
almost everyone on board was sick or injured.  Grandmaster L’Isle Adam decided to winter in 
Crete and establish a hospital to tend to the infirm.  After the winter in Crete, the fleet continued 
its journey, arriving in Civitavecchia at the end of July 1523 as Pope Adrian VI offered them 
refuge and protection.38  On June 15, 1527, the Order’s ships were forced to move from their 
anchorage due to an outbreak of plague.  They arrived in nearby Corneto, which proved to be 
equally unsafe.  Eventually, the fleet was offered accommodation at Nice by Duke Charles III of 
Savoy.39  The convoy anchored in Nice the same year, where it remained until the search for a 
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new base was concluded in 1530.  No matter where the anchorage was, the ships themselves 
continued to be the home of those awaiting a permanent home (Fig. 24).  
Fig. 24. Journey of the Order of Saint John during the years between their expulsion from Rhodes and 
arrival at Malta. (Map: author).  
There is not much information regarding the specific ships forming this fleet.  We know 
that it was comprised of three galleys – Santa Maria (Capitana), Santa Caterina, San Giovanni, 
a number of sailing ships, including a galleon named San Bonaventura, a barque named Perla, 
and a few galleasses, light brigantines, felouques, small carracks, and two large carracks.40  
However, these ships became the symbol of this difficult period in the Order’s history, and for 
that reason references to their specific details are encountered in the historical and iconographic 
record.     
The largest ships in this fleet were two carracks (see Appendix B).  The first was named 
Santa Maria, and it was already in the Order’s possession when it departed from Rhodes.  The 
second carrack, Sant’Anna, was launched in Nice at about the same time the Ottoman forces 
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ousted the Knights from Rhodes, and joined the other ships a few months after the beginning of 
the long journey.  These two ships were the most impressive among the Order’s naval forces.  It 
was traditional that the largest vessel served as the flagship by carrying the Grandmaster and the 
highest-ranking members of the Order.  The flagship came to symbolize the whole fleet and, 
eventually, this very grueling journey itself.  Contemporary historians and future generations 
referred to it as the Gran Carraca di Rodi or Gran Nave di Rodi.  The major difficulty for those 
of us who are interested in understanding the specific constructional details, size, tonnage, 
armament and rigging of this ship is the fact that the surviving information about the Gran 
Carraca di Rodi is possibly a mixture of descriptions of Santa Maria and Sant’Anna since the 
only largest ship of the fleet was Santa Maria until the arrival of Sant’Anna.  
The second type of information concerning the ships of the Order in the sixteenth 
century consists of a few paintings tentatively dated to the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.   There are seven paintings titled Gran Caraca di Rodi (Appendix B).  However, only 
two of the paintings show ships that are datable to the sixteenth century in terms of their 
constructional features.  With the exception of these two contemporary paintings, all other 
paintings titled Gran Caraca di Rodi date to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and display 
the ship from the same angle, with almost identical constructional and decorative features.  
These similarities suggest that all are copies of an original work that has not survived.41 
To what extent can we accept these pictorial representations as trustworthy likeness of 
the ships of the time?  In general, the iconographical evidence for the development of 
shipbuilding technology depends on visual representations in a variety of artistic media, in which 
the artists were often not concerned with presenting the ships in precise technical detail.42  The 
artist’s objective was generally to create and present a visual expression of those characteristics 
that made an individual or a country ‘great’.  Although there was no need –or room– for accurate 
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rendering of the truth, it is possible that even the oddest features consistently represented on 
artwork reflected reality.43  However, it is likely that this “reality” applies more to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century ships, which were contemporaneous with the painters, rather 
than to the sixteenth-century carracks that transported the Order of Saint John to Malta.     
Perhaps the most significant problem with historical sources on the Gran Caraca di Rodi 
is that almost all surviving iconography and text are not contemporary with the ships 
themselves.44  Therefore, we have reason to believe that the later, secondary writings and artistic 
renderings were exaggerated and somewhat fanciful descriptions of the Carraca.45   
It is also evident that seventeenth-century paintings showing a typical contemporary 
sailing ship were titled the Gran Caraca di Rodi (see Appendix B).   Some modern historians 
took this as a sign that the Order of Saint John was “ahead of its time” and was already building 
advanced sailing ships in the sixteenth century.46   The central problem is a general 
misconception about the size and nature of the Order’s navy.  Most modern publications about 
the fleet of the Order reflect the view that it was a major European naval power comparable to 
those of England, France or Spain.  It is also implied that the Order’s fleet was updated with 
technological advances in warfare and weaponry and already employed sailing warships in the 
sixteenth century.  In fact, the Order not only used galleys effectively until the end of its rule in 
1798, but also did not feel the need to have a fleet of sailing warships until the early eighteenth 
century.47 
The ship type known as the carrack developed in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth 
centuries, and became the preferred type as sailing warships and bulk carriers around the middle 
of the fourteenth century.48  The armament of the fourteenth-century Meidterranean carrack 
fitted for war comprised crossbows, longbows, and possibly cannons.49  How, when and where 
 
 151
the naval cannon was first used is not well known, but ships were definitely carrying guns by the 
early fifteenth century.50  It was the introduction of the gunport in the early sixteenth century that 
enabled ships to carry more guns closer to the waterline.51  The increasing use of muzzle-loading 
cast bronze guns, replacing weaker wrought iron ordnance between the last quarter of the 
fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, made cannon more powerful and 
reliable, thus more effective for naval use.52  Cast Iron guns appeared in the second half of the 
sixteenth century and would largely replace bronze ordnance in the sixteenth century.53  Cast 
iron guns were heavier than bronze ones, and were more prone to burst, but they were cheaper 
weapons.  Indeed, the distinctive differences in the construction of warships and merchantmen 
only became apparent after the mid-sixteenth century and changes in naval warfare tactics 
shortly followed.   
During the period when the Order of Saint John had two carracks in its fleet, warships 
were still mostly merchantmen equipped with weapons and troops.  The basic battle tactic 
consisted of approaching and grappling an enemy ship, boarding it, and fighting across the decks 
to slowly gain control.  In the first three decades of the sixteenth century, there was a Europe-
wide urge to construct the largest possible ships.  The possession of a great ship became a matter 
of prestige for kings who demanded high, massive fore and after castles and extensive armament 
- size being more important than the fighting capabilities of the ship.  Furthermore, these status 
symbols were built in response to the actions of other rulers rather than out of a desire to have an 
effective warship.  Except for rare appearances in battle and in ceremonies, these symbols of 
power stayed well-guarded in their homeports.54  Although there is no evidence that the Order 
shared this desire to build grandiose carracks, it is apparent from the tone of the historic record 
and the style of the paintings that the major role of the Order’s carracks was to promote its power 
and strength.  Especially during the turbulent period between 1523 and 1530, while going 
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through a test of survival, the Order had to promote its political and naval strength to prove to 
Europe that it could accomplish great deeds and continue to serve Europe, provided it could keep 
its financial resources and maintain its navy.  
The carrack’s inadequacy as a warship was quickly discovered, and its huge size made it 
an unlikely merchantman for Mediterranean trade, with the exception of the bulk trade in grain 
and alum.  The Genoese, because of their specialized involvement in the alum trade, remained 
the only merchants who continued using carracks until the seventeenth century.  The Order of 
Saint John disposed of the carracks soon after its arrival in Malta in favor of galleys, which were 
more suited to stealth and surprise raids.      
Although the carracks used by the Order of Saint John must have been impressive 
vessels, there is almost no evidence to support that the vessels were in any way superior to other 
ships of the era.  However, discrepancies in the sources provide information about the political 
situation during this period and show how rulers perceived the Carrack as a symbol of power.  
The case of the Gran Caraca di Rodi is a great example of ships as prestige objects, as political 
tools, as propaganda symbols, and as emblems of power.  The actual shape, size and strength of 




NAVAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDER OF SAINT JOHN 
 
The general concept guiding the military and naval organization of the Order was known 
as the “shield and sword idea.”1  The shield of the Order was the mighty fortifications built 
around its bases in Rhodes, Malta and all its other territories such as Cos, Halikarnassos and 
Tripoli.  The “shield” was to repulse amphibious attacks and provide security to the center. The 
“sword,” on the other hand, was the relatively small but fast and efficient naval fleet.  The 
limited number of actual vessels in this fleet required a higher level of fighting ability in its 
individual ships, commanders, officers and crews.2  It was often reported that the galleys of 
Malta were the fastest, best-manned and best-equipped in the Mediterranean.3 
Planning, provisioning, management, recruitment, and division of responsibilities within 
the navy were administered by two committees known as the congregazioni.  High-ranking 
officers of the Order were elected to the congregazioni, and were given responsibility for all 
political, financial and administrative decisions involving ships of the Order.4  The first 
congregazioni was in charge of the galleys, and the second, instituted in the eighteenth century, 
managed the squadron of sailing warships, the vascelli.  
The naval recruitment and rotation system, known as the caravan, required four six-
month-long cruises for all new Knights before they could become full members of the Order.5  A 
young aristocrat from one of the eight Langues (nationalities) first had to be accepted by a priory 
in his homeland.6  After that, the young novice paid his ‘passage’ on the Order’s ships and 
arrived at the convent.  Upon the completion of his novitiate, he would pronounce his religious 
profession of chastity, obedience and poverty, and receive the Order’s black habit with an 
octagonal white cross.  Only after this stage could the novice begin performing his caravans to 
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study the art of navigation and naval combat as a soldier, head of artillery, naval officer or as 
galley captain if he were older than 25.7  The ultimate goal of all the members of the Order of 
Saint John was to obtain the right to a commandery in Europe.8    
According to the constitution of the Order, certain government functions were reserved 
for certain Langues.  Among these was the office of the admiral, reserved exclusively for the 
Langue of Italy.  In practice, the admiral was the minister of the navy and did not lead the fleet.  
The Captain General, who was the actual fleet commander, did not have to be from Italy.9   
This administrative framework supported the principal military muscle of the Order of 
Saint John, the galley squadron.  Individual ships forming this squadron were no different from 
other galleys operating in the Mediterranean under both Christian and Muslim flags at the time.10  
Therefore, the following sections will include only general characteristics of the ships, and will 
not investigate their constructional details as, firstly, such information is not available for the 
Maltese galleys and, secondly, the so-called ‘Maltese galleys’ were built mostly in France.  The 
amount of technical information relating to the galleys is immense and, therefore, cannot be 
included in this discussion.  Furthermore, the major reason for the successes and failures of the 
Order’s fleet was related less to the performance of the vessels, than to changes in the greater 
scheme of political, economic and military developments.   
The Galley Squadron 
 
In 1530, the Order of Saint John sailed to its new base on Malta with three galleys, two 
carracks, one ship referred to as a ‘galleon’ in historical sources, and a few brigantines.11  The 
three galleys, Santa Maria (Capitana), Santa Caterina, and San Giovanni, formed the entire 
naval force of the Order at the time, as the rest of the ships were transports.  Even the vessels 
armed with cannon (i.e., the carracks) were not part of the naval squadron but were transport 
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ships capable of defending themselves.  The preferred warship of the Order of Saint John was 
the galley, a type of vessel that dominated warfare at sea in the Mediterranean from the Bronze 
Age to the end of the sixteenth century.  The reasons for the widespread employment of galleys 
as warships are complex and will not be discussed here in detail.12  Briefly stated, the major 
reason for the success of the oared ship in seas like the Mediterranean and the Baltic was its 
suitability for employment in coastal areas with variable winds.  Its effectiveness in these 
conditions led to the developent of a Mediterranean model of naval warfare, characterized by the 
close integration of naval operations, amphibious warfare and sieges, with very few full-scale 
battles in the open sea.13   The few spectacular naval battles of the sixteenth century were also far 
from producing decisive results.  A galley fleet could be renewed in a few months, and the 
logistical limitations of galleys prohibited the strategic exploitation of the victory.  Only two 
years after their disastrous defeat at Lepanto, Ottoman galleys were raiding the Apulian coast 
with a force that amounted to 200 ships.   The temporary and localized maritime control galleys 
provided could not be maintained for extended periods, providing tactical but not strategic 
results.14 
A galley could be used efficiently for about six to eight years and generally was not an 
effective weapon unless there were at least a few of them operating together.15  Due to these two 
facts, thousands of galleys were built in arsenals around the Mediterranean from antiquity to the 
eighteenth century.  Developments in galley technology and design were gradually adopted, 
copied, improved, and shared by all societies having to maintain their naval power.  There were 
slight variations in the characteristics of galleys built in different arsenals, but the differences 
between galleys of different centuries are more distinctive than the differences between vessels 
of different nationalities.  A galley built in Malta upon the request of the Order of Saint John was 
almost identical to a galley built in Marseilles or Venice at about the same time, except maybe in 
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its decoration.16  Frequent naval encounters of small and large scale, and fights against pirates 
and privateers necessitated the construction of thousands of galleys to serve in the great 
squadrons of Venice, Spain, France, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the smaller squadrons 
maintained by Genoa, Florence, Naples, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, and the Order of Saint 
John.17  Large arsenals such as Venice, Marseilles and Constantinople produced the majority of 
the galleys during the age of galley warfare.   
The Order of Saint John was a steady customer of the first two large shipbuilding 
centers.  Not only the Capitana and the ordinary galleys of the squadron, but also the ‘magistral’ 
galleys built and armed by the Grandmaster, at his own expense, were frequently built in 
European yards.  
Types of Ships Forming the Galley Squadron 
‘Capitana’ was the term used to define the largest and most prestigious ship of the 
squadron, which carried the commander of the squadron.18   This flagship generally had 28 to 30 
oars on each side and two or three lateen-rigged masts for cruises under sail.19   The unusually 
large and high stern cabin (carosse) and the fact that it was the only ship in the squadron painted 
red were the most distinctive characteristics of the Capitana.20   
The late-eighteenth-century Swedish naval architect Fredrik af Chapman provides 
information about the specific features of a Capitana of the Order of Saint John (Fig. 25).21  This 





Measurements of a typical Maltese Capitana 
Length between perpendiculars 184 ft (56.08 m) 
Breadth moulded 24 5/6 ft (7.56 m) 
Draught  8 ½ ft (2.6 m) 
 
(2) 8-pounders on the deck  
(2) 6-pounders on the deck 5  
(1) 36-pounders on the forecastle 
(18) Swivel guns 
Guns 
(18) Musquetoons  
Pairs of oars 30 5 men to each oar 
 
 
Fig. 25. Lines and construction plans of the Capitana from the Order of Saint John’s fleet by Chapman. 
(After: Chapman). 
The Padrona was the second ship in command, with its 27 oars on each side.22  After 
these two larger types came the ordinary galleys, with their 26 oars per side.23  The area directly 
abaft the bow of the galley was reserved for the five guns, the major armament of the vessel.  
The carosse was reserved for the captain and the Knights.  The ciurma or rowing force of about 
250 included Muslim slaves, the free rowers known as bonavoglia, and convicts.  It was typical 
for a galley to cruise under sail and limit the employment of the ciurma to the occasional chase, 
escape or maneuvering to board an opponent.24  
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The galley squadron also included smaller ships with a maximum of eighteen benches 
on each side called galleots.25   A galleot can best be described as the smaller and faster version 
of a galley that carried one lateen-rigged mast, one gun, heavy muskets, and perriers.26  Due to 
its small size, the galleot could only carry small quantities of provisions and munitions, limiting 
its operational range considerably.27  The galleot was popular among the private corsairs that 
carried the Order’s flag, but also appeared in the squadron on occasion to be used for 
reconnaissance missions and as a messenger ship.28   
As the Order’s financial situation declined in the eighteenth century, galleots became 
more common in the squadron, replacing the ordinary galleys that were now harder to afford.  In 
July 1741, Grandmaster Manuel Pinto de Fonseca provided funds for the construction of two 
galleots and a tartana to fight the Muslim ships of the Barbary Coast.29  By 1764 the same 
Grandmaster was paying for the maintenance of three galleots: the flagship Santa Caterina with 
a crew of 151 commanded by Francesco di Natale, Santa Maria di Filermo with a crew of 136 
commanded by Simeone Gavasso, and the Sant' Orsula under the command of Pietro Zelalix 
with a crew of 142.30  Corsair galleots with private owners carried a smaller crew than those in 
the service of the Grandmaster.  For example, a typical galleot of 15 benches commanded by 
Angelo Santo Nicolai was contracted in 1722 to be a privateer flying the flag of the Order, with 
its crew of only 67 working as rowers, sailors, and soldiers.31  Additional information about the 
sizes of galleot crews comes from documents related to another incident of 1722.  The galley 
squadron captured a galleot in this year, which was renamed L'Immacolata Concezione and sold 
in Malta to a Captain Tomaso Alferano.  On February 10, 1722, Alferano received permission to 
join the corso and use the Order’s flag to attack Muslim shipping, despite the fact that his galleot 
had a crew of only 38.32 
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Two types of oared vessels even smaller than the galleot were introduced in the 
eighteenth century in another attempt by the Order to reduce the deficit on the annual navy 
balance sheet.  The demi-galley (mezzagalera) was a smaller version of the galleot with a 
reduced crew.  Its introduction in 1742 coincides with a period of economic difficulties, during 
which the Order experienced serious problems in procuring Muslim rowers due to a sudden drop 
in the number of prizes.33   The first two demi-galleys, Sant Anna and Sant Ursola, were 
launched in 1742 and added to the galley squadron.34  The demi-galley was known as a fast 
vessel with 14 oars on each side, three guns, two lateen-rigged masts, and a crew of 200.35   
The second, type of shortened galley, with 24 benches to each side, was introduced in 
1791, but Napoleon’s capture of Malta in 1798 rendered its beneficial impact on the treasury 
irrelevant.36  It is likely that there were problems with the 24-bench design that caused the idea to 
be abandoned even before the arrival of the French forces, as no vessels of this type are listed 
among the ships taken over by the French in 1798.37  
The last type of vessel introduced in the eighteenth century was a hybrid known as the 
chebec or xebec.  A North African invention designed as a fast sailer and a capacious cargo ship, 
it had three lateen-rigged masts, but could be rowed to maneuver the ship into an anchorage or 
for corsairing activities.38  It was also heavily armed and used by Muslim corsairs, and the 
success of the vessel led the Christian merchants and corsairs to adopt the design.39   The 
gunports were placed between the oarports.40   The first chebec of the Order was built in Malta in 
1743 to carry provisions from Syracuse and Augusta.41  In 1754 the Grandmaster appointed four 
commissioners to investigate the possibility of assigning two chebecs to guard Grand Harbor.  
The reason for this proposal was the cheaper maintenance cost for these ships and the fact that 
they could also be used to transport provisions from Sicily.  The project was approved by the 
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Grandmaster and San Pietro and San Paolo were built.42  Later in the century a third chebec, 
Spirito Santo, was added to this force.43   
The size of the chebec’s crew depended on the size of the vessel.  Smaller chebecs of 10 
to 60 tons burden carried crews numbering between six and eleven, while the larger versions 
over 100 tons had crews of 14 to 25 (Fig. 26).44  The particulars of a typical armed chebec are 
provided in Table 2.45 
TABLE 2. 
Measurements of a typical Maltese chebec 
Length between perpendiculars 130 ⅓ ft (39.7 m) 
Breadth moulded 25 ¼ ft (7.7 m) 
Draught  9 ⅔ ft (2.8 m) 
 
(16) 6-pounders on the deck 
(4) 12-pounders on the forecastle 28 
(8) 3-pounders on the quarterdeck Guns 
(30) Musquetoons  
Pairs of oars 9  
 
 





Another vessel of Muslim origin, the petacchio, first appeared among the Order’s ships 
in 1626.46  The vessel was used widely in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.47   In its 
profile and general appearance the petacchio was similar to a small galleot and it was armed with 
eight to ten small guns.48 
All of the types mentioned above carried a small oared boat called a caique or a 
fregatina, or both.  The caique was used to transport the crew, water and other supplies as well 
as to tow larger galleys in narrow passages or anchorages.  It could also be armed to attack land 
fortifications.  Fregatina was mostly reserved for the service of the captain and Knights and to 
carry messages.  
Size of the Fleet 
The number of galleys in the squadron of the Order varied considerably depending on 
the period.  Table 3 provides a list of specific historical accounts that include clear references to 
the number of galleys that formed the squadron at specific times throughout its existence.  To 
summarize the information presented in the table, it seems clear the squadron of three galleys 
that left Rhodes in 1522 arrived safely to Malta in 1530.  Information about this period is 








and only two galleys were available a year later during the unsuccessful attempt to capture 
Modon.49   It seems certain that the number of galleys had increased to four by 1532, and that the 
Order operated four galleys for the next 26 years.  In 1558 the number was increased to five.  
This number did not change, with the exception of one occasion in 1564 when it again dropped 
to four.50  The galley squadron reached its maximum size of nine in 1565.  The enlargement was 
part of preparations for an anticipated Ottoman siege, which actually took place in the same year.  
There is little information about the fate of these galleys.  What is certain is that while the 
Ottoman siege failed to capture Malta, it caused great damage to the existing structures and 
fortifications.  Furthermore, the Order, realizing the weakness of its defenses, initiated a great 
construction program of fortifications.51  With all of the additional expenses for construction and 
repairs in the aftermath of the Ottoman siege, the Order had to reduce its galley squadron to four.  
Even that low number was difficult for the Order to maintain in its weakened state during the 
two decades following the siege.  During the battle of Lepanto in 1571, it was only represented 








































In 1584 the number of galleys was once again increased to five by decree of the 
Venerable Council of the Order of Saint John.  Until the next increase in 1627, the squadron was 
maintained at five for the majority of its expeditions.  There was another increase in 1651, 
bringing the number to seven and finally, with a decree of 1685, to eight.52  As will be discussed 
in detail in the section regarding financial aspects of galley construction, the major reason for the 
Order’s ability to sustain this relatively high number was the establishment of “galley 
foundations” to finance shipbuilding.  The last galley foundation operated until 1659, and the 
galleys built during this period probably required replacements about ten years later.  Increase in 
the Order’s corsair operations and the squadron’s participation in the War of Morea alongside 
Venice required the increase in the size of the galley squadron, which reached its peak number of 
eight between 1685 and 1701.53  The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed at the end of the War of Morea 
in 1699, ended hostilities in the Mediterranean and the requirement for a large squadron.  The 
number of galleys was accordingly reduced to six in 1701, to five in 1704, and to four in 1720.  
The decline of the galley squadron continued steadily as the size of the galleys, as well as their 
numbers, decreased.  The reasons for this shrinking were many and complex, with political, 
financial, and technological aspects.   
Table 4 provides information regarding the sizes of other galley fleets active in the 
Mediterranean during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  The table is not complete, but 
makes it clear that the Order’s squadron, the smallest in the Mediterranean, was no match for the 
Ottoman navy.  The enemies with similar fleets, similar financial means and similar military 
capability were the cities of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, and it was against these forces that the 






Based on the information provided in Tables 3 and 4, it is possible to determine the size 
of the galley squadron during certain time periods.  Provided that a galley could be used 
efficiently for an average of seven years, it is likely that a total of 200 galleys were constructed 
between 1530 and 1798 to serve in the galley squadron of the Order of Saint John.54   The 
galleys were built either in Malta or their construction was contracted to other arsenals in the 
Mediterranean.   
Galleys Built in Malta 
The arsenal of the Order of Saint John was a fortified building near the entrance to 
Valletta, where small arms, ammunition, guns, and other military stores were kept.55  The 
darsena was a sheltered part of the arsenal in Birgu, where galleys were built, repaired and took 
cover in bad weather or under enemy threat.56  Having said that, this three-arched building in 
Birgu will be referred to as “the arsenal” from here on for the sake of simplifying an already-
complicated discussion.  
The arsenal of the Order of Saint John was a government monopoly catering exclusively 
to the needs of the galley squadron.57  Several small and private slipways in Grand Harbor and 
Marsamxett Harbor areas built merchant ships and fishing boats for local use.58  The first arsenal 
of Birgu was built between 1538 and 1542, but the first galley built in Malta was not launched 
until 1554.59  Grandmaster Alof de Wignacourt replaced this first arsenal with a larger one in 
1607.60   Surprisingly, the surviving archival lists reveal that no galleys were built in Malta 
between 1555 and 1620, followed by another period of inactivity between 1701 and 1750.  There 
may be several reasons for these gaps, such as the increased construction activities on the 
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fortifications during the years leading to and following the Ottoman siege or the introduction of 
third-rate ships in the early eighteenth-century.61  Whatever the reason, it seems that the arsenal 
was only active in shipbuilding for 129 of the 268 years the Order was based in Malta,.  Based 
on information provided by Muscat that the construction of a galley took an average of four 
years in Malta, it seems that the Birgu arsenal produced only 32 galleys.62  Only 25 Birgu-built 
galleys were recorded in the archival lists and historic documents (Table 5). 
TABLE 5. 
Galleys built at the Birgu Arsenal63 
1535 Santa Caterina 1664 San Pietro 
1543 Santa Madalena Capitana 1665 Unnamed galley + one Capitana  
1551 San Michele Arcangelo 1666 Unnamed galley 
1554 Leona + Santa Maria della Vittoria (Capitana) 1668 Unnamed galley 
1555 San Fede 1694 Capitana of 30 benches 
1620 Capitana of 27 benches 1701 Capitana 
1625 Unnamed galley 1750 Santa Caterina 
1632 Unnamed galley 1770 Unnamed galley 
1633 Unnamed galley 1782 Capitana 
1636 Unnamed galley 1792 Experimental galley of 24 benches 
1651 Unnamed galley 1792 San Luigi  
1652 The seventh galley TOTAL 25 
 
Table 6 presents a comparison of construction activities in Malta with those of other 
contemporary locations.  Although it may not be fair to compare the three-arched arsenal of 
Birgu with those of France, it still is necessary to place construction activities in Malta in 
context.  There is no doubt that France was one of the leading naval powers at the time with 






A comparison of the construction activities in Maltese, French and Venetian shipyards                
between 1651 and 1740 
 Number of galleys built at the Birgu Arsenal64 
Number of galleys built in 
France65 
Number of  galleys (galia 
sotil) built in Venice66 
1651 - 1660 2 19 112 (1645-60) 
1660 - 1668 5 26 37 
1670 - 1700 1 96 ? 
1701 - 1740 1 23 ? 
TOTAL 9 144 
Venetian arsenal produced 
350 galleys between 1619 
and 1669. 
 
The limited nature of shipbuilding activities in the Birgu arsenal is due to two major 
factors.  Firstly, there is the economic and technological factor.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, increasing demand for galleys in the Mediterranean led to the development of large 
industrial complexes around the arsenals.  The leading arsenals, such as those at Venice and 
Marseilles, developed such sophisticated networks between the industries involved in 
shipbuilding that highly standardized but successful designs could be produced with very high 
efficiency and speed.  The industrial complexes around the galley arsenals could prefabricate 
certain parts to specific standards.  For example, the arsenal in Venice could complete a galley in 
eight months under normal circumstances, but the Venetians are known to have completed a 
galley within 24 hours on a special occasion, a feat repeated at Marseilles in 1679.67   
Construction of a similar vessel in Malta would take about four years, mainly because the Birgu 
arsenal lacked the systematized and standardized construction methods of the larger arsenals, 
slowing down the construction process. 
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The second reason for the protracted nature of shipbuilding in Malta is the complete 
absence of shipbuilding material in the archipelago.  All shipbuilding material had to be 
imported, adding transportation costs to already-high labor expenses on the island.  The fact that 
constructing a ship at home was more expensive than ordering one to be built elsewhere must 
have been the major reason why the arsenal of Malta never developed beyond its modest size.    
At the top of the list of imported shipbuilding material was timber.  The first source for 
the Order was timber acquired from the commanderies, especially the forested lands in France 
and Calabria.68   Authorization to fell the trees in these forests was issued by a special order of 
the Council,69 and the quality of the timber was inspected upon its arrival in Malta.70   Other 
archival documents indicate that quantities of timber were purchased from shipyards that were 
regularly commissioned for the construction of galleys.  Some of these centers such as Venice 
provided better terms of exchange, granting a five-year exemption of duties on timber in the year 
1762, renewed in 1770.71  The terms of this agreement stated that the timber was for the Order’s 
arsenal and was not to be sold for profit.  Timber shipments were escorted by the galley 
squadron,72 and the task of investigating the availability and the quality of timber to be 
purchased was sometimes assigned to the Captain General, who also was occasionally ordered to 
transport the material to Malta.73  Local Maltese boats were hired to transport the timber to Malta 
when the squadron was not available for this task.74 
In addition to timber, a variety of construction materials and finished products 






Galleys Ordered Abroad 
While about 30 galleys of the Order were built in Malta, approximately 170 were built in 
foreign arsenals.75  Orders for the construction of galleys abroad were placed with shipyards 
providing the best possible conditions in terms of cost and delivery date.76  Information 
regarding the Order’s galleys built outside Malta is summarized in Table 8.  
TABLE 8. 
Galleys built for the Order outside of Malta 
Date Location Archival reference (if available) and the Source of information 




Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1556 Barcelona (2) Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1561 Marseilles Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1568 Marseilles (2) Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  




Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1574 Barcelona (2) Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1583 Naples Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1584 Naples Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1588 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1589 Leghorn Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1594 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1597 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1598 Messina AOM 451, f. 253r, 4 August 1598 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1600 Barcelona Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1602 Genoa AOM 454, f. 260r, 4 May 1602 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 




TABLE 8. — Continued 







Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1608 Naples AOM 456, f. 292r, 20 March 1608 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1613 Marseilles Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1617 Marseilles AOM 454 ff. 330v-331r, 20 March 1604 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1619 Marseilles Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  




Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1626 Augusta AOM 256, f. 59r, 20 April 1626 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1626 Naples Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1632 Messina AOM 110, f. 167r, 10 May 1632 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1633 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1634 Messina AOM 256, ff. 12r-v, 23 September 1634 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1637 Messina AOM 256, f. 172v, 25 November 1637 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1645 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1642 Tuscany AOM 257, ff. 110r, 18 March 1642 in Grima, “Galley Replacements,” p. 50. 
1648 Genoa Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  





Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1655 Pisa Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1662 Messina Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1701 Leghorn, Genoa Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1703 Civitavecchia Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
1743 Civitavecchia Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 271, table II.  
Total  93  
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According to this information, about one-third of the galleys built outside Malta were 
built in Messina (28 galleys).  The second most common center was Marseilles, which delivered 
23 galleys to the Order’s squadron.  The arsenals of Naples and Barcelona built 15 and 14 
galleys respectively.  Other locations of minor importance, such as Leghorn, Genoa, 
Civitavecchia, Palermo, Augusta, Pisa, and Tuscany, built a combined total of 13 galleys for the 
Order during a period of about two centuries.  A very rough estimate would be that the Order of 
Saint John commissioned the construction of a galley in a foreign arsenal one every two years.  
By the eighteenth century, timber already cut to size was brought from Malta’s principal 
marine supplier, Venice.77  This suggests standardization in galley design and may also explain 
why the Knights did not purchase galleys from Venice.  Earlier they had recruited Venetian 
shipwrights to work in Malta, and now they brought in prefabricated galleys.78 
When a galley was built outside Malta, the usual practice was to send the galley to be 
replaced to that arsenal.  Upon arrival the old galley would be stripped of all its armaments and 
fittings that were then transferred to the new vessel.  The crew who brought the old galley would 
man the new ship and leave the old one to be sold or broken up.  The value of the old vessel 
would be deducted from the cost of the new vessel.79  If the galley being replaced was still 








in a condition to transport its crew to the shipyard, the entire squadron had to be dispatched for 
the transportation of the crew to man the new ship.  When one considers the high numbers of 
crewmen required to operate these ships, it is evident that at least four other galleys were 
required to transport a crew of about 600.  In 1608, for example, the crew of San Giovanni was 
transferred on board the other four galleys to sail a new galley from Naples to Malta.  The old 
galley, San Giovanni, was considered still serviceable and was kept in Malta.81  In some cases, 
the new hulls would be towed to Malta to be fitted out in the Birgu arsenal.82 
Cost and Maintenance of the Galley Squadron 
The heavy expenditures incurred by the galley squadron constituted one of the recurrent 
problems for the Order’s treasury.  Most of the information regarding the cost and maintenance 
of the galley squadron dates from the seventeenth century.  Based on variations in the prices 
during this period, it seems that the costs were fairly stable, and it is possible that they did not 
change too much during the first half of the eighteenth century.  The value of the type of scudi 
used in Malta is difficult to establish based on published sources and archival documents.  For 









perhaps a chronological comparison.  Figures are available for the expenditures of other 
European navies for this period, but both the larger sizes of those fleets and the absence of a 
reliable conversion equation make it difficult to compare the Maltese figures with contemporary 
naval spending elsewhere.  Nonetheless, the extent of maintenance costs for the galley squadron 
can be assessed based on the salaries in Malta.  According to the numismatic data, the cost of 
750 grams of bread in the seventeenth century was one tari, and a soldier’s daily pay was about 
four tari.83  One tari was equal to 20 grani, and 12 tari made one scudo.  Table 9 provides 
detailed information about construction and maintenance costs for the galley squadron.  
Construction cost of an ordinary galley was about 5,500 – 6,500 scudi, an amount that equaled 
the annual income of 50 soldiers.84  Other comparative information about the prices of other 
items comes from the documents of the prize courts in Malta (see chapter XI, section about the 
Corsair Operations).  According to this information, the fixed price paid for slaves by the 
Treasury of the Order was 137 scudi and 6 tari per slave, meaning that the construction of a 















In general, it can be concluded that, throughout this period, the prices of imported 
galleys were less than the costs incurred in building it in Malta.  Maintaining a galley was much 
more expensive than constructing a new one.  In 1605 the maintenance cost of one galley was 
considered to be between 18,000 and 20,000 scudi,86 while in 1637 the treasury calculated the 
expenses of a single galley as 29,700 scudi.87  Based on the report of the Prior of Dacia, Fra 
Christian Osterhausen, writing in the middle of the seventeenth century, the maintenance cost for 
a galley was about 20-21,000 scudi.88  Although it may be an exaggeration, Salva claims that the 
maintenance of each galley cost the Order 30,000 scudi in 1627.89   
In 1583 the Order spent 64 percent of its total income maintaining its galley squadron, 
which may also have included the cost of some replacement galleys.  During the 
Grandmastership of Antoine de Paule (1623-1636), out of an average yearly income of 269,116 
scudi, more than 125,000 scudi (about half) were spent on the galley-squadron, and this was a 
period when five of the galley foundations were already in operation.90  On the other hand, the 
figures about expenditures in 1583 may be excessive when compared to that of 1587 when the 
Order spent 75,671 scudi on four galleys and 1,280 scudi on the arsenal.   
Maintenance costs of the galley squadron included the wages of the rope and sail 
makers, caulkers, carpenters and blacksmiths.  In addition, there were the regular costs of 
provisions.  The captain of a galley was paid an allowance based on an estimated sum to cover 
the cost of two-thirds of the provisions.91  He was expected to contribute the rest of the funds 
from his own pocket.  The Treasury provided the bread of the ciurma (rowers) on a regular basis, 





reason why many Knights accepted command of a galley was because this type of service was 
one of the ways to attain a position in charge of a commandery.  Acquisition of rich 
commanderies, from whose income the commander retained a percentage was the ultimate 
achievement for a Knight and was the reason why many joined the Order.  In fact, a number of 
commende di gratia were kept vacant and awarded to outgoing captains.  If there were no such 
incentive, probably there would never have been enough Knights willing to command the 
galleys.93  Nonetheless, finding Knights to captain the galleys remained one of the incurrent 
problems throughout the Order’s Maltese era.  During the seventeenth century fewer and fewer 
knights were willing or financially able to risk such a sum.  A letter dated 1649 includes the 
complaints of Grandmaster Lascaris to the Order's ambassador in Rome that he could not recruit 
enough Knights to man the galleys, since they were not willing to risk their lives or fortunes.94  
Grandmaster Lascaris sought solutions to these problems.  It was clear that the expenses 
involved in the two offices of captain general and captain were a deterrent to the better 
development and management of the squadron.  The ever-increasing number of elected captains 
who refused a commission and actual captains, who resigned their office before the end of their 
terms of two years due to their inability to cope with the expenses, required urgent intervention.  
Lascaris realized that the term of two years did not allow a captain or captain-General to develop 
his talents or learn the seamanship necessary to enhance and uphold the prestige and glory of the 
Order.  In this system, there was no room for a talented and successful seaman to advance and 
contribute to the success of the fleet, unless he was also very wealthy.  Therefore, a new system, 
which did not require the individual captains to provide part of the funds required for the 




Things started to change slowly from 1637 onwards.  In this year, the captain of the 
galley San Nicola, Chevalier Antonio Papacoda, was assigned the maintenance of one galley for 
the fixed price of 20,000 scudi annually upon his own request.96  This contract was replaced 
almost immediately with a more beneficial one.  Bailiff Fra Don Carlo Valdina proposed to take 
over the maintenance of all five galleys for the price of 20,000 scudi each.97   Valdina’s four-year 
contract was signed on July 20, 1637. 
The Council of the Order soon realized that this system benefited them greatly.  In 1641 
the Council called for contract proposals, and the winner (or the only applicant) was Valdina, 
renewing his contract for another four years.98  After this date, several other contracts were 
signed with different individuals, including Grandmaster Lascaris himself.  The expiration date 
of the last contract is 1649, after which the Common Treasury of the Order, once again resumed 
maintenance of the galleys directly.99 
The Council members and the Procurators of the Common Treasury had no doubt that 
these contracts were saving the Order thousands of scudi every year.100  The major disadvantage 
of this system, which led to its abandonment, was that the Order did not have direct control over 
the maintenance of the squadron.  The events indicate that in his second term Valdina underbid, 
repeating his offer of the previous term (123,000 scudi).  However, because of price fluctuations 







honoring his contractual obligations.  Therefore, the squadron was not prepared for military 
undertakings.101  A Commission was assigned in 1647 to investigate whether or not these 
contracts were beneficial.102  The report indicated that in fact the Order saved very little by 
contracting out the maintenance of the galleys, and since enough cash was not always readily 
available, the Order as a body could obtain credit in Sicily more easily than a contract holder.103  
However, based on surviving archival documents, it is clear that the Order did benefit greatly.  In 
1631 the average cost of maintaining one galley was about 27,700 scudi, and the whole squadron 
of six galleys cost the Order 166,200 scudi annually.104  But the Valdina and Lascaris contracts 
stipulated a figure of 123,000 scudi annually for the same squadron of six galleys, thus saving 
the Order about 43,200 scudi annually.  Moreover, the amount saved was actually greater, since 
it had been calculated that total expenditure on the six galleys had increased by about 12,000 
scudi between 1631 and 1637.105  In the end, the Council decided to continue contracting out.106 
The Valdina and Lascaris contracts provide very detailed information about the crew 
numbers (gente di capo and ciurma) on board each galley, the amount of salaries, the value of 
the provisions, the clothing of the ciurma and the particular duties of the members of the Order 
on board.107  These documents also describe the regular maintenance work to be carried out and 
the supplies required for such work.108  The terms of these contracts specified that the Order was 
to hand over the galleys fully armed and fitted-out with an inventory of goods on board.  The 
owners expected to receive them back in the same condition on termination of the contract.109  
The contractor was allowed to use the galleys to ferry goods used by the squadron without 





These two contractors then gave out other contracts to subcontractors.  In 1644 a certain 
Ignatio Ribera testified in the Courts of Law that he had been given various contracts in previous 
years to supply the Order with wood and ships' biscuit.111  Since ships' biscuit was one of the 
items to be supplied by Valdina, one may safely assume that Ribera obtained contracts from him 
to supply this commodity.  In 1645 Giovanni Alard was contracted to supply material for the 
galley shrouds, which he failed to do. For this, he had to answer to Grandmaster Lascaris who, 
by now, had taken over the maintenance of the squadron which, it was alleged, was impotent 
because of the lack of stores of this kind.112 
Galley Foundations 
Six galley foundations were set up by six different benefactors between 1598 and 1636 
(Table 10). The aim of each foundation was to have enough income from invested capital to 
finance the construction of a new galley hull every so many years. Since the Order had a 
squadron of six galleys, corresponding to the same number of foundations, the problem of 












Thus, when the Order kept a squadron of six galleys, there were enough funds available 
to replace each galley hull without extra cost for the Order.  Four of the galleys from these 
foundations could be constructed in Malta.  The other two, the Lussan and Ventimiglia galleys, 
were to be fabricated at Marseilles and Messina, respectively, though they could be constructed 
locally if the Grandmaster and the Venerable Council so decided. When such constructions were 
being carried out in Malta, a Knight was placed in charge of the works to avoid any fraud. 
According to the terms of the Cavarretta foundation, this Knight had to be a relative of Fra 
Nicolò Cavarretta.114  Table 11 provides a summary of activities for one of these foundations, 
illustrating how this system in practice contributed to the maintenance of the galley squadron.  
TABLE 11. 
Ships built by the Claramonte Foundation 
Date  Ship  Location of construction Source of information 
Cost according to 
AOM 109, ff. 37v-39r, 
22 September 1627 
1600 - 
1604 Santo Stefano Barcelona 
AOM 100, f. 168r, 14 
December 1600; AOM 101, f. 
34r, 5 April 1604, Bono, 
“Naval Exploits,” p. 380. 
5,327scudi and 7 tari 
San Lorenzo Malta   6,362 scudi 3 tari 12 grani 
6,383 scudi 2 tari 18 
grani 
6,127 scudi 6 tari 19 
grani 
6,285 scudi and 2 tari 
1604- 1625 
Four other galleys  
AOM 108, ff, 62r-v, 16 
January 1625. 
9,742 scudi 8 tari 2 grani 
1626 
The sixth galley to 
be commissioned 
as Capitana 




AOM 110, ff. 39r-v, 8 October 
1630.  
1631 
The Seventh galley The seventh galley 
was ordered in 
Malta 
AOM 110, f. 106r, 7 August 
1631; AOM 109, ff. 37v-39r, 
22 September 1627, in Grima, 
“Galley Replacements,” p. 57. 
With additional costs 
(116 scudi), expenses 
added up to 40,466 
scudi.  Foundation had a 
total credit from interests 
amounting to 52,021 
scudi thus leaving a 
balance of 11,523 scudi. 
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Command and Organization 
Table 12 shows the command structure in the Order of Saint John’s naval forces.  There 
were a few rules that regulated how one was to advance, up the ranks in this system.   According 
to the Order’s statutes, every Knight Hospitaller had to participate in four caravans before he 
could hope for advancement.  A caravan meant a period of at least six months’ service on the 
galleys or one year on the sailing warship (after the beginning of the eighteenth century).115  
Every galley carried about 30 such caravanisti.  Each caravanisti on board was trusted with a 
task according to seniority.  The re di galera was in charge of the ‘services’ of the Knights, 
including distributing medicines, inspecting weapons, and looking after the safety of the galley 
captain.  The cercamare was responsible for sighting the enemy, maintaining the artillery, 
distributing the ammunition, and supervising the master gunner (capomastro d’artiglieria). The 
re di galera and cercamare had to be at least 25 years old and had to have attended two caravans 
during which they were declared proficient in their task.116  Other tasks depended on the skills of 




Organization of the Order’s naval command structure 
 Grandmaster  
   
 Admiral  
(an honorary title) 
 
   
Galley Squadron 
 Squadron of the Third Rate 
(sailing) Warships – [Men-of-
War Squadron] 
   
General Clerk of the Galleys  General Clerk of the Men-of-War Squadron 
   
Harbor commissioner & Hygiene commissioner 
   
 Captain General  
(of the Galley Squadron) 
 
   
  Lieutenant General of the Men-
of-War Squadron 
Captain of the Capitana   
  Captains of the Third-rate ships 
Captain of the Padrona   
  Captains of the Frigates 
Captains of the Ordinary Galleys   
  Captains of the Corvettes 
   
 Captains of the other ships 
Carracks, Galleons, Chebecs, 
Tartanes, Pilot ships, harbor boats 
and charter ships (operating 
between Gozo and Malta) 
 
   




In addition to the Knights, every galley carried a contingent of 50 to 200 troops, sailors 
and several skilled mariners to perform tasks pertaining to navigation and to life on board.118  
The majority of the soldiers and sailors were recruited from the native Maltese population, but 
there were hundreds of such workers coming from all parts of the Mediterranean.119  Seagoing 
freemen were referred to as Gente di Capo,120 and in general they comprised the officers, marine 
soldiers (servants-at-arms), sailors, gunners, and seamen.121   
The captain-general of the squadron was, of course, on the capitana with his staff, 
including the captain of the capitana, the chief medical officer, the major or commanding officer 
of the marine soldiers’ battalion, the riveditore or chief supply officer, and the prior (the senior 
chaplain on board).122  A Knight could become a galley captain at the age of 25, after the 
completion of his fourth caravan and after at least 10 years of membership in the Order.123  An 
act of 1548 fixed the duration of office at two years for the galley captains, mainly because the 
captains who contributed to the maintenance costs could not afford the office for extended 
periods.124   
The first lieutenant of the squadron was second in command and was in command of the 
second galley, the padrone.  The first lieutenant’s main job was to supervise the galleys 
especially as they left or returned to their moorings.125  He inspected the men’s food, took 
complaints, and trained the men to use weapons.  He had to sleep on board at all times, together 
with the duty officer or ufficiale di fischietto.126   
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Other members of the crew included the maestro scudiero who read the orders to the 
crew,127 the comito, or boatswain who supervised the rowing and the sailors,128 agozzino who 
was personally accountable for the slaves and other rowers,129 four consiglieri or councilors who 
read the sea charts, arranged the ballast and helped with the navigation,130and aglieri who were 
in charge of the galley’s boats.131  In addition, there were young boys of about twelve years of 
age called proeri who joined the galleys as sailor aspirants to learn a sea trade.132  Bombardieri, 
the gunners (including the master gunner and adjutant), formed part of the sailors’ group.133   The 
remolaro was in charge of the oars and maestro d’ascia: was the ship’s carpenter.  Bottaro 
(cooper), calfato (caulker), barbarotto (barber surgeon), galley chaplains, and the buonavoglia 
(volunteer rowers) made up the rest of the crew.   
The remainder of the crew on a galley consisted of rowers (ciurma).  The first type of 
rower was the buonavoglia, who sat at the end of the benches and controlled the oar.  They were 
‘volunteers’, numbering around 200 to 250 per galley, who accepted this position to erase their 
debts.134  Similarly, the forzati were condemned by the local tribunals to serve a sentence of 
detention on the oars.135  The third category was the slaves, ranging from 10 - 15 to 25 - 30 
percent of the total number of galley rowers. These slaves were Muslims from ships captured by 
the Order’s squadron or during attacks on land settlements.  The slave rowers were chained to 
their benches at all times.  Work conditions were, by any standards, atrocious as the rowers 
urinated and defecated into the bilge.  In addition to biscuits and water, live animals were 
brought on board, adding significantly to the stench.136    
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Decline of the Galley Squadron 
The reasons for the decline of the galley squadron are complex and intertwined with a 
number of different developments.  The events and changing trends that influenced the reduction 
in size of the galley squadron and the eventual elimination of the galleys completely by invading 
French forces were the result of issues that will be investigated in detail in the following chapters 
that analyze the function of the Order’s naval forces and naval activities.  Briefly stated, the 
major reason for galley squadron’s decline is the technological developments in gun founding, 
especially iron casting.  Widespread availability of reliable iron guns at low cost led to the 
development of fleets comprised of broadside-firing sailing warships as well as naval warfare 
tactics suitable for such fleets.  The rise of nation states made it possible for countries to build 
and maintain such fleets and acquire control of the open seas with these new naval means.  
Galleys rapidly became obsolete weapons that were ineffective against such navies.  Training 
young Knights to command galleys and the techniques of master galley warfare also became 
impractical, since it no longer contributed to their advancement in their own countries upon the 
end of their service with the Order of Saint John.  The economy of Europe was also changing, 
and the size, wealth and number of commanderies were decreasing regularly, eliminating one of 
the most attractive reasons for young aristocrats to join the Order (i.e., appointment to manage a 
rich commandery in Europe).  The decreasing number of new recruits meant decreased income 
for the Order.  Moreover, the shrinking size of the commanderies and the diminishing 
responsions were creating additional financial stress.   The worst situation was the drop in the 
number of prizes taken by the Order, eliminating an income source as well as the raison d’etre of 
the Order in general.  The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the introduction of the Dutch and 
English merchant ships into the Mediterranean meant that there were fewer targets for the 
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Order’s ships to attack.  The absence of frequent prizes also meant a shortage of slaves and an 
increase in the number of paid Maltese rowers, forcing a rise in operating costs.   
The galley squadron was directly affected by fast-changing technological, political, 
social, economic, and religious conditions during the eighteenth century.  Limited financial 
resources were spent to maintain the squadron of sailing warships.  The magnates of the Order 
were questioning the validity of retaining the galleys at a time when other Mediterranean 
countries were discarding their galley squadrons.  A report submitted to the Grandmaster in 1790 
recommended drastic reductions in the number of personnel and the ciurma.137  A desperate 
measure to cut costs was the introduction of the short galley in 1791.138  We do not know for 
certain how this project progressed but it must have been a failure, since there were no short 
galleys in service by 1798.139   
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The Squadron of Sailing Warships 
The success of the Order’s navy depended heavily on how well it kept its forces 
technologically equal or superior to those of its opponents (predominantly the Muslim 
settlements of North Africa).  Therefore, efforts to construct a squadron of sailing warships 
started shortly after the adoption of the fully-rigged man-of-war by the Barbary corsairs in the 
mid-seventeenth century.140   As the galleys could not operate during the winter, the Order was 
forced to integrate sailing warships into its naval forces in order to continue year-around 
activities.141  
The first proposal for the construction of a sailing warship squadron was prepared during 
the magistracy of Martin de Redin (August 17, 1657 to February 6, 1660).  Consequently, Grand 
Master Lascaris ordered the construction of a 50-gun ship in 1665, but this idea never 
materialized.142  On March 31, 1700, Grand Master Ramon Parellos proposed the introduction of 
sailing men-of-war, and stressed that it would be impossible to oppose the Barbary corsairs 
without a squadron of such ships.143  On January 17, 1701, a commission nominated by the 
Grand Master examined the proposal and determined its overall efficiency and cost.144  Finally, 
on April 15, 1701, a Papal Bull of Clement XI authorized the development of the sailing warship 
squadron (Congregazione dei Vascelli) and commissioned the Order to begin construction.145   
In the meantime, the galley squadron captured a Tunisian ship of 80 guns on August 14, 
1701.  This ship was called Sultana Beringhemi or Sultana Binghen and was manned by a large 
crew when it was captured.146  We do not have a record of its Christian name, but it is known 




Fig. 27.  The cross-sectional view and the rigging plan of a sailing warship from 1729 (NLM 138 f. 208). 
(after: Wismayer).  
Malta did not have shipyards capable of building large sailing ships.  Thus, foreign 
arsenals were commissioned for the construction the first ships of the Congregazione dei 
Vascelli.  Construction of San Giovanni I and San Giacomo started in Toulon on April 26, 
1702.148  On the very same day, the construction of stores for the vascelli began in Malta outside 
Senglea gate.149  Once San Giovanni I and San Giacomo were completed, they sailed to Malta in 
1704.150  For detailed information about the specific features and ratings of the ships see Table 













Not surprisingly, Maltese shipbuilding developed close ties with France at a time when 
the French Langue emerged to prominence in the Order.151  Of the period during which the 
sailing warships were in use (1700-1798), 200 out of 300 resident Knights were French.  
Therefore, shipbuilding was largely carried out following French standards, and the first two 
ships were built in Toulon by the renowned shipwrights of the Coulomb family.152   
 In the late seventeenth century, schools of naval construction were founded in Rochefort, 
Brest, Marseille, and Toulon in order to standardize shipbuilding in France.153  The naval 
construction school in Toulon was under the direction of Francois Coulomb (1654-1717), son of 
the renowned shipwright Laurent Coulomb.  Francois Coulomb built 25 vessels, fourth, third, 
second, and first rates, in Toulon between 1689 and 1705 and also compiled a manuscript on the 
design and construction of ships titled Livre de construction des vaisseaux conteneant le nom des 
pieces, leurs liaisons, et les proportions generalles de la masture comme aussy pour les fluttes et 
chaloupes, a Toulon 1683 par Coulomb fils Maitre constructeur des vaisseaux du Roy dans 
l’Escolle de la construction.154  François Coulomb and his son Blaise were also the master 
shipwrights responsible for construction of the first two ships of the Order to be launched in 
1704: San Giovanni and San Giacomo.155   
During the same period, new shipyards were built in the French Creek in Malta.156  The 
first sailing warships built in Malta were Santa Caterina and San Giuseppe.  They were designed 
and built by local shipwrights who were only experienced in galley construction.157  Therefore, 
these first trials were not successful: the ships were not good sailers and had a shorter-than-usual 
lifespan.158   
After construction of the first two men-of-war in Toulon, sailing vessels were also built 
in Malta.  Blaise Coulomb and his two sons went to Malta to oversee construction of the next 
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generation of ships in the new shipyards of the French Creek and to train local shipwrights.159  
During their stay in Malta, the Coulombs were the master shipwrights for San Giovanni Battista 
II, San Giorgio, San Vincenzo, and Sant’ Antonio da Padova.  Table 14 provides an approximate 
operational timeline for the ships of the men-of-war squadron of the Order, and includes all the 
ships employed by the Order during the period between 1700 and 1798.   
It is also important to note the custom of giving the same name of a decommissioned 
ship to its replacement.  This tradition applied especially to flagships, and thus there was a total 
of four flagships named San Giovanni.160  There is not much information about every one of 
these ships, with the exception of San Giovanni II (1716-1765), for which there is a substantial 
amount of textual information.  A reconstruction of this particular ship based on the surviving 
information is provided in Appendix C. 
TABLE 14. 
Ships forming the squadron of the sailing warships 
 
1700 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1798 
  SAN GIOVANNI II    
 
 SAN RAIMONDO  SAN VINCENZO  San Giovanni 
IV 
 
 San  
Giuseppe 
 San  
Giorgio 
   San Giovanni III 
 
 SANTA CATERINA      SAN ZACHARIA 
 








Because of the relatively late adoption of this type of warship, as well as the overall 
eonomic decline of the Order of Saint John in Malta, the sailing warship squadron never 
developed beyond a small and ineffective fleet.  The total number of men-of-war employed by 
the Order throughout the eighteenth century was only twenty, the number of ships forming the 
squadron averaged four and only on one occasion did it reach the maximum number of five 
(Table 14).  A quick look at the size of contemporary fleets makes it clear that both the size of 
the individual ships and the size of a squadron comprised of four or five ships presented an 
extraordinarily small squadron within the context of the eighteenth century (see Table 15 below 
for the sizes of the other fleets).  It is also important to note that these sailing warships, vascelli, 
used by the Order are sometimes referred to as the ‘third-rates’ in the literature.  However, these 
would normally qualify as fourth rates in the other contemporary fleets.   
TABLE 15. 
Numbers of ships in the major European fleets in the eighteenth century – compared with the fleet of the 
Order of Saint John161 
Rates Artillery Ottoman Empire Venice France England Spain 
Order of 
Saint John  
First 90- 4  1 6 1  
Second 80-90   10 2  
Third 65-80 11 9 12 33 9  
Fourth 50-64 12 2 25 54 31 3 
Fifth 31-46 6 2 8 17 2  
Sixth 20-30   3 20 4  
        
Total  33 13 49 140 49 3 
 
 
 Another likely reason for the introduction and maintenance of the squadron of sailing 
warships was the naval training function that the Order provided.  Even if it were just a miniature 
version of contemporary naval fleets, the Order’s squadron of sailing vessels could provide 
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training for aspiring Knights, who would be interested in benefiting from their experience in 
Malta in order to excel in their respective countries upon their return (see Chapter XI, section 
about Naval Training).  In all, the persistence of the sailing ships, and the gradual increase in 
their numbers at the expense of the galley squadron indicate that the squadron of the vascelli 
accomplished its function of extending the survival of the Order to the end of the eighteenth 




NAVAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ORDER OF SAINT JOHN 
 
 When he offered Malta to the Knights in 1523, Charles V proposed three functions for 
the Order: to provide an additional naval base for Spanish fleets, to resist Ottoman aggression, 
and to defend its own territory against pirate attacks.1  Placing the Order at the middle of the 
navigation routes of the central Mediterranean was also a subtle political move in anticipation of 
the Franco-Ottoman naval alliance being negotiated in the 1520’s.2 
The Order was expected to meet its obligations by sending its navy on two or three 
cruises annually and joining the Christian navies when they were engaged in battle against the 
Muslims.  It was against the neutral position adopted by the Order’s squadron to openly take 
sides in conflicts between Christian countries.  Nonetheless, the Knights occasionally took part 
in such encounters.  For example, the Gran Galeone, built for the Order in Amsterdam in 1617, 
joined the forces of Louis XIII fighting the Protestant Huguenots at La Rochelle in 1622-1623.3 
It was also common for the galley squadron or the sailing warships to escort privileged 
travelers such as high-ranking officers, members of European royal families, or important 
ecclesiastical dignitaries, as well as commercial cargo ships, especially those transporting grain, 
shipbuilding timber, or annual shipments of responsions from the commanderies to Malta.4   
The Order’s navy was also an institution performing the duty of naval training for 
aspiring knights.  Many of those who completed their caravans serving the squadron of the 
Order returned to their countries of origin where they joined the national navies as well-trained 
and seasoned warriors.5  A report by Barras de la Penne, dated 1727, mentions that at the end of 
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the seventeenth century about a third of all the officers in the French galleys were Knight of 
Saint John and former servants-at-arms of the Order.6  There were also several Knights in the 
Spanish, Portuguese, and Austrian navies.7   
The sections below provide detailed information about how the Order performed the 
functions briefly described above and the specific occasions where the Order’s naval forces were 
employed.   The activities of the period between 1530 and 1798 will be investigated in two main 
sections.  The first is titled ‘naval expeditions’ as the emphasis will be on the activities of the 
Order’s fleet in conjunction with larger Christian fleets.  What differentiates these operations 
from the second group, identified as the ‘corsair operations’, is the ultimate objective of the 
expedition.  ‘Naval expeditions’ were not carried out with the goal of capturing prizes or 
acquiring financial rewards.  These two categories are sometimes difficult to differentiate, as the 
‘corsair operations’ were also carried out with the pretext of causing harm to the ‘enemy’, which 
would be the Muslim ships, Muslim coastal settlements, and other ships carrying Muslim goods.8  
That all operations in this category resulted in the capture of prizes with a financial value qualify 





During the first decades of the Order’s presence in Malta, the prospect of recapturing 
Rhodes characterized the organization of military operations.  As part of this grand plan, the 
Order’s forces attacked Modon in 1531, only one year after their arrival in Malta.9  Modon was 
chosen as the target of the expedition because of its proximity to Rhodes, and because it was a 
small and inadequately fortified settlement.  The plan was to utilize this port as a base from 
which to stage a large-scale attack on Rhodes.  The naval forces that attacked Modon consisted 
of two of the Order’s galleys and two additional galleys hired by the Grandmaster from a famous 
privateer, Cigale.  The fleet was accompanied by two brigantines and two merchant ships 
carrying provisions.  The assailants were able to enter the settlement without any major 
difficulties but a report about the approaching Ottoman patrol fleet forced them to retreat.10  
Having no other options, the Order’s forces, and the corsairs allied with them, decided to carry 
away whatever they could find in the settlement.  The plunder described as “not over-honorable, 
tho’ profitable” by a contemporary historian of the Order, Abbé de Vertot, resulted in the 
slaughter of the male population and the enslavement of 800 women from Modon.11    
The position taken by the Republic of Venice became clear during this expedition.  The 
Dodge refused to provide ship’s biscuit for the besieging fleet of the Order and retained its 
neutral role.  Shortly after the sack of Modon, in 1534, the Venetian Provveditore dell’Armata 
issued instructions to chase down all Maltese corsairs.12 
Similar unsuccessful attempts of an even smaller scale were carried out in the years to 
follow but the project of recapturing Rhodes was completely abandoned by the mid-sixteenth 
century.  The major reasons for this were the increased financial difficulties caused by Henry 
VIII in 1534 when he seized the Order’s English commanderies,13 and the sack of Gozo by the 
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North African corsairs in 1541 while the Order’s ships were engaged with the fleet of Charles V 
in the Siege of Algiers.14  The increasing need to fortify the Maltese Islands and the fact that it 
was becoming clear that the re-conquest of Rhodes was not viable forced the Order to recognize 
that Malta would be their permanent home.15  Defending Tripoli, given to the Order as part of the 
compensation package from Charles V in 1530, was a great military liability and a drain on the 
Order’s resources.  The defenders presented very little resistance to the Ottoman attackers under 
the command of Sinan Pasha in 1551, and the loss of this fortress was a great relief to the 
Order’s finances that could finally be dedicated to the fortification of Malta.16  On the other 
hand, although Tripoli was not a valuable asset to the Order its capture considerably 
strengthened the Ottoman position in North Africa, as this was not only a strategic military 
position and a link with the Barbary States, but also a traditional port through which the African 
interior was reached.17 
 The balance of power in the Mediterranean was in constant flux during the sixteenth 
century, creating an uneasy situation for the small fleet of the Order in Malta.  The Barbary 
Corsair Khaireddin Barbarossa established his base in Algiers in 1530, and became the admiral 
of the Ottoman navy in 1533, adding to the increasing pressure of Ottoman control of the central 
Mediterranean felt by the Order.  In the meantime, the conquest of Baghdad and Tabriz led to 
increased Ottoman control over the silk route and, therefore, Mediterranean trade and politics.  
The growing power, expanding frontiers and increasing wealth of the Ottoman Empire led to the 
creation of a Franco-Ottoman alliance in 1534, which lasted for 25 years.  During the period of 
active cooperation between the French and Ottoman fleets between 1542 and 1544, Ottoman 
ships became a familiar sight in the central and western Mediterranean, often wintering in 
Toulon.18  The Third Ottoman-Venetian War (1537-1540) also had significant consequences for 
the second half of the century.  After the major naval encounter of 1538 at the Battle of Prevesa, 
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Venice abandoned the Christian league that consisted of the Papal State, Genoa, Spain and 
Venice, and sued for peace, loosing its Aegean islands.19  Not only did the combined forces of 
the Franco-Ottoman alliance take to plundering the Catalan coast after this date, but the absence 
of any sizeable force to subdue piracy in the Mediterranean led to the rise of Muslim piracy, 
especially between 1538 and 1570.     
 The sixteenth century was characterized by Portuguese expansion into the Indian Ocean 
and increased Spanish and Portuguese interests in the Atlantic trade.  The Ottoman Empire was 
involved in fighting the Portuguese to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean and expanded into 
Europe by annexing Hungary in 1541.  Although the spice trade of the Mediterranean was not 
ultimately affected by this Portuguese expansion, Venice was becoming increasingly concerned 
about the commercial rivalry presented by the Adriatic city of Ragusa, which controlled the land 
route to Constantinople, as well as the Uskok pirates who raided Venetian shipping from their 
base in Quarnaro.20   
The fact that the Order of Saint John continued its corsair activities (see Chapter XI, 
section about Corsair Operations) and regular patrolling cruises (caravans) was undoubtedly an 
insignificant detail in a larger deluge of events.  However, the Order’s galley squadron, 
consisting of four ships, is known to have been part of a number of combined Christian fleets 
fighting the Ottoman Empire.  After the failure of the first two efforts at Prevesa (1538) and 
Algiers (1541), another attack was organized by Philip II to capture Djerba in 1560.  The 
expedition was planned as a counterattack against the Ottoman expansion in North Africa and 
the western Mediterranean that resulted in the capture of Oran (1556), Bizerta (1557), Ciudadela 




The Treaty of Cateau Cambresis between Spain and France in 1559, and the death of 
Mary Tudor that ended the alliance between England and Spain, together halted the Valois-
Habsburg Wars.  The most important consequence of the end of hostilities between Spain and 
France was the simultaneous termination of the Franco-Ottoman alliance.  The Ottoman fleet 
could no longer winter in French ports and could not intervene in the affairs of the western 
Mediterranean with any speed or efficiency.  Philip II counted on this advantageous position 
when he attacked Djerba in 1560, and the Ottoman Empire, intending to counter this move 
responded by attacking Malta in 1565.  In both cases the attackers suffered the greatest losses.   
The Order contributed five galleys, two galleons, one magistral galliot, and a force of 
400 Knights and 900 soldiers under the command of Carlo Tessieres to Philip II’s Djerba 
expedition.21  The Christian fleet consisted of 49 to 54 galleys.  At the end of the disastrous 
expedition, 28 to 30 of these ships were lost, including the Capitanas of the Pope, Sicily, 
Monaco, and Terranova.  But the real importance of the defeat at Djerba for the Christian 
alliance was the loss of an entire generation of experienced fighting men.  Thousands of officers, 
sailors and seasoned marines were killed in this expedition, crippling the effective exercise of 
power at sea for Spain and its allies.22   
The Porte had to act fast to take advantage of the extraordinarily weak state of the 
Spanish fleet.23  An Ottoman force of 130 galleys, 18 galliots, 8 maonas (large merchant galley), 
11 large sailing ships, and about 36,000 soldiers attacked the Order’s base in Malta in 1565.  The 
Order had about 2,500 men and the islands’ male Maltese population numbered about 6,000 at 
the time.  Nonetheless, due to various problems within the Ottoman command structure, a 
staunch defense displayed by the Knights, and the arrival of a relief force of Spanish and 
Genoese galleys carrying 11,000 men caused the Ottomans to abandon the siege and return home 
empty handed.   
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In its broader Mediterranean context the magnitude and consequences of the Ottoman 
siege of Malta were ephemeral.24  Hess notes that “the Ottoman naval strength remained as 
formidable, its determination to realize its grand design as powerful, and its threat to the West as 
fearful as they had been in their totality before the armada had ventured on its politico-punitive 
expedition to Hospitaller Malta.”25  The fact that the Order survived the attack did not put an end 
to the Ottoman threat.26  On the other hand, the siege of Malta had an undeniable impact within 
the narrower context of the history of the Order of Saint John and the social and economic 
history of Malta.  The most permanent significance of this ‘close call’ was the Knights’ 
realization of the extent of their vulnerability.  The area of the Three Cities on the eastern side of 
Grand Harbor and Fort Saint Elmo on Dragut Point had proven especially vulnerable to battering 
from Ottoman artillery set up on the heights of the Sciberras peninsula.  Consequently the 
Knights decided to build a fortified enclave on those heights, a settlement that was to be named 
Valletta (Fig. 2).  When the project was completed, Grand Harbor was ringed by fortresses and 
ready to repel any further attacks.27  Ironically, the only attack on Malta after this date was that 
of Napoleon in 1798, when the Knights surrendered with no opposition.  The only real impact of 
this giant construction project was a great drain on the Order’s fiscal resources, and the 
decimation of the islands’ indigenous population (see Chapter XII).28   
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The Dutch war of independence against Spain was the defining military event for Spain 
between 1568 and 1648.  The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was fighting on four fronts, 
against the Muscovites and Iranians in Kazan and Astrakhan, against the Portuguese in the 
Indian Ocean, against the Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe and against Spain and Venice 
in the Mediterranean.  Another Franco-Ottoman pact came into existence in 1569 with the 
initiation of the Franco-Ottoman capitulations, granting to France all the commercial privileges 
previously granted to Venice.  As a result, Marseilles emerged as a major commercial center, 
threatening the crucial economic role played by Venice.  The outbreak of a Moorish rebellion in 
Andalusia in 1568 created considerable civil unrest in Spain and presented the Ottomans with the 
opportunity to attack Cyprus in 1570, as Venice would have to defend the island with limited 
support from Europe.29  The most significant encounter of the conflict, called the fourth 
Ottoman-Venetian War or the War of Cyprus (1570-1573), was the naval battle at Lepanto in 
1571.   
The Ottoman fleet laid siege to Venetian Cyprus in 1569 and captured the main port of 
Crete (Candia) from the Venetians in 1570.  The fleet of the Holy League consisting of 207 
galleys from Spain, the Papal States, Venice, and the Order of Saint John finally encountered the 
Ottoman fleet of 230 galleys near Lepanto in 1571.  At the end of the day, the Ottomans 
retreated having lost 30,000 men and many ships.  The Knights contributed only three galleys, 
under the command of Pietro Giustiniani, but they played a pivotal role in the capture of the 
Ottoman flagship.30  Christians decisively defeated the Ottomans at Lepanto; ironically, the 
results of military operations between 1569 and 1571 improved the strategic position of the 
Ottoman Empire: the Holy League disintegrated after the death of the Pope in 1572 and Venice 
sued for peace in 1573, leaving Cyprus to the Ottomans.  From the Ottoman point of view, 
eastern Mediterranean was now cleared of the Christian stronghold at Cyprus, which 
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consolidated their control of the sea routes that joined the wealthiest of the imperial lands 
(Egypt) to Constantinople.31  The Ottoman fleet also recovered quickly, reaching 200 galleys 
within two years and supporting their fleet with numerous galleasses, whose absence may have 
been the determining factor for the defeat at Lepanto.32 
Therefore, the absence of any major conflicts in the Mediterranean after the Battle of 
Lepanto cannot be explained away by the weakness of the Ottoman fleet.  Other developments 
such as the Catholic-Huguenot conflict in France, which culminated in the Saint Bartholomew’s 
Day Massacre of 1572, the bankruptcy of Spain in 1575, and the subsequent defeat of the 
Spanish Armada in 1588, the outbreak of plague in Venice killing one third of the population 
(1575-1577), and the start of war on the eastern front of the Ottoman empire with the Sassanids, 
left the issue of Mediterranean supremacy unresolved.  Instead, an environment of equilibrium 
was created as the attention of the major naval powers were diverted from the Mediterranean by 
other, more pressing problems elsewhere.  The period that followed was characterized by the 
spread of piracy and a slow-burning war between corsairs, the major parties being the Knights 
Hospitallers and the Barbary Corsairs.33  In addition, we see new players being introduced with 




Algiers became autonomous in 1575 and, in 1594, the Porte issued a ferman (decree) to 
the governors of Algiers and two other provinces, permitting them unlimited corsair activity.35  
From the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards the Order’s squadron very rarely took 
part in any Christian alliance or in any activity that was not mainly motivated by the desire to 
capture a prize.  Another reason why these activities can be defined as ‘corsair activities’ is that 
most often the Order’s hostility was directed at unarmed targets, such as settlements, merchant 
ships, and fishing boats, purely for the purpose of capturing slaves or goods for sale to rebuild 
the treasury (see Chapter XI, Corsair Operations).   
The only instances in which the Order was involved in activities with military motives 
was when the six galley forming their squadron joined the Venetian fleet during the War of Crete 
(1645-1669).36  The unusually long duration of this war was to exhaust Venice and the Order, as 
the former was prevented from carrying out its regular trade and the latter’s squadron was tied up 
in Crete, unable to capture prizes, depriving the Knights of income.37  At the end of the war, the 
Venetians surrendered Crete to the Ottomans and were reduced to an Adriatic power.  The real 
beneficiaries of this conflict were the Dutch and English merchants who soon replaced the 
Venetians in exchanging their woolen cloths for raw silks from the Ottoman Empire.38  Also 
coinciding with the War of Crete was the confiscation of the Dutch commanderies in 1649, 
further increasing the financial distress of the Order.39  The Venetians were once again joined by 
the Order’s seven galleys during the First War of Morea (1684-1699).40  And once again, the 
disadvantages of being involved in a lengthy conflict negatively effected the finances of the 
Order.   
The last occasion in which the Order’s squadron might have been partly motivated by 
military matters was probably the bizarre situation of 1755-1756.41  In 1755, the Bey of Tunis 
requested Grandmaster Pinto’s help to defend his city against the Bey of Algiers.  Consequently, 
 
 225
the galley squadron consisting of the Capitana, the magistral galley of Pinto, San Luigi and San 
Nicola accompanied by two sailing warships San Antonio and San Giovanni (both 64 guns) were 
sent to Tunis under the command of the Captain General Bailiff Fra De Rosset Fleury.  At the 
Grandmaster’s request, the squadron was also accompanied by the thirteen merchant ships (from 
Denmark, Sweden and Holland) that happened to be in the Grand harbor at the time, so that the 
‘armada’ would look larger.  The arrival of this seemingly large fleet caused the Algerians to 
refrain from attacking Tunis by sea, but it was nonetheless captured by land 50 days after the 
arrival of the Order’s squadron.  During their stay in the nearby bay of La Goleta, the fleet was 
provisioned by the Bey of Tunis with whom the Captain General exchanged expensive gifts.  
After the fall of Tunis, the Order’s ships captured the Tunisian ships that were also at anchor at 
La Goleta and kindly transported the Tunisians to Malta as passengers.   
After this date, almost all the activities of the fleet consist of performing annual patrols 
but capturing a dramatically decreasing number of prizes (see Chapter XI, section about Corsair 
Operations).  In 1769, the only recorded activity of the galley squadron was its performance of 
some complicated maneuvers for the entertainment of the King and Queen of Naples, his consort 
the Grand Duchess, the Ambassador of France and his wife, and two other princesses who were 
friends of the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, thereby helping Grandmaster de Rohan to befriend 
royalty.42  In 1770, three galleys accompanied the French fleet to Tunisia where they bombarded 




The Knights believed that it was their duty to police the Mediterranean and to fight the 
‘Turks’, but the definition of ‘Turk’ was problematic throughout the existence of the Order of 
Saint John.  As far as the Order was concerned, all Ottoman ships belonging to the Barbary 
regencies, as well as all European ships that carried Muslim and Jewish passengers or 
commercial merchandise with a port of origin or port of destination in the Ottoman territories, 
were ‘Turks’.43  Therefore, entire ships had to be searched in order to determine whether or not it 
was ‘Turkish’ and the Order insisted on the right to search all ships sailing in the Mediterranean 
as their fourth vow obliged them to fight Muslim forces always and everywhere.44  Naturally, 
these activities were highly unpopular among the subjects of other Mediterranean countries.45  
The religious justification for the activities of the Order were based on the harm inflicted on 
Muslim subjects and trade since commerce raiding ultimately took a financial toll on states.  As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the general military and economic climate of the Mediterranean 
led the Knights to grow bolder in their commerce raiding.46  The income derived through the 
capture of prizes became increasingly vital to the finances of the Order as revenue from the 
commanderies gradually decreased.    
As briefly outlined in the previous section, the seventeenth century was characterized by 
a demographic crisis due to catastrophic mortality during the outbreaks of plague and a 
commercial crisis due to the growing dominance of the ships of Atlantic Europe.47  Corsairing 
emerged as a profession adopted by the increasingly impoverished Mediterranean population of 
the seventeenth century.48  In contrast, the eighteenth century was also a golden age of 
international commerce.49  The Dutch had successfully monopolized the spice trade in the East 
Indies, and Holland and England increasingly flooded Mediterranean markets with cheap 
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manufactured goods.  The economic crisis created masses of poor who, in turn, increasingly 
leaned towards banditry and its maritime counterpart, corsairing; outright banditry at sea could 
be easily camouflaged as ‘holy war’ when conducted under the flag of the Order.50    
A corsair or privateer is a private individual licensed by his sovereign to fit out a ship to 
attack his sovereign’s enemies.  The prizes he acquired while carrying out his actions are his to 
keep except for the share paid to the sovereign.51  The crews of the prize ships and the 
inhabitants of the settlements attacked in raids by the Order’s ships were also a vital source for 
slaves, large numbers of whom were required to continue construction activities in Malta and 
man the oars in the galley squadron.  Privateering activities were carefully regulated by the 
Grandmaster and the Council.  All privateers flying the flag of the Order needed a letter issued 
by the Grandmaster and disputes over profits were adjudicated before special courts set up by the 
Knights.  The Tribunale degli Armamenti was intended as a prize court to be responsible for the 
organization and jurisdiction of all privateers in Malta.  It was instituted on June 17, 1605, and 
was composed of five commissioners nominated by the Grandmaster.52  A second institution, 
Consolato del Mare (established in 1697) was originally intended for litigation over regular 
maritime commerce.  Both the small scale of the regular trade and the ever increasing corsair 
activity led to the genesis of this institution into one similar to the Tribunale degli Armamenti.  
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Consolato del Mare was in charge of the 
organization, regulation, and supervision of all corsair activities in Malta.53  It was also a prize-
court to hear cases concerning corsairs flying the magisterial flag, which the Grandmaster issued 
to privateers in his capacity as the Sovereign Prince of the island.54   
Historical documents indicate that aspiring captains of corsair ships would send their 
petitions specifying the proposed area of corsair activity to the Tribunale degli Armamenti 
asking to enroll a crew for their ships.55  Permissions were granted for periods ranging from one 
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season (five to six months) to a period of five or six years.56  Before he was permitted to fly the 
flag of the Order, the captain was also required to give his word under oath not to attack 
Christian ships, deposit a bond of 1,000 scudi (to pay for damages in case he broke his oath) and 
pay a fee of 50 scudi for the right of hoisting the flag.57  Upon arrival of prizes in Malta, the 
experts from the arsenal determined the value of the inventoried items and determined the 
percentage to be paid to the Grandmaster.  The rest of the prize money was distributed among 
the owner of the ship and its crew.  There also were financiers who would pay reduced cash 
immediately after the determination of the prize for those who did not want to wait for the forty-
days quarantine period before the captured goods were allowed to be exchanged in Maltese 
markets.58 
The most common ‘items’ listed as the subjects of these commercial interactions and the 
most common types of prizes were slaves and ships (see Appendix E).  Slave prices varied 
between 8 and 320 scudi per slave, depending on the age, strength and physical beauty of the 
individual.59  It is hard to determine the individual price of a slave as they were generally 
auctioned in groups.60  It should also be noted that Christians captured by corsairs were 
considered prisoners of war, and they served as slaves unless ransomed.61  Prices of some of the 
small types of vessels captured and sold are presented in Table 16.  
TABLE 16. 
Prices for the sale of the captured prizes in Malta as of 1662, based on a document NAMRPS (National 
Archives Mdina - Registro delle Prese e Schiavi [register of prizes and slaves])62 
Saica 640-1311 scudi (depending on its size) 
Petacchio 3,000-4,000 scudi 
Galliot 550 scudi 




Privateering generated such profits that the definition of ‘the enemy’ proved increasingly 
vague over time.63  The vessels legalized by the Knights mainly assaulted Muslim and Jewish 
merchants but attacks on Greek Orthodox or Latin Christian ships were also common.64  Two 
pretexts were adduced for crossing the line into purportedly forbidden territory.  At times, a war 
between alliances of Christian states afforded the privateers an opportunity to prey on Christian 
ships belonging to a Christian State in a rival alliance.  At other times, privateers used the excuse 
that Christian vessels might be smuggling Muslim or Jewish goods on board.  The admission that 
such was the case was not infrequently beaten out of the boarded ship’s commander.65 
Why Was Corsairing Allowed? 
Fontenay’s evaluation shows that in the eighteenth century a total of 218 Hospitaller 
privateers were based in Malta.  Only 70 of these were ‘Maltese’ and another 30 had foreign 
owners ‘resident in Malta’.  The ships in these two categories make up only 46 percent of the 
total number of the privateers operating from Malta, meaning that the majority of the privateers 
belonged to the Knights themselves.66    
The Order allowed and encouraged corsairs because the corso was an integral part of the 
naval squadron and an important source of trained seamen.67  In addition, corsairing activities 
not only provided employment for the rapidly increasing population of the archipelago but also 
the Grandmasters understood the value of directing aggressive activity outward to avoid local 
turbulence.  Besides, the financial profits that corsairing brought were indispensable to the 
economy of the island that was otherwise sterile of opportunity.68  The figures provided by the 
Quarantine registers reveal that 338 prizes were brought to Malta between 1654 and 1694, an 
average of eight prizes annually.69  Ironically, because the Knights based their economy on 
preying upon Muslim trade, they became dependent upon the commercial welfare of the 
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Ottoman Empire.  With the collapse of the Ottoman economy and weakening of the North 
African regencies in the eighteenth century, the Order also lost one of its most important income 
sources, as well as the political and ideological justification for its existence.  
Why Were Corsairs of Malta Unpopular? 
Mediterranean trade was virtually impossible without the involvement of Muslim and 
Jewish merchants in one way or the other.  Shipments of spices, textiles and other oriental goods 
all originated from Muslim ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, usually in Alexandria or on the 
Levantine coast.  Goods would generally be pre-purchased by a European merchant and became 
his property before they were shipped.  But with obscure or broad definitions, these goods fell in 
the category of ‘Muslim goods’ quite readily.  Both the Order and licensed corsairs 
systematically searched Christian ships for ‘contraband’ merchandise, which could be 
confiscated upon discovery.  The ideological justification dates to the 1311 Council of Vienna, 
which banned all trade in military material with Muslim states and empowered the crusading 
Orders to hunt and seize all such ‘contraband’ goods.  In Cutajar’s words, this provision was 
“elastically interpreted” by the Order’s corsairs.70   
Understandably, piracy and privateering were highly unpopular activities among the 
countries involved in commerce.  The tensions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
between Venice and the Order of Saint John are understandable in this context.  Mallia-Milanes 
provides a summary of the conflicts and disputes between the Order and their least friendly 
counterpart in Europe, Venice.71  Long, drawn out disputes, sometimes involving the Pope, took 
place throughout seventeenth century.72  Venetians maintained “all galleys and corsairs vessels 
should keep clear of her Stato da Mar,” and in return, the Order’s position was that they were 
entitled to wage war against the Crescent “in any part of the world.”73  The easiest means for the 
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Venetians to restore the damage caused by the Hospitaller corsairs was to issue a sequestro and 
seize the Order’s income from the lands constituting the Grand Priory of Venice.74  There are 
several accounts that give us insight into the amounts of material and funds that were 
confiscated.75  For example, in 1776 the income from the Grand Priory of Venice was 10,207 
scudi, 10 tari and 13 grani, more than the cost of a new galley.76  Often, this income was 
completely lost with the issue of one or more sequestro, depending on the damage caused by the 
Hospitaller corsairs in that year.  Thus, every sequestro meant a considerable financial lost for 
the Order.  Such actions were denounced by the Order as “acts of outright larceny committed 
against her title to ecclesiastical immunity, with no regard to the rights and privileges extended 
to her by popes, emperors, kings, and princes.”77   As for Venice, the sequestro acted as security 
for the reimbursement of any losses suffered by Venetian merchants at the hand of the Order, to 
prod the Grandmaster into disciplining his corsairs, and to prove to the Porte that the Republic 
had no hand in such hostile operations.78   
Both the Hospitallers and corsair ships licensed in Malta were known for their 
exceptional brutality in extracting information from captives.  Especially during the search for 
Muslim and Jewish goods it was not uncommon that ship owners and crews would be tortured to 
“confess” about the ownership of the cargo on board.  Several such court cases by Venetian 
merchants are preserved in the Venetian archives.79  Little could be done when the ship owner 
‘confessed’, without the intervention of the Pope or the issuance of a sequestro, since the courts 
in Malta were known to be unusually corrupt; the courts could be easily bought since the judges 
and advisors were personally involved in corsairing.80 
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After several hostile incidents on the part of the Hospitaller corsairs, the Venetians 
retaliated and relations deteriorated into a state of war in the last two decades of the sixteenth 
century.81  Mediterranean and European-wide food shortages in this period led the Maltese 
corsairs to seize numerous ships around the islands.  A ship carrying Puglian grain to Naples was 
seized near Messina.  Another one from Ragusa was forced to Malta instead of its intended 
destination, Palermo.  Grain from other Genoan and Ragusan ships was similarly confiscated.82  
During the last decade of the sixteenth century the captains of the Maltese privateer ships caught 
in the Adriatic by the Provveditor of the Venetian armada were hanged and the crews 
imprisoned.83  At the beginning of the seventeenth century, relations had deteriorated to such an 
extent that the Venetians began to blame the Hospitaller corsairs for all attacks on their ships in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.84   
The loss of the commanderies in certain countries such as Britain (1540) and Denmark 
(1649) were not only hard on the finances of the Order, but having its income sources 
concentrated in certain countries created additional stress on the political affairs and the Order 
became increasingly dependent on revenue from its properties in France and Spain.  The obvious 
problem with this situation is that financial reliance often meant military and political 
dependency, which gave the two major protectorates more control over the internal affairs and 
activities of the Order.85  By the end of the seventeenth century, 45 percent of the Order’s 
revenue was coming from the commanderies in France.86  Increasing French influence was 
visible in the composition of the naval forces.  Between 1600 and 1674 the three langues of 




Fontenay points out that there is an apparent distinction between the composition of the 
Order’s naval forces (which he refers to as the corso) before and after 1675.  According to his 
classification, the first period can be described as the “classical corso” (from 1575 to 1675).  
Before 1675 the majority of the corso consisted of French Knights of aristocratic background, 
and privateering was considered to be an honorable activity.88  However, France was heavily 
involved in Mediterranean trade and, especially after 1569, when the Franco-Ottoman 
capitulations granted to France all commercial privileges previously granted to the Venetians, 
the maintenance of that fragile alliance and the good standing of French merchants in eastern 
harbors were too valuable to risk for the small, additional income through the capture of prizes.  
Accordingly, after the renewal of France’s capitulations by the Ottoman Empire in 1674, Louis 
XIV prohibited the Order’s corsair activities in the Levant altogether.89    
The nature of the relations between the Order and France can be seen in the reaction of 
the Grandmaster Cotoner, who promptly recalled all of his corsairs in the Levant in 1679 to 
demonstrate his accord with Louis XIV.90  But during the period of disorder that followed, the 
Grandmaster Perellos (1697-1720) encouraged corsair activities once again.91  Perellos’ rule saw 
a sudden and uncontrolled increase in the number of corsairs originating from Malta along with 
an enormous quantity of complaints regarding the activities of his corsairs.92  Other 
Grandmasters, like Manoel Pinto, were more prudent and took control of the situation by 
prohibiting corsair activities in the Levant in 1742 to avoid further problems with France and the 
Pope.93  
 French merchants were not the only ones concerned with the Order’s activities.  In April 
1651 the Order’s galley squadron seized an English ship named Goodwill in the Malta Channel, 
capturing 32 Turkish merchants on board along with their goods.  In retaliation, the Bey of Tunis 
imprisoned the English consul Samuel Boothouse in Tunis and sequestered the property of the 
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English merchants there as a deposit for the Turks’ eventual redemption.  The Order’s contention 
that it was lawful to seize Turkish goods carried by Christian vessels was disputed by Admiral 
William Penn, who was a directly involved in the dispute.  Since 1650, the merchants of the 
English Levant Company were paying an additional fifteen percent levy imposed on English 
customs in return for the protection of merchant shipping guaranteed by the Rump Parliament.94  
Through Penn’s intervention Consul Boothouse was allowed to travel to Sicily, where he 
obtained a letter from the Archbishop of Palermo, addressed to the Grandmaster of Malta 
demanding complete restitution of the 32 Turks and their goods.95  In the meantime, Penn 
threatened the Grandmaster to accelerate the process.  In a letter written aboard his flagship, 
Fairfax, Penn stated: “if by means of such necessity our merchants should be subject to such 
deep inconveniences, what Resentment the State of England may thereupon make, I cannot 
conclude.”96  Grandmaster Lascaris did not appreciate his intervention and the threatening tone 
of the letters he received.97  In the end, and after lengthy bargaining, this issue was settled in 
April 1657.  England paid a ransom of 40,000 pieces of eight reals of Spain to return the Turks 
to Tunisia.98    
On August 17, 1665, the Knights seized commercial merchandise belonging to an 
English merchant named Roger Fowke, the English Consul at Cyprus.  This time, Charles II 
threatened reprisals unless 4,500 dollars were paid for alleged damages suffered by Fowke.  The 
Order, through its special envoy in London, pointed out that the capture had been considered a 
good prize by the Tribunale degli Armamenti; that Fowke had not availed himself of the legal 
means afforded by the code to appeal against the capture and to obtain justice, and that in any 
case, the Order could not interfere between the parties at issue nor be held responsible in the 
matter.99  Charles did not agree with their reasoning and spoke his mind in his reply to Cotoner, 
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which led to the Grandmaster’s appeal to the French King to assist them against the demands of 
the English.  Fortunately, before the events lurched to open conflict the problem was resolved.100   
There were further conflicts between the Order and England.  Grandmaster Lascaris’ 
reaction to Penn’s accusations was similar to that of Grandmaster Carafa’s to Captain Henry 
Killigrew in 1687.  Again, the dispute resulted from the Order’s claim to the right to seize 
‘Turkish’ goods and passengers even when carried by English ships.101  
It is interesting to note that all three incidents outlined above took place during the 
period when the Order of Saint John was involved in the War of Crete (1645-1669), caused by 
the Hospitaller privateering in the Aegean.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the fact that the 
Venetians and the Hospitallers were engaged in this 24 year long struggle contributed to English 
and Dutch commercial success in the Levant.102  Thus, it is no surprise that the number of 
Hospitaller attacks on English ships show a parallel increase to the number of English ships 
involved in the Mediterranean trade.  It should also be noted that because the Hospitaller ships 
were unable to perform their annual corsairing cruises during the war, they might have been 
more inclined to attack English ships in Maltese waters.  
Based on the surviving evidence, it seems that the English were the only nation to 
aggressively protest the Order’s conduct and its insistence on reserving the right to seize Muslim 
goods onboard Christian ships.  The reason for this seems to be partly due to the fact that the 
English were not bound by religious alliance to the Catholic Order.  In the seventeenth century, 
the emergence of powerful national navies and economies based on the maintenance of 
international alliances created an environment of intolerance for the actions of the Order.  By the 
eighteenth century, the ever-decreasing size of the Order’s fleet presented a diminishing threat 
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and the limited number of their prizes served to inhibit any strong reactions to the corsair 
operations.   
An incident in 1748 caused serious problems with France.  The Knights took possession 
of an Ottoman ship, which had been taken over by its rebellious Christian crew.  On board the 
galley was the pasha of Rhodes, who was set free in Malta upon the request of the Louis XV, 
King of France.  Even after the Pasha led the largest slave revolt of Malta, the Grandmaster was 
not able to punish him as Louis XV would not issue the necessary permission.103  The French 
intervened in the Order’s affairs once again in 1760 when a ship named Corona Ottomana,104 
was captured by the Christian slaves on board while the Ottomans were on land collecting taxes.  
This crew brought the ship to Malta, where it was renamed as San Salvador and was added to the 
squadron of the Order.  However, shortly afterwards the Order was pressured by France to return 
the ship to the Ottomans.  Ultimately, France paid a ransom of 244,000 scudi and the ship was 
sent back to Constantinople in 1762.  It was manned by a Maltese crew who were returned to the 
island on a French ship after making the delivery.105 
It should also be kept in mind that punished the Order’s involvement in privateering was 
sometimes countered by similar actions of other Christian corsairs.  Maltese shipping was 
occasionally harassed by English, Genoese, Flemish, French, and Spanish ships.106 
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Why Did It End? 
The ever-increasing number of complaints against the Hospitaller corsairs finally led to 
the intervention of Roman Curia.  It was Pope Clement XII’s wish in 1732 that “no corsair vessel 
should be allowed to fit out at Malta under a foreign flag; nor should any Maltese subject be 
permitted to share of the spoils of privateering ventures covered under any but the Hospitaller 
cross.”107  These measures were intended to give the Grandmaster complete control over his 
corsairs.  However, the direct outcome of this intervention was the termination of corsairing in 
Malta altogether.  According to Cavaliero “there was no future for Maltese piracy in the Levant” 
after 1740,108 and Earle mentions that “Maltese corsairs virtually disappeared as an institution” 
around 1750.109  Mallia-Milanes wrote that measures initially intended to regulate the industry 
(privateering) restricted its scope and led to its steady, overall decline after the beginning of the 
third decade of the eighteenth century.110  Similarly, Engel speaks of decreasing numbers of 
prizes and corsair operations and the increasing number of “escorting” duties.111   
In addition to the increasing complaints about the Order’s corsairs, and the decreasing 
number of potential prizes, there were additional developments leading to a decrease in the 
privateering activities.  One such development was the technological changes in ship 
construction.  As galleys were largely replaced by sailing warships, the slave markets of Malta 
lost one of their largest customers.  The decreasing demand for slaves, and the lower prices 
offered for them made the type of corsairing practiced by the Order and the Maltese (which 
concentrated on the capture of slaves) less profitable and led eventually to its demise.112     
The decrease in the number and quality of the prizes taken by the Order highlights the 
general decline in Muslim trade and shipping.  The trade of Christian nations in the 
Mediterranean was strong during this time and according to the figures presented by Labat Saint-
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Vincent, there is a remarkable increase in the number of French prizes taken by the English ships 
during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763).113  Between 1757 and 1758 English privateers 
captured 120 French ships.  Thus, this period was the golden age of Mediterranean privateering 
due to increased trade and shipping activities.  On the other hand, the Order of Saint John, being 
bound by their vows to attack only Muslims, had fewer ships to attack.  According to the terms 
of the licenses issued to Hospitaller corsairs, even when they could capture a Barbary corsair 
ship with its Christian prize captured earlier, the Order was supposed to return the ‘rescued’ 
cargo to its Christian owners.  The limiting nature of these contracts led to a decrease in the 
corsairs that flew the flag of the Order, which, in turn, reduced the Order’s income from the 
shares of the prizes.     
Above all, Enlightenment Europe did not see an institution inspired by religious zeal in 
the Mediterranean as worthy of long-term financial support.  The only remaining threats were 
the Barbary corsairs, and they were now seen as simple brigands attacking the ‘civilized world’ 
rather than ‘Christianity’.114  There was no major ‘enemy’ to fight and the function of the Order 
was diminished to ‘patrolling’ rather than ‘crusading’.115  An effort was made to create a new 
identity for the order as the ‘safe-keepers of the seas’ at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
by the abbot of Saint Pierre.  The proposal was entitled “the Project for the extirpation of the 
Barbary Corsairs,” and suggested that a Mediterranean pact be formed to financially contribute 
to a fleet operated, maintained, and owned by the Order of Saint John.116  The detailed document 
calculates that funds spent on the construction and maintenance of the squadron would cost less 
than the damage caused by the corsair activities.117  Holland, France, England, and Spain would 
give two ships each, and Sweden, Sardinia, the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, and Tuscany 
would contribute one ship each to the existing three ships of the Order, bringing the number up 
to sixteen.  With this squadron, the Order would clear the Mediterranean of Muslim corsairs in 
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four to five years, and in the meantime would train officers for the navies of the participating 
countries.  The prize money was to be shared between the Grandmaster, the treasury of the Order 
and equipment expenses.  The abbot even included that the Porte would receive an assurance 
letter that the activities of this fleet were strictly limited to fighting the Barbary corsairs, and not 
Ottoman ships.118  
This proposal was never put in action and the activities of the Barbary corsairs continued 
to increase.  Hénin-Liétard mentions in his memoirs, published in 1787, that the Barbary corsairs 
had three thousand ships, and only an allied fleet made out of ships from France, Spain and 
England could end the problem of corsairs.119  The major difference between this idea and the 
earlier proposal is that Hénin-Liétard does not mention the Order’s forces as a viable addition to 
his proposed fleet.120  Considering that fighting the Muslim enemy was the justification for the 
existence of the Order, it is significant that the Hospitallers were not even mentioned in a 
discussion about the problem of Muslim piracy.121   
In summary, the privateers originating from Malta became a serious problem that 
infuriated the major naval powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  In addition, 
decreasing commercial activity on the part of the Muslims left the Order with an ever-
diminishing number of prizes and consequently, financial difficulties.122  On the other hand, 
increasing Christian shipping activity provided prey for ships of the Barbary regencies.  The 
Order’s squadron, having shrunk to the size of four galleys and three to four sailing ships was no 
match for the increasingly bolder and more numerous corsair ships.    
No matter how important these problems were, it is not possible to determine how much 
they contributed to the approaching end of the Order.  The end came from an unexpected source: 
revolutionary France.123  Understandably, the noble members of the Order took sides with 
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French aristocrats during and after the revolution.124  Even though the French Grandmaster 
Emanuel de Rohan made every effort to preserve the neutral position of the Order in order to 
survive the turbulent times, the French Knights were confused as to where their loyalties should 
lie and finally sided with the King of France.  The Knights tried to prevent the confiscation of 
the commanderies in France that were included in a list of church property to be ‘nationalized’ 
shortly after the revolution in 1789.  Despite all efforts, the Constituent Assembly finally decided 
to claim for the government all Hospitaller property in France with the publication of the loi 
spoliateur on September 18, 1792.125  The value of these properties was estimated to be about 
2,338,404 livres.126  Revenue fell to approximately one-fourth of what it was before 1792, 
marking the end of the Order’s economic viability.127 
By 1795 the galleys were laid up, properties were mortgaged, pensions were cancelled 
and silver was melted down.  According to Mallia-Milanes, the French Revolution not only 
marked a definitive break between the present and the past for the Hospitallers, but also 
“confirmed with irrefutable logic the Hospital’s irrelevance to the present.”128  The French 
monarchy had been the principal protector of the Order for about a century, leading to political, 
financial and social dependence and allegiance upon this country.129  The disappearance of 
support led the Order to seek new alliances, in Russia and the United States of America.130  
Technological advances and shifts in international relations weakened the naval power and 
importance of the Order and financial difficulties prevented them from being actively involved 
in the coalition against France.131  This weakened status encouraged other European countries to 
consider ruling Malta after the collapse of the Order.  The Kingdom of Two Sicilies, Naples, 
Austria, England, and Russia were all interested in occupying the archipelago.132  Another 
crucial development of this period was the increasing disagreements between the Order and the 
Roman Curia regarding the extent and exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Malta.  The 
 
 241
discussions were especially heated after the court of Naples claimed the right to interfere through 
its alto dominio to resolve the issue.133  Grandmaster de Rohan’s reaction to the papal pressure 
and his desire to establish his own absolute sovereignty and authority loosened the ties of both 
the diocesan church to Malta and the Grandmaster to Rome.  According to Mallia-Milanes “the 
fatal stab to the Hospital” came from Pope Pius VI, whose “fury and resentment had almost 
realized what the French revolutionaries had so far failed to achieve – the complete and 
immediate extinction of the Order of Saint John.”134   
In the end, the French politicians who perceived that under the Order’s rule the islands 
were “a monument of feudalism and superstition” realized that it was only a matter of time 
before Malta was occupied by one of their most dangerous enemies, Russia or England.135  The 
only logical move on their part was to act first and take control while the French Knights were in 
majority in the Order.  The population of the island, it was believed, would support the invaders 
against the Order, since “they wanted to be with the only nation which could make them enjoy 
perfect liberty.”136  Thus, Napoleon’s invasion of Malta was the result of a process that started 
long before his Egypt expedition.  
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Naval Training During the Rule of the Order of Saint John 
 Any Catholic man above the age of eighteen, who was born of a legitimate marriage and 
who could demonstrate at least eight generations of noble ancestry could become a member of 
the Order of Saint John.137  The Knights were also expected to go through an extensive training 
program called the caravan system upon their initiation.  This means that any member of the 
Order, including the Knights, the serving brothers and the chaplains, had to serve for a term of 
approximately two years at one of the main seats of the Order in Malta.  The choices were the 
military, hospitaller and religious services.  The main military service duty for caravanists was 
performed in the navy of the Order. Some caravanists stayed in the navy of the Order to develop 
a professional career as naval officers, so the navy was continuously led by experienced 
members of the Order and replenished regularly by cadets from all over Europe (see Chapter X 
for details).138  
 The Order also functioned as a naval school to generate experienced naval personnel for 
countries represented by the Order’s members, specifically France and Naples.139   During his 
service in Malta, a Knight who chose to be part of the naval forces was expected to take part in 
the patrolling cruises of the galley squadron (and the sailing ships after the eighteenth century).    
 According to the constitution of the Order certain government functions were reserved 
for particular langues.  The minister of the navy, referred to as ‘the admiral’ in contemporary 
documents, and his lieutenant admiral were always Italian.  All other functions in this navy, 
including that of the fleet commander and the captains, could be occupied by knights and 
partially by brothers at arms originating from every nation contributing to the Order.140  Since the 
squadron was constantly engaged in active service the novices were able to receive practical 
instruction at sea both in ship handling and fighting tactics.   
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Maintaining standing navies is a relatively recent practice in Europe.  The general 
practice was to construct a fleet for a specific battle and recruit the personnel to serve on the 
ships for this specific occasion.  The majority of those who served on the ships were released 
upon the completion of the mission.  Moreover, the absence of hostilities for extended periods of 
time could lead to the stagnation of experienced naval personnel who would be unprepared for 
the next round of fighting.  For these reasons, the continuous activity of the Order’s squadron 
provided a great opportunity for the European aristocrats to acquire the necessary knowledge and 
practical experience to lead their own national fleets when necessary.   
A listing of the galley commanders in the French Navy dated July 2, 1676 shows that 
about 70 percent were Knights of Saint John.141  Unfortunately no source precisely cites the total 
number of members of the Order of Saint John serving in the European navies.  However, 
according to Dauber’s study, the only fleets in which the members of the Order served were 
those of the Holy Roman Empire, Spain (all prior to the arrival of the Order in Malta), the states 
that composed the langue of Germany (before the majority of them became Protestant) and 
finally France.   
Fra Anne Hilarion de Tourville (seventeenth century), Fra Jean Baptiste de Valbelle 
(seventeenth century), Fra Paul de Saumur, Fra François Joseph de Grasse-Tilly and his brother, 
Fra Pierre Andre Suffren de Saint Tropez are some of the famous naval commanders who were 
trained by the Order of Saint John.142  The rear-admiral of the Russian fleet Fra Giulio Litta, and 
the commander of the Austro-Venetian Navy up to 1847, Fra Friedrich von Österreich, were 
other accomplished members of the Order excelling in the navies of their home countries.143  
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Name lists and other types of information are available through Dauber’s144 and 
Petiet’s145 detailed works on this subject.  It is important to note certain aspects that stand out.  
First of all, although many countries were represented in the Order, French Knights 
predominated in its navy.  Second, most of the famous officers who were first trained in the 
Order’s navy were French and served in the French Navy after the completion of their service in 
Malta. Thirdly, the Order of Saint John was increasingly under the influence of France after the 
seventeenth century.  The initiation of nautical schools in Malta (such as the Jesuits' college in 
Valletta) the introduction of third rate ships to update the Order’s fleet technologically, and the 
beginning of certain training protocols such as target practice, parades and ceremonies, all 
introduced by the eighteenth century, not surprisingly date to the decline of corsair activities.146  
Developments in maritime technology such as intricate navigation instruments and complicated 
sailing rigs, requiring skilled workers and officers with highly specialized technical knowledge.  
This demanded the creation of schools for the instruction of personnel. In 1742 Grand Master 
Pinto founded a school to teach students reading, writing and advanced mathematics, and 
another institution to impart the art of navigation.  To encourage young Knights, he provided two 
annual prizes of five and ten scudi respectively for students attending both schools.147  In 1765, 




It seems likely that the underlying motivation for developing Malta into a neutral naval 
training center was to serve the French Navy.  Indications of such an idea are apparent in a 
proposal of 1784, in which the prime minister of Naples expressed his wish of transforming the 
navy of Malta into a strictly Neapolitan naval school.  Grandmaster De Rohan sent his 
ambassador Sagramoso to Naples with an order “to do everything to prevent such things from 
happening.”149   
Malta continued its transformation into a naval training center at the end of the 
eighteenth century.  The only concern was to preserve the neutral character of the island, and 
prevent its exclusive use by one European power.  The exclusive access of French Knights to the 
administration and government of the Order enabled them, however, to pursue the establishment 
of a practical naval school in Malta while maintaining the Order of Saint John’s neutrality and 
autonomy, while the institution’s ideology provided the excuse for ‘practical training’ provided 




The practice of sequestering merchandise and passengers for a period of time before 
issuing a free release – pratica – was initiated by the Adriatic cities of Venice and Ragusa in the 
fifteenth century.150 Ragusa had a permanent quarantine center, a Lazzaretto, by 1465 and that of 
Venice was in service by 1485.  The practice spread to other Christian ports in the sixteenth 
century, but was not performed in Muslim ports and in ports outside the Mediterranean until the 
nineteenth century.151 
The Hospitaller Order of Saint John established its first hospitals in Malta shortly after 
its arrival to the island in 1530.  The building known as the Birgu Infirmary was built in 1532, 
catering to the Knights and male civilians.152  This hospital was moved into the newly built 
construction in Valletta in 1575 and was called the Sacra Infirmeria, again serving only male 
patients.153  
In both the Birgu Infirmary and the Sacra Infirmeria, patients suffering from contagious 
diseases were segregated in separate wards.154  The necessity of segregating suspected victims of 
contagious diseases led to the establishment of the first quarantine quarters in the Grand Harbor, 
between Senglea and Kordin with a temporary wharf for clearance of merchandise called the 
Barriera.155  After the construction of Valletta in 1566, a hospital known as the Barriera station 
was also added to the city, replacing the old wharf.  In 1584, a committee consisting of two 
Knights and three Maltese noblemen (known as the health commissioners) was established with 
the task of inspecting incoming ships.156   
The establishment of Manoel island as a temporary quarantine hospital – or Lazzaretto – 
took place during the plague epidemic of 1593.  The little island in the middle of Marsamxett 
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harbor was an ideal place for the segregation of contaminated cargo, passengers and crews, and 
its proximity to the Grand Harbor rendered its control feasible.  Grandmaster Lascaris erected a 
permanent Lazzaretto on the same site in 1643, which later was enlarged.157 
After the establishment of the Lazzaretto the main function of the Barriera station was 
reduced to the inspection of ships with a clean bill of health (patenta).  Passengers and goods 
arriving on ships with a clean bill of health were required to remain under observation only for 
eighteen days.158  The site selected for that purpose was on the south side of Valletta and 
consisted of a row of warehouses and rooms for the passengers and crew for their 
accommodation during the short quarantine period.  Those who displayed signs of plague were 
referred to the Lazzaretto in Marsamxett Harbor.159   Ships that entered the port for shelter or for 
supplies were also obliged to anchor below Castile Bastion near the Barriera station, and remain 
under the constant watch of two quarantine boats until the end of the bad weather or transfer to 
the Lazzaretto.160   
The main function of the Lazzaretto was to segregate incoming passengers as well as 
imports from areas where the plague was considered endemic, or from ports that were known to 
be currently infected.161   Within the first category came all the Mediterranean lands under 
Ottoman rule i.e., most of Dalmatia, Greece and the Aegean islands, Asia Minor, the Levant, 
Cyprus, Egypt, and North African lands known as the Maghreb, excluding Morocco which 
eluded Ottoman control.  All passengers and goods coming from these lands had to be cleared by 
the quarantine authorities before being granted release (Pratica) to circulate in Malta and other 
European ports.   
The quarantine period varied in duration based on the circumstances and the nature of 
the cargo.  Theoretically, every ship had to go through a quarantine period of 40 days.  The 
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beginning of the period started from the last suspected direct contact with another vessel at sea or 
the date of departure from the last port of call.162  During this period the cargo was unloaded to 
be fumigated and disinfected and the passengers were either accommodated in the same building 
or stayed on board their ships.163  According to John Howard’s report, by 1785 the Lazzaretto 
was capable of allowing a proper separation for cargoes from six or seven ships 
simultaneously.164   
Maltese merchant ships, the Order’s privateers, and even the Order’s naval fleet were 
not granted an exception to these regulations.165  In fact, the Lazzaretto’s services benefited 
mostly the Maltese ships and corsairs until the second half of the eighteenth century.166  Despite 
all precautions plague epidemics are known to have affected the Maltese Islands throughout the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.167  Plague outbreaks around the Mediterranean were 
warning signs and reasons for the quarantine control to be intensified.168 
Some instances, such as the outbreak of plague in Messina in 1743, were exceptionally 
alarming as most of the food consumed in Malta originated in this region.  In this instance the 
number of galleys patrolling the channel between Malta and Sicily were increased.  All coastal 
guards were doubled and a survey of the coastal towers was ordered by the Grandmaster.  The 
system of coastal watchtowers played an important role in controlling the traffic between Sicily 
and Malta, and was under the control of the jurats of the Università of Valletta, Vittoriosa, 
Senglea, and Mdina.169   
The Lazzaretto system operated at no cost to the treasury of the Order, its income and 
expenses being approximately equal.  According to figures from archival sources, during the 
period 1779-1788, the expenditure of the quarantine services was calculated at 12,532 scudi, and 
the income derived from the Lazzaretto was 13,117 scudi.  However, it is important to note that 
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these figures indicate the low cost of the entire operation.  Contemporary figures for naval 
construction and maintenance indicate that the cost of a galley was 17,250 scudi in 1785, while 
the annual net income of the Lazzaretto was about 762 scudi.170 
 Therefore, it is clear that the quarantine services were not providing a financial 
contribution to the Order’s budget.  Nonetheless, the Order invested in these facilities in one of 
their most economically difficult periods in the second half of the eighteenth century.   
Grandmaster De Rohan approved extensive repairs to the Barriera station and ordered the 
construction of additional buildings for the Lazzaretto in 1783.   Similarly, in 1797, after the loss 
of the commanderies in France (1792), the Council authorized the renewal of the quarantine 
barrier at the Barriera Wharf in the Grand Harbor to prevent loiterers from encroaching over the 
quarantine boundaries.171 
 It appears that in the last years of their rule in Malta, the Order made an attempt to 
emphasize Malta’s role as a major quarantine port to serve European ships.  Considering that the 
main threat to the Order’s existence was revolutionary France and the confiscation of their 
territories in that country, it seems likely that this attempt to re-define the function of Malta and 
the Order of Saint John according to the needs and requirements of France was an effort to 
survive.     
According to Saint-Vincent’s figures between 1779 and 1783 the majority of the ships 
undergoing quarantine in the Barriera station and Lazzaretto had French ports as their 
destination or origin.172  In other words, Maltese harbors were increasingly becoming the 
quarantine stations serving French merchantmen.  The fact that the French Knights dominated 
the Order in this period, and that the Knight in charge of the hospital services (the pillar or Grand 
Hospitaller) was always a French Knight, supports this hypothesis.173   After the invasion of 
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Malta by Napoleon in 1798, the new occupants must have agreed with Malta functioning as the 
main quarantine station for Europe, as Napoleon, in one of his earliest decrees, ordered that the 




MALTESE POPULATION DURING THE PERIOD OF 1530-1798 
 
The arrival of the Order of Saint John on 26 October 1530 was an important turning 
point in Maltese history.  It was the first time that Malta’s rulers were based on the island since 
the time of the little-known cultures of the Neolithic period.  Curiously, the local Maltese 
population almost entirely disappears from the historical record in this period, during which the 
emphasis was on the Order of Saint John and its European members who spent only limited time 
on the island.  The fate of the Maltese can be read between the lines, and a general picture can be 
acquired through the obscure references to the ‘locals’.  The following paragraphs are a 
preliminary attempt to shed light on the effects of the Order’s rule on Malta and the Maltese. 
Chapter IX described the first impression of the Order’s inspectors: the Maltese Islands 
lacked foodstuffs, fortifications, and the people necessary for a defensive force.  The Knights 
were almost forced to accept this ‘gift’ from Charles V, with the understanding that they were to 
build the infrastructure they would need, including fortifications, hospitals, palaces, residential 
areas and religious centers.  Fortifications such as Fort Saint Angelo and the landward defenses 
that surrounded Birgu were erected within a few decased of the arrival of the Order to Malta.   
The Order of Saint John was one of the most prosperous religious institutions in Europe, 
especially in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Their investment in Malta created an 
economic vitality on the island and new job opportunities in construction and ancillary 
businesses that provided the food and luxury items to the Knights who resided on the island.  
The Maltese population increased fivefold throughout the Order’s rule, and new trades and 
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industries were developed to meet the financial and material requirements of this population.1  
Trade contacts with the North African coast were renewed and safe-conducts were issued to 
Muslim and Christian merchants.  The major expenditures of the Order were the maintenance of 
the galley squadron, salaries of the office holders, expenses of the quarantine hospital, and the 
construction and maintenance fees for the fortifications.  In addition to the income from 
European estates, the major sources of income for the Knights were prizes taken by the galleys, 
entry fees to the Order, and the ransom and sale of slaves.  The prizes and slaves were sold in 
Maltese markets and constituted the major exchange goods of Malta.  Corsairs were expected to 
bring their prizes to Malta unless the condition of the captured ship dictated its sale in another 
harbor.2    
All of this suggests a generally positive impact on the island, but part of the Maltese 
population, especially the local nobility and the Maltese middle class, deeply resented the 
Order’s rule.  Prior to the arrival of the Knights, this population formed a ‘micro society’ 
enjoying “little money, little prestige, and little power.”3  The grant of the Maltese Islands to the 
Order in 1530 alarmed the inhabitants and the ruling class in particular.  Although rule by the 
Aragonese crown had not always been positive, the Maltese were distinctly concerned about 
what the Order’s rule might bring.  The local governing bodies, the Universitàs, objected 
strongly to the transfer of sovereignty, but in the end they had to settle for an assurance from the 
Order that their traditional rights and powers would be respected.4  The Maltese, therefore, found 
themselves the subjects of a new ruler, the Grandmaster of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem.  
According to the initial agreements the Grandmaster was expected to act with the advice of the 
Council and in accordance with its statutes.  But in his dealings with the Maltese people he was 
not so restricted and the ancient privileges and liberties of the islanders were never to greatly 
restrain his authority.5  The day to day running of the administration remained in the hands of the 
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Universitàs consisting of two to four jurats (giurati), or aldermen assisted by several officials.  
Based on Bezzina’s study the Universitàs in Gozo during the Knights’ period, the major 
responsibilities of this institution were to organize the food shipments from Sicily, arrange the 
sanitary and cleaning services in the town centers, and to administer the schools on the island.6 
Political power was taken away from the Maltese after the establishment of the Order’s 
rule, and their exclusion from the honors of the Order and its political offices, was perceived as 
an offensive act.  Maltese could not become Knights, leaving no room for the Maltese nobility 
and upper class to advance in this new system imposed by the Order.7  The rest of the population 
was illiterate, ignorant and were dominated by the clergy.8  The inquisitor, appointed both to 
extirpate heresy, witchcraft and other crimes, and to act as Papal Nuncio, was always a 
foreigner.9  Similarly, the bishops of Malta came from a number of different nations including 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and Germany.10  In Bonnici’s opinion, based on his extensive 
study of the inquisition documents, “the Maltese resented that their leaders were foreigners who 
showed little inclination to learn their language.”11   
During the Order’s rule the number and size of manufacturing concerns on the islands 
expanded.  The greatest expansion took place in the industries associated with the two spheres of 
military operations: the galley squadron and the defensive structures, most of which were around 
the Grand Harbor area.   
Changing Landscapes and Job Opportunities: Maltese As Construction Workers 
The major negative effect of the Order’s presence in Malta was the fact that the Maltese 
Islands became a more frequent target of hostile action due to the Order’s active participation in 
campaigns against the Muslims and its use of Malta as a corsair base.12  One of the most urgent 
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tasks to be undertaken by the Order upon its arrival in Malta was to reinforce the fortifications, 
but apart from creating jobs fortifications around the Grand Harbor contributed very little to the 
protection of the Maltese population.13  The attackers always choose to assault the least defended 
areas and the unprotected Maltese people of the countryside.14   
The inadequacy of the defenses became apparent after the Ottoman siege of 1565.15  In 
the years following the siege, there was a boost in construction activities, without a doubt, the 
most important addition being the construction of Valletta instigated by the events of 1565.  
Generally speaking, large scale construction activity tended to be sporadic and undertaken only 
in response to impending attack, for example, in 1566, 1635, 1645, 1670, 1715, and 1761.  
During these years, speed was usually all-important and large numbers of workers were needed.  
Most of the labor force was recruited from the local population, but shortage of workers was 
often cited as an impediment to progress.16   
Progressive urbanization of Malta and the concomitant rapid growth of the urban 
population were also accompanied by a general increase in overall population.17  The population 
of Valletta doubled between 1576 and 1632.18  The total population of Malta in 1590 was 
32,290.19  Additionally, there were 3,426 members of the Order in residence in Malta.  The 
number of the Order’s residents in Malta remained constant at around 3,500, slightly increasing 
to 3,648, while the islands’ population increased to 51,750 by 1632.  In other words, while the 
number of the members of the Order increased by six percent, the population of the Maltese 
Islands increased by about 40 percent.  According to Cassar’s figures, the population of the 





Expanding Horizons: Maltese as Boat and Shipbuilders,  
Seaman, Corsairs and Merchants 
When the Order came to Malta, there were simple facilities for repairing vessels in the 
Grand Harbor but not a full-fledged shipyard.  Larger scale repair facilities were constructed by 
about 1540 in Birgu.  In the early years the yard was used only for repair work but after the 
enlargements in 1600 and 1636 the activities there created more job opportunities for the local 
population. 
Even more job opportunities were available on board the galleys and sailing ships of the 
Order.  The highest rank a Maltese man could reach in the Order’s navy was that of assistant 
navigator, or health assistant (i.e., doctor, surgeon).  Pre-eighteenth century records of ships' 
crews are unavailable but there is no doubt that there were Maltese men serving as soldiers on 
board warships based on the payments some Maltese families received for soldiers killed in 
action.21  But in general, Maltese serving on the galleys were part of the buonavoglia.22  There 
were about 200 to 250 of this type of rowers on each galley in addition to the forzati.23  Being 
sentenced to row on the galleys was better than a prison term, as prisoners had to pay for their 
own food at fixed prison prices, while rowers were provided with at least one meal a day.24 
Volunteering to serve on board the Order’s galleys also meant access to a potential 
income as the galley crews were allowed to sell limited amounts of commercial goods in the 
ports they visited.  According to archival accounts the most lucrative business was the sale of 
tobacco, or to sell the allowance to the captain of the galley.25   
Auxiliary vessels that transported munitions, provisions, and equipment for land 
operations supported the warships of the Order.  Such vessels often belonged to Maltese masters 
and were hired for specific cruises.26  At other times, such merchant vessels transported 
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foodstuffs from Sicily and other parts of the Mediterranean.27  The Maltese tartana was the most 
common transport ship, followed by smaller boats called the pinco, the pollacca, the lateen 
rigged brigantine, and the fregata.  The Maltese xprunara was the popular passenger boat that 
plied between Malta, Sicily and Naples especially in the eighteenth century.28 
Corsairing was one of the most important incomes both for the Maltese population and 
for the island’s economy.  According to Cavaliero’s estimates, between 1650 and 1750 about 
half of the able-bodied male population of Malta was at sea –presumably as corsairs– during the 
sailing season.29  Unfortunately there is no detailed information about this aspect of livelihood 
clearly very common among the Maltese.  
The major native industry was the export-oriented cotton trade but the limited cotton 
production, and limited business opportunities on the island led Maltese merchants to invest in 
foreign trade and maritime commerce.30  In addition, because of the Order’s attacks on Muslim 
merchant ships, Maltese ships were often the target of similar attacks from their Barbary 
counterparts.  For this reason Maltese merchant ships often required escorts even for the short 
passage from Sicily to Malta.31  With the decline of the corsair sector and stagnation in the 
Order’s income during the course of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of Maltese 
began to invest in merchant vessels that followed the coasts of western Italy, southern France, 
and eastern Spain all the way to Cadiz, and sometimes Lisbon.32  These voyages were two year 
long tramping cruises with a constantly changing cargo.33  Vassallo surmised that the brigantine 
trade, which involved the exchange of goods purchased in Mediterranean ports outside Malta, 
created an extensive network of retail outlets on the Spanish mainland and provided commercial 
opportunities for the sailors in the harbor towns of Malta and Gozo, whose livelihood 
traditionally depended on corsairing and the Order’s navy.  In the eighteenth century, brigantine 
trade and the ‘cotton trade’ that involved the shipping of Maltese cotton yarn to Barcelona 
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provided both an investment opportunity for “the idle cash generated by centuries of corsairing” 
and an outlet for the Maltese population to adjust their livelihood to the changing political and 
economic conditions by switching from a war-based economy to one based increasingly on 
peaceful pursuits.34 
Hundreds of other Maltese worked in related business sectors such as the warehousing, 
and in the service industry as bakers, tavern workers, shoemakers, barbers, tailors, carpenters, 
and blacksmiths.  Other common professions included fishing and the jobs related to the thriving 
slave market.35 
European Perceptions 
 The only descriptive accounts regarding the living conditions and physical 
characteristics of the Maltese population comes from European travelers.  Although they may be 
unreliable in some cases, they provide interesting information about how the Maltese people 
were viewed by their ‘rulers,’ which, in turn, explains some of their reactions to this ‘rule.’   
 Jean Quintin, secretary to Grandmaster L’Isle Adam, in his Insulae Melitae Descriptio, 
dated 1536, described Maltese peasants as inhabitants of caves or African huts.36  He noted that 
“the women are not at all ugly but live very much as if they were uncivilized; they do not mix 
with other people; they go out covered in a veil, as to see a woman is here the same as to violate 
her.”37  Based on other traveler accounts, it seems that Maltese women continued to wear a veil 
until the end of the eighteenth century.38 
 The Venetian Gianbattista Leoni, visiting Malta some fifty years after the arrival of the 
Order, portrayed all the local inhabitants as gente povera, e rustica assai.39  According to Leoni 
the construction of Valletta had provided the people with jobs, but once the city was completed 
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they had to return to their traditional misery.  He reckoned that there were hardly ten families on 
the island with an annual income of 600 scudi and some 50 families with 200 scudi.  People 
within this income bracket managed to live “with some civility” but the rest spent miserable 
lives, partly due to sterility of the land, and partly due to “their own innate lethargy and 
indolence.”40  This picture of ‘the misery and incredible poverty of the people’ was again 
confirmed by a mid-seventeenth century account, which claimed that without the Order’s 
finances and expenditure the island’s revenues would not have been able to sustain one-fourth of 
its current population.41 
According to a seventeenth-century account the Maltese men were strong, rather dark, 
and well used to hard work.  They were unschooled and their manners were rough.  Most of 
them did not speak any language other than Maltese and, if they did, it was almost always 
Italian.42  In the sources compiled by Mallia-Milanes, Maltese are described as versatile, 
sagacious and pious.  Physically, they were tanned and sturdy.  They could endure hardship and 
live without the least delicacy and thrive on a diet of blended bread, herbs, vegetables, and 
brackish water.43  A letter written in 1624 by Inquisitor Onorato Visconti to Cardinal Bandini 
mentions that Malta swarmed with beggars and the Hospitallers did little to ameliorate the 
situation. Visconti mentioned that the per capita income was about 36 scudi a year.44  According 
to contemporary prices, such income could only have been enough to buy one loaf of bread per 
day, not counting the expenses for clothing and shelter.45   
Another European traveler, Peter Tolstoy, provides a quite different picture in his 
account of 1698.  At the time, he says, the Maltese homes were built of stone and were “fine.”  
Food was abundant, and was not expensive. Streets were never dirty.46  In the eighteenth century 
this image changes further.  Giacomo Capello, a Venetian reporting to the Doge in 1716, 
 
 259
mentioned that several families were well off, their income being derived from renting houses, 
privateering, and the slave trade.47   
Conclusion 
Maltese society under the Order’s rule was similar to European society under the ancien 
régime.  It was likely not the intention of the ruling class to treat the native population badly or 
harshly.  Nonetheless, by the eighteenth century, life in Hospitaller Malta was marked by a huge 
social and economic gap between the young and pervasive Knights who spent their fortunes on 
luxuries and entertainment, and a very poor and uneducated Maltese population who served the 
upper class.   
The Knights almost always considered themselves ‘exiled’ in Malta, and felt the need to 
spend part of the year away from the island.48  The Maltese, on the other hand, resented their 
inability to play a role in the political processes that affected their own lives.   
A political maneuver by the French aimed to take advantage of this subtle discontent.  A 
decree of 1765 by Louis XV mentioned that “the inhabitants of the islands under the Order of 
Malta are to be considered citizens of the Kingdom of France, so that they can settle here, buy 
and sell property, both inter vivos and by testament.”  This is one of the earliest documents to 
mention ‘the Maltese nationals’ without reference to the Order of Saint John.  Certain limitations 
outlined in the text maintain that even though the Maltese are allowed French nationality, they 
still could not become members of the Order of Saint John.  This limitation meant that the 
Maltese people could benefit from being French citizens by trading and conducting business in 
France, where the possibility of social mobility allowed them to rise in status.  This situation 
moved the Maltese people closer to French influences, including the revolution that was to 
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follow shortly.  In fact, in Earle’s words “Malta became for Marseilles what Leghorn was for the 
English and Zante for the Venetians” – an intermediary port for Levantine trade.49  In an 
eighteenth-century historian’s view “Malta, by 1789, was, in reality, a dependency, a colony in 
fact, of France.”50  These late-eighteenth-century developments explain the Maltese 
poplulation’s close bonds with, and interest in, a “regenerated France,” and their concurrence in 







CONCLUSIONS AND AFTERWORD 
 
The maritime history of Malta is essentially the history of major foreign powers 
competing for military and commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean.  The competition in and 
around Malta waned from the sixteenth century onward, but the archipelago played virtually no 
role in either the growth or the resolution of these conflicts.   The inflated importance of the 
islands in modern history is largely an outgrowth of the exaggerated importance attributed to the 
Order of Saint John on the world stage.  Predictably, the majority of the historians studying the 
maritime past of the Maltese Islands are either Maltese or they are modern-day Knights of Saint 
John, and all of them are convinced of Malta’s historical importance.  Thus, the tradition of 
overstating the role played by the Order and its navy in world events is based on the supposition 
that Malta was strategically important throughout history, much as it had been under British rule 
(see section titled ‘afterword’).  This erroneous supposition was supported by concomitantly 
exaggerating the importance of Malta throughout history: in many ways it is an attempt to write 
the Maltese into a history that largely ignores them.  The indigenous Maltese people themselves 
are largely absent from the historical record and are not recognizable as a cohesive group having 
a national identity until the middle of the British rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.    
 The opinions of modern historians that identify Malta as ‘strategically located’ generally 
do so after the end of the prehistoric era.  Prior to the arrival of the Phoenicians in Malta, it is 
difficult to address the possible ‘strategic importance’ of the archipelago considering the limited 
nature of seafaring and paucity of archaeological evidence.  From the Phoenician period onward 
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the strategic importance of the island paralleled developments elsewhere in the Mediterranean, 
placing Malta in varying proximity to major maritime trade routes.  The archipelago experienced 
periods when it held little strategic importance (for example, when Mediterranean trade was 
interrupted) or when trade routes generally bypassed the islands, particularly in the Punic and 
Roman periods.  During these eras, the archipelago was only loosely connected to the rest of the 
Mediterranean world, and subjected to little cultural influence via infrequent visits by ships that 
brought the provisions, exotic items and those blown off course or lost in storms.   
The most striking feature of the Prehistoric, Phoenician and Punic periods in the Maltese 
Archipelago is that the existing cultures appear to have been repeatedly and completely 
assimilated by successive waves of immigrants.  The relatively low population density of the 
islands, and the fact that there were few secure refuges may explain the clear-cut differences 
between the ancient occupation levels and those that came later; the inhabitants could be easily 
influenced or eliminated by the new arrivals.   
In the Roman period, Malta had no strategic importance and was only very loosely 
connected to the Roman system and civilization.  The inclusion of Malta in the empire was of no 
real importance, and it came under Roman dominion without resistance.  Thus, during this 
period, Malta was not subjected to systematic ‘Romanization’ and was left to develop at a very 
slow pace, adopting only a few characteristic Roman cultural, architectural and artistic features 
over many centuries.  The only ‘typically Roman’ remains of Malta are villas with mosaic 
decorations, but there are no indications that administrative buildings or architectural complexes 
so central to the Roman way of life were ever adopted in Malta.  For this reason the assimilation 
of the indigenous culture did not occur during the Roman period of Malta and Punic culture 
continued to dominate the island.   
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Until the introduction of cotton in the medieval period, a recurring enigma in the study 
of Maltese history is the nearly complete absence of any commercial export product that the 
archipelago might have offered in exchange for the foreign goods that appear in archaeological 
contexts.  The Phoenician and Roman periods are characterized by references to the ‘textile 
industry’. But the quantity of such production cannot have been large considering the low 
population density and the fact that the climate and available fresh water sources would not have 
supported the production of the raw materials necessary for a textile industry.   
Another pattern that would re-occur throughout the history of the islands was initiated in 
the Roman period: when connections with a central political authority became tenuous, the 
archipelago was transformed into a pirate and corsair base.  Literary and archaeological evidence 
suggest that Malta’s wealth increased in direct proportion to the increase of locally based 
piratical activity.  The primary reason for this phenomenon is that Malta was unable to become a 
commercial center because it lacked the resources to sustain an export economy or trade goods.  
Similarly, the island never became a major center providing maintenance and warehouse 
services for the commercial vessels because of its considerable distance from the major 
commercial routes, and the absence of shipbuilding material that required the import of raw 
material necessary for repairs.  This in turn made such activities prohibitively expensive and 
economically unviable for potential customers.  However, Malta was close enough to major 
trade routes to be a suitable base from which to launch attacks on merchant shipping.  Increased 
wealth from piracy led to an increase in population, which in turn caused food shortages, as the 
island could not sustain its own population.  From the Roman period onward, Malta became 
dependent on food imports from Sicily, which created an increasing political dependency.  
The Byzantine period was similar to the Roman period; the islands were even more 
tenuously connected to a distant central authority and so preserved previous cultural 
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‘institutions’.  They became impoverished so long as piracy was kept in check by the Byzantine 
navy and except for the accidental arrival of historic figures lost in a storm, there are no literary 
references to Malta in this period.  Overall it is clear that the turbulent events caused by the 
collapse of the Roman Empire and the rise of a variety of competing states to fill the political 
void were hardly, if at all, felt in Malta.     
The Muslim period of Malta was not very different from the Byzantine one.  The culture 
of the island remains basically unchanged, although the spoken language, possibly a Semitic 
tongue in use since the Phoenician era, was quickly replaced by Arabic.  The Muslim occupants 
did not utilize the island as a strategic base from which to launch attacks since Sicily was already 
in Muslim hands by the time Malta became part of the Aghlabid state.  In this period, Muslim 
settlers seem to have arrived as peaceful occupants, mainly involved in farming and agriculture, 
introducing new techniques and crops.  Malta was either unknown to Muslim geographers or 
seen as a place of little or no importance based on the wildly varying location or omission of the 
archipelago in contemporary charts.  It likely continued to be provisioned from Sicily, and may 
have offered a new crop, cotton, in exchange.  
Subsequent control by the Norman and Aragonese Kings of Sicily did not bring new 
settlers to Malta, and their influence on the local culture seems to have been limited to a 
progressive and slow change in customs related to worship.  The most important events of the 
period, such as the crusades, bypassed Malta, causing it to remain relatively isolated from the 
rest of the Mediterranean.  The rise of piracy in the Mediterranean and increasing visits by 
Genoese pirates strengthened the connections of Malta with southern Europe, but there is no 
indication that the native population of the island played a significant role in such activities.  
Piracy did not become an organized way of life, or a primary economic activity in Malta during 
this period.  When the Genoese lost interest in Malta as a pirate base, both piracy and Genoese 
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connections disappeared.  The rule of the Genoese counts was similar to that of the Order of 
Saint John in the way they utilized the islands: both arrived in Malta as cohesive and well-
organized political and military entities with a long history and mission.  The difference is that 
Malta was the only sovereign territory for the Order of Saint John, whereas for the Genoese 
counts it was a temporary base utilized for the specific purpose of launching attacks on merchant 
ships.   
It can be said that, until the arrival of the Order of Saint John, Malta was tenuously 
connected to the rest of the Mediterranean world, including Sicily, Italy and North Africa, by a 
limited maritime commerce that was at times sporadic.  One outcome of this situation was that 
monumental events that swept across Europe and the Mediterranean world like a tidal wave and 
determined the course of the western history and that transformed Mediterranean civilizations, 
economies and culture were only felt as a ripple in Malta.  The collapse of the Roman Empire, 
abatement of east-west communications and commerce fueled by the advent of the Crusades, the 
Italian renaissance and the reformation of Christianity in wake of the Protestant revolt in 
Germany only reached Malta as news at much later dates, the consequences of which were 
hardly observed in the archipelago at the time they occurred.   
When they arrived in Malta in 1530, the Knights of Saint John had already possessed a 
naval branch since the fourteenth century. They also had their own history, traditions, customs, 
and a complex economic system with income sources outside Malta.  We do not know the extent 
to which they interacted with or dominated the cultural life of the islands, since the Maltese 
inhabitants more or less disappeared from history when the islands became the Order’s property. 
From 1530 onward, historical accounts and references to Malta increase considerably as the 
Order of Saint John necessarily advertised its activities to justify its function, and promote its 
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accomplishments to the European powers that provided much-needed political and financial 
support.   
Another way in which the Order’s rule in Malta paralleled that of the Genoese Counts 
was that these aggressive occupants created hostilities by attacking commercial shipping and 
attracting retaliation from their victims, including Christians.  In both cases the victims of the 
corsairs originating from Malta were unguarded merchant ships, and not the naval forces of their 
stated opponent.  The retaliatory attacks targeted the unguarded countryside of Malta, causing 
considerable harm to the unprotected rural population and not to the better-defended and 
fortified harbor areas.  The Order of Saint John, however, did more to protect the islands and 
their populations, mainly because the size, the military power and the damage caused by their 
enemies was far greater in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when compared to the 
thirteenth century, and required serious defensive measures.  The first set of defensive measures 
was the erection of fortifications in the Grand Harbor area, creating jobs for the Maltese 
population, and possibly transforming the demographic patterns of the island.  But the most 
important defense of the Order was its naval forces that would ideally eliminate the enemy 
before they reached the island. This type of activity also provided employment for Maltese men, 
who, being disqualified from becoming Knights, could not be in command positions, but could 
be employed as lesser officers or rowers.  In addition to the emergence of additional sources of 
income, the emergence of piracy led to a considerable increase in population and, thus, increased 
dependence on imported food.  The Order’s economic organization, with dependence on outside 
sources of food and shipbuilding materials, was well suited to the preexisting import-oriented 
subsistence pattern of Malta.   
For the period of 1530-1798 it is not possible to speak of isolation.  But the Order of 
Saint John itself was in truth an ‘ancient’ and increasingly isolated political entity, perceived as 
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an anachronism by the European countries of the Renaissance and Age of Enlightenment.  It is 
interesting to note that the major intellectual, artistic and ideological developments of this period 
did not reach Malta at all.  The random visitor ending up in Malta due to the storm tossed Ionian 
Sea rarely occurred in this period, or at least it was not noted in records.  Due to the 
developments in navigation techniques and mapmaking everyone knew where exactly Malta was 
and, for the most part, they tried to avoid it.  The Order’s main activity was to pursue a ‘guerre 
de course’ against their enemy: Muslims and their trading partners such as the maritime 
republics of Italy, the foremost example being Venice.  The general reaction to the Knights’ 
corsairing activities was in the form of complaints by fellow Christian countries.  On the other 
hand the Muslims – the Barbary regencies and the Ottoman Empire – did not take direct 
retaliatory action against Malta, but punished the resident Christian merchants in their territories 
for the actions of the Knights, completely disregarding the absence of any connection between 
the two except for their common religion.   The attack of the Ottoman empire on Malta in 1565 
was motivated by a desire to acquire a base closer to the shores of Europe, through which to 
launch attacks, and not a punitive action directly against the Order.     
Throughout their tenure in Malta, the Order of Saint John maintained that its mission 
was to protect the Christian countries of Europe against Muslim expansion.  The main weapon of 
the Order to fulfill this function was a small navy dedicated to attacking Muslim merchant 
shipping and to take part in larger Christian coalition fleets when warranted.  The squadron that 
the Order maintained for these purposes was surprisingly small, consisting of five galleys for 
most of the first century of its existence in Malta. In the last three quarters of the seventeenth 
century this number increased to six, and for the majority of the eighteenth century, there were 
four galleys in total. 
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The maintenance of the Order’s force required the establishment of strong connections 
with Europe to acquire shipbuilding material, ships, and new developments in shipbuilding 
technologies. The knights were not shipbuilders, and they employed shipwrights from Europe, 
who, in turn, trained Maltese builders.  Nonetheless, the majority of the Order’s ships were built 
outside Malta.  The small scale of shipbuilding activities in the Maltese arsenal can be better 
shown if we compare this number with construction activities at other European arsenals.  For 
example, between the mid seventeenth and the mid eighteenth centuries the arsenal in Malta 
produced nine galleys, corresponding to only six percent of the galleys built in French yards 
during the same time. Eighty-five percent of the Order’s galleys were built outside Malta.  A 
total of thirty galleys were built in Malta during the Order’s rule, and it is likely that some of 
these were purchased in a pre-fabricated form from the Venetian arsenal.  Yet, by the end of the 
sixteenth century, about sixty-four percent of the total budget was spent on the navy, including 
costs such as the maintenance of existing vessels and officer’s salaries.    
The requirements of keeping up with the advancing technologies compelled the Order to 
develop a squadron of sailing warships in the eighteenth century.  A squadron of four sailing 
ships was added to the shrinking galley squadron.  Twenty sailing warships were constructed 
during the eighteenth century, the majority being built in European arsenals.  The justification 
for the construction of the sailing warship squadron was the need to match the forces of the 
enemy, the Barbary Regencies, who adopted sailing technology shortly before the Knights.  But 
a closer look at the history of the Order of Saint John shows that Malta was increasingly being 
transformed into an international Christian naval school in this period, providing theoretical and 
practical training to the aspiring Knights who wished to pursue a career in the navies of their 
respective home countries.  Increasing French influence in the Order during this period also 
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explains the interest of France in developing Malta as a base that would support naval and 
commercial dominance in the Mediterranean.  
Transforming their squadron and base in Malta into a naval training school was but one 
of the additional missions assumed by the Order of Saint John in the late eighteenth century as 
its increasingly weakened Muslim foe ceased to be a major threat to Europe.  Another new 
function that the Grandmasters of the late eighteenth century advertised was the services 
provided by the quarantine center of Malta as the gatekeeper and gateway to Europe, keeping the 
danger of plague under control.  
Despite these efforts, the end of the sovereign state of the Order of Saint John arrived 
before the transformation could be completed.  With the confiscation of their estates in France, 
the Knights found themselves unable to support their members, the population of Malta, and 
meet their expenses.  Closer relations with France hastened the influence of the French 
revolution in reaching the Maltese population, who, in turn, did not resist the Order’s expulsion 
from Malta by Napoleon in 1798.   
As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, the major objective in studying 
Maltese maritime history was to answer certain questions raised during the archaeological 
underwater surveys conducted around the archipelago between 1999 and 2001.  The major 
outcome of the survey was a realization of the scarcity of underwater archaeological material 
around these islands.  It is possible that the shipwrecks are covered with silt, sand or poseidonia 
grass.  Underwater archaeological sites could have been cleared out by treasure hunters, amateur 
divers or salvage companies.  It is also likely that some shipwrecks lie in deep water beyond safe 
diving limits and were inaccessible with the equipment available for this archaeological survey.  
These reasons may account for the general lack of shipwrecks, but we must also consider the 
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strong possibility that throughout history there was much less seafaring activity around the 
archipelago than modern historians have presumed. 
Historical research was undertaken to make a decision regarding the continuation of the 
survey project and the selection the future survey areas.  After one year of extensive historical 
research and studying the results of the survey project, I feel that I reached the point where I was 
able to develop an objective view about the maritime history of Malta.   
In summary, I believe that the naval and commercial role of the Maltese Islands has been 
exaggerated in the historical record, and that the islands played a much less important role in 
Mediterranean communications throughout their history.  The paucity of underwater 
archaeological material around the archipelago is in complete agreement with the results of my 
historical study and clearly demonstrates that the maritime activity was much more limited than 
we all thought.   
The maritime entities based in Malta always carried out their activities elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean.  Corsairs attacked ships in the areas with extensive trade and even when they 
caused harm to their foes, or lost their own ships, the event happened far from Malta.  Thus, 
there is not a single reference to the occurrence of a shipwreck in Maltese waters in the historical 
record.  Based on these results, I have decided to postpone the continuation of the survey project 
until cheaper, faster, and more efficient technologies to survey deeper water and silted areas 




The following is a brief outline of Maltese history in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  The last two hundred years of Maltese maritime history are not included in the study 
of the topic since, the fall of the Order of the Knights of Saint John provided a logical point at 
which to conclude for several reasons.  It was immediately following the fall of the Order that 
the archipelago first came under the absolute control of an external, fully developed, nation state.  
France ruled Malta for only a brief period until the British assumed power in 1800 for all of the 
nineteenth and most of the twentieth century.  It was during this time that Malta entered the 
modern age, ushered in by the British. Unlike the preceding millennia, during this period Malta 
actually attained significant strategic and commercial importance as the only central 
Mediterranean outpost of the British Empire and Navy.  This is also the first time that the 
Maltese themselves figure largely in the history of the islands and assume a national character.  
Perhaps this character existed for centuries leading up to the British occupation, but the history 
of the island’s indigenous peoples is largely unwritten until the nineteenth century.  It was under 
British rule that the institutions necessary for self-government developed and were nurtured, 
culminating in the independence of Malta in 1974.   
The events of the period following the collapse of the Order of the Knights of Saint John 
in Malta did not bring freedom to the Maltese people.  The French instituted a series of reforms 
according to their revolutionary principles, abolishing slavery and the nobility and establishing a 
newspaper.  But the French troops also took possession of the Knights’ belongings and 
properties in Malta and introduced new taxes, creating an extra burden for the Maltese 
population.  The defeat of Napoleon at Aboukir Bay, coupled with increased looting practiced by 
the occupying French troops that extended to the churches of Malta, fomented a rebellion in 
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collusion with the British military.  After a drawn-out siege that lasted for nearly two years, the 
French were defeated and the British flag was raised in Valletta on September 5, 1800.  
The first British Governor of Malta arrived in 1813.  English rule was characterized by a 
harsh administration from the outset, but ultimately without changing the major aspects of daily 
life.  The Maltese were still excluded from the decision-making mechanisms of government 
while the British garrison increased in number.  The establishment of the first British admiralty 
dry dock in 1848 and the subsequent growth of the Grand Harbor as a major base for the Royal 
Navy were the most important events of the nineteenth century.  However, the most significant 
development to increase the military and strategic importance of Malta for the British 
Government was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, placing the archipelago on the route to 
India.  After this date, Malta became the headquarters of the British Mediterranean fleet and the 
islands were largely developed by the occupants with the addition of new defensive works, 
towers, military hospitals, and improvements to the harbors and dockyard. The Maltese 
population found employment once again in the service sector in the establishments created by 
the British to support their naval presence.  The population of the island increased to 200,000, 
causing the migration and dispersion of Malta’s excess population to other Mediterranean 
countries.  Those who remained in Malta were finally represented in the administration of the 
islands in 1835, albeit indirectly, with the establishment of the “seven man council” that had 
three assigned Maltese members.  The council’s function was to advise the governor, who was 
by no means obliged to heed its advice.   
A second dry dock was built in French Creek in 1871.  The Royal Navy expanded the 
Order’s old shipyard and further developed their facilities in Dockyard Creek, providing most of 
the employment opportunities for the growing population of the archipelago.  Complete 
dependency on the British presence made it difficult for the indigenous population to demand 
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more local representation in the government.  However, in 1887 the Maltese were granted the 
right to be represented in a council of twenty, that had the majority of its members ‘elected’ as 
opposed to ‘assigned’.  Yet, even this council was only allowed to make minor decisions about 
local issues, and the full power of government was reserved for the Crown and to its 
representative in Malta, the governor.   
Disagreements regarding whether English or Italian was to be the foreign language 
taught in Maltese schools brought an end to the council when they refused to vote on the 
education budget in 1903.  As a consequence, the council was disbanded and a new council with 
assigned members took over, eliminating any system of self-representation until 1921.     
Since the continued employment of the ever-increasing population depended on the 
expansion of harbor services, periods during which the British re-directed expenditures to the 
home fleet were exceptionally hard for the population of Malta, particularly in the era before 
World War I.  The years after the war were marked by riots that broke out as a consequence of 
augmented unemployment and political unrest that targeted the British for the lack of jobs and 
resources.  On June 7, 1919 four Maltese were killed when British troops opened fire on a 
rebellious crowd; the popular reaction to this event brought about the establishment of a new 
constitution that granted to the Maltese self-government in matters of local concern.  However, 
growing disputes between the pro-English and pro-Italian council members caused the 
suspension of the constitution and disbanding of the council in 1930.  Malta did not regain self-
government until 1947.  
Italian aircraft bombed the Maltese Islands on June 11, 1940, the day Italy entered 
World War II.  Malta’s role during the early years of World War II was extremely important.  




losses in materiel and personnel; in fact, most of Malta was completely leveled.  At the same 
time British aircraft based on Malta were able to disrupt the supply lines between Italy and the 
Axis forces in North Africa, leading, in part, to the victory of the allied forces in the 
Mediterranean, and ultimate victory in World War II.  The defeat of the Axis forces in Africa 
and Sicily in 1943 marked the end of major hostilities in the Central Mediterranean region.  
Emerging unemployment and housing problems after the end of World War II led many Maltese 
to migrate to Australia and North America.  
The constitution of 1921 was re-established in 1947 and a council of twenty was elected 
locally.  Once again, the administration of this council was limited to internal matters, while the 
British Crown and Governor reserved the right to decide ‘the matters of imperial concern’.  After 
years of political struggle that caused the governor to disband the council on many occasions, 
differences were settled and on September 21, 1964 Malta became an independent state within 
the British Commonwealth.  A Governor General in the archipelago represented the Queen and 
an agreement between the newly independent Maltese government and the British Crown was 
reached to keep British troops in Malta as part of a “mutual defense agreement.”   
The latter half of the twentieth century was characterized by the progressive 
diversification of the Maltese economy, leading to its decreased dependence on British military 
bases for employment.  This was realized to a large extent with British and NATO support.  
Finally, in 1974, Malta became a republic with a Maltese president as Head of the State and, in 
1979, the military base agreement with Britain was terminated.  In 1981 Malta deposited a 
Declaration of Neutrality with the United Nations, signaling the emergence of a truly 







Notes to Chapter I 
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Nautical Archaeology (INA) and The Museums Department, National Museum of Archaeology 
in Valletta (NMA). 
2 The absence of archaeological material in these harbors and others may be the result of regular 
dredging since the seventeenth century.  But the dredge never comes close to the banks.  In 
Malta, cultural material in these sections is unusually scarce.  
3 The Quarantine Hospital, in front of which we were excavating, was in use in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  See Chapter II for detailed information about the excavation. 
4 See Appendix A.  
5 The shipwreck sites in Parker’s book are all based on a map made by a diver in the 1960s.  I 
personally dived in all these locations and there are no shipwrecks in any of them except for 
Meliehha Bay, and the shallow scatter at the Xlendi Bay: Anthony J. Parker, Ancient Shipwrecks 
of the Mediterranean & the Roman Provinces, BAR International Series 580 (Oxford, 1992).  
6 On the other hand, there were corsair ships owned, commanded, and manned by the Maltese 
during the same period (see Chapter XI, section titled Corsair Operations). 
7 See Chapter XI, the first section titled Naval Expeditions.  
8 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII.  For the history mentioned here see 
Commendatore Fra. Gian. Francesco Abela, Della descrittione di Malta isola nel mare Siciliano 
con le sue antichita, ed alter notizie (1647; repr. Malta, 1984). 
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22 Evans, The Prehistoric Antiquities, p. 227. 
23 Claudia Sagona, “Silo or Vat? Observations on the Ancient Textile industry in Malta and 
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of Malta.  Large agglomeration of tombs suggest the existence of rural settlements at Zejtun, 
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analysis, see David H. Trump, Skorba and the Prehistory of Malta (London 1966) p. 51.  About 
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29 One has to admit that the Greek colonies such as Zankle and Rhegion were positioned to 
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concentrate on how the currents affect the navigation in the central Mediterranean region in 
particular.  Maria Eugenia Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 133-67.  
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31 Localized winds that blow from the south at the end of the summer (generally around late 
August and early September), which might help the ships in their journey to Sicily.  These winds 
blow from the African coast, and bring very hot desert weather, and sometimes sand.  
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Anthony Bonanno, “The Tradition of an Ancient Greek Colony in Malta,” Hyphen 4.1 (1983), 1-
17.  Also, see Vidal González, La isla de Malta, p. 114.  Sometimes this incorrect information 
(of Malta being a Greek colony) is repeated in recent works with references to these early 
publications. Stefan Goodwin, Malta. Mediterranean Bridge (London, 2002), p. 5. 
41 Himera was a colony founded by the Zankleans and Selinus was established by the Megaran 
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Carthaginian Empire,” in The Phoenicians, ed. Sabatino Moscati (Milan, 1988), p. 57.  
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Antique (Paris, 1977), 65-66; Anthony Bonanno, “Malta's Changing Role in Mediterranean 
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the second Punic wars) shows that the islands were insufficiently defended: Ciasca, “Malta,” pp. 
73-74. 
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hills at the middle of the islands, as far away from the sea as possible.  They both are on the 
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during the Roman attacks.  A.A. Caruana, Report on the Phoenician and Roman Antiquities in 
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74.  For piracy in the Tyrrhenian that might have effected the south of Sicily as well see Gras, 
Trafics Tyrrhéniens, pp. 514-22. 
47 As opposed to a shipping line that goes through Carthage or Motya.  Based on his study of 
excavation reports from these sites, Vidal González suggests that “… there is nothing of 
Carthaginian and Motyan production, but all is from Eastern origin.”  For a list of references to 
the excavation reports, see Vidal González, La isla de Malta, p. 96.  For the archaeological 
evidence of a direct eastern connection see Moscati, “Some Reflections on Malta,” pp. 286-90; 
Ciasca, “Malta,” p. 72. 
48 Moscati mentions that “… on the contrary, there do not seem to be specific connections with 
Carthage nor with Punic Sicily.”  Moscati, “Some Reflections on Malta,” pp. 288-89.  Opposing 
this view, Gras mentions that Malta was ‘attached’ to Sicily since the Bronze Age and remained 
in this status during the seventh century B.C.  Thus, most Phoenician artifacts found in Malta 
actually came through Sicily. Gras, Trafics Tyrrhéniens, p. 300-304.  Gonzales thinks that the 
Maltese Islands always traded with Sicily but at the Phoenician period numerous oriental 
influences (architectural elements in the Tas-Silg temple, as well as ceramics of this period) 
started to infiltrate the culture directly from the east.  According to Vidal González, these are 
evidences of direct contact between Malta and the Levantine coast: Vidal González, La isla de 
Malta, p. 96. 
49 Ciasca, “Malta,” p. 74-75.  Ivory plaque of the last quarter of the sixth century B.C. found in 
Ras il-Raheb establishes the existence of the contacts with the Etruscan world.  However, it 
should be kept in mind that this could be a prestige item kept in a family over time or an item 
brought to Malta by pirates.  Vidal González, La isla de Malta, p. 97. 
50 Archaeological discoveries of ceramics of Syro-Palestinian, Greek, Rhodian, Cypriot or north-
African origin in Maltese contexts suggests that a certain amount of trade took place in this 
period.  Evidence of trade links and resulting cultural contacts, either directly with cities, the 
Eastern Mediterranean or along the Carthage-Sicily axis, is strongly supported by the presence of 
such items as protocorinthian and Rhodian wares, a Cypro-Phoenician torch holder, numerous 
metal objects, amulets as well as amphorae emanating from different Mediterranean sources.  
Conversely, examples of some of the more distinctive items from Phoenician-Punic Malta, such 
as the ovoid neckless amphora, small ceramic vessels richly decorated with typical reddish 
bands, branches of flowers, lamps as well as cinerary urns have been discovered at such 
locations as Carthage, Lilybaeum, Motya, Camarina, Cagliari, and Ibiza (in a third century 
context): Pace, “Phoenician-Punic Malta,” p. 105. 
51 Gonzales mentions that another issue suggested (in theory but based on the archaeological 
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THE AMPHORA SCATTER  
OFF THE ENTRANCE TO XLENDI BAY, GOZO 
 
 The entrance to the Xlendi Bay is obstructed by two shallow reefs and a very uneven 
coastal wind pattern that makes both anchorage and sailing difficult in this area.  For this reason, 
ships abandoned anchors and jettisoned cargo to avoid wrecking.  It seems that the amphoras and 
anchors around the reefs were all recovered by amateur divers in the 1960s.  Some of these 
amphoras were brought to the archaeological museum in Gozo by divers from the British Navy 
who recovered this material from 20 meters of depth at the mouth of the Xlendi Bay.  Interviews 
with the diving schools in Gozo suggest that further material was collected by divers in the last 
decades to clear all the remains in the areas up to a depth of 70 meters.  Most of this material is 
likely in private homes and collections in Gozo and Malta, unless they were smuggled out of the 
country.   
Our team begun to survey this area in 2000 to explore the seabed beyond standard 
SCUBA diving limits.  The use of mixed gases for SCUBA diving is prohibited in Malta.  Thus, 
we were led to believe that any material beyond 70 meters would be untouched.  The side scan 
sonar available for the 2000 season allowed us to explore the area up to a depth of 100 meters.  
Data collected during this survey provided further proof that the archaeological scatters 
continued in the 70-100 meters range, even though the distribution of possible targets did not 
immediately signal a typical shipwreck site.   
Still, the targets identified during the 2000 survey required further surveying using 
equipment capable of reaching this depth.  A Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV)provided by the 
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Norwegian Institute of Technology (University of Trondheim) with a depth rating of 1,000 
meters was brought to this area to accomplish this task in 2001.  After only a few minutes of 
searching we detected a concentration of archaeological material, best described as an amphora 
field, rather than a pile.  The field of scatter extends for about 400 meters and it is about 100 
meters wide, and is at a depth of about 100-120 meters.  The scatter is about three kilometers 
from the closest shore and is five to six kilometers off the entrance to Xlendi Bay.  The amphora 
scatter is surrounded by a flat, featureless sand bottom for kilometers before reaching the 
shallow area – about 70 meters deep – where broken amphora fragments reappear.   
It is difficult to determine the significance of this scatter and to determine whether or not 
it represents a shipwreck.  As discussed below in detail, there are several different amphora types 
in Xlendi, and their dates range from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D.  It is 
likely that the dangerous entrance to the bay caused many ships to sink in this area throughout 
history, but most ships might have capsized rather than sank.  Subsequent disturbance of the 




Fig. A.1. Main amphora types represented at the Xlendi site.  
 
We were able to identify seven different amphora types represented on the Xlendi site 
(Fig. A.1, Table A.1).  One of the major hurdles to overcome was the difficulty of acquiring 
precise dates for the amphoras, since the equipment and the time available in 2001 allowed for 
the retrieval of only one archaeological sample (Type 1 in Fig. A.1).  According to Torres’ 
typologies, this particular ovoid Punic amphora dates to the third century B.C., and is likely to be 
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the product of a workshop in western Sicily or in the vicinity of Carthage.1  An example of a 
Type 1 amphora was selected for recovery because the majority of the amphoras on the scatter 
field are of this type.  This type is classified as Roman type 2212 in Gonzalez’s typology, and 
has a very wide distribution pattern in the Mediterranean, having been found at sites on the 
Atlantic coast of Spain, the Balearic Islands, near Carthage, and in Punic tombs on Malta.2  
TABLE A.1. 
Amphora parallels for the types represented at Xlendi site 
Type Bibliographical info Page and table # Typology Date 
Joan Ramon Torres, Las ánforas fenicio-
púnicas del Mediterráneo central y occidental 
(Barcelona, 1995) 
Lamina IV no. 117 
Figure 156 no.117 




Third century B.C. 
(Before 250 B.C.) 
 
Type 1 
 Pablo Vidal González, La isla de Malta en 
época fenicia y púnica, BAR International 
Series 653 (Oxford, 1996) 
 
P. 84  
 
Roman Type 
2212 Third century B.C. 
  Keay LXIb Fifth century A.D. 
Type 2 Miguel Beltran Lloris, Las anforas romanas 
en España, 2 vols. (Zaragoza 1970) 
Vol. 2, p. 534, fig. 
216 Beltran 60 Fifth century A.D. 
Martin Sciallano and Patricia Sibella, 
Amphores comment les identifier (Aix-en-
Provence, 1994) 
 Mana C 2c 110-80 B.C. 
D.P. Susan Peacock and David Franklyn 
Williams, Amphorae and the Roman Economy 
(London, 1986) 
pp. 151-152 
Class 32 “Neo 
Punic”; 
Mana Type C 
Form 3 
Late third century 
B.C. – first century 
A.D. 
Víctor M Guerrero Ayuso and  Blanca Roldán 
Bernal, Cátalogo de las ánforas prerromanas 
(Cartagena, 1992) 
 Mana C ½ Third century B.C. 
Joan Ramon Torres, Las ánforas fenicio-
púnicas del Mediterráneo central y occidental 
(Barcelona, 1995) 
205-205 
Lamina IX 210 
T-7.2.1.1. Late third early second B.C. 
Anna Maria Bisi,  pp. 394-396 Tripoli Third century B.C. 
Type 3 
Alessandra Caravale and Isabella Toffoletti, 
Anfore antiche: conoscerle e identificarle 
(Formello, 1997) 
p. 58 Mana C Fourth- second century B.C. 
Type 4 Alessandra Caravale and Isabella Toffoletti, p. 84 MGS II Fifth-fourth 
                                                 
1 Joan Ramon Torres, Las ánforas fenicio-púnicas del Mediterráneo central y occidental (Barcelona, 
1995), type T-3.2.1.2.   
2 Pablo Vidal González, La isla de Malta en época fenicia y púnica, BAR International Series 653 
(Oxford, 1996), p. 84. 
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  Dressel 20  
Miguel Beltrán Lloris, Las ánforas romanas 
en España (Zaragoza, 1970) 471 and 482 
Form V 
(phase II) First century A.D. Type 5 
Martin Sciallano and Patricia Sibella, 
Amphores comment les identifier (Aix-en-
Provence, 1994) 
  First-third century A.D. 
Type 6 Miguel Beltrán Lloris, Las ánforas romanas en España (Zaragoza, 1970) 
pp. 498 no 4 & p. 
500 Type 7 First century A.D. 
 
Another less common amphora type (Type 3) identified through examination of the 
ROV tapes from the Xlendi site is a form 3 of the Maná C type also dating to the same period as 
Type 1 (late third-second century B.C.).  It is likely that this Punic type was produced in 
Tripolitania or in western Sicily.  It is found in archaeological contexts in Spain, the Balearic 
Islands, Sardinia, Corsica, sites on the southern coast of modern France, on the Italian peninsula, 
and in Tunisia.3  Amphora type 4, with numerous examples on the site, is likely to be a product 
of Sicily between the fifth and the fourth centuries B.C.4  However, it is important to note that 
the visual examinations of the ROV tapes may be misleading, and Type 4’s neck might have a 
slightly different form closer to Will’s Type 1d, which dates to 180-150 B.C., a common form 
seen widely around the Mediterranean.5  In another publication, Will catalogued a similar 
amphora under type e, in her typology.  Will’s type e is a wine amphora common from the first 
                                                 
3 Martin Sciallano and Patricia Sibella, Amphores comment les identifier (Aix-en-Provence, 1994), type 
Mana C2c; D.P. Susan Peacock and David Franklyn Williams, Amphorae and the Roman Economy 
(London, 1986), type Mana C Form 3; Víctor M. Guerrero Ayuso and  Blanca Roldán Bernal, Cátalogo de 
las ánforas prerromanas (Cartagena, 1992), type Mana C1/2; Torres, Las ánforas, type T-7.2.1.1; 
Alessandra Caravale and Isabella Toffoletti, Anfore antiche: conoscerle e identificarle (Formello, 1997), 
Mana C; Elizabeth Lyding Will, (personal communication – 2002), second century A.D.   
4 Caravale and Toffoletti, Anfore antiche, type MGS II. 
5 Elizabeth Lyding Will, “The Roman Amphoras,” in Anna Marguerite McCann, Joanne Bourgeois, Elaine 
K Gazda, John Peter Oleson and Elizabeth Lyding Will, The Roman Port and Fishery of Cosa: A Center 
of Ancient Trade (Princeton, N.J., 1987), pp. 171-223. 
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half of the second century B.C. to the last half of the first century A.D., seen in contexts from 
Spain and France to central Italy, the Lipari Islands, Algeria, Carthage and the Aegean area.6  
There is no doubt that Type 5 is a typical example of Dressel’s Form 20.  Dressel 20 was a 
transport container for olive oil used as early as the second quarter of the first century A.D. and 
as late as the fourth century A.D.7  The nature of our visual data does not allow us to see the 
stamps or inscriptions on the examples from the Xlendi site; therefore, it is not possible to 
determine the precise dating of this amphora type, for which detailed chronologies have been 
published.8 
The other types of Xlendi amphoras are more problematic.  The fact that we cannot 
closely inspect the original artifacts, except for the sample Type 1, means that the dating has to 
rely on somewhat fuzzy video images captured by the ROV, making it difficult to precisely date 
the site.  Amphora typologies and dating may change drastically depending on small details that 
are impossible to identify unless the original artifact is accessible.  However, it seems plausible 
that a number of types are more recent than the ones described above.  Types 6 and 7 may date 
to the first or second century A.D.  Type 6 bears similarities to Will’s Type 18a that dates to the 
late first to late second century A.D.9  There are at least three other types seen in quantity on the 
site, unfortunately with no parallels in known typologies.  They may either be local product of a 
workshop yet to be discovered, or they may have signs or details to help with their identification 
once raised in future seasons.  At least two cooking pots and one pitcher were also observed, but 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth Lyding Will, “Greco-Italic Amphoras,” Hesperia 51.3 (1982), 355. 
7 Will, “The Roman Amphoras,” p. 211. 
8 Emilio Rodríguez Almeida, Il Monte Testaccio: ambiente, storia, materiali (Rome, 1984), pp. 151-233. 
9 Will, “The Roman Amphoras,” p. 210. 
 
 381
video images of these artifacts did not allow identification or dating (Fig. 9 in Chapter II). In 
either case, it is certain that it will be difficult to determine the nature of the site in its entirety 
before a detailed site map is produced and other archaeological samples are brought to the 
museum for study and analysis.  However, it is important to note that this site is the first 
shipwreck site of such extent ever discovered in Malta.  The importance of the study of the 
material lies in the insights it can provide into the history of Malta, specifically the dynamics of 
trade in the central Mediterranean during the time of the Punic Wars.  
Recommendations for Future Work in Xlendi 
A detailed archaeological study of the Xlendi site is necessary before we can confidently 
interpret its significance in Gozo and Malta’s history during the Punic and Roman periods.  
Because the seabed is not completely flat in this area, a multi-beam sonar survey is required to 
determine the extent of the site and to map the seafloor.  Acoustic images produced by a multi-
beam sonar could be geographically positioned and processed to create a three-dimensional 
rendering of the site.  Next, a sub-bottom profiler should be employed to determine the extent of 
the material below the seafloor.  Simultaneously, the ROV could collect video footage required 
to produce a detailed photo-mosaic of the site to be superimposed on the multi-beam map.  Once 
a detailed map of the site, with the amphora types indicated, is available, it will be possible to 
determine the concentration of contemporaneous amphoras and ceramic types, to determine the 
nature of the site in general.  It is also essential to raise at least one representative example of 




GRAN CARRACA DI RODI IN HISTORY AND ICONOGRAPHY 
 
Description of the Textual Evidence Regarding the Carracks of the Order of Saint John 
 A number of historical documents from the sixteenth century and several paintings of 
later dates indicate that the Order of Saint John had at least two carracks around the time they 
lost their base in Rhodes, and migrated to Malta.  The historic events of this period are discussed 
in detail in Chapter IX, and the importance of the period between 1523 and 1530 lies in the fact 
that the Order almost did not survive the loss of Rhodes.  For this reason, both the heroic defense 
of Rhodes, the difficult years during which the Order struggled for survival and the arrival of this 
first group to Malta are events of great historical importance for Hospitaller chroniclers.  The 
large barges and the carracks were loaded with the people and goods of the Order after their 
expulsion from Rhodes.  Because of the length of this journey, these ships acquired a certain 
symbolic importance and survived in iconography and historiography for several centuries, 
representing not only the hardships experienced by the Knights during these years, but also the 
endurance displayed by these warriors that contributed to survival of the Order.  
Contemporary accounts of these events were provided by Giacomo Bosio, the historian 
and the agent of the Order of Saint John in the Roman Court at the time.  Bosio was personally 
involved in the events and his accounts constitute the major source of information regarding the 
sailing ships employed by the Order of Saint John during the decades before and after the 
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journey from Rhodes to Malta.1   There are a few other primary sources that are not 
contemporary with the events, such as “the history of the grand priors and the priory of Saint 
Gilles,” written by the archivist of the priory, M. Jean Raybaud in the second decade of the 
eighteenth century.2  Another historical account by Abbé de Vertot also includes a few indirect 
references to the ships.3   
Textual evidence regarding the large sailing ships of the fleet can be grouped under four 
categories: (1) information concerning the large sailing ships in general without reference to 
specific vessel types, (2) information concerning the carracks without details concerning the 
specific features of the ship, (3) information concerning the carrack Santa Maria, and, (3) 
information about the carrack Sant’ Anna.   
Sailing Ships of the Order and the Carracks 
Raybaud mentions that Brother Jacques Sarriet, the commander of the ships and the 
captain of the Grand Carrack, was in the port of Aiguesmortes in 1487 loading various 
merchandise onboard the ship, presumably, to be shipped to Rhodes.4  Unfortunately, the name 
of the ship was not specified in this particular account.  Bosio’s earliest reference to the Gran 
                                                 
1 This three-volume history of the Order of Saint John was written between 1594-1602.  Iacomo Bosio, 
Histoire des Chevaliers de L’Ordre de S. Iean de Hierusalem (Paris, 1643).  
2 It is a two volumes work and the first volume covers the history of the Hospitaller Order of Saint Jean of 
Jerusalem from its origins to the middle of the fifteenth century.  The first volume includes the history of 
52 grand priors of Saint Gilles, beginning with brother Durand in 1101 and ending with brother Jean 
Romieu de Cavaillon in 1449.  The second volume begins with the history of brother Raimond Richard 
who became in charge in 19 October 1449 and covers 41 grand priors including that of brother Joseph-
Francois de Piolenc in 1751.  Jean François Raybaud, Histoire des Grand Prieurs et du prieure de Saint 
Gilles (Nimes, 1905), pp. 3-4.   
3 Abbé de Vertot, Histoire des chevaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, appelés depuis chevaliers de 
Rhodes, et aujourd’hui chevaliers de Malte (Paris, 1778). 
4 Raybaud, Histoire des Grand Prieurs, p. 35.  
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Nave di Rodi dates to 1498.5  In this passage, the ship is mentioned as part of the preparations for 
an attack against the Ottomans, which was delayed until 1501.  Gran nave possibly served as a 
transport vessel in this expedition as the galleys formed the main fighting force and the 
Grandmaster left Rhodes on his Capitana – a galley.   
The second reference to the “carrack of Rhodes” mentions its capture of a ship described 
as the ‘gran nave’ and named Magrebina in 1507.6  Brockman mentions that the carrack that 
captured Magrebina is the oldest on record and is named St. John Baptist7, or San Giovanni 
Battista.8  The Magrebina issue is complicated because we have no primary evidence about 
Magrebina being re-named.  Curiously, the general belief among the modern historians is that 
Magrebina must have been re-named Santa Maria.9  The major reason for this speculation is the 
absence of references to the construction of Santa Maria.  Therefore, because Magrebina’s 
capture and Santa Maria’s launching dates roughly correspond it has been assumed that they are 
the same ship.     
 
 
                                                 
5 Bosio, Histoire des Chevaliers  
6 Joseph Muscat, The Carrack of the Order (Malta, 2000), p.10.  
7 Brockman also mentions that Magrebina was a carrack and he states that it was re-named as Santa 
Maria.  As usual, Brockman does not give any references as to the source of this information Eric 
Brockman, Last Bastion  (London, 1961), p. 165. 
8 Muscat, The Carrack, p. 10.  
9 Muscat, The Carrack, p. 10.  Petiet also mentions that the Santa Maria was captured from the Egyptians 
in 1507 and the ship was first re-named as Notre-Dame and than as Santa Maria. As usual Petiet does not 
provide any references as to the source of this information. Claude Petiet, L’Ordre de Malte face aux 
Turcs (Paris, 1996), p. 68; Joseph M. Wismayer, The Fleet of the Order of Saint John 1530-1798 (Malta, 




The first written evidence to identify the Carrack of Rhodes as the Santa Maria dates to 1523, 
when the Knights fled Rhodes after its fall to the Turks.  In this passage, Bosio refers to Santa 
Maria as ‘the carrack of Rhodes’ clearly as  “la Gran Nave, Santa Maria, detta volgarmente la 
Carracca di Rodi” (The Great Ship, Santa Maria, popularly known as the Carrack of Rhodes).  
The same year, the Grand Master ordered the captain of Santa Maria, Pietro de Credenus, to sail 
to Villefranche to accompany the new carrack Sant’ Anna.  In this account dating to 1523, Bosio 
began referring to Santa Maria as “the old carrack” and describes the new carrack as the “largest 
and most stupendous vessel that the Mediterranean had ever seen.” It was loaded with the 
“possessions and the treasure” when the Order arrived at Malta.  In October 20, 1530 Santa 
Maria was hit by a hurricane while at anchor in the harbor, broke free and drifted across the 
harbor running aground on the other side.10  From this date onwards, there is no account of this 
ship’s activities and it was decommissioned shortly after the incident, although the contemporary 
accounts mention that it was not seriously damaged during the storm.   
The end of Santa Maria came when it was employed as a slave prison for those captured 
from the siege of Modone.  In October 5, 1531, a slave woman set the ship on fire causing the 
magazine to explode.  Although all the officers on board miraculously survived, the loaded 
cannon still aboard, sparked by the flames, discharged within the confines of the harbor.  
Ultimately, cannon from Fort Saint Angelo fired at the ship and sank it near the Chapel of Saint 
Julian, in modern-day Dockyard Creek.  According to Bosio’s account, both the artillery and 
“the Order’s treasure” were salvaged.11  
                                                 
10 Bosio, Dell’Istoria III: 88D 
11 Bosio,  Dell’Istoria III: 108.  
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The major discrepancy of this account is that it has the treasury and Order’s slaves kept 
on board a decommissioned ship that still carried ammunition even though it was anchored in the 
harbor since 1530.  Other accounts from this period indicate that the Grandmaster was lodged in 
the Castrum Maris, in Birgu, and it is unlikely that the treasury was kept on board the carrack.   
Sant’ Anna 
Sant’ Anna was built in Nice and was launched “on the very day” the Turks took 
Rhodes12 (December 18, 1522).  Sant’ Anna’s first recorded sea voyage dates to May 1531,13 
when it encountered a squadron of 25 Muslim vessels near Favignana while sailing from Malta 
to Toulon.  The Muslim squadron under the command of Barbarossa consisted of 13 galleys and 
galleasses.  The captain of the carrack, Toucheboeuf hoisted the flags and pennants and fired the 
cannons into the Muslim fleet causing the corsairs to quickly retreat to their base.  Bosio’s 
account of the amphibious action against Coron on the Morea peninsula provides information 
about the crew capacity of the ship in 1532.  Still under the command of Toucheboeuf, Sant’ 
Anna ferried 100 Knights and 120 soldiers in addition to its usual crew of 500.14  Sant’ Anna was 
employed as a transport ship during the sack of the small coastal town of Modon on the 
Peloponessos.15   
 
 
                                                 
12 Bosio, Dell’Istoria III: 22B 
13 Bosio, Dell’Istoria III: 99 E.  
14 Bosio, Dell’Istoria III: 113E 
15 Jaime Salva, La Orden de Malta y las acciones Navales Españolas contra Turcos y Berbericos en los 
siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid, 1944), p. 96. 
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Information About the Design of the Hull and the Rig 
“… The Grand Carrack was much larger than Grimaldi, which carried 14,000 salme of 
grain, measurement of Sicily.  She had four decks above water and two under the water, 
which were sheathed with lead sheathing attached with bronze pins that made the hull as 
strong as if it was made out of iron, so that cannons of an entire army could not sink her.  
There was a chapel, an armory where the weapons of 500 men were kept, a hall, a chamber, 
and an antechamber for the Grandmaster and the Council, a dining hall, an officers’ quarter, 
a blacksmith’s quarter with separate galleries to work brass and copper and there were 
flowers in large pots around the stern deck.  There was no need to empty the bilge water as 
there was not even a drop of water in that area.  She carried 50 large artillery pieces and a 
large quantity of smaller ones. The main mast was so large that six men could barely 
embrace it.  She was very fast and very light and was decorated with paintings and 
streamers.”16  
 
Thus, according to Bosio’s description, this particular carrack, which is very likely to have 
been Sant’ Anna, had a capacity of about 2,500 tons.17  This calculation would either make Sant’ 
Anna larger than ships such as the Henry Grace a Dieu (built in 1514, 1000-1500 tons) or the 
Grand François (wrecked in 1533, 1500-2000 tons), or would suggest that Bosio gives an 
inflated number.  Bosio also seems to exaggerate the function of the lead sheathing, as this is 
usually a measure taken against wood-boring marine life from penetrating the hull as opposed to 
protect the ship from being damaged by ordnance.  It is clear that lead is not a strong enough 
metal to protect the wooden hull against cannon balls.18  
                                                 
16 Bosio, Histoire des Chevaliers, 11. 9. 332.  
17 One Sicilian salme of wheat equals 6.4 U.S. bushels and based on the assumption that the wheat carried 
by Sant’ Anna in the sixteenth century Mediterranean would have the same grain size and weight as the 
modern American wheat the above calculation can be made.  For conversions and calculations see John 
Edward Dotson, Freight Rates and Shipping Practices in the Medieval Mediterranean  (1969, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Johns Hopkins University), pp. 103, 302-05.  
18 This sentence in Bosio’s description has led many generations of maritime historians to suggest that the 
Order of Saint John had an “armored ship” in the sixteenth century.  For such statements see Eric 




The carracks of the Order were also depicted on several late sixteenth and the seventeenth 
century paintings, generally titled as Gran Caraca di Rodi.  The majority of these paintings 
represent a large vessel carrying the Order’s flag, and are likely to be the copies from a 
seventeenth century painting based on their stylistic similarities.  The mere existence of these 
paintings and the survival of the myth of the Gran Caraca di Rodi in the historical and 
iconographical record in the seventeenth century show the importance attributed to this ship that 




RECONSTRUCTION OF AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THIRD RATE SHIP 
OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF SAINT JOHN: SAN GIOVANNI BATTISTA 
OF 64 GUNS 
 
 San Giovanni Battista of 64 guns served as the flagship of the men-of-war squadron of 
the Order of Saint John between 1718 and 1765.  This relatively long period of commission was 
characterized by successful undertakings against the Barbary corsairs.  It was also a period when 
the number of ships forming the squadron was relatively high (see Table 13 in Chapter X).   
San Giovanni, built by a French shipwright in Malta and displays common features of 
French ships of this period, as well as similarities to other ships built by the Order.  Therefore, a 
detailed study of this particular ship provides insights to the shipbuilding and rigging practices in 
Malta during the last century of Order’s rule.  
A number of manuscripts that included information about the dimensions and 
construction features of this ship were preserved in the archives of Malta and Lucca, Italy.  Also, 
San Giovanni and other contemporary ships were depicted on contemporary paintings which 
provide additional information for the reconstruction of the hull and the rigging of the ship. 
The local shipwrights who built ships after the departure of the French shipwrights in 
1726 were all trained by the Coulombs who designed and oversaw the construction of six third 
rates for the Order (see Table 14 in Chapter X).  Therefore, it is likely that San Giovanni exhibits 





The renowned French shipwright Blaise Coulomb and his two sons stayed in Malta 
during the period between 1717 and 1727 to oversee shipbuilding activities in the shipyards and 
to train local shipwrights on ship design and construction.  According to contemporary records1 
the first ship to be designed and built in Malta by the Coulombs was San Giovanni Battista.2 
TABLE C.1. 
Measurements of San Giovanni3 
Measurements  French feet English feet Meters 
Length of Keel on Land 116 124.12 37.83 
Extension of Stem 20 21.4 6.52 
Extension of Stern 6 6.42 1.96 
Length from Stem to Sternpost 142 151.94 46.31 
Height of Sternpost 27' 7" 29.51 9.00 
Height of Stem 28 29.96 9.13 
Depth of Hold 18 19.26 5.87 
Maximum Beam at the waterline level 39' 4" 42.08 12.83 
Maximum Beam on Deck (Tumble-home) 29' 8" 31.74 9.68 
Maximum width at the highest point on poop 17' 9" 18.99 5.79 
Maximum width of quarterdeck 18' 9" 20.06 6.12 
Draught at stern 12' 6" 13.37 4.08 
Draught at the stem 8 8.56 2.61 
 
                                                 
1 National Library of Malta [NLM], 318 f. 201. 
2 Joseph Wismayer, Fleet of the Order of St. John, 1530-1798 (Malta, 1997), p. 286; Joseph Muscat, 
“Arsenali Maltesi dal seicento all 'ottocento,” in Navi di Legno: evoluzione tecnica e sviluppo della 
cantieristica nel Mediterraneo dal XVI secolo a oggi, ed. Mario Marzari (Trieste, 1998), p. 198. 
3 Wismayer, The Fleet, p. 286.  The formula used here for the conversion from French foot to English foot 
is: 1 French foot = 1.07 English foot; Formula for the metric conversion: English foot x 12 x 2.54. 
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The keel of the 64-gun San Giovanni Battista was laid down on September 1, 1717, and 
the ship was launched on April 16, 1718.4  The general dimensions of the hull (Table C.1), the 
mast and spar dimensions (Table C.2) and the rigging of San Giovanni Battista were recorded in 
two contemporary documents.  The first document, preserved in the Malta Archives, was 
published by Wismayer (Fig. 25 in Chapter X).5  The second document was found in the 
archives of the city of Lucca.6  The document is titled as “Stato della nave San Giovanni 
Comandante”7 and was also published by Scarabelli.8   
TABLE C.2. 
Measurements of the rigging elements 
Measurements French feet English feet Meters 
Mainmast 96 102.72 31.31 
Foremast 84' 6" 90.41 27.56 
Jib-boom 55 58.85 17.94 
Mizzen Mast 66.5 71.15 21.69 
Maintop Mast 59' 8" 63.84 19.46 
Foretop Mast 53' 6" 57.24 17.45 
Mizzen-top 36 38.52 11.74 
Main-topgallant Mast  25' 6" 27.28 8.32 
Fore-topgallant Mast 22' 9" 24.34 7.42 
Spritsail Mast 16 17.12 5.22 
 
                                                 
4 NLM 318 f. 200 and Libro di Marina 1727. 
5 Wismayer, The Fleet, pp. 286, 290. 
6 Salvatore Bongi and Domenico Corsi eds., Inventario del R. Archivio di Stato in Lucca (Lucca, 1800-
1899), 1: 7. 
7 ASL [Archivio di Stato in Lucca ] 292 f. 48 and 49.  




Unfortunately, these documents provide little information about the running rigging and 
the sails of the vessel.  The only references to the rigging and sails of San Giovanni are found in 
financial documents that stated that the main topsail of San Giovanni cost the treasury 462 
scudi.9  The sail was made of 56 canvas panels and it cost eight scudi three tari to sew each 
panel, at five stitches to the inch using palm, needle and tallow-wax.  Each seam had to be 
doubled to provide extra strength to the sail.  Most of the rigging elements were manufactured in 
Fort Ricassoli, while the guns, anchors and most of the iron fittings were forged at the Order’s 
Ferreria, also known as the Fianco in Valletta.10   
Iconographic Evidence 
There are a number of paintings depicting the men-of-war of the Order in action.  
Unfortunately, most of these paintings were made at later times to commemorate an important 
encounter of the past.  However, they provide valuable information especially in cases where 
they are in accordance with the historic and textual evidence.  A summary of the iconographic 






                                                 
9 AOM [Archives of the Order in Malta] 1899 f. 157. 




Iconographic sources consulted for the reconstruction of San Giovanni Battista 
Original name of the painting English translation Features seen on the painting Comments 
Presa del Sole d’Oro d’Algiers 
fatta dell’Acque d’Orano dalla 
Nave S. Giovanni sotto il 
Comando del Venerando Balio 
Langon-Terente Generale – li 20 
Aprile 1721 
The S. Giovanni 
capturing the Sole D’Oro 
of Algiers in April 1721. 
Bow, bowsprit, fore, main and 
mizzen masts and rigging, 
marines on deck.  The stern of 
the vessel is obscured by the 
other ship and the gunfire. 
The ship does not have the 
bowsprit topmast, and 
represents different rigging and 
construction features than the 
ones described in contemporary 
texts and archival documents. 
Presa della Padrona di Tunisi 
detta la Rosa Fatta dell’Acque di 
Morea dall’ Commandatore Fra 
Francesco Castell S. Pierre 
Primo Comandate della squadra 
li 3 Maggio dell’ 1706 
The Tunisian Fleet’s 
Capitana is captured, 
thanks to the action of 
commander Francesco 
Castell S. Pierre (1706) 
The general rig of the ship is 
clearly visible except for the 
spritsail and the bow.  There 
are three Maltese ships on the 
painting in addition to two 
Muslim ships.  Painting was 
especially useful for the 
reconstruction of the braces. 
Spritsail does not have a 
topmast and this feature does 
not agree with the 
contemporary archival 
document. 
Presa della Padrona di Tripoli 
fatta nell’acque tra la Pantelleria 
e Barbaria dalla nave S. 
Vincenzo fatta dal Cavaliere fra 
Giacomo Francesca de 
Chambray essendo Corruna il 
commana Fra Andrea de Grille li 
13 Maggio 1723. 
The S. Vincenzo sinks 
Tripoli’s capitana 
(flagship) in the waters 
between Pantelleria and 
Barbary (May 13th , 
1723) 
The San Vincenzo is clearly 
visible with all its rigging 
details: stays, braces, shrouds 
and sails. 
San Vincenzo is a smaller ship 
than the San Giovanni, and is 
possibly a frigate carrying 50 
guns.  However, its rig is very 
similar to San Giovanni as 
depicted in its archival records. 
Thus this painting provided 
good information about the 
reconstruction of the rig. 
 
The ship commanding 
the Order’s Squadron of 
sailing ships at the time 
of fra’ Emanuele de 
Rohan (1775-1797). 
Masts, topmasts, and 
topgallants, shrouds, stays, 
braces.  In addition, the stern 
decorations are very clearly 
visible and the stern 
decorations on the drawing 
were based on this painting. 
Although this is a slightly later 
ship this painting provides 
details that are missing or not 
as clear in other paintings. 
 
Detail of a painting from 
the 18th century.  Archive 
of the Order of Saint 
John in Rome 
Stern of San Giovanni Consulted for the stern decorations on the drawing 
 
Detail of a painting from 
the 18th century.  Archive 
of the Order of Saint 
John in Rome 




 Contemporary Documents Consulted for the Reconstruction of San Giovanni Battista 
A series of references were consulted for the reconstruction of the ship and its rigging.  
The major references for the specific ship San Giovanni Battista were the general dimensions for 
the ship’s hull and its masts provided by Wismayer.  However, none of the textual and 
iconographic primary sources were complete, and the reconstruction of the hull and the rig was 
largely based on contemporary French vessels of similar sizes.  Table C.4 provides a detailed 
analysis of the specific features of the hull that were compiled from these sources.  
TABLE C.4. 
Sources consulted for the reconstruction of the hull 
Name, date and specifications of the 
ship Source of information Comments 
Third rate ship designed by Coulomb 
fils (son) – date unknown 
Paris, Souvenirs de Marine, Vol. 3, 
no. 269 
Bowsprit attachment, stern deck, height of the 
stern, aft part of the vessel, and rudder.  
Dauphin Royal – 64 guns – 1736  László and Woodman, The Story of 
Sail, p. 108. 
Curve of the bow, quarter rails.  
Album de Colbert Plate 37 Colbert, Album de Colbert, pl. 37 Rudder, rudder attachments, fore deck. 
L’Athenienne – 64 gun - 1798 Gardiner, Warships of the Napoleonic 
era, p. 107 
Gunports (spacing etc), general form of the bow.  
Le Protecteur – 64 guns - 1755 László and Woodman, The Story of 
Sail, p. 109. 
Stern, the height of the stern and the back deck 
etc.  The bow extension and the placement of the 
figurehead.  
Drawing of an unidentified ship from 
the Malta archives Lib. 139 f. 208 dated 
1729 
Wismayer, Fleet of the Order. 
 
Fform of the hull, bow ornaments, rails, height 
of the stern deck, bowsprit topmast attachment. 
Mast-spar arrangement.  
 
 During the reconstruction process, a number of other sources were also consulted as 
general references to determine the specific conventions used in the representation of certain 
rigging features.  For example, although Nelson’s Victory is a larger ship built in the British 
tradition in 1765, Longridge’s drawings were very useful as general references (Plan no. 6 HMS 
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Victory Standing Rigging and Plan no 7 HMS Victory Running Rigging).11  Similarly, 
Archibald’s The Wooden Fighting Ship in the Royal Navy (Archibald 1968) was a helpful 
reference as it contained rigging profiles for ships that had similar arrangements similar to San 
Giovanni.12   
References Consulted for the Reconstruction of Specific Features of the Hull and the Rigging 
1) M. Bouguer, Traité Du Navire: De Sa Construction, Et De Ses Mouvemens 
The majority of the measurements required to reconstruct the masts and spars of San 
Giovanni were based on information provided by M. Bouguer, Traité du navire: de sa 
construction, et de ses mouvements.13  This is a French treatise that provides detailed information 
about the construction of contemporary men-of-war in French shipyards.  Section II of the fifth 
chapter of the first book was especially useful as it contained detailed explanations and formulas 
to calculate the thickness and length of the masts and spars.   
Bouguer positioned the mainmast “…at the middle of the total length of the vessel – 
from the top of the sternpost to the top of the stempost…”  The position of the foremast is 
described as the 1/40th or 1/50th of the length of the vessel.  The bowsprit is placed at a 35° angle 
                                                 
11 Charles Nepean Longridge and Edward Bowness, The Anatomy of Nelson's Ships (Annapolis, Md., 
1981). 
12 Edward H. H. Archibald and Ray Woodward, The Wooden Fighting Ship in the Royal Navy, A.D. 897-
1860 (London, 1968), p. 39.   
13 M. Bouguer, Traité du navire: de sa construction, et de ses mouvemens (Paris, 1746). 
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with the horizon (waterline) and the mizzenmast is positioned at 3/16th of the total length of the 
vessel forward of the stern.14 
 The formulas presented in the treatise, the calculations and the final measurements 
applied on the reconstruction are presented in Table C.5.  Placement of the masts following the 
rules presented by Bouguer matched almost perfectly all other contemporary ship drawings 
consulted for the reconstruction (Table C.6). 
TABLE C.5. 
Measurements used for the reconstruction of San Giovanni Battista. 
All references are from M. Bouguer, Traité du navire: de sa construction, et de ses mouvements (Paris, 1746). 
Rigging element Formula 
Reference from 
Book I, Section 
II, Chapter V.  
Formula for the Diameter 
1/40 of its length (top deck level) Main mast 
(Grand voile) 
2.5 x midship frame p. 123. 
⅔ of its maximum end thickness  
1/43 of its length Maintop mast 
(Le grand hunier) 
1/5 of the midship frame p. 124 
⅓ of the maximum thickness at the ends 
Topgallant mast 
(Le grand perroquet) 
5/12 of the maintop mast p. 124 ½ of the maintop mast 
Fore mast 
(la mizzaine) 
Midship frame x 2 ¼ p. 123 1/39 of its length (first deck level) 
Fore top mast 
(le petit hunier) 
Midship frame + ⅜ of the 
midship frame p. 124 1/43 of its length 
½ of the fore top mast Fore topgallant mast 
(le petit perroquet) 
4/7 of the midship frame p. 124 
⅓ of the maximum thickness at the ends 
1/27 of its length Bowsprit mast (voile 
de baupre) Midship frame x 1.5 p. 123 26 ⅓ pieds as pouces 
Bowsprit topsail mast 
 
2/5 of the midship frame p. 124 1/25 of its length 
7/16 of the midship frame in pieds as 
pouces. Mizzen mast (artimon) Midship frame + ¾ of the midship frame p. 124 
½ of its diameter on the bottom 
Mizzen top mast 
(perroquet de fougue) 
½ of the maintop mast p. 124 ½ of the maintop mast 
                                                 
14 Bouguer, Traité du navire, pp. 120-22. 
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All conversions from the French Royal Feet (Pied du Roi) into metric measurements 
were made following the values presented in Ross’ Archaeological Metrology.15  In summary 
one Royal Foot (Pied du Roi) equals 32.484 cm during the period between 1668 and 1840, while 
an inch (pouce) is 2.707 cm.    
TABLE C.6. 
Sources consulted for the reconstruction of rigging details. 
Rigging element Reference Comments 
Braces 
Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century, p. 101 fig. 55b This was the only reference book with detailed 
information for the braces of continental ships of 
this period.  
Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century, p. 82  
Mizzen lateen yard 
Lever, The Young Sea Officer's, p. 42  
Lever, The Young Sea Officer's, p. 33  
Boudriot, The Seventy-Four   Mainyard 
Victoria, Álbum del Marqués. Especially the lifts. 
Lever, The Young Sea Officer's, p. 39  
Boudriot, The Seventy-Four   Foreyard 
Victoria, Álbum del Marqués. Especially the lifts. 
Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century, p. 99  
Topgallant yard 
Victoria, Álbum del Marqués. Especially the lifts. 
Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century, p. 54  
Spritsail yard 
Lever, The Young Sea Officer's, p. 41  
Stay collar Boudriot, The Seventy-Four, p. 105 fig. 264  
Bumpkin stays Boudriot, The Seventy-Four, p. 127 fig. 280 Only one of the stays was applied to the drawing as the San Giovanni is a smaller ship.  
Rigging to the yards 
Boudriot, The Seventy-Four, pp. 164-165, fig. 298 Showing the detailed assembly of the lower yard, 
topsail yard and topgallant yard both for the 
mainmast and the foremast.  
Rigging to the yards of the 
mizzen mast 
Boudriot, The Seventy-Four, p. 168-169, fig. 299 Only the parts that matched with the depictions 
on the iconographic material.  
Bowsprit topmast, topsail, 
and topyard 
László and Woodman, The Story of Sail, p. 107 Le 
Fendant 
A third rate of the Lois XIVs fleet, built in 1701 
(60 guns). The only example with a similar rig to 
San Giovanni.  
Parrals Victoria, Álbum del Marqués. Especially the parrals of the mainmast and their relation to the wooldings.  
 
                                                 
15 Lester A. Ross, Archaeological Metrology: English, French, American, and Canadian Systems of 
Weights and Measures for North American Historical Archaeology (Ottawa, 1983), p. 77. 
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2) J. Boudriot, The Seventy-Four Gun Ship  
 Another very useful source especially for the reconstruction of the rigging was The 
Seventy-Four Gun Ship by Boudriot.16  His figure illustrating the bowsprit standing rigging was 
consulted for the reconstruction of the bowsprit.17  His plates of the mainmast (L), foremast and 
mizzenmast (L1) and close up view of the pendants and shrouds above the mainmast (figure 281 
on page 130) were especially useful for the reconstruction of the standing rigging.18  The 
drawings on figures 287 (shrouds and catharpins), 288 (backstays), 289 (stays and preventer-
stays) were used (along with the iconographic evidence) to reconstruct the standing rigging of 
San Giovanni.  Other details that were reconstructed based on the information presented by 
Boudriot are summarized in Table C.6 above.  
3) Additional Sources 
The major sources consulted for almost every feature on the drawing were Lever’s The 
Young Sea Officer's Sheet Anchor19 and Eighteenth-Century Rigs & Rigging by Marquardt.20  
The latter was especially important as it is the only source that contained information about the 
arrangement of the braces on continental ships during the early eighteenth century that could be 
                                                 
16 Jean Boudriot, The Seventy-Four Gun Ship: A Practical Treatise on the Art of Naval Architecture 
(Annapolis, Md., 1987). 
17 Boudriot, The Seventy-Four Gun Ship, fig. 280. 
18 Boudriot, The Seventy-Four Gun Ship, fig. 280.  See figure L for the mainmast, (L1) for the foremast 
and mizzenmast, and the close up view of the pendants and shrouds above the mainmast on figure 281 on 
page 130. 
19 Darcy Lever, The Young Sea Officer's Sheet Anchor, or, A key to the leading of rigging, and to practical 
seamanship (Mineola, NY., 1998). 
20 Karl Heinz Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century Rigs & Rigging (Cedarburg, Wis., 1992). 
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used for the reconstruction in accordance with the paintings of San Giovanni and textual 
evidence.21  For the specific features reconstructed based on these two sources see Table C.6.  
When the French captured Malta in 1798 the fourth San Giovanni was in the final stages 
of construction.  It was completed by the French, but was never able to escape the British 
blockade, and thus became a British prize when Valletta surrendered in 1800.  As a 64-gun ship 
of average dimensions, the ship was not very valuable to the royal navy, but was pressed into 
service during the pre-Trafalgar panic, and operated in the Mediterranean until being wrecked 
off Sicily in October 1806.  A drawing of this ship is preserved in Greenwich (DR 7260) and 
was published by Gardiner.22 The drawing was consulted to reconstruct specific features of the 
hull along with contemporary drawings of other ships of the approximately similar sizes.   
 Le Fendant was a 60-gun ship built in 1701 and was a third rate of Louis XIV’s fleet 
which did not have a mizzen topgallant mast. 23  Details of the topgallant braces illustrated by 
László and Woodman were useful for the reconstruction of this particular rigging feature. 
                                                 
21 Marquardt, Eighteenth-Century, fig. 55b. 
22 Robert Gardiner, Warships of the Napoleonic era (Anapolis, Md., 1999) pp. 106-07.  
23 Veres László and Richard Woodman, The Story of Sail (Annapolis, Md., 1999), p. 107. 
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Finally, the treatise Álbum del Marqués de la Victoria (Folio 43) was consulted for the 





EXCAVATION IN THE MARSAMXETT HARBOR NEAR THE 
QUARANTINE HOSPITAL 
Background Information 
The two large and well-protected harbors of Malta, Marsamxett and Grand Harbor are 
located to the north and to the south of Valletta, the capital of Malta, respectively.  Manoel 
Island is at the middle of the Marsamxett harbor and is today connected to land by a small 
bridge.  The island was the quarantine center of Europe for nearly two centuries and it is likely 
that it was settled before the Knights period of Malta.  Because most of the island was overbuilt, 
no archaeological survey has ever been conducted on Manoel Island or around the Marsamxett 
Harbor.  The emergence of a development project that included the construction of a yacht 
marina to the west of Manoel Island prompted the Museums department to contact the Institute 
of Nautical Archaeology for a comprehensive underwater archaeological survey in the areas 
where the piers were to penetrate the seafloor to the bedrock.   
Thus, in April 2000, INA conducted an archaeological hazard survey around Manoel 
Island on behalf of TBA Periti & Associates and at the behest of the Malta Museums 
Department.  A 14-meter hydrographic survey vessel outfitted with a high-resolution sub-bottom 
profiler, coupled to an advanced digital data collection system (CODA) and a precision global 
positioning system accurate to within 50 centimeters were used for this survey.  Two gigabytes 
of sub-bottom profile data was collected, our efforts being focused predominantly on areas 
adjacent to the historic Quarantine Hospital building and the proposed site of the breakwater 
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construction as these areas were the most probable locations for potential disturbance of 
archaeological resources, and the largest area scheduled for seabed-modification.  
Two known shipwrecks within the survey area and several other sub-bottom anomalies 
were detected within the general survey area, but none appeared to be at risk due to the 
construction of the breakwater, or the placement of floating docks.  However, it was clear that, 
given the history of Manoel Island, there were most certainly small artifacts contained within the 
sediment and below the detection threshold of the equipment employed.  One area of sub-bottom 
anomalies was investigated by divers and was found to contain archeological material ranging 
from Roman amphora/pottery fragments to modern debris (Fig. D.1).  During the diver’s 
inspections of the sub-bottom profiler targets, we also observed a high concentration of modern 
debris including tires, construction debris, and various non-descript metallic objects.  Mixed in 
with the modern debris were fragments of ancient pottery.  It was also noted that limited probing 
into the seabed revealed the existence of numerous buried objects in the area. 
 
5 meters Point-source diffractions
4-5 meters of sedimentary overburden
 
Anom. B1: 14.501665E / 35.90122666N 
 




Excavation Season of 2001 
Additional diving investigation was planned for the area of high concentration of 
archaeological material that might represent a dredge spoil pushed towards the Hospital building 
(Fig. D.2).  The abundance of artifacts near the Quarantine Hospital was also considered an 
impetus for further study in the area and an extended survey that involved systematic collection 
of the surface material and the excavation of a number of trenches was planned for the summer 
2001. 
 
Fig. D.2. Quarantine Hospital building seen from Valletta (photograph: author).  
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The underwater slope in front of the Quarantine Hospital is littered with furniture 
discarded from the building and large boulders that tumbled into the sea when the building was 
damaged by bombing during World War II.  In addition to beds and boulders, the charm of the 
site is augmented by Carolita, a modern iron-hulled wreck attracting fish and sport divers to the 
area.   Carolita looks almost haunted in the murky waters of the harbor; visibility is never higher 
than three meters provided that the bottom is not disturbed.  The diving survey near the 
Quarantine Hospital proceeded under these circumstances and in two phases:  (1) a systematic 
surface collection of archaeological material, and (2) the excavation of test trenches in the most 
promising areas.  The team consisted of eight divers from INA, the National Museum of 
Archaeology, the University of Malta, and Bristol University.   
The first dives focused on acclimating the team members to diving in zero-visibility and 
on the collection of archaeologically diagnostic surface material.  After each dive a short 
meeting was held to familiarize the team members with the archaeological material recovered 
and to hone their skills of discernment.  The surface material was mostly white porcelain used by 
the British Navy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, broken artifacts dating to the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and a few late Roman – Byzantine sherds.   
Once the surface survey data was analyzed the areas for excavation squares were 
selected.  The squares were made of PVC pipes and measured 2 x 2 meters (labeled 1-4 in Fig. 7 
in Chapter II).  Each diver was assigned to a quarter of the square.  The collection of the material 
from the squares started with photography and sketching.  Divers were also responsible for 
labeling and on-site logging of the artifacts from their sections.  A water dredge was set up to 
increase the speed of silt removal and to increase visibility.  In addition to the squares, a number 
of up-slope sand pockets were excavated for they formed natural traps for material and had 
better stratification of artifacts preserved in-situ.  Once the loose silt was removed the grayish 
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and more compact level that contained earlier artifacts was reached immediately, especially in 
the sand pockets.  However, the layer approximately ½ meter below the gray silt preserved the 
traces of the roots of the poseidonia grass that only grows only on a sandy bottom, and dates 
approximately to the seventeenth century.  Archaeological material from this layer yielded more 
consistent dates.  The location of the squares and the excavated sand pockets were measured and 
positioned on a large-scale map and assigned precise geographical coordinates.   
 
Fig. D.3. Examples of artifacts from the Quarantine Hospital Area trenches (drawing: author).  
 
Preliminary Results 
Ceramics from the excavation were cleaned, desalinated, reconstructed, photographed 
and drawn once the excavation was over.  All 434 logged artifacts were entered into a database 
that allowed for comparison of the archaeological material in terms of their number, date and 
origin (Fig. D.3).  Although ceramic studies are still being carried out, preliminary observations 
indicate that the eleventh and twelfth century Islamic ceramics (possibly of North African origin) 
outnumber the seventeenth to early nineteenth century polychrome Majolica sherds of the 
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‘Knights’ period, during which time the Quarantine Hospital was in active use.  This points to an 
extensive use to the harbor during the medieval period.  We look forward to the complete results 
of the pottery study to determine the contribution of this survey to our knowledge of the 
maritime history of Malta in the medieval period. 
 
 APPENDIX E 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE SUMMARIZING THE MAJOR NAVAL UNDERTAKINGS OF THE ORDER OF 
SAINT JOHN, INFORMATION REGARDING THE NAVAL FORCES, AND THE MAJOR HISTORICAL 
EVENTS AFFECTING THE MEDITERRANEAN DURINGTHE PERIOD WHEN THE ORDER OF SAINT 
JOHN WAS BASED IN MALTA 
 
Date     Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 







1523 The fleet left Rhodes N/A 
Sailing ships: La 




N/A    N/A N/A Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 31.  
1524 
The three galleys capture 
two galliots belonging to 
the famous corsair Giudeo 
Corsair 
activity 












Prizes brought to Citavecchia 
where the other ships were.  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 32.  
1524 
The size of the Venetian fleet: 24 galleys + 100 in reserve at the arsenal (until 1570). 
Spain: (maximum) 25 galleys, but hired Genoese when needed. 
In 1520 the Ottoman fleet that attacked Rhodes composed of 100 galleys +300 other vessels. 
Petiet, L’Ordre de 
Malte, pp. 59, 61, 
63.  
5 galleys: Santa Maria (Capitana), Santa Caterina, San Giovanni, + two galleys built in Villefranche, 
San Filippo and San Giacomo 
+ Carracks Santa Maria and Sant’Anna, a ship called La Marietta, three barciotti, one transport ship, 
two brigantines, 700 soldiers 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 33-34.  October 26, 
1530 
Arrival of the Order in 
Malta N/A 
5 galleys, 2 carracks, one galleon, the vessel named Mariette de Rhodes, and the vessel belonging to 
Bonaldi, 2 armed barcoiottis, 2 brigantins 
Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 10.9. 297.  
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 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 









Unsuccessful attempt to 
capture Modon 




galleys + 2 
Galleys of the 
famous privateer 
Cigale hired by 
the Grandmaster 
for this 
expedition + 2 
brigantines and 
two merchant 
ships to carry 
provisions.   
None 800 women Fra Bernardo Salviati 
The goal was to capture Modon 
because it was a location close 
to Rhodes. This Attack was part 
of l’Isle Adam’s plan to 
recapture Rhodes.  The report 
about an approaching Ottoman 
force forced the Order’s forces 
to retreat but before leaving they 
plundered the houses of the 
town.  
800 married women and 
maidens were taken as slaves 
from Modon in addition to the 
plunder described as “not over-




Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 10.11.313-
314; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
36; Mori Ubaldini, 
La Marina, pp. 
134-37.  
1531 
Carrack Santa Maria 
destroyed in fire 
[according to Rossi she 
was only disarmed] 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 114; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 34 
August 8, 
1532 
Charles V’s Papal fleet 
under Andrea Doria’s 
command (and including 
the Order’s galleys) 
capture Coron  
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
The great carrack 
and 4 galleys.    
Bernardo 
Salviati  
Coron was chosen because the 
Christian forces refused to 
attack the better-fortified 
Modon, which had been looted 
the year before.  Soldiers were 
underpaid and they needed the 





Bastion , p. 172. 
1534 
Henry VIII seized the 
Order’s properties in 
England, arresting most 
resident Knights  
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vertot, The 
History, 2:60-61; 




 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








The Order captured three 
‘Turkish’ galleons near 
Djerba 
Corsair 
activity    
Fra Aurelio 
Bottigela  
Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 11.11.335; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 37; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, pp. 140-
41; Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354.  
June 1535 
Charles V led an armada 
of 400 ships and 30,000 
men to invade Tunis 
(captured from its former 
ruler, Mullah Hasan by 
Khaireddin Barbarossa - 
the admiral of the 
Ottoman navy since 1533) 
Naval activity 











or sold as 
slaves.   




Exploits,” p. 353.  
1535-1536 
The first galley 
constructed in the Birgu 
arsenal, and in Malta – 
called Santa Caterina  
Construction  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Muscat, The 
Maltese Galley, p. 
6.  
1536 
Captured two Muslim 
galliots near Sicily 
+ one galleon carrying oil 
near Tripoli + one galliot 
near Djerba  
Corsair 
activity    
Fra Aurelio 
Bottigela  
Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 11.11.335-
36; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
38; Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354.  
1537 Two galliots and a fusta off Calabria – 80 slaves 
Corsair 
activity    
Leone 
Strozzi  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 39; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354. 
1538    Prevesa
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
Knights were 






Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 38.  
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 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








Sant’ Anna (carrack) 
decommissioned because 
of financial difficulties 
and left to rot in the 
harbor – related to the 
decreasing income 
because of the loss of 
territories in England  
N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A Replaced by a ship of smaller tonnage.  
Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 12.6.355; 
Muscat, “The 
Warships,” p. 85. 
1541 
Siege of Algiers 
(Charles V’s disastrous 
failure before Algiers) 
 




(bastarda) and La 
Catarinetta] 
   
Unsuccessful expedition.  75 
Knights and 400 soldiers died at 
Algiers.   Besides, while the 
bulk of the fleet was in Africa, 
the Muslim corsairs attacked the 
island of Gozo capturing 
inhabitants. 
The papal fleet lost 15 galleys 
and 86 vessels in less than half 
an hour during a storm during 
the day of the fighting.  
Vertot, The 
History, 2:86-90.  
1545 
A small village called 
Almaia or Lmaia to the 
west of Tripoli sacked.  
Rich booty  
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  




The goal was to capture the city 
but that goal was not achieved.  
Bono describes it as “partial 
success” 
Bosio, Histoire de 
Malthe, 11.13.373; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 382.  
1549 
The ship that replaced the 
carrack Sant’ Anna is 
taken out of commission 
and replaced by two 
galleonetti (1500 salme 
each) due to increased 
financial difficulties  
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 378. 
1550 Two merchant ships sunk in a storm       
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 114. 
1550 
A fast sailing ship called 
Catarinetta loaded with 
money is taken by Dragut 
      Dauber, Die Marine, p. 114. 
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Capture of  Monastir and 
Mahdiya (both in Tunisia) 
by Charles V  
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 





Order of St. John: 
4 galleys. 
  Fra Claude de Sengle 
36 Knights died during the fight 
in Mahdiya.  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 42; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354.  
1551 
The forces of Dragut 
devastated Gozo and also 
conquered the fortress of 
Tripoli 
     
The knights, partly because the 
troops within the fortress had 
given way, offered only a very 
brief resistance. 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 42; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354.  
1552 Unsuccessful attack on Zuara   











  Leone Strozzi 
Small town to the west of 
Tripoli, attacked as part of a 
larger expedition aiming to re-
conquer Tripoli.  




Marina, pp. 42-43;  
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, pp. 178-
80; Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 354. 
1554 
The first galley built in 
the new Birgu arsenal is 
launched – a Capitana 
named Santa Maria della 
Vittoria 
Construction       Muscat, “The Arsenal,” p. 260. 
1555 
Capture of two vessels at 
Cape Misurata and 
another close to Malta 
Corsair 











Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 43; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, p. 186; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 356. 
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4 galleys were 
capsized in the 
Grand Harbor, 
one is completely 
lost (San 
Claudio) 
N/A   N/A N/A
4 galleys were overturned in the 
Grand Harbor, loosing their 
crews and rowers.  Three were 
repaired but one of them had to 
be scraped.  Thei last one was 
replaced in the same year 
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, pp. 107-108; 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 115. 
1555-1620 No galleys were built in Malta during this period N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
Muscat, “The 
Arsenal,” p. 270. 










Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 44, 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 357. 
1558       
Standing fleet of 
the Order 
consists of 5 
galleys and two 
galleots 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 115. 
1559-1560 
Order's galleys took part 
in an expedition against 
Djerba, led by Philip II  
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
Five galleys, two 
galleons, one 
Magistral galliot 
and other minor 
craft + 400 
Knights and 900 
soldiers 
[total amount of 
vessels in the 
Christian force: 
49-54 galleys] 
  Carlo Tessieres 
Christians lost 28 galleys, half 
of the sailing ships, and nearly 
all the small craft were lost.  
Thousands of men, who were 
either killed or enslaved.  
Order’s galleys returned but two 
of the galleys of the Order had 
suffered serious damage. 
Most important outcome: loss of 
trained manpower, crippling 
Spain for a long time.  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 45-46;  
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, pp. 202-
26; Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 355; 
Anderson, Naval 
Wars, pp. 12-13. 
1563 Unsuccessful attack on Oran and Mers-al-Kebir        
1564 
Order's galleys helped in 
the conquest of Peñón de 
Velez 
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
4 galleys     
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 43, 46-
7; Mori Ubaldini, 
La Marina, pp. 
182-83, 215-7; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 357. 
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1565       
The number of 
galleys increased 
to 9 with the 
addition of the 
Magistral galley 
because of the 
feared siege of 
Malta.  
Dauber, Die 








In its broader Mediterranean context and within the framework of the 
Ottoman imperial design of extending Turco-Muslim influence to the west, 
the magnitude and consequence of the siege of Malta were ephemeral. It 
was a victory of hardly any lasting significance to long-term historical 
development.  The Ottoman naval strength remained as formidable, its 
determination to realize its grand design as powerful, and its threat to the 
West as fearful as they had been in their totality before the armada had 
ventured on its politico punitive expedition to Malta.” (from Hess) 
The Genoese island of Chios, the fortress town of Szigeth in the southwest 
of Hungary, Tunis, the Venetian island of Cyprus, and Morocco each in 
turn bears visible witness to the audacious advance by the Ottomans in the 
decade or so after 1565.   
Within the narrower context of the history of the Order and the social and 
economic history of Malta, the repulsion of the Turks assumed a far more 
permanent significance.  After the siege, the Knights drew one clear lesson 
from their close call.  Both the area of the Three Cities on the eastern side 
of Grand Harbor and Fort Sant’Elmo on Draggut Point had proven 
vulnerable to battering from artillery set up on the heights of the Sciberras 
peninsula.  The Knights determined to build a fortified enclave on those 
heights, and thus they gave birth to Valletta.   
Hess, The 
Forgotten Frontier, 









p. 11.  





  Spices and 90 men. 
Captain 
Saint Aubain  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 47-8; 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 357.  
1567 
Capture of two 
brigantines at Favignana 
and the attack of Zuaga 











Need for slaves to be employed 
for the construction of Valletta.  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 44, 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 357 
1568 
Legislative measures 
enacted in 1568 
prohibited the fitting out 
of ‘private’ galleys 
 
The number of 
galleys reduced 
to 4 
    
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 379; 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 115. 
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1568 Construction of a galleon in Malta  
Construction of a 
galleon in the 
ditch under the 
bastion of France 
and Aragon. 
   
Construction of a galleon in the 
ditch under the bastion of 
France and Aragon.  From the 
context in Muscat, I understand 
that this was built in one year. 
Muscat, “The 






Three galleys are lost at a 
battle off Sicily  
Three galleys are 
lost.     
King of Spain replaced these 
losses before Lepanto.  Their 
participation was a decisive 
factor in the success of this 
campaign (i.e. Lepanto).  
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 116. 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 379. 
July 15, 
1570 
The Capitana was driven 
ashore and was 
completely lost in Sicily 
by an Algerian enemy, the 
Calabrian renegade Luca 
Galeni (Uluch Ali or 
Occhiali or Lucciali).  
Two galleys San 
Giovanni and Sant’Anna 









lost together with 
hundreds of 
fighting men 
(killed or carried 
away to Algiers). 
The only survivor 
was the Padrona, 








St. Clement  
The galley squadron of the 
Order was painted vermilion but 
in 1625 the Capitana was 
painted black like the Spanish 
flagship and in commemoration 
of the St. Clement debacle at the 
hands of Uluch Ali’s galliot.  
Upon his return to Malta St. 
Clement was court martialled 
and sentenced to be strangled 
and flung over the bastions into 
the sea. Also executed was 
Orlando Magri, the master of the 
Capitana, who had 
distinguished himself during the 
Siege of 1565 
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 16; 
Brockman, Last 
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1571 Naval battle of Lepanto 
Naval activity 




three galleys, the 
S. Maria della 
Vittoria, the S. 
Giovanni and the 
S. Pietro  
Holy league: 207 










the share of 














Loss of experienced manpower 
for the Ottomans (about 30,000 
men were lost) – the death of a 
tradition.  
The Christian victory was more 
incisive in its psychological 
impact than in the military and 
strategic advantages. 
The Knights contributed a very 
small percentage of the total 
Christian force, but their galleys 
played a pivotal role from their 
initial position in the Christian 
reserve.  When the Turkish left 
wing sailed through a gap 
opened by the imprudent action 
of Andrea Doria on the 
Christian right, the Knights 
helped to block the Turkish 
advance long enough to prevent 
a complete flanking and 
encirclement of the Christian 
center.  That successful blocking 
action and the subsequent 
capture of the Ottoman flagship 
allowed the Christian fleet to 
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enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 







       
Christians decisively defeated 
the Ottomans. Ironically, 
however, the results of military 
operations between 1569 and 
1571 improved the strategic 
position of the Muslim empire.  
Ottoman soldiers cleared the 
southeastern Mediterranean of 
the Christian stronghold at 
Cyprus, consolidating their 
control over the sea routes that 
joined the wealthiest of the Arab 
lands (Egypt) to Istanbul. 
Ottoman sources give no 
indication that this defeat 
constituted a turning point in 






Ottomans increase their 




1573       




Marine, p. 116. 
1574 
Ottoman reconquest of 
Tunis and La Goletta – 
under the command of 
Eludj Ali – Uluc Ali? 
     
Creates an equilibrium between 
the Christian and Muslim blocs 
both diverted away from the 
Mediterranean by the force of 
other more pressing problems 
elsewhere.  The period that 
follows is characterized by the 
spread of piracy and an inferior 
war of corsairs.  Major parties 
being the Knights Hospitallers 
and the Barbary Corsairs.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 358:  
Ciano, Navi 
Mercanti, p. 46. 
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The renowned corsair 
Romegas (Maturin de 
Lescaut) becomes the 






with three Tuscan 
galleys) 
  









 Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 51.  
1582 
Grandmaster Verdalle 
fitted out one ‘private’ 
galley with papal 
approval   
 
4 galleys + the 
Magistral galley 
+ the galley 
belonging to the 
Knight Guinucci 
= total 6 
    
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 379; 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 116. 
1584 
The Venerable Council of 
the Order decided that the 
galley squadron was to 
maintain a fighting 
strength of five galleys 
       5 galleys Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 53.  
1584 
Corsair fleet of the Order 
is strengthened by the 
addition of two galleys, 
one galiote and one 
Brigantine 
 
Corsair fleet of 
the Order is 
strengthened by 
the addition of 
two galleys, one 
galiote and one 
brigantine 
    Dauber, Die Marine, p. 116. 
1586 
Grandmaster Verdalle 
fitted out one more 
‘private’ galley with papal 
approval   
       
1592 Galleon San Giovanni added to the corso  N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
NLM Lib 413, ff. 
225 in Muscat, 
“The Arsenal,” pp. 
87-88. 
1592-1594 
Ottoman main fleet + galleys from Bizerta (90-120 galleys) raid land settlements of Calabria and Sicily  
Source: Anderson, Naval Wars, p. 63.  
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Government issue a 
ferman (decree) to the 
governors of Algiers and 
the other two provinces, 
permitting them unlimited 
corsair activity 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A




Series of Registers] 
f. 212: ferman to 
Shaban Pasha of 
Algiers, in Ilter, 
Şimalî Afrikada, 1: 
181.  
1595 
Prohibition of ‘private’ 
galleys was reconfirmed 
by the election of 
Verdalle’s successor, 
Grand Master Garzes 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 379. 
1598 
Addition of Santo Stefano 




fund to support 
the galley Santo 
Stefano is 
provided by 
Bailiff Stefano de 
Claramonte.  
   Donated the sum of 12,000 scudi.  
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 116. 
1601 A great vessel, Cigno was bought N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
I am not sure what a Cigno is… 
but from the context in Muscat, 
I understand that this is a sailing 
cargo ship.  
Dal Pozzo, 
Historia della 
sacra, 1: 458; 
Muscat, “The 
Arsenal,” p. 268. 
1600-1602 Captured six Muslim ships  
Five galleys + 
ships from 
Naples, Sicily 
and Genoa.  
  Giacomo du Blot Viviers   
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 59, 62. 
1601 Attack on Castelnuovo (Morea) 
Naval activity 














Blot Viviers   
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 59.  
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Size of the Ottoman fleet: 45-50 galleys  
 
Anderson, Naval 
Wars, pp. 67, 70-
71, 75-76, 79-80, 
85, 87; de Groot, 
“The Ottoman 
Threat,” p. 208. 
1602 Sack of Hammamet  
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
Five galleys  396 slaves Giacomo du Blot Viviers   
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 59; 
Vertot, The 
History, 2:60.  
May 5, 1603 Attack and capture of Patras and Lepanto 
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  












+ ships from 
Naples, Sicily 
and Genoa. 
    392 slaves
The aim of capturing grain 
supplies which were thought to 
be stores in those citadels and 
which however turned out to be 
only false reports 
 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 62; 
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 6; Dauber, 
Die Marine, p. 116. 
1604 Sack of the island of Cos 
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
  165 slaves    Vertot, The History, 2:60.  
1604 Attack on La Goletta   
3 of the 5 
galleys are 
lost 
   Dauber, Die Marine, p. 116. 
1604 Construction of San Stefano  
Addition of San 
Stefano to the 
squadron 
   
Constructed in Barcelona, 
financed by the 1598 Galley 
Foundation of Chevalier Stefano 
de Claramont 
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Construction of another 
San Stefano (II)  
Addition of San 
Stefano II to the 
squadron 
   
Constructed in Malta, financed 
by the 1598 Galley Foundation 
of Chevalier Stefano de 
Claramont 
(cost: 6,362 scudi) 
Devastating storm wrecks 
three galleys off Tunis  Storm 
The Capitana, 
the San Michele, 
and the San 




Giacomo and the 
San Luigi 













Five galleys were lying in wait 
for Muslim vessels in a small 
bay in the island of Cimbalo 
(Zembra) in the Gulf of Tunis 
off Cape Bon, when the 
squadron was surprised by a 
violent storm. 
The Capitana, the San Michele, 
and the San Giorgio – were 
wrecked. The other two galleys 
– the Padrona named San 
Giacomo and the San Luigi 
managed to ride the storm safely 
to Trapani and Malta 
respectively. Forty knights, 
seventy Maltese soldiers and 
five hundred men were killed or 
taken prisoners by the 
subsequent Moorish attackers 





Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 60-62; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, pp. 326-




Several donors help the 
Order recover from this 
damage 
 
King of Spain donated a new galley built at Naples and an old 
disarmed one from Palermo.  In addition, a galley which the Order 
was building in Marseilles was soon brought into service. 
But the naval activities in the 
following years are somehow 
restricted. Salvatore Bono, 
“Naval Exploits and 
Privateering,” in Hospitaller 
Malta 1530-1798. Studies on 
Early Modern Malta and the 
Order of Saint John of 
Jerusalem, ed. Victor Mallia-




Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 61; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
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A further donation was made by Captain-General de Speletta 
himself, who gave 6,000 scudi to help defray the expenses for 
constructing a new Capitana 
 
AOM 1759, f. 
344r; AOM 1760, 
ff. 300r-v; both 12 
May 1606. 
   Chev. Fra Nicolo’ Sciortino donated 300 scudi  
AOM 1759, f. 
344r; AOM 1760, 
ff. 300r-v; both 12 
May 1606. 
1609 Order’s corsairs attack Lazajjo  
Corsair 
activity 
Chevaliers Fressenet, Maurot and Gaucourt surprise the fortress of Lazajjo in the gulf of that name, 
make their way into it by means of a peterd which blew up the gate; take a great booty, and after 
blowing up the fortifications of the place, carry off above 300 slaves. Note that  no reference is made to 
the defeat at all… 
Vertot, The 
History, 2:13, p. 
60. 
1609 
Order’s corsairs being 
attacked by the Ottoman 
patrol fleet  
Corsair 
activity 
Others [ships] belonging to “the Religion” in general, to the Grandmaster or individual Knights, had 
captured a few Turkish vessels and had raided Mitylene and Ayaz near Alexandretta with considerable 
success in the latter case.  News of this reached the Kapudan Pasha, Khalil, on his way south along the 
coast of Asia Minor with some 50 galleys, and off Cyprus he came up with 3 galleons and a pinnace 
under a French Knight, Fressinet.  The pinnace escaped, but the others, including Fressinet’s great “Red 
Galleon” of 80 guns, were taken. 
Anderson, Naval 
Wars, p. 75.  
1609 
A corsair galleon of 80 
guns captured by the 
Ottoman fleet off Cyprus 






3 galleons and a 
pinnace 50 galleys  
Chevalier de 
Fressinet 
Only the Pinnace escaped.  
French Knight Fressinet was 
killed. Bibliotheque Nationale, 
Paris {BN} ff. 7094, f. 248 (in 
de Groot, “The Ottoman 
Threat,” p. 217) identifies 
d’Aubusson, de la Feuillade, de 
Cergis, Chamois, Pontac, St. 
Martin, and Wignacourt among 
the slaves brought to 
Constantinople.  
Anderson, Naval 
Wars, p. 75.   
1609 
The prizes brought by the 
Ottoman fleet to 
Constantinople in this 
year 
Privateering     50 galleys








Wars, p. 75; de 
Groot, “The 
Ottoman Threat,” 
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1611 Sack of Corinth  
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
Order’s galleys 
and ships from 
Naples, Sicily 
and Genoa. 
 300 slaves    Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 62. 
1611 Kerkenna islands in the gulf of Sirte 
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
5 Hospitaller 
galleys + 30 
others from other 
Catholic allies 
 180 slaves    Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 361. 
1612 
Algiers disposed of six galleys and 60 sizeable sailing warships 
Tunis had six galleys and 14 big sailing ships 
Tripoli: two or three galleys  




Attack on the small 
settlement to the north of 
Smyrna, Phocaea  
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
  
18 women  













of Henry IV, 
king of 
France.  
 Rossi, Storia della Marina, pp. 62-63.  
1613 Construction of galley San Lorenzo      
4,812 scudi: materials 
1,550 scudi: paid to workmen   
AOM 458, ff. 296r-
v, 21 February 




1614 Unsuccessful expedition without any major results  
A total of 26 
galleys including 
Order’s galleys 







 Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 63.  
1614 
A fleet of 80 Ottoman galleys were combined, to oppose the combined fleet of Naples, Sicily and Malta (a total of 25-27 ships).  The Ottoman fleet 
sailed to Negropont, and than to Navarino searching for the enemy but could not find any.  A raid upon the bay of Marsascala in Malta was undertaken 
with no major fighting or results.  The fleet continued to Tripoli to take care of a domestic problem related to a rebellion there.  Having re-established 
the authority of the Porte in north Africa Khalil Pasha returned to Navarino (passing through Malta with no events).  The restoration of the Porte’s 
authority in outlying provinces like Tripoli and the Morea had in itself already been a remarkable achievement 
Anderson, Naval 
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1615 60 Turkish galleys land a force of 5,000 men to Malta but they are not able to enslave anyone as the population hides in the fortifications  Vertot, The History, 2:60.  
1615 Some caramussals captured  
Corsair 




 Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 63. 
Construction of San 
Lorenzo  
Addition of San 
Lorenzo to the 
squadron 
   
Constructed in Barcelona, 
financed by the 1598 Galley 
Foundation of Chevalier Stefano 
de Claramont 
(Cost: 6,383 scudi)  
1615 
Construction of another 
San Lorenzo (II)  
Addition of San 
Lorenzo II to the 
squadron 
   
Constructed in Malta, financed 
by the 1598 Galley Foundation 
of Chevalier Stefano de 
Claramont 














During the fighting 250 of the 
‘Turks’ were killed and 362 
were captured.  Five knights and 
numerous Maltese were lost as 
well as the 72 of the Sicilians.  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 63. 
December 
26, 1617 
Arrival of the galleon 
called the Gran Galeone 
to Malta  
 
Construction of a very 
beautiful galleon built in 
Amsterdam (Dauber) 
Construction of a Flemish 
galleon built for the 
Knights (Muscat) 
N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
According to Muscat this was: 
“the most stately and the 
strongest war machine that 
sailed in the Mediterranean at 
that time.”  
 
It could carry 4,000 salme of 
grain. 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 116; 
Muscat, “The 
Warships,” p. 92; 
NLM 413, 168; see 
also Dal Pozzo, 
Historia della 
sacra, 1: 243, 634; 
Muscat, “The 
Arsenal,” p. 268. 
1618 
Construction of galley 
San Giovanni Battista in 
Messina 
N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
Built in Messina 
4,480 scudi: materials 
1,804 scudi: wages 
AOM 459, ff. 
263v-264r, 7 






 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 







1619 Construction of galley San Giovanni   
Addition of San 
Giovanni to the 
squadron 
   
Built in Malta  
(Cost: 6,285 scudi)  
AOM 109, f. 37v, 
22 September 




1623 Capture of five Tunisian ships near Sardinia 
Corsair 
activity      231 slaves
Surprise attack on these ships 
anchored near Island of San 
Pietro near Sardinia  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 364. 
1625 Sack of Santa Maura 
Corsair attack 
on a land 
settlement  
5 Galleys, four 




 Rossi, Storia della Marina, p. 65.  
1624 Three Tunisian vessels captured near Zembalo 
Corsair 
activity 
4 galleys and 10 
galleys from 
Sicily 
     150 slaves
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 364; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 65. 




Two galleys, San Francesco and 
San Giovanni, were captured by 
the enemy and about 350 men 
were killed.   
Dal Pozzo, 
Historia della 
sacra, 1: 739; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 65; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, pp. 359-
362; Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 116; 
Muscat, “The 
Warships,” p. 94. 
June 1625 
Loss of two galleys off 
Sicily (near Murro di 
Porco)   
This setback prompted the Venerable Council to pass new ordinations concerning the number of men on board each galley 
and the qualifications of the Captains 
AOM 108, f. 106v 
seq. and 113r, 16 
July and 22 August 
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The realization that the Capitana’s scarlet colour (after the Spanish custom) made it an obvious and easier target. This 




sacra, 1: 744; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 66; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, p. 363. 
The Bishop of Malta, Mgr. Baldassare Cagliares, immediately donated 3,000 scudi for the replacements of the lost ships 
AOM 256, f. 32r, 
27 June 1625. The 
Bishop’s donation 
was la rendita di 
Lentini che importa 
circo tre mila 
scudi, in Grima, 
“Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
54; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
65. 
The Castellan of Amposta presented twelve slaves for service in the galleys 
AOM 256, f. 32v, 
29 June 1625, in 
Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
54; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
65. 
Grand Master Antoine de Paule presented a further 30 slaves. 
AOM 256, f. 32v, 
30 June 1625, in 
Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
54; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
65.  
The Viceroy of Sicily, Cardinal Giannettino Doria, presented the Order with a new galley hull. 
AOM 256, f. 33r, 4 
July 1625, in 
Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
55; Rossi, Storia 





 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 







Order’s Receiver in Palermo, Chev. Fra Don Carlo Valdina – himself a future Captain-General of the Order’s squadron – 
donated the sum of 2,000 scudi to be used for engaging buonavoglie to serve on the new galley 
AOM 256, f. 33r, 4 
July 1625, in 
Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
55; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
65. 
Prior of Aquitaine, Chev. Fra Giacomo de Gaillarbois, donated the sum of 4,600 scudi 
AOM 256, ff. 34v-
35r, 27 July 1625, 
in Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
55; Rossi, Storia 
della Marina, p. 
65. 
The Order also played its part and imposed a levy of six months’ income on all its goods 
AOM 108, f. 108v, 
17 Judy 1625, in 
Grima, “Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
55.   
A galley hull, kept for such an emergency at the Vittoriosa Arsenal, was hurriedly fitted out Mori Ubaldini, La Marina, p. 362. 
1626 Construction of a Capitana      
Built in Malta (cost: 9,742 
scudi) 
AOM 109, f. 37v, 
22 September 





The strength of the 
squadron was increased to 
6 galleys 
       6 galleys
AOM 256, f. 69r, 
12 July 1627, 
AOM 1759, f. 
322r, AOM 1760, 







 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








Exceptionally large and 
beautiful galley is given 
as a gift by Maria 
Magdalena of Tirol and 
Austria.  
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Dauber, Die Marine, p. 116. 
1628 
Two tripolitan vessels 
captured near Rhodes and 
two Tunisian ships near 
Licata 
Corsair 
activity     





Sailing Magistral ship 
referred to as Ammirante 
appears in archival 
records.  
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Dauber, Die Marine, p. 116. 
1631 
Captain General of the 
galley squadron 
sanctioned an increase of 
5 to 6 in the number of 
ships 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Dauber, Die Marine, p. 119. 
1632 
The galley San Giovanni 
was wrecked in the Straits 
of Messina off the coasts 
of Calabria 
     
This loss was counterbalanced 
by the donation of a galley hull, 
in 1634, by Chev. Fra Nicolo’ 
Cavarretta Prior of Venice, and 
a similar gift by Chev. Fra 
Antonio Perdicomati in 1636.  
AOM. 1759, f. 
346v; AOM 1760, 
f. 302v; both 13 
March 1634; AOM 
111, f. 179v, 6 
January 1636; Dal 
Pozzo, Historia 
della sacra, 2:12; 
Mori Ubaldini, La 
Marina, p. 68. 
1632 A galley ordered at Messina shipyard N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
Construction cost is 5,500 scudi, 
a cheaper price than the 
construction in Malta (compare 
to San Lorenzo and San Stefano, 
built in Malta above) 
AOM 110, f. 167r, 




1633 Four vessels captured near Zante  
Corsair 
activity    650 slaves 
Carlo 
Vandina   
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 363; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 67.  
 
427
 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








Five vessels captured near 
Cape Misurata to the east 
of Tripoli 
Corsair 
activity    338 slaves 
Carlo 
Vandina  
5 knights, 32 soldiers and sailors 
were killed during the fighting.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 363; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 67.  
1638 Three Tripoli tan vessels captured near Calabria 
Corsair 
activity      312 slaves
Near Roccella, under the 
command of Ibrahim Reis 
known as Baccazza.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 364; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 67; 
Vertot, The 
History, 2:159-60.  
1640 
Attack on Santa Maura 
[Before the Crete 
campaign started in 1645 
the Order went to assist 
the Venetians against the 
invading Turks] 
Naval activity 




    
Order’s galley squadron lost 12 
knights, 28 crew, 5 bionavoglia, 
1 convict rower and 6 slaves 
AOM 1768 ff. 136-
138; Wismayer, 
The Fleet, pp. 52-
53. 
August 1640 
Attack on La Goletta and 
capture of six galleys 
from Kara Khogia 
(Caracoggia) 






Exploits,” p. 364; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 67-68, 
AOM 257, ff. 56-
57.  
1641 Capture of three Turkish galliots near Rhodes 
Corsair 








Exploits,” p. 363, 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, p. 68; Dal 
Pozzo, Historia 
della sacra, 2:55.  
1642 The Capitana sank off Cape Passaro Storm     
Grand Duke of Tuscany donated 
a galley to the Order to replace 
it.  
AOM 1759, ff. 
346v-347r; AOM 
1760, ff. 302v-
303r; both 17 
February 1642 in 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 380.  
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70 miles off Rhodes squadron 
under the command of Captain-
General Boisbodrant saw ten 
ships coming, attacked two of 
them, sank one and captured the 
other one.  The Captain General 
died. 
AOM 1771 ff. 133-
34 in Wismayer, 




Capture of an Ottoman 
ship (referred to as 
Sultana in the records, 
also referred to as a 




The Sultan was especially 
annoyed because one of 
his favorites in the harem 
and her baby son had 





















This event ultimately led to the 
Order’s involvement in the 
Cretan War.  The Most Serene 
Republic of Venice and the 
Order of Saint John were 
mutually suspicious allies in this 
war. Venice blamed the Knights 
for having provoked Turkish 
aggression by seizing, in the 
autumn of 1644, a Turkish 
vessel in the Aegean and taking 
it to Crete, a colony of Venice 
since the thirteenth century. In 
reprisal Sultan Ibrahim had 
seemed at first to threaten an 
attack on Malta but had chosen 
Crete finally as the target of his 
revenge. 
Allen, “The 
Order,” p. 147.  
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The consequent attrition of 
trying to prevent Crete from 
falling completely to the 
Sultan’s forces was to exhaust 
Venice and the Order of St. John 
during the twenty-four years of 
war.  The beneficiaries of this 
conflict were to be the Dutch 
and English merchants who 
soon replaced the Venetians in 
exchanging their woolen cloths 





1645-1669 Ottoman Venetian war of Candia 
Naval activity 










galleys and 7 
transport 





+ 20 from 
Algiers, 5 
from Tunis 
and 3 from 
Tripoli. 
 Flaminio Balbiani 
Order’s customary profits from 
its corso in the Levant were 
nullified by its galleys’ 
participation in the protracted 
Ottoman Venetian war of 
Candia.   
Allen, “The 
Order,” p. 142; 
number of Ottoman 
ships: de Groot, 
“The Ottoman 
Threat,” p. 225; 
Anderson, Naval 
Wars, pp. 140, 145, 
151.  
1646 
The galley Vittoria was 
shipwrecked off the island 
of Capri. 
      
AOM 1759, ff. 
346v-347r; AOM 
1760, ff. 302v-




 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 







Capture of the Algerian 
22 gun ship named Bechir 
Hoggia 
off Capo Passero 
Corsair 
activity 
6 galleys:  





Caterina and San 
Francesco 
N/A 






as slaves  
 
Squadron commander was shot 
during the fight 
Off Capo Passero 
AOM 1769 ff. 212-
213 in Wismayer, 
The Fleet, pp. 59-
60. Shortly after 
January 15, 
1647 
Dauber’s report of the 
same event: He refers to 
the prize as a galleon, 
named Kara Hogia 
     
Dauber mentions that this ship 
was fitted and put into service in 
Order’s fleet. 
Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 119. 
1649-1660 
Size of the British fleet: 
216 ships were added to 
the existing fleet of 50 
ships and a few ketches 
(previous fleet of Charles 
I) 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A Allen, “The Order,” p. 145. 
1649 
Order’s estates 
confiscated by the Dutch 
Republic 
N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
These were included in the 
grand priory of Germany, and 
the Grand Prior of Germany, the 
Cardinal Landgrave of Hessen-
Darmstadt tried to get an 
indemnity for these lands… I 
don’t know if he was successful.  
Allen, “The 
Order,” p. 142. 
1650 
Three French Knights 
seize an English ship with 
a cargo belonging to a 
Maltese Ignatio Ribera 
outside the Grand Harbor 
Private 
corsairs with 
the flag of the 
Order 
    
Grandmaster Lascaris order 
them to return the ship to the 
Englush.  This is an example of 
Order’s forces sometimes being 
involved in fighting between 
European powers, and catholic 
vs. protestant fighting. 
AOM 1554, 
despatch of 28 May 
1650, in Allen, 




 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








The standing fleet is 
increased to 7 galleys by 
Grandmaster Jean de 
Lascaris.  Funds are 
allocated for the sailing 
ship squadron 
 
Seven galleys – a 
new galley called 
Lascara is added. 
    
AOM 117, ff. 
138v-129v, 140v-
141v; AOM 222, 
ff. 166v-167r, 2 
and 7 October 
1651, in Grima, 
“Galley 
Replacements,” p. 
48; Also Dauber, 
Die Marine, p. 119. 
April 1651 
32 Turkish merchants and 
their merchandise 
captured by the Order’s 
galleys as they were 
sailing in the British ship 
Goodwill through the 
Malta Channel  
Corsair 
Activity     
This creates major problems as 
the British protest the act, and 
the Bey of Tunis sequesters the 
property of all English 
merchants in Tunis.  Ultimately 
the English freed these Turkish 
captives.  
Allen, “The 
Order,” p. 146. 
1652 
The Ottoman forces were 
at the time laying siege to 
Crete (Heraklion) which 
could only be supplied 
from the sea. In 1652 the 
Order had sent a squadron 
of seven galleys under the 
command of Bailiff 
Baldassar de Demandols 
Naval activity 
in a Christian 












While cruising off the Venetian 
island of Tine, the combined 
Venetian and Order’s fleet gave 
chase to enemy.  The Maltese 
squadron managed to overtake 
and cut off the fine galley of 
Ibrahim Kara Batak Bey of 
Malvasia which was taken prize  
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 6.   
June 26, 
1656 
Again in conjunction of 
the Cretan situation 
Attempt to blockade the 
Ottoman fleet in the 
Dardanelles to prevent it 
from reaching the Aegean 
Sea. 
Known as the Battle of 
the Dardanelles 
Naval activity 






Plus the Venetian 
ships: 24 galleys, 
7 galeasses, 28 
sailing ships 
under the 















The Ottoman fleet under the 
command of a Kaptan Pasha, 
slipped successfully in the 
Aegean on June 23, 1656.   
After a second encounter with 
the chasing Christian fleet only 
14 of the Ottoman ships could 
escape and 2,500 Christian 
slaves were freed.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 366-
367; Rossi, Storia 




 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 









Capture of a large ship in 
the Malta Channel (?) by 
The squadron under the 
command of Prior of 






was returning to 
Malta from Crete.  
N/A 
A large ship 
on her way 
from Tunis 











Pasha Adan was on board the 
ship.  He has been on diplomatic 
missions to the Beys of Algiers, 
Tunis and Tripoli and was now 
returning.  He was accompanied 
by the Khadi of Tunis who was 
with his son.  These highly-
placed dignitaries were to bring 
in a large ransom.  A crew of 
150 was also captured along 
with the cargo of caps, 
confectionary and camel-hair 
cloth.   
AOM 1770 ff. 13-
20 in Wismayer, 




Capture of four Ottoman 










+ the Venetian 
fleet consisting of 
23 galleys, 6 






















The squadron under the 
command of Prior of Bagnara, 
Fra Fabrizio Ruffo joined the 
Venetian fleet in the 
Dodecanese archipelago looking 
out for a much larger Turkish 
fleet of 80 galleys.  They ended 
up chasing another fleet coming 
from Rhodes and going to 
Canea and capturing four of 
these galleys.  
AOM 1770 ff. 12-
20 in Wismayer, 
The Fleet, pp. 61-
63. 
1664 
The galley arsenal is 
equipped with three 
wooden sheds 
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
Muscat, The 
Maltese Galley, p. 
6.  
1669 
End of the war of Candia, 
Crete surrenders to the 
Ottomans 




from the bakery in 
Augusta (Sicily) 
Bringing in 
provisions      N/A N/A Prior Caraffa 
Captain General of the squadron 
Prior Caraffa was summoned to 
the Magistral Palace in Valletta 
and was given his operational 
orders by Grandmaster Nicolas 
Cotoner  
AOM 1767 f. 133 
in Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 53. 
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Capture of two galleons 
and two ships-of-the-
line??? Near Rhodes 
Corsair 
activity     
Bono mentions that this is “the 
caravan of Tripoli.” 
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 368.  
1675 
English Admiral Sir John 
Narborough uses Malta as 
his base against the 
Tripolitan corsairs  
     
Narborough’s official 
complaints about the fact that 
his flag was not saluted.  
Allen, “The 
Order,” p. 152; also 




An attack of a Barbary 
corsair towing a Christian 
prize off Tangier 
Corsair 











After a long fight the enemy 
vessel’s captain set fire to the 
powder magazine and blew up 
his own ship.  Königsmark fell 
in the sea but was saved by his 
own crew.  Because of his 
heroic act (in fighting I guess) 
Grand master Cotoner made him 
a Knight of Magistral Grace in 
spite of his different religious 
denomination 
Engel, Knights of 
Malta, pp. 47-49 
1682 
Introduction of a fleet of 
sailing warships into the 
Ottoman fleet  
N/A      N/A N/A N/A N/A
de Groot, “The 
Ottoman Threat,” 
p. 227. 




sailing ships and 
other small craft 
+ 7 galleys form 
Malta, 5 from the 










and 2 from 
Tunis 
    
1685 Surrender of Coron 
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
7 galleys   334 slaves  Inhabitants of Coron shared among the allied forces.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 369.  
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End of the siege of 
Vienna by the Ottomans 
and the following 
Ottoman wars 
 
Eight galleys (the 
number increased 





     
1686 Capture of Navarino, Modon and Nauplia 
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
     
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 369; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 78-79.  
1687 Capture of Castelnuovo 
Naval activity 
in a Christian 
coalition fleet 
     
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 369; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 78-79.  
1690-97 
Durign the reign of 
Grandmaster Adrien de 
Wignacourt the wooden 
sheds of the Birgu arsenal 
were replaced by the three 
arched barrel vaulted 
sheds 
      
Muscat, The 
Maltese Galley, p. 
6. 
1695 The Ottoman flagship was a sailing ship N/A       N/A N/A N/A N/A
1699 
End of the War of Morea. 
Order is excluded from 
the peace talks 
  
     
The Treaty of Karlowitz :Venice 
gained Dalmatia, the Morea and 
small islands.  Lepanto and 
Prevesa were returned to the 
Ottomans.  
Hungary (including 
Transylvania but not the Banat 
of Temesvar), Croatia, and 
Slavonia were ceded to Austria 
by the Ottomans. Podolia passed 
to Poland. 
marked the beginning of the 
Ottoman Empire's 
disintegration. 
de Groot, “The 
Ottoman Threat,” 
p. 231; Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 119. 
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Capture of a Muslim 
merchant ship called 
Beneghem off 
Lampedusa. According to 
Duaber the name of the 






and three others 
called Santa 
Maria, San Luigi 
and Magistrale 
(According to 










A sailing ship was chased, 
attacked and captured off 
Lampedusa.   
The captured ship was re named 
as San Giovanni and kept as the 
first ship of the sailing warships 
squadron (Dauber’s 
information). 
AOM 1771 ff. 153-
154 in Wismayer, 
The Fleet, pp. 46-
50; Dauber, Die 
Marine, p. 119. 
February 15, 
1700 
Sinking of the Capitana 
under the command of 
Captain General Spinola 
the Grand Prior of 
Messina off the eastern 
coast of Sicily close to the 
Correnti islands while 






formed of 7 
galleys including 
one San Paolo 
that plays a role 







Two Tunisian sailing ships were 
seen sailing south.  The flagship 
(Capitana?) attacked one of 
these ships but some 700 men in 
this galley drowned when the 
galley “split open and sank 
under them” soon after they 
caught up with the Tunisian ship 
and before they boarded.  The 
rest of the crew was saved by 
the galley San Paolo.   




and Ambassador of 
the Holy see in 
Malta) dated March 
6, 1700 preserved 
in the Vatican 
Library marked 
Malta 51.  
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 64. 
17 January 
1701 
A special commission 
appointed by 
Grandmaster Ramon 
Perellos y Roccaful 
instituted the new 
squadron of the third rate 
ships, also taking the 
decision of reducing the 
number of galleys from 





    Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 381.  
1701-1750 No galleys were built in Malta during this period N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
May be due to the introduction 
of the third rates.  
Muscat, “The 
Arsenal,” p. 270. 
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Capture of one Tunisian 
garbo four miles off 
Cartagena.  
Corsair 
activity 6 galleys N/A 
One garbo 
and her 






Captain-General Bailiff Spinola 
and his fleet of 6 galleys hear 
about a number of small Muslim 
ships anchored at Cartagena and 
they capture one garbo four 
miles off Cartagena. 
AOM 1771 ff. 156-
157 in Wismayer, 
The Fleet, p. 6.  
August 17, 
1701 
Capture of a Tunisian 
salentino and an ondro, 
which were at anchor at 









Antonio and the 










Spinola’s squadron finds the 
Tunisian boats that were 
reported to be anchored at 
Cartagena, but were not found to 
be there when searched.  They 
were finally found at anchor at 
La Goletta and even though 
there are two Tunisian forts 
protecting this anchorage, the 
Order’s galleys were able to 
take two of these little boats and 
burn two that were even smaller 
(an ondro and a garbi were 
burnt).  
AOM 1771 ff. 156-
157 in Wismayer, 
The Fleet, p. 6.   
1704 Number of galleys reduced to 5        5 galleys
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 381.  
1705 
Two third rate ships 
constructed in Malta, and 
two in Toulon, and one 
captured from the 
Tunisians  
 Sailing ships: 5     Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 381.  
1709 
Capitana of Tripoli was 
set on fire by a combined 
squadron of galleys and 
sailing ships 
To defend 
Calabria Not mentioned  Two galleys 350 slaves  De Langon 
The squadron was ordered to 
stop these two Algerian ships 
from attacking Calabria.   
Vertot, The 
History, 2:13, p. 
106. 
1716 
Turkish war breaks out 
again and the Order’s 
fleet is put into action. 
War ends with the peace 
of Passarowitz 
 
Fleet reduced to 5 
galleys, 2 sailing 
ships  
    Dauber, Die Marine, p. 119. 
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1720      
Sailing ships: 3 
 Number of 
galleys reduced 
to 4 
Reason: reduced number of 
prizes.  
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 381; 
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 85-86.  
1732 
Sailing ship squadron 











117 slaves  
De 
Chambray  
Rossi, Storia della 
Marina, pp. 86-87. 
1743 
Demi-galleys Santa Anna 
and Santa Teresa are 
added to the fleet 
       
October 
1747 
Galley squadron sent to 
Lampedusa as a 
punishment? 
N/A     N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grandmaster Pinto sent the 
galley squadron to Lampedusa 
as a punishment for entering the 
port of Messina for greasing 
while this city was under 
suspicion for plague.   
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 95. 
1746 
Francesco Messina was 
appointed to a new galley 
named La Concezzione 











N/A Wismayer, The Fleet, p. 96. 
February 1, 
1748 
Two galleys of the 
squadron are ordered by 
the Grandmaster Pinto to 
go and investigate the 
nationality of a strange 




indicated that the 
Order’s squadron 
had a total of 6 





N/A   N/A N/A
It turns out that the galley was 
an Ottoman galley from Rhodes 
(called, I guess this means re-
named, Volpetta) that was 
captured by its Maltese crew 
who took over the ship.  These 
Maltese man were possibly 
rowing slaves before.  
Engel: pasha of Rhodes was on 
board. He was set free upon 
France’s request, but than 
caused a slave rebellion.  
NLM 466 ff. 1-212 
in Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 101;  
Engel, L'Ordre de 
Malte, p. 214. 
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During the slave revolt of 
this date the galley 
squadron had already left 
for the summer cruise, 
around the Italian coast 
and that was planned to 
last for four months.  
N/A 
Squadron: 4 
galleys and 2 
galiots Galleys in 
the squadron: 
Capitana, San 




In addition, the 
Magistrale was 
in Malta.  
N/A   N/A N/A
This reference is in relation to 
the slave revolt of this date, 
which turned out to be 
unsuccessful.  





Fleet, p. 102.   
May 15, 
1752 
The squadron takes two 
Algerian Xebecs off Cap 
Bon.  
Corsair 


















The squadron takes two 
Algerian Xebecs off Cap Bon. 





Fleet, p. 102.   
Jul 14, 1753 
The strange incident of 
the French renegade who 
wanted to turn himself in 
with his two Xebecs.  
N/A 
4 galleys (the 
whole squadron) 













A French renegade 
(Acimussa??? Must be Haci 
Musa?) wrote to Grandmaster 
Pinto and said that he wanted to 
return to his old faith and join 
the order and turn in the two 
Algerian Xebecs that he had in 
his command.  So the squadron 
went to Monte Calabro (between 
Spain and Majorca) to take over.  
But as the Xebecs approach the 
galleys of the Order think this is 
a trap and they run away back to 
Malta. 





Fleet, pp. 104-107.   
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Charles VII (King of 
Naples becoming king of 
Spain in 1759 with the 
name of Charles III?) 
decided to interrupt all the 
relations (including 
commercial) with Malta 
putting the commanderies 
in Italy under sequester.  
N/A       N/A N/A N/A N/A
1755 or 
1757 
Hurricane that destroyed 
many ships in harbor and 





San Giovanni  
   
Galley squadron was escorting 
San Giovanni that brought an 
ambassador of the Grandmaster 
to Naples to congratulate King 
Carlos on his accession to the 
throne of Spain. 
So the galleys were saved from 
the storm.  





Fleet, p. 108.   
1755 or 
1756 
Knights help the Bey of 
Tunis to defend himself 






Luigi and San 
Nicola + 2 ships 
of the line: San 


















Bey of Tunis presented gifts of 
food to the Grandmaster Pinto, 
who in turn accepted to provide 
him naval support in his struggle 
against the Algerians.  Pinto sent 
his ships there and also 
convinced the 13 merchant ships 
(from Denmark, Sweden and 
Holland) that happened to be in 
the Grand harbor to go along so 
that the “armada” would look 
larger.  4 galleys and one sailing 
ship stayed there for 50 days.  
This refrained the Algerians 
from attacking La Goleta from 
the sea, so they captured it from 
land.  After the fall of Tunis, the 
squadron captured the Tunisian 
ships that were at anchor at La 
Goleta, where they also were 
waiting. 





Fleet, pp. 108-112.   
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Algerian xebec at anchor 
captured and sold at 
Palamos 
Corsair 









15 miles off San Felipe (near 
Palamos, Spain) 





Fleet, pp. 113-114.   
September 
14, 1760 
A ship supposedly called 
Corona Ottomana – 
Ottoman Crown (80 guns) 
were captured by the 
Christian slaves on board 
while the Ottomans were 
on land collecting taxes.  
This crew brought the 
ship to Malta 
Slave 
rebellion? N/A    N/A N/A N/A
The ship was rebaptized as San 
Salvador and added to the 
squadron of the Order.  
However, later the Order was 
pressured to return the ship to 
the Ottomans by their ally 
France.  Ultimately the ransom 
of 244,000 scudi was paid by 
France and the ship was sent 
back to Constantinople.  It was 
manned by a Maltese crew who 
were brought back to Malta on a 
French ship after delivering the 
ship.  
Hoppen, “Military 
Priorities,” p. 400.  
1763-1765 The squadron does not leave Malta  
The Capitana 
was damaged in a 
storm in 1761 
and was still not 
repaired 
   Bailiff Fra Giovanni Antonio Riquet de Mirabeau.  





Fleet, pp. 116-117.   
1765 
The squadron’s itinerary:  
Malta – Trapani – 
Cagliari – Malta.   
And the capture of a 




















A Xebec Polacca, a Tunisian 
corsair ship of 22 guns was 
captured by the four galleys of 
the Order near Cagliari after 
three days of fighting.  
There is a description of this 
type of ship on page 119.  





Fleet, pp. 117-119.   
August 1767 
They chase two Tunisian 
galleys and two galiots 













They chase two Tunisian galleys 
and two galiots near Sardinia 
but the ships sink in a storm.  
Nothing else happens that year. 





Fleet, p. 120.   
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The squadron entertains 
the King and Queen of 
Naples, his consort the 
Grand Duchess, the 
Ambassador of France 
and his wife and two 
other princesses who were 
friends of the Grand 
Duchess of Tuscany in 
Pozzuoli (near Naples), 
catching swans and 












This is all happening because de 
Rohan had ulterior motives and 
wanted to make friends with the 
royalty.  





Fleet, p. 121.   
1770 
The three galleys joined a 
French fleet on its way to 
Tunisia   
Naval activity 




of 2 frigates, 




















This combined fleet bombarded 
Sousse and Bizerta.  





Fleet, p. 122.   
1772 
Only two of the galleys 
(the other two being 
disabled because they 
were old) went to Corsica 
and came back  
Regular 
patrol  
The squadron of 
4 galleys started 
but because the 
old Capitana was 
leaking it was left 
in Cagliari along 
with San Nicola 









la Tour de 
St. Quentin 
Nothing was accomplished and 
especially after a storm between 
Cagliari and Malta they were 
happy enough to be alive.  





Fleet, pp. 122-123.   
 
442
 Date Event Descriptor Number of Order’s ships 
Number of 
enemy ships 
In the case 
of corsair 








A year characterized by 
the removal of coffee and 
chocolate from the 
officer’s fare.  Ration 
scale and the crew pay 
were also diminished 
 











    
NLM 466 pp. 169, 
176, 177 in 
Wismayer, The 
Fleet, p. 125.   
1784-1792 
Venetians attack Tunis 
and make an arrangement 
with the Order to use 
Malta as a base. The order 
grants permission for the 
full use of its ports, 
storage facilities, 
dockyards, barracks 
accommodation and the 
hospital.  
The stay of the Venetian 
fleet in Malta vitalizes 
trade 
 
Sailing ship San 
Giovanni and two 
frigates 
contributed to the 
Venetian force.  
    Bono, “Naval Exploits,” p. 376. 
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The Order’s fleet: 4 
galleys, 2 demi-galleys, 2 
line ships, 2 frigates 
 
2 galleys (S. 
Luigi, Magistral 
galley S. Nicola), 
2 demi galleys, 2 
sailing ships (San 
Zaccaria and San 
Giovanni – later 
named as Dego 
and Berousse in 
the French navy), 






the French navy). 
    
Bono, “Naval 
Exploits,” p. 377; 
Rossi, Storia della 
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